J
JDaniel
Guest
Excellent question, Betterave. I think, in a sense, it does not, but, in another sense it does. One the the main propositions of the direction of the confrontation of the mind by ens is that it must be prior to Truth and knowledge. “Truth”, and, perhaps, “knowledge”, are things that derive from being and have “being” in themselves so that there can be no change in the nature of the ens confronted. If a thing is not, there is nothing that Truth (or “knowledge”) can pertain to. So, what Aquinas suggests is that truth is first an emanation of God’s being, then an emanation from our being, as there is a scalar difference here. And, it is the apprehension of the being in question that is initially confronted, from which truth is then considered by dividing and composing, resulting in a knowledge of the being confronted. A sentence may convey the Truth, but, it cannot guaranty it. Thus, God and soul are prerequisites of that which is the True. Without them, we merely have consensus - even if consensus is possible.How does this relate to what I quoted from the *Summa *(q.16, art. 2), not the De veritate? Do you think that what you have written here should be taken to “overrule” my *Summa *quote and to establish that Aquinas teaches that human knowledge is *not *first to be found in the intellect dividing and composing?
Truth, and the true, are most importantly, for St. Thomas, a matter of the souls of God and men dealing directly with that-which-is. For God, there is but one “truth” of (an) ens; for men, there is but one truth as well (due to the souls of men), but, it can be multiple, in its forms, because of the multiplicity of these lesser souls (of men) viewing being imperfectly at times.
Think about it: without that which is immutable concerning Truth and the true, they cannot be predicated of that-which-is in any meaningful way that will stand to reflect that-which-is. All that men can say is that “I believe it to be thus,” and, others, to say, “I believe it to be different.”
Pretty much the same way you did, with the slight alteration of what is important from the above.I read these passages (especially Fr. Dewan’s) as commentaries on what I quoted and said that don’t contradict what I wrote and said. How do you read them?
Of course. I was simply (playfully) mocking your “sincere” admiration for my interlocutor.jd, metaphysics is not about making dogmatic declarations about the intellectual intuitions of the Truth you’ve had that unfortunately can’t be put into propositional form. There’s plenty to be said about Truth, but surely nothing (metaphysically interesting) to be said about it in non-propositional form? How would that even make sense? Metaphysics is also essentially dialogical, especially here (CAF), so it’s silly to simply assert propositions that will obviously make no sense to your interlocutor, given her conceptual framework.
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jd