It strikes me that a lot of disagreements about faith vs. reason, religion vs. science, and so on, center around epistemology - how we know what we know. In fact my own biggest argument about faith is the fact it cannot be known deductively (since God’s revelation isn’t logically necessary) nor inductively with absolute certitude (since inductive methodology doesn’t allow for 100% certitude) yet the Church insists believers have no doubt whatsoever that what is claimed to be Divinely revealed is in fact so. In response, some believers claim some mysterious “third way” of knowing which “transcends” reason. But my question is, how do they know that they are really knowing rather than being deceived or mistaken?
But in a broader picture, it outlines a basic problem. What is knowledge? And whatever the answer, how is it known that that is knowledge? And whatever the answer, how is that known to be known to be knowledge? One winds up in an inexorable infinite regress. And there’s really no way out. Even if certain things are held “self-evident” (e.g. law of non-contradiction), how are they known to be self-evident? If the response is that it’s self-evident they are self-evident, then how is that known, and so on. Well, I guess no wonder I’m now agnostic…
The solution: there is no second-order knowledge. But even that throws us back into perplexity…
One problem is that knowledge must be true. This, prima facie, excludes all second-order knowledge, because how can you *know *that something you believe is true? This could only be sustained if we had direct unmediated access to truth, and we had knowledge that we had such access – but even in that case, we could still coherently doubt that we had access!
A simpler question, though: Can we justify our beliefs that we can justify our beliefs? Yes, it seems that we can. So a non-skeptic might say that this is all we need – if our first and second order beliefs happened to conform to reality, then we would have knowledge. This may not be an infinite regress, if there a “basic” beliefs, e.g. that “this is a hand”. You bring up a good problem with this kind of foundationalism, however: as soon as you put together a set of conditions for “basic beliefs” (say, being self-evident), you open yourself to the question “Why?” – which seems to indicate that those beliefs weren’t basic after all,
if they have to be justified.
Alternately, perhaps an infinite regress isn’t a problem: Peter Klein thinks we hold an infinite number of beliefs which justify each other all the way down. (He might be right: consider, did you hold a belief that 5,644,898,212 was an even number before you read this sentence? I suspect you did.)
It is when you start studying epistemology that skepticism starts to look awfully compelling.
I’m convinced that the requirement that we “know what we know” is far too stringent. In English, “know” is usually just a word indicative of certainty. But since that definition is too subjective, we have this idea that there is some objective definition: perhaps, justified true belief (JTB). But how is JTB not subjective? Justification is in the eye of the beholder, it seems. The most logical position may be to hold that there are “educated opinions” and “uneducated opinions”, although we can’t develop a science to judge between the two. It seems that certain virtues on the part of the knower – critical thinking, keenness of insight, intelligence, level of attention, etc. – will lead to more instances of true belief and less instances of false belief. We might call this “epistemic virtue”, and accept that some beliefs are better than others, and thus avoid the pitfalls of slippery “knowledge”.
As for “the Church insists believers have no doubt whatsoever that what is claimed to be Divinely revealed is in fact so”, can you tell me where you found this insistence? The Church has insisted that the faithful not contradict Church teaching, but this is a far cry from demonizing doubt. Proper doubt is a virtue, because it creates a contrast of the mind, against which the truth will be far more evident.