Tony,
Just clarifying some things, I hope. (Fundamentally, we don’t disagree.)
What about the argument that we are basically reasonable beings is proved by the success of science? To deny that is to contradict yourself…
Though you may just be speaking loosely, be sure to distinguish between:
(a) the abstract propositional content of a man’s beliefs (propositions), and
(b) his distinct act of psychologically assenting to those propositions (beliefs).
Only the former may stand in the relation of contradiction; no one can literally contradict himself, though he may profess to affirm and assent to two directly contradictory propositions. However, his doing so is by no means a broadly logical impossibility. Arguably, it is mentally impossible, though even that is disputable. It’s an empirical question of fact regarding psychological, not logical, consistency, and the practical feasibility of a subjective belief, or lack thereof, doesn’t necessarily shed any light on whether that belief’s propositional structure and constituents correspond to external fact. Hence, the potential gap between idea and mind, object and subject, ideal and practical.
Some people are willing to contradict themselves. Are they not basically themselves?
And is the above really proof? What is proof? Do you think that there is such a thing as an argument so powerful that to deny it would be to go into immediate cardiac arrest?
She’s correct if she’s pointing out that a belief-act, b, which accepts a proposition, p, does not contradict even a belief-act, b2, accepting the opposite proposition, ~p. They are distinct positive acts and can no more “contradict” one another than, say, my jovial behavior could “contradict” my verbally alleging to be upset.
That is not the point. To deny that we are basically reasonable is unreasonable because the success of science demonstrates the power of reason.
Why should a powerful argument cause immediate cardiac arrest? The fact that we are basically reasonable does not mean we cannot choose to be unreasonable. None are so blind as those who will not see…
It may now be clearer now why you haven’t persuaded her. Your first claim, that it’s unreasonable to, in effect, affirm two (for argument’s sake) inconsistent propositions, is without argumentative support. Since, as shown, it’s not a contradiction, what sort of premise would help out? It would need to give at least rough criteria for what constitutes reasonable behavior, and thus presumably tie rational behavior to true belief, and then ultimately bridge the gap from a descriptive proposition (e.g., ‘a is F’) to a prescriptive one (‘n ought to m’).
In other words, ‘p and q are two inconsistent propositions,’ must somehow, presumably logically, justify ‘One ought not believe in both p and q.’ You suggest this is done by ‘It is unreasonable behavior to believe in both of two inconsistent propositions,’ except that only leaves you with a descriptive claim and fails to justify an ethical assertion.
You seem to appeal to an assumption, ‘One ought not to behave unreasonably,’ only, I don’t think she “sees” this like you do, at least not as being clearly worthy of acceptance, or self-evident, doxastically compelling, existentially compelling, etc. After a quick look at her blog, it would appear she’s a pragmatist.
So: how can you prove to her (show, demonstrate) an assumption based on (apparently) strictly intuitive non-logical grounds that (also apparently) are subjective? By examining the pragmatic effects of affirmation vs. denial? By praying for her intellect to be freed from the darkness of sin – and, perhaps, the dependence on her own creations of indirect mental representations – so that it might openly know the light of truth directly? More logic and argument, hopefully pointing out her acceptance of two inconsistent beliefs?
In a perfect world, due to the ultimate, beautiful unity of the True and the Good, and of our intellects and wills, knowing the slight ontological priority of either one might bear little practical significance for our righteousness. In OUR world, however, they may be somewhat independently pulling in two different directions, one to heaven, one to hell.
Besides attempting disambiguation of terms and viewpoints, I don’t recommend getting into ongoing “rational” discussion with someone who denies the meaning, nature, and value of truth as it’s traditionally understood by common sense, whether allegedly or sincerely. That’s walking a dangerous tight-rope over nihilistic nonsense and chaotic unintelligibility (whatever that is).
