What does, " the nature of a thing " mean?

[inocente]

Now I think you are fibbing, you just forgot .

You could be right. I don’t remember.

*Of course Metaphysics follows physics, in the Aritotilean order of knowledge, but physics in his day wasn’t what physics is today. In his day physics was more like a simple observation of the natural ( I know you love that wore ) order. And this is still true, since the natural order has not changed, but science has.

And, as you know, what I said was that philosophy and science look at the same reality from a different point of view and that science does not have a corner on the search for causality and truth.

How’s that ?*

Almost . I’d say that philosophy has to follow science in the sense there’s not much point in a philosopher arguing against empirical evidence, but also that the philosopher can go beyond the science to say what she thinks it means.

 

[Bahman]

It’s not a claim though. A physical law isn’t an assertion, it’s a generalization. It just says that whenever certain conditions are present, a particular phenomenon has always been found to happen.

You misunderstood my statement. I meant that their claim that laws of nature has an underlying metaphysical background is an assertion.

By the way do you believe that there exist a set of laws that can explain the state of existence?

 

[Bahman]

You could be right. I don’t remember.

Almost . I’d say that philosophy has to follow science in the sense there’s not much point in a philosopher arguing against empirical evidence, but also that the philosopher can go beyond the science to say what she thinks it means.

A good philosopher neither follows science nor deny empirical evidence. Science however suffer from lack of correct interpretation of current state of matter since most people just use mathematical tools offered by science to calculate which to me it will eventually fails since the reality is not calculable by which I mean that there either does not exist a set of laws that can explain reality or reality is not measurable.

 

[Aloysium]

Linus, if I may feed back some of my thoughts from your discussion of “immutability” that you posted above:

Water has an essence that makes it what it is, water.
Water is a reality that may or may not be present and may be decompsed into constituent parts that cause it to cease to exist as water. It can also undergo a change in “state” (accidents?) - ice, fluid, gas.
Would I be correct to say:
Water as an essence is transcendental in that it is not found in the “realm” described by physics. Essence has to do with the reality of water, physics deals solely with its behaviour (reflecting its nature) and the behaviour of its constituent parts.

I am going to leave it at this for simplicity’s sake, to see if I’m anywhere near the right track.

BTW: Thanks for the free philosophy class - I will pass it on.

 

[balto]

If something has the properties of a hydrogen atom, it’s called a hydrogen atom, otherwise it’s called something else.

I think you are implicitly making Linus’ point here. Saying that two things exhibit the properties of a hydrogen atom concedes that the nature or essence of a hydrogen atom is objectively intelligible and meaningful. Part of the reason why the Aristotelian has such difficulty getting people to accept the reality of essences and forms is that the skeptic assumes that the Aristotelian is committed to affirming the existence of essences and forms as existing in their own right and the skeptic objects that it is unnecessary to postulate the extra existence of these objects. But that’s an argument against the Platonic view. Contra Platonism, the Aristotelian doesn’t think that essences are things in their own right, but rather that part of what it means to be a “thing” at all is that it has certain features and causal powers that place it within a certain class where any differences between objects of the same essence are due to certain mutually-exclusive potentialities being actualized over others. That’s what is meant by affirming that things have essences, or at least my understanding of it anyway.

 

[balto]

It’s not a claim though. A physical law isn’t an assertion, it’s a generalization. It just says that whenever certain conditions are present, a particular phenomenon has always been found to happen.

This really doesn’t say anything meaningful though. The big question is why anything exhibits any causal regularities at all. On the one hand, the Aristotelian argues that things exhibit causal regularities because they have a specific nature that grounds their powers and what they do (hence the subject of the thread). On the other hand, you have the Cartesian that argues that transcendent laws of nature cause matter to behave in regular ways. But the Humean approach seems to make the erroneous assumption that since there is an epistemic limit to our being able to know with certainty what these natures or laws are, then there is no ontological basis for them which makes our observances of regularities somewhat magical.

 

[Skeptic92]

Since this has been a hot subject of discussion in a current thread, it is well to bring it to the attention of all. It was Aristotle’s contention that , " Nature is the principle of motion and rest in those things which are such, per se. What he meant is that every substance which exists, which can be identified as a substance in its own right and not as an accident in some substance, has a nature which is an expression of its constituent principles of matter and form. And from this nature ( also called essence or substance flow all the physical elements of the substance as well as its natural and characteristic behaviors and powers.

Thus all living and non-living substances have a very specific nature which can be identified by the observation of those elements and behaviors and powers which are typical of a particular substance.

It is partially on this bases that the sciences typically categorize the substances it studies. But generally science does not call these substances natures. It typically gives them a name like iron, water, hydrogen, man, animal, cat, dog, etc. The name stands for a large group of individuals which can be grouped under this name. In other words, the name science gives stands for a type of nature which exists in numerous individuals. So the name or nature is used both universally and specifically as existing in individuals.

From the old Catholic Encyclopedia we have the following definition:

" In scholastic philosophy, nature, essence, and substance are closely related terms. Both essence and substance imply a static point of view and refer to constituents or mode of existence, while nature implies a dynamic point of view and refers to innate tendencies. Moreover, substance is opposed to accidents, whereas we may speak of the nature and essence not only of substances but also of accidents like colour, sound, intelligence, and of abstract ideals like virtue or duty. But when applied to the same substantial being, the terms substance, essence, and nature in reality stand only for different aspects of the same thing, and the distinction between them is a mental one. Substance connotes the thing as requiring no support, but as being itself the necessary support of accidents; essence properly denotes the intrinsic constitutive elements by which a thing is what it is and is distinguished from every other; nature denotes the substance or essence considered as the source of activities. "Nature properly speaking is the essence (or substance) of things which have in themselves as such a principle of activity (Aristotle, “Metaphysics”, 1015a, 13). By a process of abstraction the mind arises from individual and concrete natures to those of species and genera. "

Linus2nd.

Let me clarify just to make sure; would the later Scholastic use of nature be equivalent to “quiddity”? As that appears to be what you are describing in this post. I just want to make sure.

 

[balto]

Would I be correct to say:
Water as an essence is transcendental in that it is not found in the “realm” described by physics. Essence has to do with the reality of water, physics deals solely with its behaviour (reflecting its nature) and the behaviour of its constituent parts.

I know I am not Linus but here is my :twocents:

You seem to be having the same problem I was having for a while. I don’t think it is correct to say that the essence of water is transcendent and found in another realm. That would be the Platonic view of forms/essences, but then you run into all the difficulties of explaining how these essences that exist in another realm are able to become instantiated in the material world. The Aristotelian/Thomistic philosopher instead says that essences are real but do not have independent existence. In other words, an essence is not a “thing” itself, but part of what it means to be a “thing” in the first place is that it has an essence (it is this type of “thing” rather than that type of “thing”). If essences are not real, then sample of water A would have nothing in common with sample of water B, but that runs completely contrary to our everyday experiences.

I would say that science and physics are in the business of uncovering and describing essences, but science has to take the reality of essences for granted. People seem to think that science is in the business of observing causal regularities, which it does do but that’s not the end of the story. Usually the scientist takes her object of study into a laboratory and observes its behavior under a highly artificial and controlled environment to remove many interfering influences and observe how the object behaves when these influences are removed. This seem to be more consistent with uncovering the hidden powers of the thing in question than simply observing regularities.

 

[inocente]

A good philosopher neither follows science nor deny empirical evidence. Science however suffer from lack of correct interpretation of current state of matter since most people just use mathematical tools offered by science to calculate which to me it will eventually fails since the reality is not calculable by which I mean that there either does not exist a set of laws that can explain reality or reality is not measurable.

I guess there’s a school of philosophy somewhere which argues that reality contains subjective aspects too fuzzy to be measured, but I don’t know what that school is called.

Or are you making a Descartes’ “we can’t trust sense data, we’re living in The Matrix” style of argument?

 

[Bahman]

Linus, if I may feed back some of my thoughts from your discussion of “immutability” that you posted above:

Water has an essence that makes it what it is, water.
Water is a reality that may or may not be present and may be decomposed into constituent parts that cause it to cease to exist as water. It can also undergo a change in “state” (accidents?) - ice, fluid, gas.

That is a good question and it is related to the fact, whether the behavior of an entity is reducible or not. The existence essence as you rightly point out, means that any behavior of entity is not reducible which is in conflict with scientific point of view which states that the behavior of an entity can be explained in term of its constituent. Science however is very successful in explaining the behavior of simple systems meaning that given constituent one can predict the behavior of the system which means that simple systems has no essence than of what is its constituent which put old notion of essence under serious threat. But what if science will be successful in prediction of complex system like human? Question like what is consciousness and free will? We know very very that consciousness is not reducible. This is a part that science has difficulty and to resolve the problem they claim that a behavior a system that is not explicable in term of the behavior of constituent is a result of emergence of complexity. What does that means? It means that a complex system is not simply the sum of its constituent.

Would I be correct to say:
Water as an essence is transcendental in that it is not found in the “realm” described by physics. Essence has to do with the reality of water, physics deals solely with its behaviour (reflecting its nature) and the behaviour of its constituent parts.

I am going to leave it at this for simplicity’s sake, to see if I’m anywhere near the right track.

BTW: Thanks for the free philosophy class - I will pass it on.

What is reality of water? How could we know the reality of water without knowing how it behaves? If all behaviors is explained by physics then what is left?

 

[Bahman]

I think you are implicitly making Linus’ point here. Saying that two things exhibit the properties of a hydrogen atom concedes that the nature or essence of a hydrogen atom is objectively intelligible and meaningful. Part of the reason why the Aristotelian has such difficulty getting people to accept the reality of essences and forms is that the skeptic assumes that the Aristotelian is committed to affirming the existence of essences and forms as existing in their own right and the skeptic objects that it is unnecessary to postulate the extra existence of these objects. But that’s an argument against the Platonic view. Contra Platonism, the Aristotelian doesn’t think that essences are things in their own right, but rather that part of what it means to be a “thing” at all is that it has certain features and causal powers that place it within a certain class where any differences between objects of the same essence are due to certain mutually-exclusive potentialities being actualized over others. That’s what is meant by affirming that things have essences, or at least my understanding of it anyway.

Consider a system with certain constitute C={a,b,…}, one can expect an objectively meaningful and intelligible behavior provided that each constitute is meaningful or intelligible. We know that water in a pitcher is not intelligible yet the same water is intelligible when it is part of human body. Hence intelligibility is potentiality of each constitute provided that it is constitute has the right structure by which intelligibility is gone upon the destruction of structure. This is serious threat to holymorphic dualism which states that death is the end. Ironically many Christian believe that holymorphic dualism is correct.

 

[inocente]

I think you are implicitly making Linus’ point here. Saying that two things exhibit the properties of a hydrogen atom concedes that the nature or essence of a hydrogen atom is objectively intelligible and meaningful. Part of the reason why the Aristotelian has such difficulty getting people to accept the reality of essences and forms is that the skeptic assumes that the Aristotelian is committed to affirming the existence of essences and forms as existing in their own right and the skeptic objects that it is unnecessary to postulate the extra existence of these objects. But that’s an argument against the Platonic view. Contra Platonism, the Aristotelian doesn’t think that essences are things in their own right, but rather that part of what it means to be a “thing” at all is that it has certain features and causal powers that place it within a certain class where any differences between objects of the same essence are due to certain mutually-exclusive potentialities being actualized over others. That’s what is meant by affirming that things have essences, or at least my understanding of it anyway.

Yes, any system which classifies needs to select for properties.

But you don’t need any metaphysical underpinning for what those properties might mean, all you need is a procedure for recognizing the property values. Hydrogen was first recognized without knowing it is made from atoms. Atoms were recognized without knowing they are made from elementary particles. And so on.

The fact that metaphysics are never needed in order to progress is a eureka moment for which we can thank Newton:

“I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not frame hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.” - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Scholium

This really doesn’t say anything meaningful though. The big question is why anything exhibits any causal regularities at all. On the one hand, the Aristotelian argues that things exhibit causal regularities because they have a specific nature that grounds their powers and what they do (hence the subject of the thread). On the other hand, you have the Cartesian that argues that transcendent laws of nature cause matter to behave in regular ways. But the Humean approach seems to make the erroneous assumption that since there is an epistemic limit to our being able to know with certainty what these natures or laws are, then there is no ontological basis for them which makes our observances of regularities somewhat magical.

See the link above on Newton’s General Scholium. He beat off the followers of Descartes with his famous I do not frame hypotheses battle cry. It could be argued that science progresses in large part because it doesn’t have to get stuck in navel gazing about such questions.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Let me clarify just to make sure; would the later Scholastic use of nature be equivalent to “quiddity”? As that appears to be what you are describing in this post. I just want to make sure.

To be honest with you I don’t recall what later Scholastics meant and I don’t have the energy to look them up right now. What does Gilson say or Feser? To me it seems that nature, essence, substance are used similarly and at two levels of reality, the first being the ground or source all a beings structure, activities, powers, etc. The second being the " external " appearance that can be touched, seen, experienced. Each may be called a " quiddity, " but at different levels.
Man by definition is a rational animal. That is his quiddity, that is what he is. But the definition still applies whether we are talking about Second Substance ( nature, essence at the level of matter, form, and act ) or First Substance, the thing we see and expericne and lay hands on.
It is the same quiddity viewd from different perspectives.

From post # 12 above: " "Nature properly speaking is the essence (or substance) of things which have in themselves as such a principle of activity (Aristotle, “Metaphysics”, 1015a, 13). By a process of abstraction the mind arises from individual and concrete natures to those of species and genera. "

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

This really doesn’t say anything meaningful though. The big question is why anything exhibits any causal regularities at all. On the one hand, the Aristotelian argues that things exhibit causal regularities because they have a specific nature that grounds their powers and what they do (hence the subject of the thread). On the other hand, you have the Cartesian that argues that transcendent laws of nature cause matter to behave in regular ways. But the Humean approach seems to make the erroneous assumption that since there is an epistemic limit to our being able to know with certainty what these natures or laws are, then there is no ontological basis for them which makes our observances of regularities somewhat magical.

I think there is epistemic limit in knowing what a being ontologically is. A system lets call it S is epistemically knowable if and only if there exist a set of of laws that explain its behavior only if there exist a set of inexplicable properties lets call it P which the behavior of the system is explained in term of them.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thank you for the link. I will look at it shortly.

You always say that but you never do.

The form could exist as manifestation of mind. This was what I was trying to explain. There is no matter since one has to prove that there exist irreducible beings which are self sustain. By this I mean if there is a elementary particle, then it does not constitute of anything. Take one electron and one positron and hit them together. They disappear and give you one photon. How electron and positron could be elementary?

Nothing in the universe is indefinitely sustainable for ever. " Death " is the law of existence. And why do there have to be " irreducible " beings? Isn’t matter convertible to energy to mass? All is in a state of flux, yet each has a nature with at least a temporary identity.

So we are using different notation for form. Form to me exist as manifestation of mind and that is what you call accident. Things however to me is constitute of one thing so called mind. To you they are constitute of two entities matter and form. I have have a question however, why use two when one explain the subject matter well.

If you would read all the links I have given you in the past, you might be thinking differently now. Your idealism just doesn’t make sense. We live in a real world and we know it as real, we do not create it with our minds. It was here before we ever existed!!!.

That is what they are claiming so called law of nature. They claim that law of nature is underlying metaphysical reality.

It seems that many scientists themselves are conflicted about what " laws of nature " mean. But Aristotle was not conflicted, he knew a rock when he saw one and he knew a strom cloud when he saw one and he knew a lightening flash when he saw one. And he knew he was a rational animal like other men. He knew every substance had a nature by which it could be classified and which was the principle of all its observable habits, powers, actions, etc. It is only since Hume that the world has lost its sanity and come to believe that nothing is real.

I have a problem with dualistic picture. To me everything is mind and these properties can be manifested from mind which is irreducible.

You know I wish we could sit down face to face and discuss this because it is the source of all your difficulties. But that is impossible. Read the Summa Theologiae Questions 75-89. It explains how man knows and knows that he knows.
newadvent.org/summa/1.htm

I meant that the assumption that there exist a micro which is not constitute of something else is wrong.

Well, we do eventually reach a point ( and haven’t we reached it already) where it is impossible to know if we are dealing with an individual thing, a basic, irrecucible somthing. Other wise how could matter, energy, mass be convertible?,

I was not talking about evolution. I was talking whether given a set of irreducible particle and the laws that they govern one can explain the existence of phenomena like consciousness?

No, because consciousness or the awareness of being awake and living and knowing that one knows, is an immaterial or spiritual act. Our soul which has the power of knowing and self awareness or consciousness is not reducible to the tiniest particle that can be imagined. It is beyond matter absolutely. Our soul is in a dimension that cannot be touched, measured, weighed, sounded, seen, etc., yet it interacts with the dimension of matter.

In my language form exists as manifestation of mind hence any mental is a form of mind.

Yes, language derives from phantasms of the mind or mental images and forms. But the forms or images the mind have of the external world are beings of the mind, they are not real beings. The real beings, the real forms exist in the world outside the mind in real concrete individuals.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

To me their claim that there exist a set of laws which explain the underlying nature of beings is a metaphysical assertion.

But a correct one arrived at by simple observation.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You could be right. I don’t remember.

Almost . I’d say that philosophy has to follow science in the sense there’s not much point in a philosopher arguing against empirical evidence, but also that the philosopher can go beyond the science to say what she thinks it means.

Philosophy, at least Aristotilean/Thomistic philosophy is not arguing against empirical evidence. And why can’t philosophy go beyond science? Science is not some sacred god, that knows all there is to know - that is empicism. There are things science cannot know or judge. You already know that Divine Revelation is beyond the competence of science. The same for philosophy. It teaches truths which are also beyond the competency of science.

A very lively day, thank you.

Linus2nd

 

[balto]

But you don’t need any metaphysical underpinning for what those properties might mean, all you need is a procedure for recognizing the property values. Hydrogen was first recognized without knowing it is made from atoms. Atoms were recognized without knowing they are made from elementary particles. And so on.

Well yes you do need a metaphysical underpinning. We’re not interested for the moment in what the nature of hydrogen is, to use your example, in this thread, but whether or not hydrogen has a nature at all. I don’t see anyway to make sense out of any scientific finding without affirming that it does. If hydrogen does not have a specific nature, then how would anybody be able to say that canister A of hydrogen gas and canister B of hydrogen gas both contain hydrogen? If they don’t share a nature they have nothing in common. If they share similar properties, why are they similar if they do not have the same nature?

The fact that metaphysics are never needed in order to progress is a eureka moment for which we can thank Newton:

Physics, and science more generally, studies being in as much as it is changeable being. Metaphysics studies being proper. How do you study changeable things without having an idea of what it means to be a thing in the first place? Everybody has a metaphysical framework in which they operate, but many people have not spent the time to examine it so most people are not even aware of all the assumptions they are making. That’s not to say you have to become a strict rationalist because I would agree that metaphysics needs to be grounded in experience.

Newton’s objection may have force against a Platonist who thinks that natures exist in their own right, but like I said earlier the Aristotelian is not positing the existence of “occult” realities when she speaks of essences or natures. All she is saying is that when we say that hydrogen is a specific type of thing and that oxygen is a different type of thing, that is a statement that is objectively meaningful.

 

[balto]

I think there is epistemic limit in knowing what a being ontologically is.

Agreed.

A system lets call it S is epistemically knowable if and only if there exist a set of of laws that explain its behavior only if there exist a set of inexplicable properties lets call it P which the behavior of the system is explained in term of them.

I don’t know how such a system could be epistemically knowable if it needs to be explained in terms of “inexplicable” properties. Wouldn’t that make P epistemically unknowable? Anyway, the only point I was trying to make is, using your example, that S may not be completely knowable because you cannot know with 100% certainty what P is, but we can still know that some P is real. Although for me S would be the substance and P would be the essence.

 

[balto]

Consider a system with certain constitute C={a,b,…}, one can expect an objectively meaningful and intelligible behavior provided that each constitute is meaningful or intelligible. We know that water in a pitcher is not intelligible yet the same water is intelligible when it is part of human body. Hence intelligibility is potentiality of each constitute provided that it is constitute has the right structure by which intelligibility is gone upon the destruction of structure.

I’m not sure I understand what you are saying. I would argue that water in a pitcher is intelligible because it has a sufficient reason for its existence, i.e. when you ask a question about its nature or properties there is an answer, even if the answer is not accessible to a human mind. For example, if I ask why water boils at 100*C the objective answer is never going to be “just because.” I don’t think intelligible is defined as whatever constitutes an intelligent agent if that’s what you are saying.

This is serious threat to holymorphic dualism which states that death is the end. Ironically many Christian believe that holymorphic dualism is correct.

I don’t know why that would pose a threat to hylemorphic dualism. The Thomist would argue that the human intellect is essentially immaterial and incorporeal and that the intellect flows from the rational animal nature of a human. If you accept that, then it is hard to see why the human substance would end with bodily corruption and death given that our intellect is incorporeal. A bodiless intellect would be a defective human yes but many Christians believe in a resurrection of the body which would restore the human to their natural state.