What is Metaphysics & Why Is It A Valid Means Of Describing Reality?

[MindOverMatter]

What is Metaphysics & Why Is It A Valid Means Of Describing Reality?

I have never seen a thread devoted entirely to Metaphysics. I am going to take a back seat on this, as i want to see a debate rather then get involved at the moment. But i realize that there are allot of people who seem to think that Metaphysics is hocus pocus; and thats people who are both theist and atheist.

Is there anybody who cares to defend Metaphysics?

 

[Areopagite]

Metaphysics is the investigation/study of the universal principles that apply to all sciences/knowledge.

It can traditionally be broke up into various ways, commonly into general metaphysics and special metaphysics. Special metaphysics is usually divided up into* cosmology, psychology, and theodicy* (a.k.a. natural theology … what we can know of God through natural reason). General metaphysics is more or less equivalent to ontology. Ontology is the study of being. Sometimes, according to some opinions, metaphysics should be subdivided into ontology and universal science. Universal science (or this could be considered one part of ontology) is the study of universal principles that are necessary for all other sciences and perhaps even knowledge in general. Such first principles famously include the principle of non-contradiction, which states that a thing cannot be a not be at the same time in the same way. Another first principle, based off that is the principle of the excluded middle.

Ontology, which is the study of being and a subdivision of metaphysics (as stated earlier), concerns itself with understanding what we mean by the very basic concepts that relate to being, such as the terms “thing,” “quantity,” “quality,” “relation,” “action,” “reception,” “time,” “location,” “posture,” “state,” “attribute,” “substance,” “type,” “necessity,” “possibility,” “essence,” “existence,” “nature,” and even “reality.” Such things are very universal and transcendent of all sciences and thinking, and yet can be studied and looked at with a kind of organized method that qualifies it as a science. This involves investigating how we use these aforementioned terms, what their exact definitions are, and then carefully understanding how the terms should be used consistently so as to clarify thinking in all sciences. If one objects and says metaphysics is just a vague and uncertain cloud of mist wherein shady practices are performed, they are essentially saying that these terms cannot be defined and/or cannot be used consistently. If that is the case, then, these basic concepts upon which all other sciences are formed, being without solid meaning, causes all science to fail as a serious and reliable kind of knowledge. Thus, it is important to get these fundamental concepts down, clearly, systematically, to make sure how we use them and what general implications follow. And, in short, they all have to pertain, ultimately, to the idea of being.

The definition of “being” (in short) in ontology is “that which can exist.” This covers a lot. And actually, by a curious coincidence, it covers everything. Everything possible as well as existing. Being not only includes animals, plants, and people, but it also includes colors, karate moves, the idea of being late for your dentist appointment … literally everything. Ontology, ironically, also includes a study of non-being, i.e. nothing. A square circle is an example of a non-being. It does not have being because its essence contradicts itself, violating the principle of non-contradiction. It does not fulfill the definition of being, which is “that which can exist.” There is of course a distinction between that which has the the intrinsic possibility to exist versus that which has the extrinsic possibility to exist. A pink elephant has the intrinsic possibility to exist because there is nothing contradictory in its essence, but it can be said that, at least for us, it doesn’t have an extrinsic possibility to exist because nothing can produce it (except God of course … but that’s cheating). Nonetheless, it has intrinsic possibility and thus is included in being. Just because it has being, however, does not mean it has existence. For again, being is that which can exist (but might not actually exist at a given moment).

What does metaphysics have to do with reality? Well, for one, I think it might be the only science to define what reality is. Reality is being that can have existence independent of the mind. The pink elephant, for example, is thing with real possible existence, though not real actual existence. A gray elephant, however, has real actual existence. Notice that in talking about real things, the terms “real,” “actual,” and “existence” are used, which are terms studied principally in metaphysics. If one were to argue that these terms do not pertain to reality, and even deny that terms “quantity,” “quality,” “action,” “time,” etc., don’t pertain to reality either … then you may have a case for rejecting metaphysics. I would be curious though … what DOES pertain to reality then? Kant claimed that we cannot know reality at all and that all our ideas pertain to our distorted mental experience of reality and not to reality itself. If that’s the case, even physics would not pertain to reality, since we can only study physics through our experience. Denying metaphysics, in short, denies the mind’s ability to grasp reality and being in general.

Man … I could go on … but I think someone might try to kill me. I will be impressed if anyone reads anything I just said. I kind of cut-corners too a little bit on some of the concepts here, so I expect some requests for clarification. Well, I hope it helps turn a light on for some people. It’s a pretty important field, metaphysics. In fact, as I go through life, all arguments seem to be caused by someone not thinking clearly about some metaphysical principle. I know that’s quite a claim, but it’s probably true. Well, a good deal of the time at least. People used to study metaphysics a lot more, even Protestants and non-theists, and because of that, the sciences weren’t so segregated from each other due to the fact that they were united in some way by the universal language of metaphysics. But people are forgetting it, and the quality of education seems to be getting quite low. But anyway, **for those who attack metaphysics … I’d like to know why. ** I’m betting you went through some bad experience of some pseudo-intellectual who said some random, cloudy, and subjective garbage and called it metaphysics in an attempt to disprove you on something. If so, I don’t blame you. Such a thing is a traumatic experience. But let’s hear your anger. Let’s hear your objections. It’ll benefit you, and me, and everyone. But, if you didn’t read this, that’s okay too.

 

[Tamsulosin]

I am not adding anything at this moment or advancing the topic, but just saying I very much enjoyed this clear an informative piece that wonderfully explained the different concepts:thumbsup:
In fact I will print it up for future reference.Thanks, Tam

 

[Prodigal_Son]

“Why is metaphysics a valid means of describing reality?” is a strange question, a bit like asking “why are words a good way of describing a symphony?” Metaphysics is not a particularly good way of describing reality, I suppose, but we have no other way.

Consider: “The snow is white.” Metaphysics is about such questions as: Are you saying that “snow” and “white” are the same thing? Is “white” a property of the snow? Is my observation that the snow is white referencing an external reality, or only a mental reality? Is there any difference between external and mental realities? If two of us call the snow “white”, how do we know we are describing the same phenomenon? Does “white” exist over and above its instances in the world? Could there be a world without white?

There is no scientific way to talk about such things, because they are not scientific questions. We’re stuck with metaphysics.

 

[geometer]

“Why is metaphysics a valid means of describing reality?” is a strange question, a bit like asking “why are words a good way of describing a symphony?” Metaphysics is not a particularly good way of describing reality, I suppose, but we have no other way.

Consider: “The snow is white.” Metaphysics is about such questions as: Are you saying that “snow” and “white” are the same thing? Is “white” a property of the snow? Is my observation that the snow is white referencing an external reality, or only a mental reality? Is there any difference between external and mental realities? If two of us call the snow “white”, how do we know we are describing the same phenomenon? Does “white” exist over and above its instances in the world? Could there be a world without white?

There is no scientific way to talk about such things, because they are not scientific questions. We’re stuck with metaphysics.

Well, you have left out a whole lot of scientific information about vision, color, optical properties of snow, etc…

The snow is white, may be simply imprecise, but we know what is meant by that statement. If snow were illuminated by red light, then would you say that the snow is red?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, you have left out a whole lot of scientific information about vision, color, optical properties of snow, etc…

The snow is white, may be simply imprecise, but we know what is meant by that statement. If snow were illuminated by red light, then would you say that the snow is red?

Yes. The snow would “be” red then. Your saying that it is white depends on a certain type of light striking it. My saying that it’s red depends on a different type of light. Colors are perceptual experiences. You’re talking about something else, some scientific phenomena – hue, perhaps.

Don’t you find it curious that a rectangle is *never * perfectly rectangular in the eye of the beholder, because of the distance of our eyes to the edges of it? How do we get the idea of a rectangle, then?

 

[jkiernan56]

Metaphysics is the investigation/study of the universal principles that apply to all sciences/knowledge.

I will be impressed if anyone reads anything I just said. I kind of cut-corners too a little bit on some of the concepts here, so I expect some requests for clarification. Well, I hope it helps turn a light on for some people.

Thank you very much for your brief explanation of metaphysics. I thoroughly enjoyed it.

 

[Newbot]

I really enjoyed your post, Areopagite – short or not, it was remarkably clear. There were a few questions I had, though…

The definition of “being” (in short) in ontology is "that which can exist."

Why the can? Is it because you want to include both actual and potential beings? I would have said that “a being” (ens) is that which has “being” (esse) – which is basically what you said, but without the can – but added that it is an actual or potential being depending on whether it had being actually or potentially. But I’m sure you had a good reason for including the can.

Another quick question, if I may: are these particular beings, or kinds of beings, or are you abstracting from the distinction?

If one objects and says metaphysics is just a vague and uncertain cloud of mist wherein shady practices are performed, they are essentially saying that these terms cannot be defined and/or cannot be used consistently. If that is the case, then, these basic concepts upon which all other sciences are formed, being without solid meaning, causes all science to fail as a serious and reliable kind of knowledge.

Nice .

Kant claimed that we cannot know reality at all and that all our ideas pertain to our distorted mental experience of reality and not to reality itself.

Just to clarify, I imagine Kant would say that the mind, not so much distorts experience, as interprets it, in order to make sense of it and unify it. In other words, to have an actual experience, the raw manifold of sensation is not enough: we need to distinguish shapes and positions and times and objects and so forth, information not contained in the manifold but imposed by the mind. Perhaps a small distinction, but might as well give Kant his due. I think what you said about the impossibility of science concerning external reality still follows.

There is no scientific way to talk about such things, because they are not scientific questions. We’re stuck with metaphysics.

By “scientific” I presume you mean the scientific method used in natural science – gathering experience, forming a hypothesis relating measurable quantities through induction, testing by experiments and predictions, etc. – in which case what you said is quite right: metaphysical questions cannot use that method at all. But might you clarify why the next sentence follows? My own first impression would be, not that we’re stuck with metaphysics, as if we would prefer the method of natural science if we could use it, but rather that metaphysics therefore has its own method appropriate to it. To try to answer “what is ‘oneness’?” by taking measurements and writing equations would be like trying to prove the Pythagorean theorem by saying that it is to the advantage of the squares and an adaptive characteristic that it is so.

Of course we might discuss which method has more certitude – which is probably what you were getting at. One might argue that, whereas the method of natural science yields clear and palpable evidence for the conclusions it proposes, metaphysics has no such experimental or external basis to test against. One has to rely on the strength of the reasoning itself, and thus one is in danger of being misled by any sophist who cleverly conceals his errors. There aren’t many sophists in natural science, because their conclusions just don’t work out. In brief, it is much easier to fall into error using a metaphysical method; subjectively speaking, it is less certain. Is that basically what you were saying?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Of course we might discuss which method has more certitude – which is probably what you were getting at. One might argue that, whereas the method of natural science yields clear and palpable evidence for the conclusions it proposes, metaphysics has no such experimental or external basis to test against. One has to rely on the strength of the reasoning itself, and thus one is in danger of being misled by any sophist who cleverly conceals his errors. There aren’t many sophists in natural science, because their conclusions just don’t work out. In brief, it is much easier to fall into error using a metaphysical method; subjectively speaking, it is less certain. Is that basically what you were saying?

That pretty much covers it. Science has embedded within it comparatively little reliance on language itself; metaphysics is very much bound up in language. This makes its questions – for example, “Is existence a predicate?” – endlessly provocative, but rather unclear. And if can’t even figure out what you mean by a question (or even if such a question is possible), then how can you get a good answer to it.

Entire branches of philosophy have their origins in a skepticism about the possibility of answering metaphysical questions. I have sympathy with scientists who dismiss it, although I myself am an aspiring philosopher.

 

[Newbot]

That pretty much covers it. Science has embedded within it comparatively little reliance on language itself; metaphysics is very much bound up in language. This makes its questions – for example, “Is existence a predicate?” – endlessly provocative, but rather unclear. And if can’t even figure out what you mean by a question (or even if such a question is possible), then how can you get a good answer to it.

This is also true, though it is probably worth distinguishing from the difficulty I mentioned earlier. Both tend to conclude that it is far harder to come to certitude in metaphysics than in any other systematic investigation, and much easier to fall into error, but for slightly different reasons. In one case, it is the lack of experimental confirmation, meaning that we can only judge the accuracy of some metaphysical line of reasoning from the validity of the argument itself, and cannot directly test the conclusion. This makes it harder compared to, for instance, natural science.

In the other case (leaving aside speculative grammer), it is the connection to language that raises difficulties. This would make it more difficulty than, say, mathematics, where it is possible to define the words in terms of simpler concepts. I can think of at least two reasons why language would raise special difficulties for metaphysics: first, because the things it deals with (e.g. “being”, “property”, etc.) are so fundamental that they can’t be defined in terms of simpler concepts, since they are already the most simple concepts which all else is defined in terms of. It is easy to start speaking vaguely and lose track of the meaning of the words, something the Scholastics were accused of (perhaps sometimes rightly, though not always). Second, because sometimes language is actually used as an argument in metaphysics, the assumption being that how we speak reflects how we think, and our thoughts are likenesses to the external reality. Hence if arguments of this sort are used, but the distinction between speech, thought, and reality is not clearly maintained, it is easy to make incredibly subtle mistakes. I do believe St. Thomas Aquinas says that many fall into this fallacy, even among the wise.

Both of these difficulties certainly make metaphysics much harder than other systematic investigations, indeed I would go so far as to say the hardest of all such investigations, and the easiest in which to fall into error. But I wonder if it might, nonetheless, be, in itself, the most certain. Let me try to clarify. In natural science, there are so many factors that go into any given phenomenon, that it is remarkably difficult to separate them all out. Not to mention, the factors are often subtle and hard to measure. Hence Newtonian physics was a close approximation to reality; but as measurements became more precise, it became clear that it was only a special case of Special Relativity, when v → 0. Likewise Special Relativity itself is just a special case of General Relativity when a → 0, or when there are no gravitational fields. But because measurements were imprecise previous to Einstein, and because the discrepancies were only apparent at incredibly high velocities, the evidence for relativity just wasn’t apparent. And this is always the case: however well-tested some theory or law may be, it is always subject to correction by more precise data.

Whereas with metaphysics, there is not such a wealth of factors to take into account, and not such a wide range of experience necessary. The answer to the question of “whether a thing can both be and not be at the same time in the same respect”, if there is an answer, does not depend on a great number of factors; what being and not being are should be enough. Whereas to answer “what path will this ball take when I drop it” does depend on an enormous quantity of factors. Likewise the distinction between the kinds of causality is the basis of much of reality, rather than something following from it. In other words, it seems that metaphysics is more certain in itself, because it is so fundamental and depends on so little else.

Again, since metaphysics deals with truths universally applicable to every science (e.g. the principle of non-contradiction, being, etc.) any incertitude in metaphysics will leak down, as it were, into all the sciences. If I am unsure whether a thing may be and not be, then I am equally unsure whether the ball, if it will fall, might also not fall. And so forth.

In brief, it is quite indisputable that metaphysics is, subjectively speaking, harder and less certain than natural science. One ought to do all one can to avoid it, by laying out arguments as explicitly as possible, distinguishing every possible meaning of the words one uses and taking care to point out which sense one is using; and even so, one is likely to slip up occasionally. Yet I would like to say that in itself, because it is more fundamental, depends on so few other factors, and is the basis for all other science, it is objectively speaking more certain.

Sorry if I’m not clear or too longwinded. Guess I’m not too good a metaphysician . I’m a little unsure about the subjective vs. objective certainty thing… I hope you’ll be able to clarify it.

Newbot

 

[nancy_dalrymple]

Ive alway’s liked Deepak Chopra, I listened to him do Freddy the Leaf. Do you consider him more Scientific or Philosopher , If so on what of his works can you refere to?

 

[Betterave]

What does metaphysics have to do with reality? Well, for one, I think it might be the only science to define what reality is. Reality is being that can have existence independent of the mind. The pink elephant, for example, is thing with real possible existence, though not real actual existence. A gray elephant, however, has real actual existence. Notice that in talking about real things, the terms “real,” “actual,” and “existence” are used, which are terms studied principally in metaphysics. If one were to argue that these terms do not pertain to reality, and even deny that terms “quantity,” “quality,” “action,” “time,” etc., don’t pertain to reality either … then you may have a case for rejecting metaphysics. I would be curious though … what DOES pertain to reality then? Kant claimed that we cannot know reality at all and that all our ideas pertain to our distorted mental experience of reality and not to reality itself. If that’s the case, even physics would not pertain to reality, since we can only study physics through our experience. Denying metaphysics, in short, denies the mind’s ability to grasp reality and being in general.

Critics of metaphysics understand that metaphysics seeks to define what reality is. Saying this much is rather banal. The issue is grounding the possibility of such defining. **

Kant’s critique of metaphysics claims that the conditions for the possibility of metaphysical knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is not governed by the conditions of possible ‘experience’) do not obtain, at least not on the basis of theoretical reason. We can indeed have knowledge of phenomenal reality (reality as it appears to us/as it reveals itself to us), but what appears (what is cognizable) depends on the cognitive faculties of the being to which it appears, not just on the thing itself (and even on the part of the thing itself, no need for us to dismiss Heraclitean claim that “being loves to hide”). To illustrate, a sheep cognizes ‘wolf’ but not in the same way in which a human does. The point is just that it is possible to distinguish (conceptually) the object of our knowledge (the thing as it appears to us on the basis of our sense faculties and the categories of our understanding) from the thing as it is in itself.

Anyway, to address the second question, Why Is It A Valid Means Of Describing Reality?, to be ‘valid,’ I assume, would mean metaphysics constitutes a true justified belief describing reality (?) so the question then is whether a metaphysical description of reality is/can be 1) true, 2) justified, 3) believed. Issues can be raised on all three of these points.

Newbot’s subjective/objective certainty distinction seems to refer to Aristotle’s distinction between what is ‘better known in itself’ and what is ‘better known to us’. I think the question for many people about metaphysics is whether what is ‘better known in itself’ (according to Aristotle) is really ‘knowable to us’ or whether we can even conceive (in a plausible way) of how this is possible.**

 

[Betterave]

Science has embedded within it comparatively little reliance on language itself; metaphysics is very much bound up in language.

Say what?! Certainly it’s true that metaphysics is very much bound up in language, but the notion that ‘science has embedded within it comparatively little reliance on language itself’…?? You know anyone that does science without relying on language? Wouldn’t that require doing science without concepts, i.e., without understanding anything??

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Say what?! Certainly it’s true that metaphysics is very much bound up in language, but the notion that ‘science has embedded within it comparatively little reliance on language itself’…?? You know anyone that does science without relying on language? Wouldn’t that require doing science without concepts, i.e., without understanding anything??

Scientific language, in my experience, tends to refer to discrete entities: a molecule, for example. It is much easier to “talk about the same thing” when you talk about a molecule than when you talk about terms like “nature” or “secondary quality”. Of course, science cannot know anything without assuming metaphysics.

When it comes to quanta and related (more theoretical) concepts, science is very much in the same boat as metaphysics.

 

[Leela]

What is Metaphysics & Why Is It A Valid Means Of Describing Reality?

I have never seen a thread devoted entirely to Metaphysics. I am going to take a back seat on this, as i want to see a debate rather then get involved at the moment. But i realize that there are allot of people who seem to think that Metaphysics is hocus pocus; and thats people who are both theist and atheist.

Is there anybody who cares to defend Metaphysics?

In short, metaphysics is a attempt to get past appearances and get in touch with reality as it really is. In much modern philosophy, metaphysics is becoming obsolete. Pragmatists like myself who have dropped the correspondence theory of truth can’t imagine how anyone could ever be out of touch with reality.

 

[jkiernan56]

In short, metaphysics is a attempt to get past appearances and get in touch with reality as it really is. In much modern philosophy, metaphysics is becoming obsolete. Pragmatists like myself who have dropped the correspondence theory of truth can’t imagine how anyone could ever be out of touch with reality.

The only thing that “REALLY IS” … is God … because only God by nature must exist … and cannot NOT exist. It is God’s nature to exist.

All else that has been brought into being by God only “really is” by God’s sheer will to continue it’s existence in being.

 

[Just_Lurking]

How do you tell if a metaphysical chain of reasoning is valid?

For mathematics, if a proof obeys the rules of logic, then you can rely on its conclusion. That doesn’t seem to be the case in metaphysics. The terms used have no precise definition and the axioms used seem completely arbitrary. So a metaphysical argument doesn’t seem to really establish anything, nor is the conclusion something that can be independently examined and analyzed.

In these regards, metaphysics seems a lot like string theory!

 

[jkiernan56]

How do you tell if a metaphysical chain of reasoning is valid?

For mathematics, if a proof obeys the rules of logic, then you can rely on its conclusion. That doesn’t seem to be the case in metaphysics. The terms used have no precise definition and the axioms used seem completely arbitrary. So a metaphysical argument doesn’t seem to really establish anything, nor is the conclusion something that can be independently examined and analyzed.

In these regards, metaphysics seems a lot like string theory!

That doesn’t seem to be the case in metaphysics? The terms used have no precise definition and the axioms used seem comoletely arbitrary?

On what basis do you say this? I have not studied Ontology, but from the little I’ve been able to understand about the science of “being” … there is a definition of terms according to Socratic philosophical definition … if you speak that language, then I would have to conclude there is a body of understanding to hold a person’s feet to … as a basis of definition and communication of terms …

now if you are a person who does not agree to Socratic philosophical definition of terms … then you speak in another language without any ability to understand metaphysics … because it is in a language you simply don’t understand or speak. You would be like a Mexican trying to understand someone who is speaking Chinese without you having any understanding of Chinese … utterly futile …

 

[tonyrey]

In short, metaphysics is a attempt to get past appearances and get in touch with reality as it really is. In much modern philosophy, metaphysics is becoming obsolete. Pragmatists like myself who have dropped the correspondence theory of truth can’t imagine how anyone could ever be out of touch with reality.

Metaphysics does not attempt to get past appearances it succeeds! Whether we like it or not we make metaphysical assumptions. Logical positivism was abandoned because the verification principle cannot be verified empirically. It implies that only physical reality is the only reality - without being able to justify that assumption. All theories of knowledge are based on preconceived ideas about reality, i.e. metaphysical assumptions. They must be because otherwise they would exist in a vacuum!

Pragmatism is based on metaphysical assumptions such as:

1. The physical universe exists.
2. The physical universe is the only form of reality.
3. The physical universe is orderly.
4. The physical universe is intelligible.
5. We exist as distinct individuals.
6. We are aware of ourselves and physical objects.
7. We can understand to some extent the mechanisms of nature.
8. We can and do control our activity and the mechanisms of nature.
9. We can choose to initiate different actions.
10. Some actions are more useful than others.

Pragmatism is superficial because it restricts its attention to **appearances **without considering the origin, nature and significance of underlying reality. It is strictly utilitarian and neglects the beauty of the night sky and the moral law within… Its aims and values are restricted to a closed system and it evades the most important questions about the purpose and destiny of the human race.

 

[tonyrey]

So a metaphysical argument doesn’t seem to really establish anything, nor is the conclusion something that can be independently examined and analyzed.

How about the metaphysical argument that the mind is more powerful than the body? Isn’t that a conclusion that can be independently examined and analyzed?