What is meant by God's simplicity?

[Prodigal_Son]

This topic directly follows up a conversation in my thread on compatibilism. R Daneel mentioned God’s simplicity, and I realized that I have very little understanding of what it means for God to be “simple”.

Here’s what I think I can make out. God is simple because all of His properties are essential to His being, whereas we have many inessential properties (liking popcorn, e.g.) and thus we are complex.

It would follow that we could say that “God is essentially good”, “essentially omnipotent”, “essentially omniscient”, etc. But these ascriptions seem to create problems, specifically with the incarnation and the question of free will.

What does the Church mean by God’s simplicity? What do theologians mean? Is this a dogma and – if so – is the content of the dogma very concretely described and understood?

I gots questions. You got answers?

 

[JohnDamian]

Divine simplicity is the fact that God is identical to his Essence.

Simple.

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

Though I’m not a professional philosopher, I’ve been playing around with formulations of Divine Simplicity.

Here’s my formulation in the language of Analytical Philosophy: “Divine simplicity means that God is identical in every possible world where God alone exists.”

 

[JohnDamian]

Though I’m not a professional philosopher, I’ve been playing around with formulations of Divine Simplicity.

Here’s my formulation in the language of Analytical Philosophy: “Divine simplicity means that God is identical in every possible world where God alone exists.”

I don’t mean to be mean; but in it’s theological & philosophical sense the notion of Divine Simplicity means nothing more than God being identical to his essence (quiddity).

I mention this; not to correct; but to avoid confusion.

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

I don’t mean to be mean; but in it’s theological & philosophical sense the notion of Divine Simplicity means nothing more than God being identical to his essence (quiddity).

I mention this; not to correct; but to avoid confusion.

Well, there’s an issue amongst the real philosophers (I mean that phrase to implicate me, not you, of being the impostor), such as Eleanore Stump (Thomist Catholic) and Alvin Plantinga (Protestant) about what “being identical to (his) essence” even means, and both find the issue to be very difficult. Plantinga has given up on the doctrine, denying divine simplicity. Stump still wants to save the doctrine, but doesn’t know how.

My formulation seems to solve the problem, but it’s hard to relate that to what St. Thomas really said. It’s only a problem for those who put any stock into Analytical Philosophy.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, there’s an issue amongst the real philosophers (I mean that phrase to implicate me, not you, of being the impostor), such as Eleanore Stump (Thomist Catholic) and Alvin Plantinga (Protestant) about what “being identical to (his) essence” even means, and both find the issue to be very difficult. Plantinga has given up on the doctrine, denying divine simplicity. Stump still wants to save the doctrine, but doesn’t know how.

My formulation seems to solve the problem, but it’s hard to relate that to what St. Thomas really said. It’s only a problem for those who put any stock into Analytical Philosophy.

Hi Paul! I’m a philosophy grad student at a school which is quite analytical (maddeningly so, in fact). At any rate, I have sympathy for your comments, and I have a lot of sympathy with Plantinga here.

Here is one problem with simplicity: omniscience and free will.

If God is good, we must have free will. (Since free will is key to any solution to the problem of evil).

Suppose God is essentially omniscient. It follows that, at the moment God created me, He knew everything I would do. And yet He created me anyway. But then, I am powerless to change the events of my life.

Thus, the belief that God is essentially omniscient commits one to the belief that human beings are not free – or, at best, they are free in some compatibilist sense. (And I think compatibilism is bunk!)

But let’s take your view of simplicity, for a moment: “Divine simplicity means that God is identical in every possible world where God alone exists.”

I’m not sure I like this at all, since I am confused – to say the least – by possible worlds semantics. If we follow Leibniz, of course, there will only be one possible world where God exists, and I am inclined to follow Leibniz. Thus, simplicity becomes utterly trivial: “God is identical to God in this world.” Ack!

I suppose you might have a more unstable view of how God “might” have acted. But then we have to figure out how “God in this world” corresponds to “God in that world”, and so on.

Interesting points, though.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Divine simplicity is the fact that God is identical to his Essence.

Simple.

Thanks, John!

It would follow that any property of God is an essential property, no?

 

[JohnDamian]

Thanks, John!

It would follow that any property of God is an essential property, no?

God doesn’t have properties per se; God is essentially God; and nothing else.

St. Thomas denied the essence-existence distinction in infinite bodies.

I shall quote from a seperate Scholastic who gives a concice rundown of what simplicity is;

“Every such concept is irreducibly simple; and therefore one part of it cannot be conceived while another part remains unknown, as is evident from the statement of the philosopher (metaphysics, Bk IX) that there is no deception regarding irreducibly simple concepts as there is regarding the quiddity of what is comples. This is not to be understood as though the simple intellect; is formally decieved regarding the knowlege of quiddities, for in simple intellection there is neither truth nor falsity. In regard to a quidity that is composed, however, the simple intellect can be virtually decieved. For if such a notion is false in itself, then it includes virtually a false proposition. But what is irreducible simple includes a false proposition neither virtually nor formally; therefore there is no deception in it’s regard. Either it is grasped totally or not at all, in which case it remains completely unknown. Of no irreducibly simple concept, therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful of another.”

Scotus - Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, prol., 5

Here is one problem with simplicity: omniscience and free will.

If God is good, we must have free will. (Since free will is key to any solution to the problem of evil).

Suppose God is essentially omniscient. It follows that, at the moment God created me, He knew everything I would do. And yet He created me anyway. But then, I am powerless to change the events of my life.

This is a fallacy of equivocation - just because God knows your future actions does not elicit a causal potency upon them; thus your freedom is not in any way hampered.

Here is a simple analogy; I know that someone on the ground floor of my house will eat the last pikelet; I also know who that someone is. However; my knowlege of this does not cause him to do this. – Granted; I do not have absolute and certain Knowlege; but this clearly demonstrates that my knowlege is irrelevant and accidental to the act of the free agent.

I’m not sure I like this at all, since I am confused – to say the least – by possible worlds semantics. If we follow Leibniz, of course, there will only be one possible world where God exists, and I am inclined to follow Leibniz. Thus, simplicity becomes utterly trivial: “God is identical to God in this world.” Ack!

It is not as trivial as you might think; stating that “God is identical to God in this world” is a very fundemental claim about the nature of God that strikes at the heart of the problem of individuation. However; I would disagree with Leibniz for the following reason; A being is not individuatied by it’s accidents. (Opus Oxoniense II. d.3, part 1, qq 6. 142-212). So “God is not identical to God in this world” - God is identical to God.

This itself is not trivial though; it is probably because you didn’t cover the Medieval problem of individuation that this appears trivial. The problem of individuation is what makes a thing what thing (quiddity) or this thing (haecceity)? So; is God God because of his essence (quiddity) - the answer is no; because he is not God because of his essence. Is God God because of his haecceity? - Yes; because it is intrinsic that his quiddity is identical and incorperative to and of his being. So the answer becomes; God is God because of What makes God what God is; which is God. - This is not as trivial as it appears; if we were to use quiddity we would get; God is God because of what God is; which is God’s quiddity; therefore God is contingent - This is obviously incorrect.

My formulation seems to solve the problem, but it’s hard to relate that to what St. Thomas really said.

Specifically; your formulation in the first post is confusing Thomism; God’s properties are not essential to his being; they are identical. Essential implies some causal relationship; which would be a misrepresentation of divine simplicity.

But these ascriptions seem to create problems, specifically with the incarnation and the question of free will.

I cannot see where they would cause problems at all; but by all means ask.

I gots questions. You got answers

Ask and ye shall recieve.

 

[R_Daneel]

Well, let’s get down to the problem.

John says that it is not really correct to say that God has “attributes”, like God has knowledge, or God has power. These propositions just relfect our insufficient vocabulary. God’s knowledge is an “integral part” of God, and we must be aware that the word “part” is not really correct. So far, so good. Let’s take this definition and see where it leads.

Another “so-called” attribute of God is that God is a “necessary” being, which translates into: “God does not depend on anything”. Which is expressed as “I AM, WHO AM”.

Now comes the real problem.

God’s knowledge, omniscience means that God has full knowledge of everything that can be known. This already presents a problem, since now God’s omniscience is contingent upon (or is dependent upon) what is “knowable”. By the way, the same applies to “omnipotence” - which is defined as "God can do anything that is “doable”. This also presents a “dependence”.

But the problem does not stop here.

If God’s knowledge (let’s call it “A”) incorporates all of out free actions (let’s call it “B”), then there is an exact “mapping” between the two, namely A == B. In this case there are four, distinct possibilities:

1. A causes B (A → B), or God’s knowledge is the causative factor for our actions.
2. B causes A (B → A), or our actions are the caustive agent for God’ knowledge. In other words, God knows what we do, because our actions are reflected by God’s knowledge.
3. A and B are independent, and it is a mere coincidence that they “happen” to be mapped onto each other.
4. Both A and B are caused by some external causative agent (or agents).

That is all. There are no other possibilities. Go forth and analyze them. Which one is true?

 

[JohnDamian]

God’s knowledge, omniscience means that God has full knowledge of everything that can be known. This already presents a problem, since now God’s omniscience is contingent upon (or is dependent upon) what is “knowable”. By the way, the same applies to “omnipotence” - which is defined as "God can do anything that is “doable”. This also presents a “dependence”.

The potency per se is none contingent; but the objects of that potencies act have a causal determinance of the formation of the knowlege. That is to say; the existence of an object in no way interferes with omniscience per se; but for omniscience to have a knowlege of a particular thing; that particular thing must exist. In such a way; it seems clear that the existence of the thing is necessarily prior to the knowlege of the thing.

That is not to say God’s omniscience is contingent; merely that the objects of his omniscience are contingent. He cannot know that I am drinking tea; unless I am drinking tea. Thus; his knowlege of me drinking tea necessarily is posterior to me drinking tea.

Likewise; God’s omnipotence itself is not contingent. However; the act of his potency is contingent - God cannot smite Sodom unless Sodom exists; thus; Sodoms existence is prior to God’s smiting.

However; the fact that the act is contingent upon the agency recieving the act does not mean the potency is. That would be an equivocal fallacy.

Now; I shall go through all four of your points as follows;

1. A causes B (A → B), or God’s knowledge is the causative factor for our actions.

This would contradict free will; and appears to be contrary to our experience of volition or nolition; so there is no good reason to accept it. (although; this negative; like Solipsism cannot be apodeictically refuted)

1. B causes A (B → A), or our actions are the caustive agent for God’ knowledge. In other words, God knows what we do, because our actions are reflected by God’s knowledge.

In a sense this could be said to be true of people - but not of God; before we act a person can only know what we are going to do; it is only after or whilst we are acting that a person can know what we have done or are doing. This is moreover circumvented by the fact that God operates outside of time; to him there is no distinction between going to do, doing, and done - thus; they are one and the same – if God is to have knowlege at all of our actions then he knows them in all relative tenses; thus; our actions have no causative effect on God - if we accept the premise that God is omniscient. It is clear that God cannot have knowlege of an act unless we do that act; but as God already knows which act we will do, and which we won’t; thus his knowlege is not contingent upon our free will; as he already knows what will occur (or to him has; will and is occurred/occur/ocurring).

1. A and B are independent, and it is a mere coincidence that they “happen” to be mapped onto each other.

This is partially correct; however it is not a coincidence; it is a consequence of omniscience that B is known by A; even though A does not cause* B to happen; and B does not elicit a contingency in A’s knowlege (see above)
*-Talking about accidentally ordered sequences; and not the essentially ordered sequence which places God as a first principle.

1. Both A and B are caused by some external causative agent (or agents).

Although this is plausible; it seems more likely that 3 is the case (omitting the coincidental aspect; for clarity).

Go forth and analyze them. Which one is true?

Number 3 (adjusted to remove coincidence, and clarified)

There are no other possibilities

Just for my own amusement;
5) A is formally identical to B
6) A is really identical to C; C determines B; thus A determines B
7) A is really identical to C; B determines C; thus A and C are determined by B
8) Neither A nor B exist
9) The Composite of A and B contain predicates that are in some way inter or co-dependant.

Etc. etc. etc.

 

[tonyrey]

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

We have to admit we cannot fully understand the nature of our Creator. How can finite beings grasp the Infinite? Our starting point has to be in Revelation which tells us that God is “He Who Is”. Nothing could be simpler than that! It is the most economical, most adequate, most fertile and most elegant explanation of reality that has ever been presented…

God’s simplicity stems from His unity. He is One, the sole Being Who has always existed and exists necessarily. This truth is evident in Our Lord’s prayer that “they may be one as we are one”. Oneness is the result of love which unites persons in peace, harmony and joy. Yet oneness does not entail being static and inert. Love is dynamic, fertile and creative. The supreme example of this is the divine love of the Blessed Trinity - which is the reason why everything exists!

God’s nature is simple because it is spiritual and indivisible into parts - unlike physical objects. His perfection implies integrity, i.e. oneness and wholeness. We find this difficult to grasp because we think discursively and do not see the wood for the trees. Yet God’s simplicity is implied in the convergence of all His attributes: truth, goodness, freedom, justice, beauty and love - which are interdependent and inseparable. God does not change; He is the Cause of change. “In Him we live, move and have our Being”. He is the Alpha and Omega, the sole Source and End of all that exists…

 

[R_Daneel]

The potency per se is none contingent; but the objects of that potencies act have a causal determinance of the formation of the knowlege. That is to say; the existence of an object in no way interferes with omniscience per se; but for omniscience to have a knowlege of a particular thing; that particular thing must exist. In such a way; it seems clear that the existence of the thing is necessarily prior to the knowlege of the thing.

And we are talking about logical priority here, which does not necessarily entail temporal priority. But you say: “the existence of an object in no way interferes with omniscience per se” and that is some type of “middle knowledge”, which is highly problematic. It would accept such propositions: “God has knowledge about the contents of a book, which was never written, because the author was never born, since the parents never met”. Absurd, is it not? To talk about “knowledge” in relation to that nonexistent book does not have any meaning.

That is not to say God’s omniscience is contingent; merely that the objects of his omniscience are contingent. He cannot know that I am drinking tea; unless I am drinking tea. Thus; his knowlege of me drinking tea necessarily is posterior to me drinking tea.

Of course the knowldge that you actually drink tea is contingent upon you drinking tea. And thus God’s knowledge is contingent.

This would contradict free will; and appears to be contrary to our experience of volition or nolition; so there is no good reason to accept it. (although; this negative; like Solipsism cannot be apodeictically refuted)

Agreed.

In a sense this could be said to be true of people - but not of God; before we act a person can only know what we are going to do; it is only after or whilst we are acting that a person can know what we have done or are doing. This is moreover circumvented by the fact that God operates outside of time; to him there is no distinction between going to do, doing, and done - thus; they are one and the same – if God is to have knowlege at all of our actions then he knows them in all relative tenses; thus; our actions have no causative effect on God - if we accept the premise that God is omniscient. It is clear that God cannot have knowlege of an act unless we do that act; but as God already knows which act we will do, and which we won’t; thus his knowlege is not contingent upon our free will; as he already knows what will occur (or to him has; will and is occurred/occur/ocurring).

The idea of timelessness is not relevant. God’s knowledge is logically dependent on our actions, and that does not imply temporal succession. For the highlighted part: “that is the current problem” - just how does God’s omniscience “operate”. It is a logical error to say “well, there is God’s alleged omniscience” and leave it at that. Imagine someone (Mr. Smith) is rolling dice, one after the other, trillions of times every second, in a closed room. Someone else (Mr. Jones) writes down a set of numbers, also trillions of times every second. The two list turn out to be identical. If the rolling of the dice does not cause what Mr. Jones writes down, and the dice-rolls are not caused by what Mr. Jones wrote down, then what else is there than coincidence?

This is partially correct; however it is not a coincidence; it is a consequence of omniscience that B is known by A; even though A does not cause* B to happen; and B does not elicit a contingency in A’s knowlege (see above)
*-Talking about accidentally ordered sequences; and not the essentially ordered sequence which places God as a first principle.

Which is meaningless, for the same reason as above. If there is an exact correspondence between two sets of events, and neither event causes the other, then we see a “coincidence” on a cosmic scale. You try to cut through this Gordian knot, by stipulating: “well, this is omniscience”?

Although this is plausible; it seems more likely that 3 is the case (omitting the coincidental aspect; for clarity).

But you cannot just omit the coincidence, and substitute it with “well, this is omniscience”. This possibility would stipulate a causative factor for our actions, and if one discards option #1, then must also discard this option, too, and for the same reason.

As a matter of fact, most people would immediately choose (and did choose in the past) option #2. They would declare without a second of hesitation, that God’s knowledge reflects our actions. And that would even be sensible, since this choice would not repudiate our free will. And this is where God’s simplicity comes into the pictute. If God’s knowledge is contingent, then God is contingent and that is all.

And there is no way out of this problem. Your assertion, that “this is how omniscience operates” simply does not hold water.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

God doesn’t have properties per se; God is essentially God; and nothing else. … God’s properties are not essential to his being; they are identical. Essential implies some causal relationship; which would be a misrepresentation of divine simplicity.

In analytical philosophy, “essential property” does not have any causal implication at all. It is an essential property of a bachelor to be unmarried, but being unmarried does not make one a bachelor. Or, a better example: It is an essential property of “2” to be an even number, but being an even number does not cause 2 to be 2!

As far as one’s properties being identical to one’s being, I don’t see how that could be, since properties are simply things that are said of a person – that is, representations. But perhaps I am being to nitpicky, here.

“Of no irreducibly simple concept, therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful of another.”

But isn’t an omnipotent being who is not good conceivable? If not, then how is God free?

This is a fallacy of equivocation - just because God knows your future actions does not elicit a causal potency upon them; thus your freedom is not in any way hampered.

This sounds like compatibilism, to me.

Here is a simple analogy; I know that someone on the ground floor of my house will eat the last pikelet; I also know who that someone is. However; my knowlege of this does not cause him to do this. – Granted; I do not have absolute and certain Knowlege; but this clearly demonstrates that my knowlege is irrelevant and accidental to the act of the free agent.

But you did not give the person downstairs the power to eat the last pikelet. God did. If He had not, He would not have known anything about it.

It is not as trivial as you might think; stating that “God is identical to God in this world” is a very fundemental claim about the nature of God that strikes at the heart of the problem of individuation. However; I would disagree with Leibniz for the following reason; A being is not individuatied by it’s accidents. (Opus Oxoniense II. d.3, part 1, qq 6. 142-212). So “God is not identical to God in this world” - God is identical to God.

Actually, I think I misspoke. Paul’s version reduces to “God in this world is identical to God in this world.” Which **is **trivial.

This itself is not trivial though; it is probably because you didn’t cover the Medieval problem of individuation that this appears trivial. The problem of individuation is what makes a thing what thing (quiddity) or this thing (haecceity)? So; is God God because of his essence (quiddity) - the answer is no; because he is not God because of his essence. Is God God because of his haecceity? - Yes; because it is intrinsic that his quiddity is identical and incorperative to and of his being. So the answer becomes; God is God because of What makes God what God is; which is God. - This is not as trivial as it appears; if we were to use quiddity we would get; God is God because of what God is; which is God’s quiddity; therefore God is contingent - This is obviously incorrect.

I’ve got a vocabulary gap looking at the above. We need some sort of Thomistic philosophy to analytic philosophy translator. Both disciplines talk about the same things, largely, but in different ways.

Your response to Daneel, about knowledge being necessarily posterior to its objects, is very intriguing, and strikes me as correct. God cannot have knowledge of our freedom unless our freedom exists; thus, the creation of freedom – which is a good – smooths over the problems of foreknowledge.

Still, I’m not quite clear on this, and how it differs from compatibilism. It still seems like God has to limit His omniscience in some way, at the “moment” He creates each individual with free will.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

And we are talking about logical priority here, which does not necessarily entail temporal priority. But you say: “the existence of an object in no way interferes with omniscience per se” and that is some type of “middle knowledge”, which is highly problematic. It would accept such propositions: “God has knowledge about the contents of a book, which was never written, because the author was never born, since the parents never met”. Absurd, is it not? To talk about “knowledge” in relation to that nonexistent book does not have any meaning.

But this is just knowledge of a conditional: “IF so-and-so exists, THEN such-and-such will happen.” God has knowledge of “so-and-so” essence, which is not contingent upon “so-and-so”'s existence. Why? Because God can view every essence (every possibility).

Of course the knowldge that you actually drink tea is contingent upon you drinking tea. And thus God’s knowledge is contingent.

Suppose you know “If Bob exists, he likes coffee” and you know that “Bob exists.” Then you know that Bob likes coffee, without having to “look”. How is this contingent?

But you cannot just omit the coincidence, and substitute it with “well, this is omniscience”. This possibility would stipulate a causative factor for our actions, and if one discards option #1, then must also discard this option, too, and for the same reason.

I’m inclined to agree with this objection, and I’m curious to see John’s response.

 

[JohnDamian]

And we are talking about logical priority here,… relation to that nonexistent book does not have any meaning.

Well God cannot have knowlege of an object that does not exist. Bear in mind here; that God being held to operate outside of time necessarily entails that what will occur has to him already occurred.

That is to say; if the book will be written at all; then God will know it; if the book is not written at all; then God will not know it; because it does not exist.

In regards to the operation of omniscience; temporality is accidental.

Of course the knowldge that you actually drink tea is contingent upon you drinking tea. And thus God’s knowledge is contingent.

Yes; but all knowingness is really distinct from the objects of knowlege; clearly. There is a greater than formal disunity in the operation of omniscience and the objects of knowlege; thus - the occurence of objects is accidental to the state of omniscience; although contained within.

Think of it this way;

If we reduce omniscience; by way of creating an analogy - to lets say the people elected presidents of the USA. If I have this “president-knowlege”, the particular presidents elected would be irrelevant; accidental to the knowlege itself. I would have this “president-knowlege” if Obama won; or if Obama lost - his victory or failure is irrelevant to the state of my “president-knowlege”.

Likewise; omniscience is not effected by the objects of that knowlege. If an entity has omniscience it has that omniscience regardless of the outcomes of objects; which are accidental to it. My choice to drink tea instead of coffee does not alter or in any way make God’s omniscience contingent; it merely makes the object of God’s omniscience (in this case; my preffered drink) contingent upon my action.

Now; when I have a drink later today; God will already know which one I will freely choose; yet his knowlege does not causally make me choose tea or coffee; I make that choice of my own volition. But; since God is operating outside of time then he knows what drink I will have. To God; the drink I later imbibe has happened; is happening and will happen. This event is already known to God; even though to us it has not occurred; and though our free choices allow us to determine the outcome of this event; it is both known by God; and not-influential over his omniscience.

It is clear that there is a distinction between all knowningness and the objects of knowlege; to dispute this is to make a fallacy of composition error; because all knowingness is not merely a composite; it is a per se potency.

It is a logical error to say “well, there is God’s alleged omniscience” and leave it at that. Imagine someone (Mr. Smith) is rolling dice, one after the other, trillions of times every second, in a closed room. Someone else (Mr. Jones) writes down a set of numbers, also trillions of times every second. The two list turn out to be identical. If the rolling of the dice does not cause what Mr. Jones writes down, and the dice-rolls are not caused by what Mr. Jones wrote down, then what else is there than coincidence?

Their is either;

a) a coincidence
b) a formal unity

It is clear that it would be innacurate to state that it was a coincidence; as I have stated earlier. Therefore it appears that there is some formal unity between the events - namely; there is a less than causal unity underlying the event’s where the outcomes of one is identical to the outcome of another. Now; if we take 2+2 for example, me saying 2+2 and getting the answer 4 is identical to some other individual saying it; however - there is no causal unity between this per se; but there is a unity greater than a coincidence; hence there is a formal unity between the events; that the product of one correctly reflects the product of the other.

If there is an exact correspondence between two sets of events, and neither event causes the other, then we see a “coincidence” on a cosmic scale. You try to cut through this Gordian knot, by stipulating: “well, this is omniscience”?

I see that (rightly) there would be a contradiction entailed by saying it is a coincidence; now I may not off the top of my head be able to solve it apodeictically; for I am neither a genius nor a well educated person - but I feel compelled to try and resolve this contradiction using reason - because I am left with these three practical possibilities;
a) Omniscience is a contradiction in terms
b) Omniscience is a coincidental potency
c) Omniscience operates in a particular manner not yet fully known

As a matter of fact, …And this is where God’s simplicity comes into the pictute. If God’s knowledge is contingent, then God is contingent and that is all.

This is precisely why I rejected #2. It would contradict divine simplicity. The fact that most (Catholic) people would pick it is indicative of a lack of understanding of Catholic teaching.

And there is no way out of this problem. Your assertion, that “this is how omniscience operates” simply does not hold water.

Aren’t you also making a simple statement about how omniscience operates? It appears we are having some equivocal troubles here as our understandings of the term appear to be giving somewhat different conclusions.

For myself; omniscience is a potency which allows all objects to be known. From this it follows that the specific objects disposition exert no causal changes to the state of the active potency itself; merely to the objects per se.

 

[JohnDamian]

In analytical philosophy, “essential property” does not have any causal implication at all. It is an essential property of a bachelor to be unmarried, but being unmarried does not make one a bachelor. Or, a better example: It is an essential property of “2” to be an even number, but being an even number does not cause 2 to be 2!

Essentiality of predicates determined individuation; I don’t know much about analytical philosophy and how that defines terms. Perhaps we are encountering equivocal problems due to a misunderstanding of terms.

As far as one’s properties being identical to one’s being, I don’t see how that could be, since properties are simply things that are said of a person – that is, representations. But perhaps I am being to nitpicky, here.

This is called nominalism. I take a Scotist perspective which says that properties are real thing’s independant of conception.

This sounds like compatibilism, to me

It is a necessary consequence of voluntarism and omniscience. Although compatibilism in it’s modern form is quite distinct.

But you did not give the person downstairs the power to eat the last pikelet. God did. If He had not, He would not have known anything about it.

True; but only as the product of an essentially ordered series; my action insofar as leaving the pikelet there produces itself an accidentally ordered series which no doubt will end in the consumption of the pikelet. God is not relevant in the latter series.

Actually, I think I misspoke. Paul’s version reduces to “God in this world is identical to God in this world.” Which is trivial.

Absolutely trivial

I’ve got a vocabulary gap looking at the above. We need some sort of Thomistic philosophy to analytic philosophy translator. Both disciplines talk about the same things, largely, but in different ways.

If only there was such a translator! Incidentally; and to avoid confusion - I am not using Thomistic philosophy (with the exception of his definition of simplicity) I am using Scotistic philosophy, which is quite different.

Still, I’m not quite clear on this, and how it differs from compatibilism. It still seems like God has to limit His omniscience in some way, at the “moment” He creates each individual with free will.

The latter part of what you say here is called “Molinism” - which is best to be avoided as it severely undermines Divine Simplicity and Omniscience.

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

But let’s take your view of simplicity, for a moment: “Divine simplicity means that God is identical in every possible world where God alone exists.”

I’m not sure I like this at all, since I am confused – to say the least – by possible worlds semantics. If we follow Leibniz, of course, there will only be one possible world where God exists, and I am inclined to follow Leibniz. Thus, simplicity becomes utterly trivial: “God is identical to God in this world.” Ack!

First off, I don’t really understand possible world semantics either. You probably have a better grasp of them than I do. I like Saul Kripke’s formalism, because it has rules, and as someone who loves mathematics, I like clear rules.

Kripke’s formalism deals with the problem of names and identity. He holds that when we name someone, we are actually referring to the person, to something metaphysical, necessarily. And his argument deals with this possible world semantics, where he says that we can imagine a world where Napoleon, for example, doesn’t invade Russia. But he’s still Napoleon.

I would think that the statement “if God exists, there couldn’t be any other possible world but this one” goes even beyond Leibniz to say not that God wouldn’t have made the world any other way, but that he couldn’t have made the world any other way. This enters into a Spinozist regime that I’m uncomfortable with. I believe God could have decided not to send His Son to die for us. He would have been totally justified in doing so. That he did anyway means more to me because of this. And that’s the fuzzy sort of picture I have when I talk of possible worlds.

The other problem, for Kripke, is, if God only exists in this possible world (because if God exists then this is the only world he’s make, necessarily), then there is no way to properly name “necessary being” “God”. We’d be talking about logically possible worlds here, including metaphysically possible worlds, though I think both are open, since God has free will.

God could, de dicto (loosely, as a logical possibility), decide to create nothing, and exist by himself. In all of these possible worlds, God must still be identical. However, the question is open whether this is a de re (loosely, as a metaphysical possibility) possibility.

Please let me know if the above makes some sense.

For Daneel’s question: I’d answer that Daneel’s position is one of perspective. From the Divine Order, I’d agree with 1, that God causes our actions, but assert that he’s not a direct cause. Instead, it’s: “G → W → A”. God causes our will. Our will is a causative agent (because God wills it to be), and our will causes our actions (actions understood in a specific way).

 

[R_Daneel]

For myself; omniscience is a potency which allows all objects to be known. From this it follows that the specific objects disposition exert no causal changes to the state of the active potency itself; merely to the objects per se.

This is where the difference resides. As you presented in your “president-knowing” example, you consider it sufficient to omniscience the knowledge of “someone will be elected president”, and it is not necessary that “Obama will be elected president”. Well, that is not much of an omniscience. To “know” that “something, somewhere, somewhen will happen” is not the same than to know that “this particular event will happen at this place and at this time”. As they say, the devil is in the details.

There is either;

a) a coincidence
b) a formal unity

It is clear that it would be innacurate to state that it was a coincidence; as I have stated earlier. Therefore it appears that there is some formal unity between the events - namely; there is a less than causal unity underlying the event’s where the outcomes of one is identical to the outcome of another. Now; if we take 2+2 for example, me saying 2+2 and getting the answer 4 is identical to some other individual saying it; however - there is no causal unity between this per se; but there is a unity greater than a coincidence; hence there is a formal unity between the events; that the product of one correctly reflects the product of the other.

Not a good example. In this case the underlying factor, which causes both utterings is the fact that “2 + 2” really makes “4”. Try to apply your reasoning to those trillions of equivalences in the hypothetical die-tossing scenarios, and see what will happen there.

I see that (rightly) there would be a contradiction entailed by saying it is a coincidence; now I may not off the top of my head be able to solve it apodeictically; for I am neither a genius nor a well educated person - but I feel compelled to try and resolve this contradiction using reason - because I am left with these three practical possibilities;
a) Omniscience is a contradiction in terms
b) Omniscience is a coincidental potency
c) Omniscience operates in a particular manner not yet fully known

I don’t think that there is a contradiction here, merely an incredibly improbable coincidence. After all, it is possible that those trillons of die-tosses and the writings of the other person just “happen” to turn out to be the same. The fact that the probability of such occurrence is so small that it cannot be imagined does not make it an impossibility. Of course this would mean that God’s omniscience is just coincidental, which is not a palatable idea.

As for omniscience, it is just another ill-defined nonsense. We do value “knowledge” and thinking about God as “infinitely knowledgable” is just another anthropomorphic extension of what we value. As a matter of fact, it is easy to prove that a controlled experiment denies omniscience. If we assume that God can know all our future actions, and he attempts to prove it, then the proving process will prove instead that God does not know what we shall do. And it is a very simple experiment.

This is precisely why I rejected #2. It would contradict divine simplicity. The fact that most (Catholic) people would pick it is indicative of a lack of understanding of Catholic teaching.

Right on. But of course you should contemplate that the Catholic teaching may be wrong - precisely because it leads to a contradiction.

 

[R_Daneel]

For Daneel’s question: I’d answer that Daneel’s position is one of perspective. From the Divine Order, I’d agree with 1, that God causes our actions, but assert that he’s not a direct cause. Instead, it’s: “G → W → A”. God causes our will. Our will is a causative agent (because God wills it to be), and our will causes our actions (actions understood in a specific way).

That is cool, but does not explain just how does the equivalence occur.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Paul, I’m going to answer this in two parts, since they are largely different topics. Last part first, following up the conversation with Daneel.

For Daneel’s question: I’d answer that Daneel’s position is one of perspective. From the Divine Order, I’d agree with 1, that God causes our actions, but assert that he’s not a direct cause. Instead, it’s: “G → W → A”. God causes our will. Our will is a causative agent (because God wills it to be), and our will causes our actions (actions understood in a specific way).

This is what I believe. But I also believe that, in order for our will to be truly creative, God must “not be thinking about” what free agents will do at the “moment” He creates them. (I put all references to time/change in quote marks, because God does not work in time). Apparently, this makes me a Molinist, which – I’m happy to note – is not a heresy.

Although believing that God is not simple may be a heresy, unless I interpret simplicity as a tautology.

From the Catholic Encyclopedia, on Molinism:

The idea of the scientia media Molina had borrowed from his celebrated professor, Pedro da Fonseca, S.J., who called it scientia mixta. The justification for this name Molina found in the consideration that, in addition to the Divine knowledge of the purely possible (scientia simplicis intelligentiœ) and the knowledge of the actually existing (scientia visionis), there must be a third kind of “intermediate knowledge”, which embraces all objects that are found neither in the region of pure possibility nor strictly in that of actuality, but partake equally of both extremes and in some sort belong to both kinds of knowledge. In this class are numbered especially those free actions, which, though never destined to be realized in historical fact, would come into existence if certain conditions were fulfilled. A hypothetical occurrence of this kind the theologians call a conditional future occurrence (actus liber conditionate futurus seu futuribilis).

This reflects the debate in the context of our discussion here rather nicely.