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levinas12
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Aquinas would disagree …
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levinas12
Guest
Guys, I just want to correct two [edit, make that three] things:
Firstly, a ‘person’ is indeed a member of a genus, namely the genus of persons. If a person were not a member of a genus then no one could be said to be a person because there would be no common kind to which all persons belong. So, some of you (not necessarily the person I’ve quoted) have mixed up your terms considerably.
Secondly, a human being is not an incarnate angel. An angel is an entirely distinct substance. It might be better to say that a human being is an ‘incarnate intellect,’ meaning a bodily intellect, NOT an intellect which pre-exists a body but then somehow fills it.
Thirdly, a human being – as someone else pointed out, a ‘rational animal’ – is a single substance or nature comprising the union of two principles or modes of existence in a SINGLE act of existence. These two modes are the spatio-temporal mode of existence (which is often referred to by the term ‘body’) and the vital mode of existence (referred to by the term ‘soul,’ which is the substantial form of the human being). A human being, therefore, is IDENTICAL TO a human body, as long as we understand ‘human body’ correctly to mean, exclusively, the conjunction of a body which would be spatio-temporal but not living, and the soul which would be vital but not spatio-temporal. Together these constitute one substance. Since they are integral parts of a single whole substance they cannot exist in the same way as the whole substance – although another argument can be made that the soul is indestructible or subsistent but that’s not the purpose of this discussion, I take it.
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levinas12
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It would seem at first blush that there is a genus for persons … with 3 specific differences, “divine”, “angelic” and “human”.
If only it were that simple … but unfortunately “person” is a very peculiar word … it designates not what some entities have in common, what is shareable … but, on the contrary, what they don’t have in common (“incommunicability”).
This notion of “incommunicability” is not novel. Aquinas uses it to explain the Holy Trinity. Father, Son and Holy Spirit have the same nature but are distinct as persons.
As Thomas points out, “person” (not just in the divine context) is not nature, definable by a a genus and species. See, e.g., ST I, q. 29, aa.1-3.
Genus/species belongs to “form”, and “form” along with matter belongs to “essence”, to quiddity, the “what”. But “person” is a “who” not a “what” … and, as a “who”, “person” belongs to the “esse” side of the ledger … “person” is associated with “esse” that “owns” itself.
All of this is compatible with “person” being, at the same time, a gift from God.
In addition to the Spaemann quotes in my postings above, you might also take a look at Sokolowski’s Christian Faith & Human Understanding, pp. 165ff.
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levinas12
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levinas12
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Just a followup to my previous posting. Loosely adapted from Sokolowski.
I can say, “Come over here, I want to show you a tree (or a house or an animal or a man)”.
But I can’t really say, “Come over here, I want to show you a person”. As if I’m saying, “this is what a person is like”.
It would be like saying, “Come over here, I want to show you an individual”. As if I’m saying, “This is what an individual is like.”
It can’t be a question of “likeness” because “person” pertains to the “incommunicable”, to radical “individuation” - not just spatio-temporal localization but a more fundamental uniqueness … on the side of “esse” …
However, I can say, “Come over here, I want you to meet JD or Alterum” …
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greylorn
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There seems to me to be no point to such a scheme. What would be the purpose in it, especially given your subsequent comment about dolts, and the short lifetime of the human body?
That would depend entirely upon exactly what “souls” are and how they came into being. My theory holds that all are different in their ability to realize their consciousness potential.
Yet one might well assume that the level of souls being brought into consciousness on planet earth were originally all of the same abysmally low level. Assuming that to be the case…
All must learn through experience, which on planet earth will differ for each.
The brain determines most of what accounts for human personality. Brains are as different in us as they are in cats and dogs, giving each soul an internally unique experience irrespective of environment.
Soul has free will and sometimes uses it to make random choices, the outcome of which change its knowledge and nature.
Then, a single lifetime will be insufficient to move a soul into a suitable level of consciousness. Those returning for their 793rd lifetime will have acquired a level of conceptual experience that will set them apart from those here for their first ride in a body.
I’m going to hold the answer to that, in hopes you’ll be intrigued enough to read my book. December, I’m hoping.
Mostly quiescent, non-self aware, interacting randomly with the stuff of the universe, never assembling enough from the data it might absorb to extrapolate from there into self-awareness.
I think that its service time comes post-death. Life is boot-camp, a training and sorting process.
Yes, I know that you were figuring upon spending an eternity singing hymns and strumming harps but mostly doing nothing that requires effort, but that makes no sense. Study Mathew 25:14… from this alternative perspective: Why would God be so keen on his most effective and profit-making servant, rewarding him above the others, unless he figured on putting that fellow to work later?
It is a simple matter of definition. The Church has defined “spirit” to be something outside the physical universe, something inherently non-physical. Only things which are physical can interact with other physical things.
The Church theologians put themselves into this illogical box by being bright enough to realize, long ago when they were thinking about how the universe might work, that there was more to the universe than matter. (e.g: soul) Then they made the dreadful mistake of defining that mysterious other stuff as spirit, forever putting it beyond the reach of scientific inquiry.
This is a big mistake which perhaps the Church will muster up enough common sense to rectify before too much longer.
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Alterum
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Unfortunately I haven’t read that book of Sokolowski’s, but are you sure you’re exegeting him correctly here? It seems like an odd thing to maintain. Perhaps he’s trying to make a (Thomistic) distinction between essence and esse, the latter of which is never univocally predicated of anything.
I looked over that bit you referenced in the Summa (remember he’s talking about the Holy Trinity) and Thomas does indeed say that a person is a member of a genus, as per Boethius’ definition: he’s a rational substance. Perhaps the distinction Sokolowski wants to make is between man’s first substance (the ‘individual’ which cannot ‘inhere in’ anything else) and his second substance, which is his essence (quiddity) (see article 2). So ‘JD’ would be the first substance, ‘human’ the second, because it is predicated of all human beings (ie, all humans are human). It’s the ‘human,’ the second substance, that counts as the genus. ‘JD’ is not a genus; nothing else is ‘JD’ but ‘JD’. This is what I suspect is meant by ‘incommunicable’: the first substance cannot be predicated of anything.
So… with respect to the Trinity, remember that underlying Thomas’ predicating anything of God is the analogia entis: nothing can be said of God except as it is connected to Him by the thinnest thread of analogy.
You can indeed say, “Come over here, this is a person,” and point to a person in order to give an ostensive definition of person. But you can’t say, “Come over here, this is a JD,” unless you were pointing at the one-and-only JD (and unless you had an odd grammatical habit of using articles where they weren’t appropriate).
The bottom line is that this is a linguistic issue which corresponds to a metaphysical issue. In order to classify things there must be genera to which they belong: all things are kinds of things. And for reasons I won’t go into our language corresponds to the way things actually are: we can recognize universals exemplified in particulars (at least for Thomas). God alone transcends all categories and stands outside of all genera (hence the peculiar kind of analogy that Thomas has to employ in speaking of Him), a point with which I’m sure Sokolowski would have sympathies.
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levinas12
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“Person” does refer to the first substance of a rational nature … but the relation of person to its nature is different than the relation of non-personal supposita to their natures. The incommunicability of person is special because of this relation. You can see Thomas struggling with this issue in ST 1, 30, art. 4.
Whereas other individals of a particular genus/species are simply instantiations, persons are not. This difference is the basis for calling persons “singularities” - we may invoke of a genus of “singularity” to cover persons, but such a genus does not function at all like the traditional ones (“tree”, “man”, etc). Grammatically it looks similar but ontologically it’s not - because “person” is really a relation of the “esse” to itself.
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levinas12
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When I say “person” is a relation of the “esse” to itself, I am referring to “ownership” of the “esse”. A person can freely dispose of himself or herself. This self-relation is absent in non-personal supposita (first substances) which can be considered simply instantiations of their natures. Human operation does not follow a prescribed programme embedded in “human nature” (unlike non-personal entities whose operation flows automatically from their nature).
Non-personal first substances are individuated solely by their “matter”. With human beings, this is not the case. “Person” is an individuation that transcends “matter”.
That’s why a person comes into actuality at the moment of conception through a special
creative act of God. The individuation is not a matter of “matter”. And this might explain why persons continue to exist even if the matter disappears.
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levinas12
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I think when you say, “Come over here, this is a person”, what you really mean is, “Come over here, this is a rational animal” … and you proceed to point out various rational activities (e.g., talking, blogging, etc) to nail down the “demonstration” … but “person” does not mean “rational animal” … “person” indicates the “JD-ness” or “Alterum-ness” of some rational animal … but the “-ness” here is not a property … because “JD” or “Alterum” is really the radically individuated bearer of essence or properties … this is why proper names are a problem in Fregean logic … they are not “functions” …proper names are purely “referential” … not “descriptors” …
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Alterum
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I’d be lying if I said I didn’t see any problems with Thomas’ account of men and their individuation one form another, but I don’t see the problem you apparently see. For Thomas, in fact, the (primary) principle of individuation is prime matter, not the substantial form, because the substantial form is intrinsically the same (call it human-ness). Again, this is why we are all human: we have the same substantial form. If we’re staying with Thomas here (and it seems like we are), then the way you’re using ‘person’ seems to refer to the distinct prime matter which individuates this person (along with whatever accidental forms he possesses). So perhaps we could say that your name refers to (supposits for, if you want) you, but signifies your essence (human substantial form).
In conception, the ‘special creative act’ is simply the corruption of egg and sperm and generation of a human being.
So, again, the point where you and Thomas differ (although Thomas is nuanced here) appears to be what you consider to be the principle of individuation.
Edit: Also, yes, a proper name refers to the bearer of the name. But that doesn’t seem to be related to the issue here.
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levinas12
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I don’t think prime matter can explain the uniqueness of the person. Again, it is not simply a question of spatio-temporal locality. Somehow, “someone” has arrived on the scene (from the
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levinas12
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Happy Thanksgiving.
I don’t think matter alone can explain the radical individuation required for persons. The radicality of this individuation is related to what you might call, “existential” responsibility. As opposed to non-personal animals, I “lead” my life. I have a story, a history that is “mine” and not anyone else’s.
Or, to put it another way, I own myself. This “ownership” is not transferable. As Heidegger says, nobody can die in my place.
More formally, “person” is a self-relation, or a relation of my “esse” to itself. I think this is what Thomas calls “subsistence”. Only rational agents can “subsist”.
My “ownership” of myself does not push God out of the picture. The “ownership” is precisely why I am accountable to Him.
Such “ownership” and subsequently accountability cannot be explained solely by matter.
With respect to your “Edit”; the logical problem with proper names is that they cannot be “defined” by a set of Russellian definite descriptions. The proper name “refers” but it has no definite or bounded “Fregean sense”. This explains the “singularity” of the person.
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levinas12
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I need to qualify “person” as “self’-relation”. Just as or even more fundamental is “person” as “relation to other persons”. I am primarily “responsible” or “accountable” for how I relate to other persons, not how I am relate to myself.
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Alterum
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Happy Thanksgiving to you too!
I don’t think moral responsibility directly bears on the discussion of individuation. We possess moral agency because we are individual substances of a rational nature, not the other way around. And we are individuated by matter since we share what is intrinsically the same substantial form, as do all animal species (among the species).
I’m not quite sure what this has to do with personhood as a ‘self-relation’. I’m related to myself by a relation of identity. It seems like ‘ownership’ is just a different way of talking about moral responsibility. Perhaps I can’t see what you’re trying to say.
I don’t know what Frege thought about proper names so I can’t comment on some ‘Fregean sense’ of proper names.
I don’t think moral responsibility directly bears on the discussion of individuation. We possess moral agency because we are individual substances of a rational nature, not the other way around. And we are individuated by matter since we share what is intrinsically the same substantial form, as do all animal species (among the species).
I’m not quite sure what this has to do with personhood as a ‘self-relation’. I’m related to myself by a relation of identity. It seems like ‘ownership’ is just a different way of talking about moral responsibility. Perhaps I can’t see what you’re trying to say.
I don’t know what Frege thought about proper names so I can’t comment on some ‘Fregean sense’ of proper names.
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tonyrey
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I agree with you because personal existence is prior to particles!
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levinas12
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Maybe there’s another way to get at this.
It is possible to have an “individual substance of a rational nature” who is not totally responsible, in the metaphysical sense, for his actions.
Consider the medieval controversy about the unicity of the agent intellect. Averroes argued that there was only one agent intellect for all human beings. Aquinas, on the contrary, argued that each human being had his own individual agent intellect (in addition to a possible intellect). In this way, Aquinas secured the uniqueness of the human person.
There is a connection here to moral agency. If there is just a single cosmic agent intellect, then an external factor is involved in human actions. Could I continue to say, in this scenario, that my actions are really “mine” and “mine alone”?
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JDaniel
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Alterum:
I know you were not speaking to me, but, I just had to jump in here. Primary matter is not Aquinas’ individuating principle. If either of these first two causes is the individuating principle, Form is. Primary matter is the “subject,” i.e., a blank receptacle, so to speak, for the Form. In substantial change, primary matter is pure undifferentiation (chaos). Only in accidental change, may (secondary) matter be considered in its common meaning.
Two most common mistakes concerning Aquinas’ concepts are: (1) assuming “matter” to be what in its common meaning refers to having weight and occupying space. That could be the subject of secondary matter, but not “primary matter.” The best definition he gives for “Primary matter” is simply, “that which is the subject of substantial change.” And, “subject” must not be narrowly taken in its modern meaning. It is kind of like the “subject of a sentence,” in that it can be (almost) anything and as such is absolutely undifferentiated, rather than a specific “matter” or a matter that is specific to a particular owner, i.e., possessor. And, (2) assuming that Form only means shape or figure.
Human-ness is the reification of our sense-data of “human being(s)”. It is called first order, or rather, physical order, abstraction. In this order of abstraction, the the intellect, operating on the data presented to it by the senses dematerializes such data, in order to make things intelligible, then leaves aside what is called individual sensible matter but retains, in abstracted form, what is termed common or universal sensible matter. (Summa Theologica, I, q. 85, a. 1, reply 2.)
What the mind reifies is the commonality of certain “human” determinants. For this it does not need Primary Matter or Form separated; it needs them precisely as we see them, as composites, or compounds, if you will.
We have “substantial form” because we are the results of “substantial change.” For Aquinas, substantial change is a change of a whole mobile being, yet there is some perduring subject (primary, or fundamental, matter) which remains throughout the change. What we as human beings have is a certain sameness of accidental characteristics, in reification terms, but we have very specific differentiation when it comes to our “boundaries.” My boundary, i.e., separateness (from all others), is what confers “individuality.” The one among the many. That is the result of substantial change. But here agin, please don’t take “boundary” in too narrow a meaning. It means such things as, personality, intelligence, and physical features.
Our names in some imperfect way indicate our separation, our separateness, despite the occasional duplication. So, yes, your name “supposits” for you and signifies (points to) that essence that is your (and no one else’s) closest personal possession.
I’m not so sure it is that “simple.” It’s not merely a “corruption” of gametes. And, it is more a compound (rather than than a mixture), i.e., a binding together of the material of the gametes. It is such a thorough compound(ing) that the result becomes quite different from either parental gamete. This is tough, because Aquinas never intended primary matter to be conflated with gametes. He never intended for us to make such explanations. But, since you are here doing this, let’s see if we can get it as right as we can.
God bless,
jd
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JDaniel
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Here is Suarez on subsistence, substantial change and substantial form:
books.google.com/books?id=ftq1aUvWbaQC&dq=efficient+causality&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=x2z9AScg_l&sig=-Mk34dPTLrqdy2B5ld3eWa3YR6U&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result#v=onepage&q=subsistence&f=false
jd
books.google.com/books?id=ftq1aUvWbaQC&dq=efficient+causality&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=x2z9AScg_l&sig=-Mk34dPTLrqdy2B5ld3eWa3YR6U&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result#v=onepage&q=subsistence&f=false
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Alterum
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Hi JD. Sadly I don’t have a ton of time on my hands but here we go.
I know very well the distinction between primary matter and extended matter, which is why I qualified the kind of matter to which I was referring. Likewise do I know the distinction between ontological form and ‘shape’ (as a common sensible). These are non-sequiturs. Furthermore do I know how Thomas believes the process of sensation, intellection, abstraction, and conceptualization works. This is another non-sequitur. Although it is worth pointing out that your characterization of this process is rather lacking in nuance. Proper and common sensibles are, after all, sensibles: they perfect the senses; the intellect does not abstract sensibles at all. It abstracts universal intelligible form exemplified in matter. In particular, the agent intellect abstracts intelligible forms from sensible forms provided by phantasms, which are generated by the phantasia (a power of inner sense, not intellect). But again, this is a non-sequitur, although I’d be happy to clarify with considerable perspicuity, precisely what Thomas thinks regarding cognition, if you’d like.
The real issue here is that you attribute to Thomas Aquinas a position which he demonstrably did not hold; and instead of referring me to Thomas you refer me to Suarez (a notable interpreter of Thomas). But here, I will refer you to Thomas, who most certainly does insist that primary matter is, as I said, the primary principle of individuation. I say (and I said) ‘primary’ because in fact it is primary matter in conjunction with its particular dimensive qualities which accounts for individuation.
“*n natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.” – ST I.75.4
“Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.” – ST I.76.2 ad 3
What does Thomas mean by ‘signate matter’? Exactly what I said:
“But matter is the principle of individuation. From this it might perhaps appear to follow that an essence which includes in itself matter along with form is only particular and not universal. And from this it would follow that universals would not have a definition, if essence is that which is signified by a definition. We should notice, therefore, that the principle of individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatever, but only designated [signate] matter. And I call that matter designated which is considered under determined dimensions. Such matter is not placed in the definition of man as man, but it would be placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition.” – De Ente et Essentia, 2.22-3
What worries me is that this is Thomas’ well-known and controversial position which you aver, claiming to speak for Thomas, that he rejects. That is a patently false attribution; I hope you don’t make it again.
With regard to conception, again, I stated exactly what Thomas states (except that he refers to ‘sperm’ and ‘menstrual blood,’ having not the notion of ovum). Now you can argue with Thomas; you are free to do so. But do not argue that Thomas held a position which he did not.*
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