What is meant by God's simplicity?

[R_Daneel]

But, neither does your assertion that our “assertion simply does not hold water.”

How does this “omniscience” operate? To say that it “does somehow” is not an argument to be taken seriously.

Let’s think about it. God is infinite. Our actions “reflect,” as in a mirror image, onto God, which in no way declares that there is contingency on the part of the mirror.

But of course it does. If there is nothing in front of that mirror, then there is nothing to reflect. The existence of something in front of that mirror is logically necessary to have a reflection.

 

[JohnDamian]

But of course it does. If there is nothing in front of that mirror, then there is nothing to reflect. The existence of something in front of that mirror is logically necessary to have a reflection.

Here we have the problem.

Taking the mirror analogy; God’s omniscience is not the reflection but the reflective capacity..

That is to say; whilst the reflection itself is contingent upon the object; the mirror will have reflective capacity regardless of the object. This is how omniscience seems to operate.

 

[R_Daneel]

Here we have the problem.

Taking the mirror analogy; God’s omniscience is not the reflection but the reflective capacity..

That is to say; whilst the reflection itself is contingent upon the object; the mirror will have reflective capacity regardless of the object. This is how omniscience seems to operate.

I partially agree with your argument. The analogy is not precise, as it is usally the case. With the mirror we know how the reflection happens. We know what properties of the mirror give it the reflective ability. None of this is applicable to God.

I am not interested in the “reflective ability”, in other words, “how does God’s omniscience operate”? I am simply saying that the “ability to reflect” may not be contingent upon the “stuff to be reflected”, but what is reflected is contingent upon it.

The problem is again splitting the “omniscience” into two parts, 1) the ability to know, and 2) the actual knowledge. This distinction is invalid if God is truly simple.

 

[JohnDamian]

The problem is again splitting the “omniscience” into two parts, 1) the ability to know, and 2) the actual knowledge. This distinction is invalid if God is truly simple.

Not necessarily; only the ability to know all thing’s is predicated of God’s essence; which is identical to his existence (thus; simple).

His specific knowlege; like his specific acts (from omnipotency); are not part of his essence; and are not therefore predicated of him; and are not in any way part of what constitutes omnipotence/omniscience; and thus irrelevant to the notion of God’s simplicity.

God having the power to know all (aliqui) things is God having omniscience; likewise God having the power to do all (aliquid) things is God having omnipotence.

The products of these things are contingent; we could say that the praxis of God’s omnipotence is contingent; he cannot smite Sodom unless it is ther. We can likewise say the praxis of his omniscience is contingent; he cannot know Job unless Job is there.

However; these things are merely the consequential praxis of God’s divine and simple attributes; and they are accidents of that. We know that accidents are not predicated of an essence; and thus they are irrelevant to his Divine simplicity.

I must say however; challenging questions!

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

Betterave,

Since I’m not confident on how “analogy” is to be understood in the context of analytical philosophy, I cannot offer anything enlightening to the first part of your post. I generally agree, though, that analogy is a useful way to talk about God, and that properties like goodness,etc. cannot be univocally attributed to God and man. I understand that I disagree with the likes of Scotus on this. I’ve tried to read his arguments, but I don’t understand them.

So I’ll side with you, Betterave, and just say to John Damien “my scholastic theologian can beat up your scholastic theologian.”

Interesting. But I don’t see the bite of the objection. Yes, God’s knowledge (‘thought’) includes the content of the proposition ‘Paul exists,’ but that is part of the broader knowledge about the manner of your existence, namely that you exist precisely as a contingent creation that He himself willed into existence. So what’s the problem?

Well, I’m with R Daneel on this point. God can’t know what isn’t so, because that isn’t really knowledge. So if God didn’t make me (and for the time I didn’t exist; I don’t understand what it means for God to be outside the dimension of time, but that’s another issue entirely) God wouldn’t be thinking thinking “Paul exists”. So his thinking “Paul exists as a contingent being” isn’t necessary to him. It could be removed, and God would still be God. So God isn’t complex.

My answer to this argument (while fully respecting its formidable power) is to say that that’s not what Divine Simplicity really is.

For a better description of the problem (and to maybe find good reasons my “solution” really doesn’t work), consult Eleonore Stump’s “Aquinas”, Chapter 3. You can find a good part of it online: books.google.com/books?id=qSQdPlKdu5MC&lpg=PP1&dq=Eleonore%20Stump%20Aquinas&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false

For a statement of the argument from the emminent philospher who posed it, you can find it on closertotruth.com/video-profile/Can-God-Change-Alvin-Plantinga-/1269

 

[Prodigal_Son]

For a statement of the argument from the emminent philospher who posed it, you can find it on closertotruth.com/video-profile/Can-God-Change-Alvin-Plantinga-/1269

As an aside, I’m not sure that philosophers can ever be eminent – or rather, as soon as they become eminent, we have started ignoring their arguments and lending authority to their name. But, in philosophy, “authority” is a bad word. This is not to say that philosophical arguments cannot be made to follow authorities (they certainly can!), but simply to say that someone’s being an authority is no reason to believe them.

Philosophers can certainly be imminent, which may be considered a misfortune to those downwind.

 

[Paul_Rimmer]

As an aside, I’m not sure that philosophers can ever be eminent – or rather, as soon as they become eminent, we have started ignoring their arguments and lending authority to their name. But, in philosophy, “authority” is a bad word. This is not to say that philosophical arguments cannot be made to follow authorities (they certainly can!), but simply to say that someone’s being an authority is no reason to believe them.

I only use the word to mean that he’s done good work, and that I generally take his arguments seriously. Since I’m not a philosopher or professional student of philosophy (though I am an avid philosophy hobbyist) I’m not the best person to judge these sorts of arguments. I’ll be happy to speculate, but this is far outside my area of expertise.

 

[R_Daneel]

Not necessarily; only the ability to know all thing’s is predicated of God’s essence; which is identical to his existence (thus; simple).

His specific knowlege; like his specific acts (from omnipotency); are not part of his essence; and are not therefore predicated of him; and are not in any way part of what constitutes omnipotence/omniscience; and thus irrelevant to the notion of God’s simplicity.

God having the power to know all (aliqui) things is God having omniscience; likewise God having the power to do all (aliquid) things is God having omnipotence.

The products of these things are contingent; we could say that the praxis of God’s omnipotence is contingent; he cannot smite Sodom unless it is ther. We can likewise say the praxis of his omniscience is contingent; he cannot know Job unless Job is there.

However; these things are merely the consequential praxis of God’s divine and simple attributes; and they are accidents of that. We know that accidents are not predicated of an essence; and thus they are irrelevant to his Divine simplicity.

I must say however; challenging questions!

I understand your line of reasoning, but I evaluate it differenty. What you say is that God’s “active” knowledge is somehow “auxiliary” to God, like a hard disk is “external” to the main memory. Yes, I know that the analogy is imprecise. Let’s put it this way: is God’s actual knowledge “alien” to God, or does it form part of God’s indivisible self?

The truth is that in either case God is not simple. You separate God into an “essence” and into “accidents’”- which immediately contradicts “simplicity”. In my eyes you defined “simplicity” in order to accommodate the contingent part. But this still makes God contingent - in this respect. And, as far as I know God is not supposed to be contingent - in any respect.

 

[JohnDamian]

The truth is that in either case God is not simple. You separate God into an “essence” and into “accidents’”- which immediately contradicts “simplicity”. In my eyes you defined “simplicity” in order to accommodate the contingent part. But this still makes God contingent - in this respect. And, as far as I know God is not supposed to be contingent - in any respect.

I do seperate God; insofar as his essence is what he is; and his accident is not what he is. In doing this I refer to Scotus Ordinatio II. d.3, part 1, QQ 6 142-212: so I am not just making this up as I go.

Therefore; no formal or real contrarity is entailed by such a seperation.