What is Metaphysics & Why Is It A Valid Means Of Describing Reality?

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I’m a Catholic, anyway, and I believe in facts. Some people believe that gravity exists, others don’t, other don’t know whether to believe it exists or not, or what exactly it means when someone says, “gravity exists”
You might be right about gravity, but only to the extent that the theory of gravity might be wrong. Once one understands why 2 + 2 = 4 you cannot say that you “believe”, since its a matter of certain knowledge; not belief. Would you say that you believe that a square is not a triangle? Or would you say that you know that a square is not a triangle? We certainly don’t all know why gravity is true as a theory, but we all know that the appearance is that we are not floating around. That is not a belief.
 
You might be right about gravity, but only to the extent that the theory of gravity might be wrong. Once one understands why 2 + 2 = 4 you cannot say that you “believe”, since its a matter of certain knowledge; not belief. Would you say that you believe that a square is not a triangle? Or would you say that you know that a square is not a triangle? We certainly don’t all know why gravity is true as a theory, but we all know that the appearance is that we are not floating around. That is not a belief.
I think I see your worry and, yes, it is strange to say ‘I believe that a square is not a triangle.’ But it is also strange to say ‘I know that a square is not a triangle’ or ‘it is a fact that a square is not a triangle’ - the normal thing to say is just ‘a square is not a triangle’ or, better, not to mention such an obvious point at all… unless you’re actually making a point about something other than squares or triangles altogether (non-contradiction for example). That is not to say that I cannot say that I believe such things, I just generally have no use for such assertions. If someone says to you “You know, I don’t believe that 2+2 does equal 4 after all,” there would be nothing wrong with your replying, “Au contraire, I believe it does… Whatever can you mean?..”

Language is a tool. We always use it in specific contexts - we can’t say, as philosophers, “the word ‘belief’ has been ordained for this purpose and this purpose alone”. Language is not a tool in the same sense as a hammer, as I take Leela to have claimed, but it certainly is a tool, don’t you think? If I think someone is misusing language (tools have natural purposes that can be abused), I should try to understand what they are trying to accomplish with what they’re saying and engage in a dialogue on that basis. (That is what philosophy is (including metaphysics) since at least Plato.) After that, perhaps it’s true: “He who knows not, nor listens to the wisdom of another, is a useless wight” (Hesiod) - but I must have humility in approaching others and be aware that I am no more intrinsically immune from being a useless wight than my dialogue partner.
 
I think I see your worry and, yes, it is strange to say ‘I believe that a square is not a triangle.’ But it is also strange to say ‘I know that a square is not a triangle’ or ‘it is a fact that a square is not a triangle’ - the normal thing to say is just ‘a square is not a triangle’.
I understand what a square is, and i understand what a triangle is, thus i know that a square is not a triangle. There is nothing strange about such a statement.
I know that given the correct system of logic that 2 + 2=4 “You know, I don’t believe that 2+2 does equal 4 after all,” there would be nothing wrong with your replying, “Au contraire, I believe it does… Whatever can you mean?..”
I know that given the correct system of logic, as in when propositioned in the right context, that 2 + 2 equals 4. Its not a matter of belief. I don’t believe that 2 + 2 equals 4; i know that 2 + 2 equals 4. Is that really a difficult thing to grasp?
Language is a tool. We always use it in specific contexts - we can’t say, as philosophers, “the word ‘belief’ has been ordained for this purpose and this purpose alone”. Language is not a tool in the same sense as a hammer, as I take Leela to have claimed, but it certainly is a tool, don’t you think? If I think someone is misusing language (tools have natural purposes that can be abused), I should try to understand what they are trying to accomplish with what they’re saying and engage in a dialogue on that basis. (That is what philosophy is (including metaphysics) since at least Plato.) After that, perhaps it’s true: “He who knows not, nor listens to the wisdom of another, is a useless wight” (Hesiod) - but I must have humility in approaching others and be aware that I am no more intrinsically immune from being a useless wight than my dialogue partner.
All very interesting, but i know that i exist. Thanks.
 
I understand what a square is, and i understand what a triangle is, thus i know that a square is not a triangle. There is nothing strange about such a statement.

Correct. Your point?
(“I like hotdogs and I know that a square is not a triangle” - voila, now it’s strange again! ;))


I know that given the correct system of logic, as in when propositioned in the right context, that 2 + 2 equals 4. Its not a matter of belief. I don’t believe that 2 + 2 equals 4; i know that 2 + 2 equals 4. Is that really a difficult thing to grasp?

Not at all; you want to insist on a particular use of the word ‘belief’ and so you have specified a particular context in which your usage fits. That’s fine, and it’s not difficult to grasp.

All very interesting, but i know that i exist. Thanks.

Uh…so what?
[Just for fun, here’s the full Hesiod quote from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Bk 1, ch.4:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.]
 
[Just for fun, here’s the full Hesiod quote from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Bk 1, ch.4:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.]
:)Pretty good poem. I hope you learn from it.😉
 
From Tuesday’s gospel: “blind guides, you strain out gnats and swallow camels!” - I don’t want to point fingers, but that is a warning that Catholics are supposed to take to heart. 😊
I would take your words to heart if I were you. By the way, there are plenty of people who aren’t even Christian that are closer to God than some that are Catholic/Christian. I heard a recent saying by St. Augustine I fully agree with -

“There are some in the Church that God does not have and there are some not in the Church that God does have.”

You and I will be judged by the same standard of God’s Holiness - which is His Love. Don’t count your chickens too soon before they hatch. Remember if you have not love, you are NOTHING at all. At least this is what I try to remind myself alot. I have no pretenses when it comes to realizing how far I have to grow in Love. See you in Purgatory? Are you expecting to go straight to heaven? Sure sounds like it. 🤷
 
Belief is a criteria of knowledge.
It is not a criteria for all knowledge. Please read the link again Leela. The 3 criteria definition is not held by all philosophers and is open for debate. Did you read that part by chance?

Even if one agrees with the 3 fold definition - common sense instructs that “belief” is not what makes something true. Something has to be true before it can be internalized (or believed as Leela would tout).

Piaget (child psychologist) would say learning is a process of “assimulation and accomodation”. There are plenty of people who “believe” in things that are not true. You can easily find them in mental institutions. So just to reiterate the point - belief is not what makes something true.
 
I think I see your worry and, yes, it is strange to say ‘I believe that a square is not a triangle.’ But it is also strange to say ‘I know that a square is not a triangle’ or ‘it is a fact that a square is not a triangle’ - the normal thing to say is just ‘a square is not a triangle’ or, better, not to mention such an obvious point at all… unless you’re actually making a point about something other than squares or triangles altogether (non-contradiction for example). That is not to say that I cannot say that I believe such things, I just generally have no use for such assertions. If someone says to you “You know, I don’t believe that 2+2 does equal 4 after all,” there would be nothing wrong with your replying, “Au contraire, I believe it does… Whatever can you mean?..”

Language is a tool. We always use it in specific contexts - we can’t say, as philosophers, “the word ‘belief’ has been ordained for this purpose and this purpose alone”. Language is not a tool in the same sense as a hammer, as I take Leela to have claimed, but it certainly is a tool, don’t you think? If I think someone is misusing language (tools have natural purposes that can be abused), I should try to understand what they are trying to accomplish with what they’re saying and engage in a dialogue on that basis. (That is what philosophy is (including metaphysics) since at least Plato.) After that, perhaps it’s true: “He who knows not, nor listens to the wisdom of another, is a useless wight” (Hesiod) - but I must have humility in approaching others and be aware that I am no more intrinsically immune from being a useless wight than my dialogue partner.
Like I said earlier, once truth has been established and acknowledged, it is a basis for also being able to say what is NOT true in the particular context of what IS true. If I know 1+1=2, then I can also say that I know that 1+1 is NOT equal to 79. What IS TRUE must first be established before being able to say what is NOT TRUE. It is truth that defines what is not true. It is Goodness that defines what is Evil. Evil does not define Goodness. It is Health that defines Disease and not the other way around.
 
I guess I’m still not making myself clear. Belief, justification, and truth are terms we need to be clear about. A person can believe something that is not true but cannot know something that is not true because to know something means you belief it, you are justified in believing it, and it’s true.
A person certainly can know something that is false. You, for example, believe something to be true about truth relative to sentences only, and you believe that it is true, thus, according to your designations, you “know” it. But, such a limiting of truth, or, Truth, is precisely what makes it false.

I can sit, sipping coffee, on a spectacular morning, with the sun shining through a tree and, via broken rays, into my dining room window, and slip out of this world into the mystical and ethereal world of the non-mundane. I can encounter relationships that are of a spiritual nature. I CAN encounter Truth(s) in that spiritual realm. None of them needs to be formulated into a sentence. In fact, I may not be able to lucidly proclaim what I witnessed in the form of a sentence, yet, I know I witnessed Truth.

Thus, I know your profusion (above) is believable falsity.

That what I witnessed as Truth is known by me with as much certitude as knowing that I cannot overlay a square with a circle of the same radius, where the circle does not extend beyond any exterior limit of the square.
I never heard of such an ism. It sounds nothing like pragmatism.
Of course you do.
Since truth is something we say about sentences, you’ve asserted that some sentence is ultimately true. What is ultimate truth as compared to truth? What sentence are you suggesting is not merely true but ultimately true?
Here, again, you’re limiting “truth” to your exquisite whim.

jd
 
A person certainly can know something that is false. You, for example, believe something to be true about truth relative to sentences only, and you believe that it is true, thus, according to your designations, you “know” it. But, such a limiting of truth, or, Truth, is precisely what makes it false.

I can sit, sipping coffee, on a spectacular morning, with the sun shining through a tree and, via broken rays, into my dining room window, and slip out of this world into the mystical and ethereal world of the non-mundane. I can encounter relationships that are of a spiritual nature. I CAN encounter Truth(s) in that spiritual realm. None of them needs to be formulated into a sentence. In fact, I may not be able to lucidly proclaim what I witnessed in the form of a sentence, yet, I know I witnessed Truth.

Thus, I know your profusion (above) is believable falsity.

That what I witnessed as Truth is known by me with as much certitude as knowing that I cannot overlay a square with a circle of the same radius, where the circle does not extend beyond any exterior limit of the square.

Of course you do.

Here, again, you’re limiting “truth” to your exquisite whim.

jd
Woo Hoo yeah! Jd is back!:cool:
 
I would take your words to heart if I were you. By the way, there are plenty of people who aren’t even Christian that are closer to God than some that are Catholic/Christian. I heard a recent saying by St. Augustine I fully agree with -

“There are some in the Church that God does not have and there are some not in the Church that God does have.”

You and I will be judged by the same standard of God’s Holiness - which is His Love. Don’t count your chickens too soon before they hatch. Remember if you have not love, you are NOTHING at all. At least this is what I try to remind myself alot. I have no pretenses when it comes to realizing how far I have to grow in Love. See you in Purgatory? Are you expecting to go straight to heaven? Sure sounds like it. 🤷
I just hope I don’t go to hell (and same for you brother!). If you like Augustine, try this out for size (from Book III of his Contra academicos):

Docuit etiam me [dialectica], cum de re constat, propter quam uerba dicuntur, de uerbis non debere contendi, et quisquis id faciat, si imperitia faciat, docendum esse, si malitia, deserendum, si doceri non potest, monendum, ut aliquid aliud potius agat, quam tempus in superfluis operamque consumat, si non obtemperat, neglegendum.
 
Like I said earlier, once truth has been established and acknowledged, it is a basis for also being able to say what is NOT true in the particular context of what IS true. If I know 1+1=2, then I can also say that I know that 1+1 is NOT equal to 79. What IS TRUE must first be established before being able to say what is NOT TRUE. It is truth that defines what is not true. It is Goodness that defines what is Evil. Evil does not define Goodness. It is Health that defines Disease and not the other way around.
So this is why you’re not a Thomist! Not impressed by the via negativa, I take it.
 
Al Kresta:
“…a mark of intellectual maturity is the ability to represent one’s opponent’s position in a way that your opponent would recognize as fair and accurate.”

…obvious, right? :o
 
I can sit, sipping coffee, on a spectacular morning, with the sun shining through a tree and, via broken rays, into my dining room window, and slip out of this world into the mystical and ethereal world of the non-mundane. I can encounter relationships that are of a spiritual nature. I CAN encounter Truth(s) in that spiritual realm. None of them needs to be formulated into a sentence. In fact, I may not be able to lucidly proclaim what I witnessed in the form of a sentence, yet, I know I witnessed Truth.

Thus, I know your profusion (above) is believable falsity.

That what I witnessed as Truth is known by me with as much certitude as knowing that I cannot overlay a square with a circle of the same radius, where the circle does not extend beyond any exterior limit of the square.

jd
It may be worth pointing out that Leela’s view is much closer than JD’s view to Aquinas’ teaching about truth: When Leela says truth is found in sentences, this is what Aquinas means when he says that the primary locus of truth is in judgments (division and composition) (=sentences) made by the intellect. He distinguishes human truth and divine truth, but obviously(?) we’re all just humans here, so the human kind of truth would seem to be the appropriate one to discuss (especially with an atheist/agnostic such as Leela).

He specifically states that the intellect knows truth, but…

“But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it (id quod ipse apprehendit de ea). But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing “what a thing is.” When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate…”
 
And I don’t think Augustine’s view is much different. He just adds the necessity of divine illumination in order to produce certainty in our judgments (technical details;)).
 
It is not a criteria for all knowledge. Please read the link again Leela. The 3 criteria definition is not held by all philosophers and is open for debate. Did you read that part by chance?

Even if one agrees with the 3 fold definition - common sense instructs that “belief” is not what makes something true. Something has to be true before it can be internalized (or believed as Leela would tout).

Piaget (child psychologist) would say learning is a process of “assimulation and accomodation”. There are plenty of people who “believe” in things that are not true. You can easily find them in mental institutions. So just to reiterate the point - belief is not what makes something true.
I’ve never said that believing an assertion has any bearing on the truth of the assertion. In fact, I’ve repeatedly said that truth is a wheel that spins freely of belief and justification. All I keep saying is that by Plato’s JTB description of knowledge, which is the usual starting point for any philosphical discussion of knowledge, someone has to believe the assertion before that person could be said to know that that assertion is true. If I were you, I would first try to understand what JTB as truth means before trying to disagree with it. So far it seems that you just don’t get it, and maybe just don’t want to get it, and, anyway, I don’t know how else to try to explain it. Maybe we can move on…

I’ve lost track long ago about what any of this has to do with metaphysics anyway. Does anyone remember what the point was to this discussion of JTB as knowledge?

I remember that I was arguing that metaphysics (as the project of trying to get past appearances to reality) is a project we would be better off giving up on since we don’t need to think that we are out of touch with reality to begin with. At least, I’d first need to be convinced that I am out of touch with reality before I would find the need to concern myself with getting past appearances (Plato’s Cave, for example).

Best,
Leela
 
It may be worth pointing out that Leela’s view is much closer than JD’s view to Aquinas’ teaching about truth: When Leela says truth is found in sentences, this is what Aquinas means when he says that the primary locus of truth is in judgments (division and composition) (=sentences) made by the intellect.
However, St. Thomas (and Augustine) insert carefully the manner in which the truth is presented to a cognitive entity. Aquinas changes the three-fold direction of said cognition in the Summa theologiae from the direction he gave in De veritate. He did this because he understood that Truth and the true are essentially ways by which the intellect is confronted by Truth, and thus, Truth and the true have being in an ontological sense.

Jacques Maritain says, “The True is being inasmuch as it confronts intellection, thought; and this is another aspect of being, thus revealed, a new note struck by it. It answers to the knowing mind, speaks to it, superabounds in utterance, expresses, manifests a subsistence for thought, a particular intelligibility which is itself. An object is true – that is to say, conforms to what it thus says [about] itself to thought, to the intelligibility it enunciates – to the extent that it is.” - Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, Sheed and Ward, 1939.

Thus, ens, or, that-which-is is first to confront the mind, then Truth and the true, then knowledge. Lawrence Dewan says, "We have a presentation of the very roots of definability. The concept expressed by the word ens is the concept first conceived, is indeed most known, and all other intellectual concepts are “resolvable” into ens. Thus, all other conceptions of the intellect are constituted through addition to “ens” It is a lesson on our conceptions and their basis in the concept of “ens,” and asks how we can be said to “add” to it. The first point is to steer us clear of the idea that we add some different nature. Everything we add must have the nature of “ens”. Accordingly, the additions are presented as “modes” of “ens.” One sort of addition is a special mode, and thus the conceptions of the categories of “ens” are seen to add to it: for example, says “ens per se.” Such additions result in grades of entity. - Is Truth a Transcendental to St. Thomas Aquinas?
He distinguishes human truth and divine truth, but obviously(?) we’re all just humans here, so the human kind of truth would seem to be the appropriate one to discuss (especially with an atheist/agnostic such as Leela).
And all along, I thought this was a thread about metaphysics.

jd
 
However, St. Thomas (and Augustine) insert carefully the manner in which the truth is presented to a cognitive entity. Aquinas changes the three-fold direction of said cognition in the Summa theologiae from the direction he gave in De veritate. He did this because he understood that Truth and the true are essentially ways by which the intellect is confronted by Truth, and thus, Truth and the true have being in an ontological sense.
How does this relate to what I quoted from the *Summa *(q.16, art. 2), not the De veritate? Do you think that what you have written here should be taken to “overrule” my *Summa *quote and to establish that Aquinas teaches that human knowledge is *not *first to be found in the intellect dividing and composing?
Jacques Maritain says, “The True is being inasmuch as it confronts intellection, thought; and this is another aspect of being, thus revealed, a new note struck by it. It answers to the knowing mind, speaks to it, superabounds in utterance, expresses, manifests a subsistence for thought, a particular intelligibility which is itself. An object is true – that is to say, conforms to what it thus says [about] itself to thought, to the intelligibility it enunciates – to the extent that it is.” - Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, Sheed and Ward, 1939.
Thus, ens, or, that-which-is is first to confront the mind, then Truth and the true, then knowledge. Lawrence Dewan says, "We have a presentation of the very roots of definability. The concept expressed by the word ens is the concept first conceived, is indeed most known, and all other intellectual concepts are “resolvable” into ens. Thus, all other conceptions of the intellect are constituted through addition to “ens” It is a lesson on our conceptions and their basis in the concept of “ens,” and asks how we can be said to “add” to it. The first point is to steer us clear of the idea that we add some different nature. Everything we add must have the nature of “ens”. Accordingly, the additions are presented as “modes” of “ens.” One sort of addition is a special mode, and thus the conceptions of the categories of “ens” are seen to add to it: for example, says “ens per se.” Such additions result in grades of entity. - Is Truth a Transcendental to St. Thomas Aquinas?
I read these passages (especially Fr. Dewan’s) as commentaries on what I quoted and said that don’t contradict what I wrote and said. How do you read them?
And all along, I thought this was a thread about metaphysics.
jd, metaphysics is not about making dogmatic declarations about the intellectual intuitions of the Truth you’ve had that unfortunately can’t be put into propositional form. There’s plenty to be said about Truth, but surely nothing (metaphysically interesting) to be said about it in non-propositional form? How would that even make sense? Metaphysics is also essentially dialogical, especially here (CAF), so it’s silly to simply assert propositions that will obviously make no sense to your interlocutor, given her conceptual framework.
 
I can sit, sipping coffee, on a spectacular morning, with the sun shining through a tree and, via broken rays, into my dining room window, and slip out of this world into the mystical and ethereal world of the non-mundane. I can encounter relationships that are of a spiritual nature. I CAN encounter Truth(s) in that spiritual realm. None of them needs to be formulated into a sentence. In fact, I may not be able to lucidly proclaim what I witnessed in the form of a sentence, yet, I know I witnessed Truth.

Thus, I know your profusion (above) is believable falsity.

That what I witnessed as Truth is known by me with as much certitude as knowing that I cannot overlay a square with a circle of the same radius, where the circle does not extend beyond any exterior limit of the square.
What do you think of Wittgenstein’s beetle-in-a-box argument? You have a beetle in a box, no one else has seen it but you, and you can’t describe it in a way that means anything to anybody else. But you still insist on talking about it even though you don’t know how to do so in a meaningful way. All you can say is “it’s a Beetle, it exists; I don’t know what color it is, I don’t know how big it is, it’s just a wonderful, wonderful Beetle.” But why not just be quiet, Wittgenstein says? It’s your beetle, no one else’s. What basis do you have for insisting that others believe in it? Maybe Leela has her own private beetle too - so what?
 
jd, metaphysics is not about making dogmatic declarations about the intellectual intuitions of the Truth you’ve had that unfortunately can’t be put into propositional form. There’s plenty to be said about Truth, but surely nothing (metaphysically interesting) to be said about it in non-propositional form? How would that even make sense? Metaphysics is also essentially dialogical, especially here (CAF), so it’s silly to simply assert propositions that will obviously make no sense to your interlocutor, given her conceptual framework.
…like when he asked me whether or not the table I’m sitting at is true. That doesn’t even sound like a question to me. Doesn’t he need to assert something about the table before talking about truth?

I can understand “God is love,” but what does it mean to say that God is truth? I don’t know how to make sense of asking whether the assertion that God is truth is true.
 
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