What is meant by God's simplicity?

[Paul_Rimmer]

That is cool, but does not explain just how does the equivalence occur.

I’m not sure what you are asking. Are you asking how G->W->A actually works out?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Essentiality of predicates determined individuation; I don’t know much about analytical philosophy and how that defines terms. Perhaps we are encountering equivocal problems due to a misunderstanding of terms.

This is called nominalism. I take a Scotist perspective which says that properties are real thing’s independant of conception.

All I’m saying is that the THING we refer to is not identical to the WORD we use to refer to it. To say that “John is a bachelor” isn’t to say that John possesses “bachelorhood”, but rather to say that “being a bachelor” is an accurate way to describe John. Thus, properties do not exist independently in *any *being. Do we take it that there is a “part” of a bachelor that is not married? No, indeed! The whole darn thing is not married.

I suppose this is a variety of nominalism, but I take the position simply because it seems to me self-evidently true. Now, there are arguments for realism about properties, and if you like we can consider them.

It’s tempting to, as a sort of “further step” here, to say that *every *person is identical to his essence. This would solve the problem, but I’m not sure if I like such a solution. Still, it does have a certain charm to it, since it interprets the concept of action well. An action is NOT a part of a person; it is an expression of the essence of a person. If the person had never encountered the situation, they would not have acted in any such way.

Of course, Catholics – on this interpretation – would believe that free agents determine their essence, not God. (Echoes of Sartre – “existence precedes essence”). I like this line of thought, although it is certainly not fully fleshed out yet.

One problem: if free agents determine their essence, then are they identical to themselves prior to such a determination? Very strange question…

It is a necessary consequence of voluntarism and omniscience. Although compatibilism in it’s modern form is quite distinct.

Slight adjustment: It is a necessary consequence of the belief that: a) we have free will, and b) God is powerless to suspend His omniscience.

True; but only as the product of an essentially ordered series; my action insofar as leaving the pikelet there produces itself an accidentally ordered series which no doubt will end in the consumption of the pikelet. God is not relevant in the latter series.

And this is compatibilism, writ large.

If only there was such a translator! Incidentally; and to avoid confusion - I am not using Thomistic philosophy (with the exception of his definition of simplicity) I am using Scotistic philosophy, which is quite different.

I’ll need to brush up on my Scotus, then. Sounds like fun!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

First off, I don’t really understand possible world semantics either. You probably have a better grasp of them than I do. I like Saul Kripke’s formalism, because it has rules, and as someone who loves mathematics, I like clear rules.

Kripke’s formalism deals with the problem of names and identity. He holds that when we name someone, we are actually referring to the person, to something metaphysical, necessarily. And his argument deals with this possible world semantics, where he says that we can imagine a world where Napoleon, for example, doesn’t invade Russia. But he’s still Napoleon.

Sounds like I’ll like Kripke, in this regard.

I would think that the statement “if God exists, there couldn’t be any other possible world but this one” goes even beyond Leibniz to say not that God wouldn’t have made the world any other way, but that he couldn’t have made the world any other way.

Well, yes, but could God have chosen any other way, and still been God? I don’t know. We’re in deep waters here. I suspect too deep to say anything accurate.

This enters into a Spinozist regime that I’m uncomfortable with. I believe God could have decided not to send His Son to die for us. He would have been totally justified in doing so.

I agree that He would have been justified. But wasn’t it in His character to send His Son? Thus, how could He not do so, and still be Himself?

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

I agree that He would have been justified. But wasn’t it in His character to send His Son? Thus, how could He not do so, and still be Himself?

If God has to do exactly what He’s done, or he wouldn’t be God, in what sense does God have free will?

I prefer St. Thomas Aquinas’s language. All things are possible for God (he is the most free) but what he has done is (possibly among different options) the most fitting for him.

My formulation doesn’t even require this, though. You could have a totally Spinozist God, set to make the universe in only one way, and we can still imagine, as a logical possibility (in the larger scheme), God deciding not to create anything.

In all these logically possible worlds, God is identical. This is Divine Simplicity (as I understand it).

We can imagine a world in which only I exist (as a logically possible, but not metaphyscially possible world; I’m not a necessary being). I could exist with one arm or two, with one leg or two, etc., and would still be me. So I’m a complex being. There are properties that I have, that are not simply relational properties, that are accidental, not essential to who I am. My existence and my essence, in other words, is not identical.

For God, you could imagine a world where only he exists, and is not good (or not loving, etc.), but then he would not be God. Every non-relational property God has is essential. His essence is his existence.

Why this formulation? To distinguish between relational and non-relational properties (the trip-up point of Plantinga in all this).

 

[Betterave]

All I’m saying is that the THING we refer to is not identical to the WORD we use to refer to it. To say that “John is a bachelor” isn’t to say that John possesses “bachelorhood”, but rather to say that “being a bachelor” is an accurate way to describe John. Thus, properties do not exist independently in *any *being. Do we take it that there is a “part” of a bachelor that is not married? No, indeed! The whole darn thing is not married.

I suppose this is a variety of nominalism, but I take the position simply because it seems to me self-evidently true. Now, there are arguments for realism about properties, and if you like we can consider them.

…self-evidently true??

It’s tempting to, as a sort of “further step” here, to say that *every *person is identical to his essence. This would solve the problem, but I’m not sure if I like such a solution. Still, it does have a certain charm to it, since it interprets the concept of action well. An action is NOT a part of a person; it is an expression of the essence of a person. If the person had never encountered the situation, they would not have acted in any such way.

Of course, Catholics – on this interpretation – would believe that free agents determine their essence, not God. (Echoes of Sartre – “existence precedes essence”). I like this line of thought, although it is certainly not fully fleshed out yet.

One problem: if free agents determine their essence, then are they identical to themselves prior to such a determination? Very strange question…

Existence precedes *perfection *of essence - but not essence simpliciter, surely? Things are identical to themselves always, but always imperfectly. Creatures are always (more or less) imperfectly identical to themselves whereas God is essentially and perfectly identical to himself. I think this is a direct corollary of the doctrine of divine simplicity.

Slight adjustment: It is a necessary consequence of the belief that: a) we have free will, and b) God is powerless to suspend His omniscience.

not-(b) is incoherent, imho - and are you suggesting that Molinism implies such a thing? I don’t understand.

 

[Betterave]

If God has to do exactly what He’s done, or he wouldn’t be God, in what sense does God have free will?

I prefer St. Thomas Aquinas’s language. All things are possible for God (he is the most free) but what he has done is (possibly among different options) the most fitting for him.

My formulation doesn’t even require this, though. You could have a totally Spinozist God, set to make the universe in only one way, and we can still imagine, as a logical possibility (in the larger scheme), God deciding not to create anything.

In all these logically possible worlds, God is identical. This is Divine Simplicity (as I understand it).

But according to the ‘real’ doctrine of divine simplicity, we should say that God is perfectly free will, not that God has free will, right? And how can a Spinozist God be identical to the Christian God? Is the Spinozist God essentially characterized by simplicity? (Real questions.) I may be mistaken, but it sounds like you are making a nominalistic assertion about ‘God’ in various logically possible worlds and ignoring divine simplicity as real attribute of a real God, who can not only be conceived as being free to will another possible world, but who actually is so.

 

[R_Daneel]

I’m not sure what you are asking. Are you asking how G->W->A actually works out?

I am interested, just how does it happen that God’s knowledge prefectly reflects our free actions. That is all. The G → W → is not specific.

 

[JohnDamian]

All I’m saying is that the THING we refer to is not identical to the WORD we use to refer to it. To say that “John is a bachelor” isn’t to say that John possesses “bachelorhood”, but rather to say that “being a bachelor” is an accurate way to describe John. Thus, properties do not exist independently in *any *being. Do we take it that there is a “part” of a bachelor that is not married? No, indeed! The whole darn thing is not married.

You are absolutely correct; properties do not exist independant of any thing; for We should never make any distinction between whether a thing exists & what it is, for we never know whether something exists, unless we have some concept of what we know to exist - Opus Oxoniense I 3 1-2.

Thus; existence is identical to essence in both finite and infinite bodies.

One problem: if free agents determine their essence, then are they identical to themselves prior to such a determination? Very strange question…

A free agent cannot create his own essence; because all he can elicit are accidents; which cannot individuate -* Opus Oxoniense II d.3 1 qq6 1-6.*

Slight adjustment: It is a necessary consequence of the belief that: a) we have free will, and b) God is powerless to suspend His omniscience.

A correct understanding of divine simplicity means that one cannot suspend his omniscience; as it is identical to what God is. Nor is the genus of potency when applied by god in omina enough to elicit such a thing; that would be contrary to Catholic theology; De Divina Omnipotentia shows this.

And this is compatibilism, writ large

Determinism only ever elicits a contradiction against voluntarism when the determined element exerts a causal influence over the primacy of the will; which no Catholic should believe.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

…self-evidently true??

I said that it seemed *to me *self-evidently true. But I’m open to realist arguments. (I’m a realist about numbers and personal identity, and probably other things). As for something like omniscience, however, I think that there is no such “thing” as omniscience; omniscience is “just a name” we ascribe to a being who knows everything there is to know.

Existence precedes *perfection *of essence - but not essence simpliciter, surely? Things are identical to themselves always, but always imperfectly. Creatures are always (more or less) imperfectly identical to themselves whereas God is essentially and perfectly identical to himself. I think this is a direct corollary of the doctrine of divine simplicity.

I don’t follow this. I can see that people might not be identical to “who God wants them to be”, or to “who they ought to be”, but I don’t see how they could (at any given moment) not be identical to themselves. I take it that:
**
For all x, x=x.**

Am I missing something?

I don’t think it’s a problem for beings to acquire and lose properties, and I don’t think this incurs any changes in their essence. Essentially, I would say, each human being is “a particular creature of a particular kind” – the kind that walks upright, talks sensibly (at times), and has freedom. Now, certainly some “humans” behave like animals, and thus they do not have freedom, and are not “human beings” as defined above. But they are still precisely what they are, certainly? x=x? No?

not-(b) is incoherent, imho - and are you suggesting that Molinism implies such a thing? I don’t understand.

I don’t know much of anything about Molinism; JohnDamian just put that label on my view, so I went with it. I think it’s compatibilism that is incoherent, so I’m looking for other options. What particular incoherency do you find in not-(b)?

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

I am interested, just how does it happen that God’s knowledge prefectly reflects our free actions.

I don’t know.

 

[JDaniel]

And we are talking about logical priority here, which does not necessarily entail temporal priority. But you say: “the existence of an object in no way interferes with omniscience per se” and that is some type of “middle knowledge”, which is highly problematic. It would accept such propositions: “God has knowledge about the contents of a book, which was never written, because the author was never born, since the parents never met”. Absurd, is it not? To talk about “knowledge” in relation to that nonexistent book does not have any meaning.

Of course the knowldge that you actually drink tea is contingent upon you drinking tea. And thus God’s knowledge is contingent.

Agreed.

The idea of timelessness is not relevant. God’s knowledge is logically dependent on our actions, and that does not imply temporal succession. For the highlighted part: “that is the current problem” - just how does God’s omniscience “operate”. It is a logical error to say “well, there is God’s alleged omniscience” and leave it at that. Imagine someone (Mr. Smith) is rolling dice, one after the other, trillions of times every second, in a closed room. Someone else (Mr. Jones) writes down a set of numbers, also trillions of times every second. The two list turn out to be identical. If the rolling of the dice does not cause what Mr. Jones writes down, and the dice-rolls are not caused by what Mr. Jones wrote down, then what else is there than coincidence?

Which is meaningless, for the same reason as above. If there is an exact correspondence between two sets of events, and neither event causes the other, then we see a “coincidence” on a cosmic scale. You try to cut through this Gordian knot, by stipulating: “well, this is omniscience”?

But you cannot just omit the coincidence, and substitute it with “well, this is omniscience”. This possibility would stipulate a causative factor for our actions, and if one discards option #1, then must also discard this option, too, and for the same reason.

As a matter of fact, most people would immediately choose (and did choose in the past) option #2. They would declare without a second of hesitation, that God’s knowledge reflects our actions. And that would even be sensible, since this choice would not repudiate our free will. And this is where God’s simplicity comes into the pictute. If God’s knowledge is contingent, then God is contingent and that is all.

And there is no way out of this problem. Your assertion, that “this is how omniscience operates” simply does not hold water.

But, neither does your assertion that our “assertion simply does not hold water.” Let’s think about it. God is infinite. Our actions “reflect,” as in a mirror image, onto God, which in no way declares that there is contingency on the part of the mirror.

There is no a priori nor is there any a posteriori in God, whether in reality or in logic. Whatever we happen to be doing is currently being “reflected,” at a level we cannot truly comprehend, in God. Causation, whatever any there be, is not final causation pointing to God. It truly is final causation on our part, issuing forth from our own volition. Our soul is the final cause. Gods connection with the man, while it represents true efficient causality, is a different causality from a final causality that corresponds with God as the raison d’etre. In the same way that a home builder might unintentionally build in a defect that a sub knew about and didn’t correct.

Now, you could assert that God, being Omniscient, should have know about and corrected the defect, but, my point is not to circumlocute the argument with extraneous matter, but to provide, however poorly, an analogy.

God bless,
jd

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

But according to the ‘real’ doctrine of divine simplicity, we should say that God is perfectly free will, not that God has free will, right?

Not in St. Thomas Aquinas’s formulation. God has many different attributes. “Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; ‘a fortiori’ should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.” (Part 1, Q.4, Art.2, Rep. Obj. 1) Also, St. Thomas Aquinas names many of the attributes, or properties, of God.

But in another sense, I think you are right. St. Thomas Aquinas also holds that there is some relationship (that I don’t understand), called analogy, between God’s properties and ours. So God should not have a will in the way we do, but his will is related to ours by analogy.

And how can a Spinozist God be identical to the Christian God?

He can’t. For one thing, he’s not free. But, even Spinoza’s God is in one sense trivially simple. He’d be the same in every metaphysically possible world because for Spinoza every metaphysically possible world would be identical. However, it seems possible to imagine other worlds in the first place, and for Spinoza, these would involve different Gods for different worlds, and so God isn’t simple in that sense, for Spinoza.

I may be mistaken, but it sounds like you are making a nominalistic assertion about ‘God’ in various logically possible worlds and ignoring divine simplicity as real attribute of a real God, who can not only be conceived as being free to will another possible world, but who actually is so.

Well, there is a real problem in this, Plantinga’s problem. Let’s just say that divine simplicity means that all of God’s properties are essential properties, and only talk about God in this world, leaving aside the “many worlds” semantics, for now. One of God’s properties is his thought that I exist. Because he thinks this, his thinking this, as a property, must necessarily be part of God, and so I have to exist. Now I’m also a necessary being. But it’s worse than that. Everything I do is now also necessary. Since God knows everything, everything I do and think and will is done and thought and willed necessarily.

Aquinas already thought of this objection (amazingly; the guy blows me away), and answered it by dividing God’s properties into “relational” and “non-relational” properties. However, it’s very hard for me, and for Plantinga, to come up with a clear distinction between these two kinds of properties (sadly, St. Thomas never provided a clear distinction in his writings). One way is to adopt the many-worlds semantics (which Plantinga, Stump, and most analytical philosophers favor anyway). Many-worlds semantics (at least for Kripke’s formalism) are decidedly not nominalist.

This is a serious problem today for Thomism, but humorously, one I imagine St. Thomas would have been able to solve in the span of a couple hours. A two hour problem for Aquinas appears to be a generation-long problem (at least) for contemporary philosophy. So much for contemporary philosophy.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, there is a real problem in this, Plantinga’s problem. Let’s just say that divine simplicity means that all of God’s properties are essential properties, and only talk about God in this world, leaving aside the “many worlds” semantics, for now. One of God’s properties is his thought that I exist. Because he thinks this, his thinking this, as a property, must necessarily be part of God, and so I have to exist. Now I’m also a necessary being. But it’s worse than that. Everything I do is now also necessary. Since God knows everything, everything I do and think and will is done and thought and willed necessarily.

This is exactly the objection I’ve got in mind.

 

[JohnDamian]

Well, there is a real problem in this, Plantinga’s problem. Let’s just say that divine simplicity means that all of God’s properties are essential properties, and only talk about God in this world, leaving aside the “many worlds” semantics, for now. One of God’s properties is his thought that I exist. Because he thinks this, his thinking this, as a property, must necessarily be part of God, and so I have to exist. Now I’m also a necessary being. But it’s worse than that. Everything I do is now also necessary. Since God knows everything, everything I do and think and will is done and thought and willed necessarily.

That certainly required some reading…

(Treatise on First Principle) – 4.44 …Whatever is identical with this being [God], exists necessarily. The existence of other intelligible things is not a necessary existance. A being that is necessary of itself is prior by nature to everything that does not necesssarily exist.

4.45. Another Proof; The existence of every other thing is dependent upon this as a cause (3.19) and since it is the cause of some such being; a knowlege of the same by the cause is also required. Therefore this cognition is prior by nature to the existence of the thing known.

–

It follows from this that you do not exist necessarily; for you exist contingently both in causal terms to the essential order you are a product of; and the cognition of the omniscient being. Even if you may be a necessary product of this order(par accidents); you are not a necessary being per se; as the productive order that instigated you (causal and cognative) was enacted contingently. Thus; you are a necessary product of a contingent order; thus you are per se contingent.

 

[Betterave]

I said that it seemed *to me *self-evidently true. But I’m open to realist arguments. (I’m a realist about numbers and personal identity, and probably other things). As for something like omniscience, however, I think that there is no such “thing” as omniscience; omniscience is “just a name” we ascribe to a being who knows everything there is to know.

As I understand the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), omniscience is a singular attribute of God, to which God is identical. So to say there is no such thing as omniscience in this context is to say there is no such thing as God.

I don’t follow this. I can see that people might not be identical to “who God wants them to be”, or to “who they ought to be”, but I don’t see how they could (at any given moment) not be identical to themselves. I take it that:
**
For all x, x=x.**

Am I missing something?

I don’t think it’s a problem for beings to acquire and lose properties, and I don’t think this incurs any changes in their essence. Essentially, I would say, each human being is “a particular creature of a particular kind” – the kind that walks upright, talks sensibly (at times), and has freedom. Now, certainly some “humans” behave like animals, and thus they do not have freedom, and are not “human beings” as defined above. But they are still precisely what they are, certainly? x=x? No?

Well I did say that all creatures are identical to themselves, so I’m certainly not denying that x=x. To say they are imperfectly identical to themselves expresses the idea that they come to be and are always changing, so they are not perfectly ‘identical’ to who they will be and who they have been, even if they retain an essential identity. Perfect identity pertains to God alone. The concept of essence (or any concept) is not applied univocally to God and creature. Thus the essential identity of man is real, but imperfect relative to that of God (such that God has no accidental properties, but man does).

I don’t know much of anything about Molinism; JohnDamian just put that label on my view, so I went with it. I think it’s compatibilism that is incoherent, so I’m looking for other options. What particular incoherency do you find in not-(b)?

A self-evident incoherency. Omniscience excludes any lack of knowledge, it seems!

 

[Betterave]

Not in St. Thomas Aquinas’s formulation. God has many different attributes. “Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; ‘a fortiori’ should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.” (Part 1, Q.4, Art.2, Rep. Obj. 1) Also, St. Thomas Aquinas names many of the attributes, or properties, of God.

But in another sense, I think you are right. St. Thomas Aquinas also holds that there is some relationship (that I don’t understand), called analogy, between God’s properties and ours. So God should not have a will in the way we do, but his will is related to ours by analogy.

Certainly, the notion of analogy is crucial for Aquinas (on whom you seem to be more of an expert than I, btw). But I think in your quote it is inaccurate to suggest that Aquinas’ formulation is contradictory to my point: here he would say will pre-exists in God (the cause of all things) and that God is identical to his will, not simply that God has a will, as men do. In any case, if you bear in mind that the ‘having’ of will in God is not univocal to the ‘having’ of will in man, then we’re okay.

He can’t. For one thing, he’s not free. But, even Spinoza’s God is in one sense trivially simple. He’d be the same in every metaphysically possible world because for Spinoza every metaphysically possible world would be identical. However, it seems possible to imagine other worlds in the first place, and for Spinoza, these would involve different Gods for different worlds, and so God isn’t simple in that sense, for Spinoza.

I fail to see how this addresses the central notion of DDS: that all of God’s attributes are really identical - of course in all possible worlds, but that’s really not the point, is it? We must distinguish His attributes, but only because we are unable to think about God except on analogy to ourselves.

Well, there is a real problem in this, Plantinga’s problem. Let’s just say that divine simplicity means that all of God’s properties are essential properties, and only talk about God in this world, leaving aside the “many worlds” semantics, for now. One of God’s properties is his thought that I exist. Because he thinks this, his thinking this, as a property, must necessarily be part of God, and so I have to exist. Now I’m also a necessary being. But it’s worse than that. Everything I do is now also necessary. Since God knows everything, everything I do and think and will is done and thought and willed necessarily.

Interesting. But I don’t see the bite of the objection. Yes, God’s knowledge (‘thought’) includes the content of the proposition ‘Paul exists,’ but that is part of the broader knowledge about the manner of your existence, namely that you exist precisely as a contingent creation that He himself willed into existence. So what’s the problem?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

As I understand the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), omniscience is a singular attribute of God, to which God is identical. So to say there is no such thing as omniscience in this context is to say there is no such thing as God.

But then God also has the property of being good, to which He is (on your interpretation) identical. But, unfortunately, Mary also has the property of being good, from which it follows that Mary is God.

Your solution, I would imagine, is to say that Mary’s goodness is not the same as God’s goodness. So far, so good: but is this a difference of **kind **or a difference of degree? If it is a difference of kind, then we cannot discover anything of God’s kind of goodness by looking at Mary – but this is clearly false. If it is a difference of degree, then it would follow that Mary is *partially *God, since she has a portion of one of His qualities.

This second option is clearly preferable, but it does seem to dispense with individual identity apart from God. And – critics would claim – this is precisely the sort of “nonsense” that results from a neo-Platonic realism about properties. Personally, I find the idea interesting, although it is definitely a form of mysticism.

Well I did say that all creatures are identical to themselves, so I’m certainly not denying that x=x. To say they are imperfectly identical to themselves expresses the idea that they come to be and are always changing, so they are not perfectly ‘identical’ to who they will be and who they have been, even if they retain an essential identity. Perfect identity pertains to God alone. The concept of essence (or any concept) is not applied univocally to God and creature. Thus the essential identity of man is real, but imperfect relative to that of God (such that God has no accidental properties, but man does).

Here we have degrees of being. But I just don’t understand this, to put it bluntly. When I say that “God exists”, I am saying that there *is *an entity – God – about which other things may be true. When I say that “Billy Joel exists”, I am saying precisely the same thing about Billy Joel. Or so it seems to me.

A self-evident incoherency. Omniscience excludes any lack of knowledge, it seems!

Ah, that.

I would like that knowing the future freely willed actions of persons at the “moment” you are creating them is a contradiction. Certainly, if I created a computer program which I knew would choose to destroy the power grid of North America, it would be nonsense to say that the program was choosing “freely”. (And yet, the computer program chose as it liked).

Thus, if omnipotence includes the power to create beings with free will – which I take it does! – then omniscience cannot be defined comprehensively as “knowledge of all there is to know (at all “times”)”. So either omnipotence, omniscience, or free will has to go, and I choose to jettison omniscience – but only as classically defined. I would be happy to affirm any definition that takes omniscience to mean “all knowledge compatible with the freedom of will”.

 

[Betterave]

But then God also has the property of being good, to which He is (on your interpretation) identical. But, unfortunately, Mary also has the property of being good, from which it follows that Mary is God.

Your solution, I would imagine, is to say that Mary’s goodness is not the same as God’s goodness. So far, so good: but is this a difference of **kind **or a difference of degree? If it is a difference of kind, then we cannot discover anything of God’s kind of goodness by looking at Mary – but this is clearly false. If it is a difference of degree, then it would follow that Mary is *partially *God, since she has a portion of one of His qualities.

This second option is clearly preferable, but it does seem to dispense with individual identity apart from God. And – critics would claim – this is precisely the sort of “nonsense” that results from a neo-Platonic realism about properties. Personally, I find the idea interesting, although it is definitely a form of mysticism.

This is where analogy comes in - it’s neither univocal (different only in degree) nor equivocal (entirely different in kind). It’s analogous. Mary’s goodness indeed points to God’s goodness, but it is different in more than just degree. You might insist that it then must be different in kind, but the point is that it is not so different that it fails to discover anything of God’s goodness to us, or that there is no grounds for our common ascription of goodness to both.

Here we have degrees of being. But I just don’t understand this, to put it bluntly. When I say that “God exists”, I am saying that there *is *an entity – God – about which other things may be true. When I say that “Billy Joel exists”, I am saying precisely the same thing about Billy Joel. Or so it seems to me.

You can say this, certainly, and intend to limit your meaning to something that is univocally predicable of God and Billy Joel. But the fact remains that the realities you refer to belong to different categories at the most fundamental level (according to this view, anyway). I can’t see any reason to deny this - can you?

I would -]like/-] think that knowing the future freely willed actions of persons at the “moment” you are creating them is a contradiction. Certainly, if I created a computer program which I knew would choose to destroy the power grid of North America, it would be nonsense to say that the program was choosing “freely”. (And yet, the computer program chose as it liked).

Thus, if omnipotence includes the power to create beings with free will – which I take it does! – then omniscience cannot be defined comprehensively as “knowledge of all there is to know (at all “times”)”. So either omnipotence, omniscience, or free will has to go, and I choose to jettison omniscience – but only as classically defined. I would be happy to affirm any definition that takes omniscience to mean “all knowledge compatible with the freedom of will”.

Well it is a hard concept to wrap one’s head around. I think you have to pay attention to the discursive element in your computer program analogy - the indecision, deliberation, followed by decision, action, knowledge. You have to recognize that this (perhaps only subconsciously imagined) discursive element somehow needs to be eliminated in order to create a just analogy.

Also, do you think we are computer programs, or that computer programs have wills and intellects? It would seem to me that a computer program lacks these faculties and so, yes, it is nonsense to say it would be choosing freely, in the same sense in which we do so.

Then there is the objection that when we try to think about the alternative you propose, it is more clearly nonsense: if God doesn’t know what his creatures will freely do at the moment he creates them, when does he know? How does he find out? Does omniscience just mean omniobservant and omniremembering in your scenario?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

This is where analogy comes in - it’s neither univocal (different only in degree) nor equivocal (entirely different in kind). It’s analogous. Mary’s goodness indeed points to God’s goodness, but it is different in more than just degree. You might insist that it then must be different in kind, but the point is that it is not so different that it fails to discover anything of God’s goodness to us, or that there is no grounds for our common ascription of goodness to both.

Are you familiar with trope theory? This sounds just like trope theory, which is a response to the realist/nominalist argument. When I say that “Socrates is clever” and “Thales is clever”, am I really saying that the two men have the same thing: that is, cleverness? You might say, no, because the two do not talk about the same things, approach things in the same manner, etc. So there seem to be two things: 1) Socrates’ cleverness, and 2) Thales’ cleverness. This is trope theory.

But in what relation to Socrates’ and Thales’ clevernesses stand? Here the trope theorist, who earlier rejected the universal cleverness, is forced to say that both clevernesses have something in common; call it proto-cleverness.

So if we do this maneuver with God’s goodness and Mary’s goodness, we end up with proto-goodness. But then a question: Does God possess protogoodness? If you say yes, then we’re back saying Mary is God. If you say no, then you’ve contradicted yourself. Of course, you can appeal to the fact that our reasoning could necessarily not grasp the concepts here, but that’s always the case.

You can say this, certainly, and intend to limit your meaning to something that is univocally predicable of God and Billy Joel. But the fact remains that the realities you refer to belong to different categories at the most fundamental level (according to this view, anyway). I can’t see any reason to deny this - can you?

Which different categories? Is God’s existence in a spiritual category and Joel’s existence in a physical category? Or necessary versus contingent? I can’t evaluate the claim till I know what the claim is.

Well it is a hard concept to wrap one’s head around. I think you have to pay attention to the discursive element in your computer program analogy - the indecision, deliberation, followed by decision, action, knowledge. You have to recognize that this (perhaps only subconsciously imagined) discursive element somehow needs to be eliminated in order to create a just analogy.

Certainly, the analogy is imperfect. But I think it is still rather convincing.

Also, do you think we are computer programs, or that computer programs have wills and intellects? It would seem to me that a computer program lacks these faculties and so, yes, it is nonsense to say it would be choosing freely, in the same sense in which we do so.

Well, one can imagine these things of a computer program, whether or not they are metaphysically possible. I am tempted to think that matter arranged in a certain – extremely precise – way, becomes conscious. But that’s just my functionalist alter-ego talking. I really have no idea.

Then there is the objection that when we try to think about the alternative you propose, it is more clearly nonsense: if God doesn’t know what his creatures will freely do at the moment he creates them, when does he know? How does he find out?

This is very good question. My answer is admittedly ad hoc. I would propose that God “closes His eyes” when He has reason to close His eyes, and opens them at every other time. This is extremely similar to the understanding of the Incarnation that says that Jesus did not grow up knowing – i.e. being conscious of – everything. Why not? Because He wouldn’t have been fully a man if He had so egregiously bypassed such a fundamental reality of manhood.

God limits Himself for a time, when there is a need. This is so firmly a teaching of the Church that we might at least consider it, when addressing the problem of free will.

 

[Betterave]

Are you familiar with trope theory? This sounds just like trope theory, which is a response to the realist/nominalist argument. When I say that “Socrates is clever” and “Thales is clever”, am I really saying that the two men have the same thing: that is, cleverness? You might say, no, because the two do not talk about the same things, approach things in the same manner, etc. So there seem to be two things: 1) Socrates’ cleverness, and 2) Thales’ cleverness. This is trope theory.

But in what relation to Socrates’ and Thales’ clevernesses stand? Here the trope theorist, who earlier rejected the universal cleverness, is forced to say that both clevernesses have something in common; call it proto-cleverness.

So if we do this maneuver with God’s goodness and Mary’s goodness, we end up with proto-goodness. But then a question: Does God possess protogoodness? If you say yes, then we’re back saying Mary is God. If you say no, then you’ve contradicted yourself. Of course, you can appeal to the fact that our reasoning could necessarily not grasp the concepts here, but that’s always the case.

I’m not sure exactly what to say here - good objections… I would suggest that the claim here should be that there is no such real thing as protogoodness. Protogoodness is a second-order concept, rather transparently derived from first-order concepts of goodness. Such a notion, then, is merely a derivative from the first-order concepts (which are abstracted from real instances of goodness). Also, I would note, the distinction between different ‘tropes’ of goodness here is only applicable between goodness of creator and goodness of creature.

I would also add that whereas God is his (essential) goodness, Mary genuinely has the property of goodness. So we could never conclude that Mary is God, only that Mary has (participates), in a particular way, the divine nature.

Which different categories? Is God’s existence in a spiritual category and Joel’s existence in a physical category? Or necessary versus contingent? I can’t evaluate the claim till I know what the claim is.

How about… necessary, simple, uncaused, omniscient creator vs. contingent, composite, caused, limited-in-knowledge creature. Or: essence is existence vs. existence is a perfection/accomplishment/bringing-to-completion of essence.

Certainly, the analogy is imperfect. But I think it is still rather convincing.

Convincing in itself, or to us? (assuming you accept this distinction)

Well, one can imagine these things of a computer program, whether or not they are metaphysically possible. I am tempted to think that matter arranged in a certain – extremely precise – way, becomes conscious. But that’s just my functionalist alter-ego talking. I really have no idea.

In that case, where you are referring to a program that is genuinely intellective, then you couldn’t make such a program. But I don’t see why it would be absurd for God to do so.

This is very good question. My answer is admittedly ad hoc. I would propose that God “closes His eyes” when He has reason to close His eyes, and opens them at every other time. This is extremely similar to the understanding of the Incarnation that says that Jesus did not grow up knowing – i.e. being conscious of – everything. Why not? Because He wouldn’t have been fully a man if He had so egregiously bypassed such a fundamental reality of manhood.

God limits Himself for a time, when there is a need. This is so firmly a teaching of the Church that we might at least consider it, when addressing the problem of free will.

I agree those are points worth thinking about. However, I think only the incarnation, the hypostatic union, would make possible this kind of virtual eye-closing. And I don’t think it makes sense to say that Jesus at any point was genuinely cut off from the divine omniscience - if he had been, he wouldn’t have been God. I think it much less likely that God can close his eyes to his knowledge, when He ‘has a reason to do so,’ than that we could do such a thing - and it is possible for us sometimes, sometimes it’s a quasi-necessary coping strategy perhaps, but it’s never laudable in itself, and I don’t see why it would be in God. What you’re describing sounds like God just pretending he doesn’t know, doesn’t it? And to me that again sounds like nonsense.