N
neophyte
Guest
Completely unconvincing. You acknowledge that the context shows that it could not possibly have been a normal solar eclipse, and yet you proceed as if it were one. Not only that, you assign a non-zero probability that it was such an eclipse, when we already know that it wasn’t: the actual probability is 0.Here’s the final part.
This is a fundamental misapplication of the theorem. For an event in the past, it allows us to move from what we know about the event to predict the probability that something that we don’t know also happened. Was the guy holding the hammer left handed? Did he have attached or detached earlobes? What color was his hair?
But you can’t take an event that did happen and claim that it didn’t merely because the probability against it was low in advance of it actually happening. After the event happens, the probability that it *did *happen is 1. As I indicated in my previous post, the probability against you happening is vanishingly small, and yet you are here.
This is merely a fancy version of the argument that rejects out of hand the possibility of miracles, on the grounds that they are impossible. But miracles are impossible only if God does not exist, which begs the question. It’s an illogical argument.