What is the difference between a Philosophical Arguement and a Metaphysical arguement?

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Greg27:
However, where modern philosophy would diverge with Thomas is that religious revelation does not give us insights into metaphysical questions above and beyond those insights natural reason can demonstrate…
Therefore no need to stigmatize branches of philosophy such as metaphysics.
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Greg27:
and in fact much modern and post-modern philosophy is deeply hostile to religion and judges religious claims in the light of human reason…
Modernism was. Pomo is still up for grabs.
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Greg27:
Getting back to the question, I think it can be argued that a philosophical argument tries to demonstrate a certain conclusion by correctly following the rules of logic and not appealing to irrational means such as mystical experience or divine revelation to settle a question, nor by engaging in fallacious modes of argument.
For a compare/contrast of mysticism/science see this thread: Philosophy: Mysticism is for those who can’t do the math
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Greg27:
A philosophical argument can be used to try and demonstrate the rationality of a metaphysical belief (such as God’s existence or the immortality of the soul) without trying to appeal to divine revelation…
Exactly.
 
I disagree with him before that: in the argument from first cause, I don’t think there necessarily must be an uncaused cause at all.
Whether there is a first cause or not, explain why an uncaused cause is not rational; and then explain why an infinite casual regression of finite things in to past, is a rational conclusion to arrive at, or is as rational as an uncaused cause. God or infinite regression; these are the only options available; one of them is rational and one of them is not; and I think you and I know why that is the case.
 
I hold it as an article of faith that he did not; further, should I be wrong, let him ask.

I explained some of my problems with the Prime Mover argument lower down in that same post, actually, responding directly to you.
Thats was not an explanation; that was a ridicule.

The question still stands. Prove to me that metaphysical arguements do not hold to logic.
 
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Mirdath:
Ani Ibi: you’re quite correct. Metaphysics is a bit deeper than just ‘what is real?’ though, concerning itself also with attributes of the real, objectivity/subjectivity, and to an extent the place of humanity. I was not using the term correctly myself, though – being more concerned with the questionably-real parts. Thanks
Hi Mirdath. These philosophy threads can sometimes be quite removed from what many people know. And therefore it is always a problem to decide whether to give a simple definition or example or a more detailed definition or example.

If we give really detailed definitions and examples, then we lose folks who have come to the thread to see what they can learn. And often those folks have very refreshing insights which other more experienced philosophy buffs have missed.

We have worked out an informal way on the philosophy threads of starting out simple and adding details as needed.

Yes, you are correct. :yup: Metaphysics is much deeper than simply asking the question: ‘what is real?’
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Mirdath:
I hold it as an article of faith that he did not; further, should I be wrong, let him ask.
It doesn’t have to be him who asks. The thread is a discussion where more than two folks are discussing. If one person makes a claim, then that claim is up for grabs by anyone reading the thread.

:grouphug:
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Mirdath:
I explained some of my problems with the Prime Mover argument lower down in that same post, actually, responding directly to you.
The explanation was not understood. Therefore clarification was requested. Requests for clarification are not challenges to anyone’s point of views – though sometimes they appear more robust than necessary for the purposes of discussion (as is frequent on other Apologetics threads).

On their face, however, requests for clarification are merely the expression of willingness to understand what is being said and to continue the discussion. This can be easily addressed by taking time out to explain what a philosopher is saying, give an abbreviated quote, and give a link to background reading. 🙂 Good examples of this are on this thread: The Big Bang Theory
 
Thats was not an explanation; that was a ridicule.
I still think you’re looking at the wrong part of that post, but okay, here goes 🙂

The Prime Mover argument:
  1. Things exist.
  2. Things have a cause.
  3. At some point there must be an uncaused cause.
  4. That uncaused cause is God.
A few criticisms:
  1. Solipsism – things do not exist. (for the record, I don’t buy this one either)
  2. The existence of an uncaused cause is unprovable and unnecessary. It could be a gigantic loop; we don’t know either way.
  3. An uncaused cause may not fulfil other attributes necessary to the divine. If one accepts the argument through step 3, step 4 still does not prove any god, let alone the Abrahamic God specifically.
  4. Why stop with God? Could not the God Aquinas seeks to prove exists, the Abrahamic God, have a cause? Could not there be a super-supernature? This one ties into #2.
The question still stands. Prove to me that metaphysical arguements do not hold to logic.
A well-constructed metaphysical argument must hold to logic; otherwise, what’s the point at all? In the case of the supernatural specifically, however, it must also postulate the existence of something that cannot be properly perceived or reasoned from a human/natural perspective.

Like the parable of the wise and foolish builders: the wise man built his house on a solid foundation, the foolish man did not. They could have been equal in skill at construction, or the foolish man could even have been better; but all his skill mattered not a bit because he built his house on sand.

Lack of logic is not the problem; premises that are not universally evident are.
 
When they appear; in the case of arguments for the existence of the supernatural, the latter is the greater and more common.
I’ve already addressed ‘supernatural.’ See post #19 above.

As for arguments for the existence of the supernatural, you are again blending epistemology with metaphysics.
 
Metaphysics is the study of the supernatural.
Again, this is not an accurate definition of metaphysics. It is the study of being as being. It is true that it’s concerned with what can be abstracted from material substances, and so is primarily concerned with the immaterial such as form, substances, and accidents. But these things are all part of the natural order according to metaphysics. The supernatural refers to an effect (caused by God directly) other than that due to creation.
Yet God cannot be sensed; Thomists take those senses and cram them into assertions based on faith. ‘Things exist’ becomes ‘things have a cause’ becomes ‘there has to be an end to the chain somewhere’ becomes ‘whoops, God’.
You are correct that God cannot be sensed, unless he specially revealed himself somehow. I understand that you don’t believe the cosmological argument is valid and that you question its premises. But that hardly makes metaphysics a faith based discipline; at least not any more than any other philosophy. The foundation of metaphysics is not the cosmological argument. It’s the other way around. And as you know, the cosmological argument is not trying to define any attributes of God - at least not initially - but is only attempting to establish that there must be a first mover.
What things?
This is in response to my assertion that you believe things on faith as well. The validity of the laws of logic and their universality for starters.
Actually I just liked the idea of the CI; it makes sense and seems to be directed generally toward the good of society and the individual. That’s my foundation.
Not a bad end from my perspective. Of course the question always becomes what is the good, and whether it really must include society or not. This is where I commonly see ethical systems break down.
I disagree with him before that: in the argument from first cause, I don’t think there necessarily must be an uncaused cause at all. It’s a logical leap, and is the first place that argument breaks down. If Aquinas could prove God without such leaps, I’d be a believer; fortunately or unfortunately, that seems to be generally impossible.
There must be an uncaused cause, because it is logically impossible for an actual infinite to exist. Not just practically impossible, logically impossible. So it is you who is taking the logical leap by positing that there could be such a thing as an endless series of causes. This is one of the refinements that the Kalam Cosmological Argument makes to Aquinas’ traditional argument.
 
This is in response to my assertion that you believe things on faith as well. The validity of the laws of logic and their universality for starters.
True enough. I believe in those because otherwise I’d quite obviously be in deep trouble.
There must be an uncaused cause, because it is logically impossible for an actual infinite to exist. Not just practically impossible, logically impossible. So it is you who is taking the logical leap by positing that there could be such a thing as an endless series of causes. This is one of the refinements that the Kalam Cosmological Argument makes to Aquinas’ traditional argument.
I would not say logically impossible but rather logically incomprehensible – such a thing is a limitation of the human mind, not necessarily of the universe. We break down on the infinite. Even so, an infinite chain is not necessary – a finite loop will serve just as well.

I looked up the kalam argument on wikipedia; from the text there, it seems to me that it is misusing the term ‘actual infinite’ – a beginningless series of events is not an actual but a potential infinite, as it is not completed and boundless at one time. Perhaps you could clarify?
 
True enough. I believe in those because otherwise I’d quite obviously be in deep trouble.
Me too! My point here is that faith isn’t something that is the domain of metaphysics to the exclusion of other philosophical systems.
I would not say logically impossible but rather logically incomprehensible – such a thing is a limitation of the human mind, not necessarily of the universe. We break down on the infinite. Even so, an infinite chain is not necessary – a finite loop will serve just as well.
Once you start down the path of incomprehensible, it starts to look very much like logically impossible. Just like it is incomprehensible that two different objects could occupy the same space at the same time in the same sense. The law of non-contradiction applies and tells us that it is not logically possible. If I were motivated I believe I could construct a syllogism with premises you’d accept that would demonstrate an actual infinite cannot logically exist. But I’m not that motivated:) Let me see if I can find where someone has done the work for me.

As for a finite loop of causes, if it is finite then it must have a beginning. If what you mean is that it consists of the same causes happening over and over again endlessly, then it has no beginning and is an infinite number of causes, even though it may be the same set of causes happening repeatedly. The KCA doesn’t require that each cause be distinctly different.
I looked up the kalam argument on wikipedia; from the text there, it seems to me that it is misusing the term ‘actual infinite’ – a beginningless series of events is not an actual but a potential infinite, as it is not completed and boundless at one time. Perhaps you could clarify?
This is one of the objections to the KCA. But I disagree that a series of events without beginning can be defined as a potential infinite. If a series of events or causes has no beginning, then how is it that the events and causes we see in the series actually exist? Yet clearly they do since we witness them happening every day. I think to say that an actual series of events has no beginning is to say that an actual infinite exists. Do you see an alternative explanation?

In any case, I don’t know that there will ever be an argument for God’s existence the premises of which will be beyond dispute. My only purpose here is to demonstrate that metaphysical systems should not be deemed more faith based or irrational than any other system.
 
That’d be a bad Thomist. Continental rationalists, British empiricists, yes – but that doesn’t extend to the supernatural.
this is what aquinas said:

Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu. (Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses).
 
I looked up the kalam argument on wikipedia; from the text there, it seems to me that it is misusing the term ‘actual infinite’ – a beginningless series of events is not an actual but a potential infinite, as it is not completed and boundless at one time. Perhaps you could clarify?
but it is completed: an actually infinite number of moments must have elapsed prior to this moment if there was no first moment of time…

look, either the number of moments of past time are finite or they are infinite; if it’s not finite, then it must be infinite.
 
Metaphysics asks the question what is real?
Epistemology asks the question what is knowable?
i hate to nitpick here, but there’s a lot of misinformation about philosophy being bruited around in this thread…

metaphysics is the study of the most general and abstract features of reality.

epistemology is the study of what constitutes knowledge.

ok, carry on.
 
i hate to nitpick here, but there’s a lot of misinformation about philosophy being bruited around in this thread…

metaphysics is the study of the most general and abstract features of reality.

epistemology is the study of what constitutes knowledge.

ok, carry on.
John, are you scientist?
 
In any case, I don’t know that there will ever be an argument for God’s existence the premises of which will be beyond dispute.
How about this:
  1. God by definition, should God exist, is a supreme (maximally perfect and changeless) being.
  2. If God exists now, as a maximally perfect being, God could not pass out of existence. (based on 1, changeless)
  3. So if God exists now, God exists now necessarily. (based on 2)
  4. If God does not exist now, as a maximally perfect and changeless being, God could not now come into existence. (based on 1–contingent beings aren’t maximally perfect, being dependent on something else for their existence)
  5. So if God does not exist now, it is now impossible for God to exist. (based on 4)
  6. God either exists now or does not exist now. (Law of excluded middle)
  7. So either God exists now or it is now impossible for God to exist. (based on 3, 5, and 6)
  8. It is not now impossible for God to exist (unless you want to try to argue that God’s existence is actually logically impossible).
  9. So God exists now. (based on 7 and 8)
One problem I have with discussions of the ontological argument (such as this one) or cosmological arguments (such as Aquinas’s, which I would also defend) is that those who don’t accept them usually present them in versions which I wouldn’t accept, either! But I do like this version. Any critiques? (as if you all needed invitation)🙂
 
Lol! That sounds a lot like Plantinga, but I don’t think it’s his ontological argument. Nevertheless, Plantinga is a stallion. Imho, he has the most convincing solution for the problem of evil of any other theologian. I don’t have to suffer through these arguments for the existence of God anymore because I already believe in him. Gotta run.
 
Lol! That sounds a lot like Plantinga, but I don’t think it’s his ontological argument. Nevertheless, Plantinga is a stallion. Imho, he has the most convincing solution for the problem of evil of any other theologian. I don’t have to suffer through these arguments for the existence of God anymore because I already believe in him. Gotta run.
Combination of Plantinga and Norman Malcom.👍
 
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