What is the role of credulity in religion and is it useful in promoting the message?

[Roscoe_Turner]

don’t

think it’s fair to tell religion people that they “ought not” to introduce their religion into the public sphere, just that – once it is introduced into the public sphere, whether in the name of faith or reason – it is fair game for public debate, and the respect that is due to others’ religious beliefs does not preclude openly voiced disagreement. There is that saying, “we are entitled to our private opinions, but not our private facts.”

I think religious believers themselves have a good understanding of aspects of their religion that admit of secular arguments – moral issues, especially, such as abortion or euthanasia – and those aspects of their religion that do not (for example, arguing that everyone should go to Catholic mass on Sunday, or not eat meat on Fridays during Lent). Any religious Catholic who would introduce the latter into public discourse would probably be viewed as quixotic by his co-religionists. Obviously, when it comes to moral arguments, the contention is that their applicability is not religion-specific, but amenable to reason. And there are bitter disagreements, to be sure – for example, Catholics maintain that the disordered, even immoral, quality of homosexual relationships is amenable to reason (via natural law), while many secular thinkers maintain that it is not and that insistence on the inherent immorality of homosexuality is tantamount to insisting you ought not to eat meat on Fridays during Lent, or that you ought to attend Catholic Mass every Sunday.

It is very difficult to propose one without having to defend the whole religion. There is presuppositions that are made on each side but ultimately the ones that come from the religious side are religious. For example euthanasia. The presupposition is all life is sacred and we don’t have the moral authority to end life (often called “playing God”). Since the presuppositions are faith based it opens the faith to criticism and critique.

Things that are taken for granted within the faith aren’t outside it. So if someone takes a contrary position it’s seen as against the faith. If you are against the faith you are against God. If you are against God you are evil. It’s hard to reason with someone that thinks you are evil, there isn’t much middle ground that can be found.

 

[Portofino]

It is very difficult to propose one without having to defend the whole religion. There is presuppositions that are made on each side but ultimately the ones that come from the religious side are religious. For example euthanasia. The presupposition is all life is sacred and we don’t have the moral authority to end life (often called “playing God”). Since the presuppositions are faith based it opens the faith to criticism and critique.

I certainly see what you’re saying. For one thing, there is a fundamental difference between a secular humanist, versus a Christian, conception of suicide; and this may be the origin of the disagreement on euthanasia. The secular humanist tends to adopt, as a rule of thumb, “you are free to do with your own life and your own body as you please, so long as you do not violate the rights of others. Your body is your private property, the most intimate form of private property there is. This is why rape is wrong. This is why murder is wrong. The bodies of others belong to them, as their own private property. You cannot encroach on the body of another individual. However, you have a right to do with your own body, as you please.” For a secular humanist, I think suicide is conceived of as a tragedy, and the person who commits suicide is a victim. In most cases, suicide prevention is something that they would very much encourage. However, I’m not sure it would make sense for a secular humanist to say that suicide – or, by extension, euthanasia – is morally wrong.

For a Christian, suicide is morally wrong because your body does not belong to you, it belongs to God (in some manner, this has reverberations in the abortion debate, as well). You cannot do with your body as you please, whether it be in terms of entering into a homosexual relationship; or committing suicide; or bidding someone else to assist you in committing suicide (euthanasia).

In a way, it is surprising how much secular humanists – or, to be more accurate, secular humanists, plus liberal Christians, plus non-Christian theists of a similar bent – can agree upon with orthodox Christians. Both can revile pedophilia, as constituting the rape of a child. Both can revile rape in general. Both can condemn genocide. Where agreement breaks down is over this idea that you do not have the right to do with your own body, as you please (for example, as regards homosexual behavior, or euthanasia). I omit abortion because one could argue that, although one has the right to do with one’s own body, as one pleases, an abortion infringes upon the right to life of another. But there are certainly those who argue in favor of abortion, as part of a consistent ethic that one’s own body is one’s private property and is at one’s own disposal, and no one else’s (meaning, the state has no right to legislate your body or your uterus).

that are taken for granted within the faith aren’t outside it. So if someone takes a contrary position it’s seen as against the faith. If you are against the faith you are against God. If you are against God you are evil. It’s hard to reason with someone that thinks you are evil, there isn’t much middle ground that can be found.

This can definitely exist, I think no one would deny! That reasoning is even more evident in some circles of Islam, whereby offenses against God are worse than offenses against man. At worst, this fed into what I would call an anti-humanistic conception of religion. Its logic was, “human beings derive their value through God; God can have value without human beings, but human beings cannot have value without God. You offend God, you’ve committed a crime worse than murder. God’s honor is worth more than your own life, because your own life derives its value from God.” In former centuries, this meant that offenses against God were rightly punishable by death, because an offense against God, was – indeed – worse than murder. As I had once put it to myself, “crimes against God justified crimes against man” – because crimes against God were conceived as the worst crimes of all.

Today’s Christians do not think this way – it would be slander to suggest that they do – but this was once a compelling logic in Christian circles (Aquinas believed that unrepentant heretics not only merited a death sentence, but that it was God’s will that they got it). Perhaps there are aftereffects of this thinking, today, in what’s called the odium theologicum; for how can one not find it repugnant, that someone rejects the totality of all that is good and holy, in the person of God? Calvin once wrote, “a dog barks when his master is attacked. I would be a coward if I saw that God’s truth is attacked and yet would remain silent.” In Calvin’s case, this had involved not only not remaining silent, but the burning at the stake of a thinker who had denied the Trinity (Michael Servetus, an early Unitarian). The concept of God, which was supposed to be the great unifier of humanity, was instead a source of division and mutual hostility.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The secular humanist tends to adopt, as a rule of thumb, “you are free to do with your own life and your own body as you please, so long as you do not violate the rights of others. Your body is your private property, the most intimate form of private property there is. This is why rape is wrong. This is why murder is wrong. The bodies of others belong to them, as their own private property. You cannot encroach on the body of another individual. However, you have a right to do with your own body, as you please.”

There is something almost schizophrenic in this conception of secular humanism (not that that is a problem solely with your depiction, which perhaps reflects the inconsistency in secular humanism itself).

What real value is there In anything that can be disposed of with impunity? By doing whatever s/he wants with her/his body and, by extension, with the will that resides in the body, the secular humanist is making the statement that his/her body and will are only as valuable as s/he wills them to be. If s/he chooses to accord them no value, they have none and can be disposed without remorse. Anything that can be accorded such a fluid valuation cannot be inherently valuable, so how can the will that abides in the body have such “moral” authority to accord things moral value when its own value is completely contingent on its own valuation, which has no essential value or basis upon which to ground value? This sounds like a very flimsy ground upon which to base crucial moral valuations and decisions. Shifting grounds have never provided a solid foundation for anything.

Why should anyone else, according to this secular humanist conception, grant that your body and, again by extension, your subjective will, has any value when it has, no intrinsic, but only contingent, value which can be revoked by an arbitrary act of will? When a secular humaist no longer values his/her life they are free to dispose of it. The “valuer” and the “valued” are both devalued by a single act of will. Yet, how can anything valued by such a fickle determination have anything approaching enduring value?

Why should anyone be morally obligated to the value and well-being of others, when that value can be rendered null by an arbitrary act of will? Why should I have respect for the well-being of others, care for them and have obligations towards them when all my love and emotional commitment to them can be rendered meaningless whenever they choose? Sorry, Portofino, but this seems to deal the secular humanist’s basis for a coherent ethical position a deadly blow.

 

[polytropos]

In part, I think this attitude could stem from a genuine spirit of fairness (not sure it does in that case of that particular author, though). By that I mean, one is saying, “if you attempt to use rational arguments to prove your religion, I will not refrain from arguing back. For one thing, by making rational arguments in favor of your religion, you are implying that these arguments ought to be binding on my reason, as well, on the reason of everyone. But if you openly profess that your religion is a matter of faith – or even, that faith is a necessary element, and that reason alone is not a necessary and sufficient grounding for assent to your religion – then I will respect your beliefs, and I will leave them alone.”

Agreed. Like all claims that purport to be reasonable, religious claims would be subject to reasonable critique. I see no issue with that and I don’t even think it needs to be stated; that is how dialogue works. If I state that my claim is based on reason, then by necessity I am disputing contrary claims.

As you note, the author in the article was expressing something else, that religious claims are acceptable when they are emotional and not acceptable when they purport to be reasonable. Religion is okay when it is “emotion-driven.” You are not supposed to take “supernatural and miraculous phenomena as evidence.” This is not a claim that such phenomena have never occurred (which is what a reasonable dialogue would be about); it is a claim that such phenomena could not have occurred and thus should not be considered, ie. if you take the claims of your religion seriously, you should not articulate them as something that actually happened. Obviously these debates over miraculous phenomena are disputed, and whether or not they happened is a separate debate, but the idea that people cannot try to hold belief in them reasonably or engage in dialogue about them is preposterous and suppressive.

Someone like Dawkins does not subscribe to this. He will not cease and desist, just because someone professes that this is their faith. He does not have a notion of respecting the faith of others, because he believes that religious faith – which he portrays as an irrational belief – is dangerous and harmful.

Dawkins is in a slightly different category. He would like to “confront” any faith-based claim, and he believes that no one should hold a belief that they cannot rigorously defend. I actually don’t think there is such a massive difference between the author and Dawkins, though, in that Dawkins is just the step-up from the author. They both find the emotionally-based claims ridiculous and untenable; the author just doesn’t care if people hold them. I don’t think Dawkins minds Christians who a). agree that they should not share their views in the public sphere, b). concede that their religious beliefs exist in a domain separate from reason, and c). do not believe in the “magical” parts of faith like transubstantiation, the divinity of Jesus, the human soul, etc. He probably would mock their beliefs in the right context, but his crusade is against religious people who believe that their religion is universally and wholly true.

Part of my problem with Dawkins is that he also holds untenable metaphysical beliefs. He would like to extend human rights to great apes on the basis of intelligence (while supporting abortion and conceding that he only opposes infanticide as advocated by Peter Singer in order to avoid a slippery slope). He will not be able to prove within the limitations of scientific methodology that all intelligent beings have any intrinsic rights any more than theists will prove within the limitations of scientific methodology that humans have souls. He gets to arbitrarily select who has dignity because he is in a position of power.

In a similar way - as someone who attends a very liberal college - I find it hypocritical that there are people majoring in “environmental studies” and who are vegans but would have an abortion. I suppose the goal is to construct a value system, purported to be logical and scientific but necessarily arbitrary and socially constructed, that allows you to do what you want while still partaking in the “charitable” actions that make you feel good about yourself.

 

[polytropos]

I would agree that I don’t think it’s fair to tell religion people that they “ought not” to introduce their religion into the public sphere, just that – once it is introduced into the public sphere, whether in the name of faith or reason – it is fair game for public debate, and the respect that is due to others’ religious beliefs does not preclude openly voiced disagreement. There is that saying, “we are entitled to our private opinions, but not our private facts.”

I think religious believers themselves have a good understanding of aspects of their religion that admit of secular arguments – moral issues, especially, such as abortion or euthanasia – and those aspects of their religion that do not (for example, arguing that everyone should go to Catholic mass on Sunday, or not eat meat on Fridays during Lent). Any religious Catholic who would introduce the latter into public discourse would probably be viewed as quixotic by his co-religionists. Obviously, when it comes to moral arguments, the contention is that their applicability is not religion-specific, but amenable to reason. And there are bitter disagreements, to be sure – for example, Catholics maintain that the disordered, even immoral, quality of homosexual relationships is amenable to reason (via natural law), while many secular thinkers maintain that it is not and that insistence on the inherent immorality of homosexuality is tantamount to insisting you ought not to eat meat on Fridays during Lent, or that you ought to attend Catholic Mass every Sunday.

I do see it as problematic (at the very least because it is hopelessly ineffective) that positions against abortion etc. are argued on a religious basis. I do not see any reason for a secular person to accept a religious argument on a specific issue. I do think there are secular arguments against abortion, however. I think it is tougher to construct a secular argument against same-sex marriage and a few other issues, but the fact that people generally don’t try to construct secular arguments is disappointing. I also can sort of see why the attitude against rational religious claims in the public sphere has come about: many politicians who make religious arguments do not try to justify the religious beliefs.

I would say that I generally agree that civil law should only prohibit those things that affect other people. I don’t think mass attendance or yearly confession or belief in God should be mandated - those are all sins between the person and God. Abortion, on the other hand, is not just between a woman and God, it is between a woman, a child, and God. The debate on same-sex marriage is particularly contentious because there is disagreement as to whether there is a third-part that is affected.

 

[Portofino]

There is something almost schizophrenic in this conception of secular humanism (not that that is a problem solely with your depiction, which perhaps reflects the inconsistency in secular humanism itself).

What real value is there In anything that can be disposed of with impunity? By doing whatever s/he wants with her/his body and, by extension, with the will that resides in the body, the secular humanist is making the statement that his/her body and will are only as valuable as s/he wills them to be. If s/he chooses to accord them no value, they have none and can be disposed without remorse. Anything that can be accorded such a fluid valuation cannot be inherently valuable, so how can the will that abides in the body have such “moral” authority to accord things moral value when its own value is completely contingent on its own valuation, which has no essential value or basis upon which to ground value? This sounds like a very flimsy ground upon which to base crucial moral valuations and decisions. Shifting grounds have never provided a solid foundation for anything.

I think there is a certain empirical quality to this kind of humanism, that – for better or worse – can never be absolute.

For example, is life inherently worth living? That’s a question I can only answer for myself, not for anyone else. I don’t know what it’s like to inhabit another’s body, nor to face the life circumstances that they face. I cannot tell them what life is, only what it is to me, and what (perhaps) I believe it can be for them. In terms of the question of whether life is worth living, I know I don’t have the right to make that determination for them.

But I think I overstated the suicide case; this would be like overstating martyrdom, in terms of a religious respect for life. I could easily imagine a liberal humanist (let’s say) being a healthcare professional, a profession which is fundamentally based on caring for and nurturing life. A healthcare professional does view suicidal tendencies as a symptom of sickness, not to mention a psychologist or counselor. One can still care about the lives of others, even though we acknowledge that the choice is theirs to make (nor can we live their lives for them; the most we can do is seek to help them).

With euthanasia, the argument is different – “dying with dignity”; quality of life as a consideration; the desire not to suffer any longer, if one is terminally ill. This seems based on the reasoning that both suffering and death are evils to be avoided, but that I don’t have the right to make the determination as to which is the worser evil, when a patient is faced with excruciating suffering and their condition is terminal. I’m not feeling their pain; it is much easier for me to take the high road of idealism, so long as they can’t transfer their illness to me, and let me bear it for them. The suffering is inside their body, not mine – and it could be a suffering I’ve not only never experienced, but can scarcely imagine bearing for as long as they’ve already borne it.

should anyone else, according to this secular humanist conception, grant that your body and, again by extension, your subjective will, has any value when it has, no intrinsic, but only contingent, value which can be revoked by an arbitrary act of will? When a secular humaist no longer values his/her life they are free to dispose of it. The “valuer” and the “valued” are both devalued by a single act of will. Yet, how can anything valued by such a fickle determination have anything approaching enduring value?

This is admittedly going beyond the ken of liberalism, which is grounded more pragmatically, in terms of respect for individual rights. Those rights were social endowments and were based on what people wanted – demanded, in some cases, even at peril to their lives. People valued their own lives, and their own autonomy (in some cases, the latter even trumped the former, “give me liberty or give me death”). People generally do not want to be killed or raped or assaulted, nor enslaved; that is why, on a social level – on a human level – it is morally wrong (I admittedly can’t speak about it on a cosmic level). These rights were granted, initially, not merely out of idealism, but out of necessity, as a way of maintaining peace and avoiding war. A pragmatic humanistic ethic admittedly cannot tell you why we should value our lives; it just empirically observes that most of us do. It admittedly also can’t tell us why we should value others’ lives, except that it empirically observes that families exist; that friendship exists; that neighbors exist; that fellow citizens exist.

This is my own understanding of liberalism, in the philosophical sense; I cannot say that it is everyone’s. For someone like Thomas Jefferson, individual rights were metaphysically grounded, God-given – “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness forbid murder, by implication (right to life); forbid rape (right to liberty); forbid enslavement (right to liberty); but do not, for instance, forbid homosexual relationships, nor pre-marital sex, nor something as non-public (presumably ) as masturbation. The principles of the Founding Fathers are very “bare bones”, very much the lowest common denominator of a humanistic ethic. But it is also, perhaps, the most we can expect to reach consensus on.

 

[Portofino]

Part of my problem with Dawkins is that he also holds untenable metaphysical beliefs. He would like to extend human rights to great apes on the basis of intelligence (while supporting abortion and conceding that he only opposes infanticide as advocated by Peter Singer in order to avoid a slippery slope). He will not be able to prove within the limitations of scientific methodology that all intelligent beings have any intrinsic rights any more than theists will prove within the limitations of scientific methodology that humans have souls. He gets to arbitrarily select who has dignity because he is in a position of power.

I once heard Dawkins being asked about morality, and he seemed confused by the question. He speaks of it as innate, as natural (altruism as a result of evolution, I suppose). On some level, he posits it to be self-evident.

I think the filmmaker Stanley Kubrick – who was rather genially non-theistic in his thinking, not aggressive in the manner of a Dawkins – said, “the only real evil for me is that which threatens the species; the only real good, that which preserves it.” His orientation there was admittedly diffuse, but he took the preservation of life as his ethical standard. Unless everyone gets to live, no one will get to live – having made a film about nuclear holocaust, he believed this literally to be the case. War was a great evil, assuring mutual destruction.

His motivations were part selfish, part altruistic, though both tending in the same direction of wanting to preserve his own life and the life of his species. He just didn’t ask why he wanted to preserve his own life, to begin with; he took it as self-evident that death was a great evil.

Everyone needs their axiomatic presuppositions, I suppose, and those were his.

a similar way - as someone who attends a very liberal college - I find it hypocritical that there are people majoring in “environmental studies” and who are vegans but would have an abortion. I suppose the goal is to construct a value system, purported to be logical and scientific but necessarily arbitrary and socially constructed, that allows you to do what you want while still partaking in the “charitable” actions that make you feel good about yourself.

It may be that they are only dimly aware of the contradictions that you perhaps take to constitute their hypocrisy. This exists with the religious as well, of course – I personally can’t conceive of the Christianity of a president who, as a governor of Texas, was responsible for the deaths of so many convicted felons. The Vatican’s general take on it was that the death penalty not be applied in virtually all cases today, as part of a consistent ethic of life. Being hawkish – almost eager to go to war, not as a last resort but as one of one’s first resorts – also seems inconsistent with a Christian ethic, yet is very prevalent.

With abortion, three values likely collide within these environmentally-minded vegans – individual liberty (a woman who is forced to carry a pregnancy she does not want has been rendered a human incubator, in the eyes of many); the right to life (I presume these vegans are anti-war and anti death penalty); lastly, feminism (in former centuries, even decades, women were often treated as little more than sperm receptacles, whose purpose in life was to produce male offspring at the behest of their husbands; “self-determination” for women was a joke). It is an issue that is very clear-cut on a theoretical level, very complicated on a practical level. For example, I’m not sure pro-lifers are, themselves, fully clear as to how the criminalization of the practice would work, in terms of penalties and enforcement.

I imagine that these environmentally-minded vegans might be among those who say, “I don’t know if I would ever have an abortion, but I don’t have the right to tell a woman that she can’t.”

That may be a cop-out, but no more a cop-out – in my mind – than the Vatican telling Catholics that there is no specific guidance provided on individual death penalty cases, or individual wars that their government may involve them in; rather, it is a question of “individual conscience” (this stance was paradoxically maintained, even as the Vatican, if I remember correctly, urged the American government not to initiate the second war in Iraq). The Church speaks of just war, yet doesn’t dare tell Catholics which wars are just, which are not. It suspends judgment, remains neutral, presumably out of pragmatism.

 

[Portofino]

The debate on same-sex marriage is particularly contentious because there is disagreement as to whether there is a third-part that is affected.

Yes, I can appreciate that; even if same-sex marriage and same-sex parenting are two distinct issues, they are closely tied up together. Much of the debate centers around whether the presence of homosexual parents is doing damage to the child, psychologically or otherwise. At the same time, I know of one individual – belonging to an older generation – who privately admits that she has always been against inter-racial marriage, deeming it “not fair to the children” to burden them with potential confusion (she is not very philosophical about it, nor politically correct; for one thing, she deems that the children may look “funny” and be ridiculed in school, or simply be confused as to which group to identify with).

I’m sure there are Catholics who would not be thrilled to give children over to be raised by Scientologists, though would suspend judgment in an official legal capacity (and Scientologists, conversely, who may not be thrilled at the prospect of children raised by Catholics).

 

[polytropos]

I once heard Dawkins being asked about morality, and he seemed confused by the question. He speaks of it as innate, as natural (altruism as a result of evolution, I suppose). On some level, he posits it to be self-evident.

Indeed, I think he does. But if morality is self-evident, then one is left to explain why there is moral disagreement today, which side should be taken as holding what is properly self-evident, and why we now disagree with many moral stances that for much of recorded history were regarded as “self-evident.” Dawkins scoffs at those who would suggest that morality is not self-evident and explicable through evolution, and then defines those who disagree with him as simply those who have wrongly interpreted “self-evident” morality because they have been mislead by socially constructed religious institutions.

I think the filmmaker Stanley Kubrick – who was rather genially non-theistic in his thinking, not aggressive in the manner of a Dawkins – said, “the only real evil for me is that which threatens the species; the only real good, that which preserves it.” His orientation there was admittedly diffuse, but he took the preservation of life as his ethical standard. Unless everyone gets to live, no one will get to live – having made a film about nuclear holocaust, he believed this literally to be the case. War was a great evil, assuring mutual destruction.

I don’t think it’s an unreasonable position to hold. A complaint that some supporters of abortion make is that the world will become overpopulated if abortion is not allowed. But I would have to wonder if a society can be considered “good” if it only thrives by killing those at the bottom.

The Declaration of Independence asserts as much, that humans have the right to life. Yet whether that right is respected by the law is contested. When the right to pursuit of happiness comes to be defined as the right to sex without consequences, I suppose it supersedes the right to life. (I am just being bitter. No need to respond to this.)

His motivations were part selfish, part altruistic, though both tending in the same direction of wanting to preserve his own life and the life of his species. He just didn’t ask why he wanted to preserve his own life, to begin with; he took it as self-evident that death was a great evil.

Again, I don’t see preservation of life as an unreasonable axiom. I think what might be agreed upon by all is that evolutionary psychology discloses that humans (and all animals) generally act in ways that preserve life. The exceptions to this are generally considered to be pathological (in the case of desiring suicide for mental illness).

It may be that they are only dimly aware of the contradictions that you perhaps take to constitute their hypocrisy. This exists with the religious as well, of course – I personally can’t conceive of the Christianity of a president who, as a governor of Texas, was responsible for the deaths of so many convicted felons. The Vatican’s general take on it was that the death penalty not be applied in virtually all cases today, as part of a consistent ethic of life. Being hawkish – almost eager to go to war, not as a last resort but as one of one’s first resorts – also seems inconsistent with a Christian ethic, yet is very prevalent.

I agree. I think most Christians (including Catholics) are more beholden to political doctrines than their religion. The Republican Party’s attitude towards the poor (and war, as you mention) do not strike me as particularly Christian.

With abortion, three values likely collide within these environmentally-minded vegans – individual liberty (a woman who is forced to carry a pregnancy she does not want has been rendered a human incubator, in the eyes of many); the right to life (I presume these vegans are anti-war and anti death penalty); lastly, feminism (in former centuries, even decades, women were often treated as little more than sperm receptacles, whose purpose in life was to produce male offspring at the behest of their husbands; “self-determination” for women was a joke). It is an issue that is very clear-cut on a theoretical level, very complicated on a practical level. For example, I’m not sure pro-lifers are, themselves, fully clear as to how the criminalization of the practice would work, in terms of penalties and enforcement.

I can understand the cultural forces that beget such attitudes. And there certainly are various attempts at justifying abortion, so it’s hard to suppose.

What I find inconsistent is the simultaneous denial of metaphysics with respect to the soul of a human fetus and embracing of metaphysics with respect to other animals and the environment. Now, I am sure that there are a lot of rebuttals; one might claim that they are not vegan or environmentally friendly because of metaphysics but for practical reasons, and one might note that they probably do not actually think of any of the issues in terms of “metaphysics” per se. But nevertheless they are acting under assumptions of value being inhered in the world; it is good to prevent the death of animals for human consumption and good to protect the environment, but it is not good to protect a human fetus.

There are separate justifications that one can make for various things. One can say that it’s right to protect the environment for future generations, or that animals are in some way more valuable than a human fetus. But I don’t really think one escapes making arbitrary valuations - which are at least functionally metaphysical.

 

[polytropos]

I imagine that these environmentally-minded vegans might be among those who say, “I don’t know if I would ever have an abortion, but I don’t have the right to tell a woman that she can’t.”

I actually find such a statement untenable - that one can personally oppose abortion but not have a right to express it to others. It depends on why you are saying that you would never have an abortion. But if you are saying you would not have an abortion because you believe it is murder or that it is unjust for the child, then this statement is equivalent to saying, “I don’t know if I would ever murder someone, but I don’t have the right to tell a murderer that he/she can’t.”

I suppose one could say that they would never have abortion because they want kids soon and don’t expect to be in a situation of having “too many,” but in that case it would probably be stated differently.

The other objection, of course, is that a woman’s right to her body prevents others from telling her what to do, no matter what. I generally feel that the right to life is the most inviolable of rights and is not “trumped” by the “right to convenience.”

 

[sugar57]

All babies are born without any religion; religion is learned and usually learned during childhood.

 

[polytropos]

All babies are born without any religion; religion is learned and usually learned during childhood.

They are also born without making any attempt to discern and without making any statement about the likelihood of any religion being true; babies are not born agnostics or atheists.

 

[Portofino]

Indeed, I think he does. But if morality is self-evident, then one is left to explain why there is moral disagreement today, which side should be taken as holding what is properly self-evident, and why we now disagree with many moral stances that for much of recorded history were regarded as “self-evident.” Dawkins scoffs at those who would suggest that morality is not self-evident and explicable through evolution, and then defines those who disagree with him as simply those who have wrongly interpreted “self-evident” morality because they have been mislead by socially constructed religious institutions.

I suppose it is tempting to argue that morality is self-evident; that is one way to attempt to come to a non-religious, secular basis of agreement. It’s true that I’ve never met anyone who personally enjoys being lied to, or stolen from, or taken advantage of (without their consent). That’s the first person regarding whom folks tend to have moral clarity – themselves Of course, consensus regarding the role of women in a society, or regarding homosexuality, has unraveled within just the past few decades, at least in the West. Positions regarding race relations, slavery, colonialism, and religious liberty have also changed.

don’t think it’s an unreasonable position to hold. A complaint that some supporters of abortion make is that the world will become overpopulated if abortion is not allowed. But I would have to wonder if a society can be considered “good” if it only thrives by killing those at the bottom.

I will grant you, that is disturbing in its implications; so would those same individuals take issue if there were not enough abortions? Would they encourage more? I suppose they would also be pro-contraception and would question whether it is moral to bring a child into the world without having the reasonable means to feed and clothe that child; they would associate overpopulation with the suffering of children. It does give pause, though, to hear someone conclude, “it would be better not to be born at all,” even though I assume someone who is pro-life would not take the suffering of children lightly, and there is sure to be some hypocrisy on the other side, as well (such as the allegation that some pro-lifers suddenly lose interest in the welfare of the child, once it is born, at least in terms of the social policies that they support).

the right to pursuit of happiness comes to be defined as the right to sex without consequences, I suppose it supersedes the right to life

Sex without consequences; this has normally been the prerogative – not the moral prerogative, but the practical one – of men. A man has a choice that a woman doesn’t – when he impregnates a woman, he can either face up to his responsibilities, or leave town.
A woman can say, with full awareness, “every time I have sex, I could get pregnant.” A not particularly thoughtful, or simply irresponsible, man could say, “yes, every time we have sex, she could get pregnant.” Unfortunately, in a way, a man always has the freedom of choice that a woman lacks – the freedom to have nothing to do the pregnancy.

I find inconsistent is the simultaneous denial of metaphysics with respect to the soul of a human fetus and embracing of metaphysics with respect to other animals and the environment. Now, I am sure that there are a lot of rebuttals; one might claim that they are not vegan or environmentally friendly because of metaphysics but for practical reasons, and one might note that they probably do not actually think of any of the issues in terms of “metaphysics” per se. But nevertheless they are acting under assumptions of value being inhered in the world; it is good to prevent the death of animals for human consumption and good to protect the environment, but it is not good to protect a human fetus.

I think that many human beings have difficulty thinking in terms of abstractions. The prospect of their own death is an abstraction; for a smoker or a drinker, the prospect of terminal illness or of premature death is an abstraction (with some societies actually putting graphic pictures on their cigarette cartons); just so, for many, the pre-natal life of a fetus is an abstraction, which I know many pro-life advocates try to remedy, by showing ultrasounds and the like.

I can freely admit that what goes on in a slaughterhouse is an abstraction, to me; I’d rather not think about it. If I had to slaughter my own food, I may not give up meat entirely, but I probably would eat it less frequently than I do.

 

[nmgauss]

All babies are born without any religion; religion is learned and usually learned during childhood.

I don’t know which is more influential in a child’s belief system, Santa Claus or Jesus. It has been said that Santa Claus can be such a powerful belief that learning that he is a myth can shatter a child’s credulity. I know it worked that way with me. Perhaps that is why I became such a confirmed skeptic. I figured that if Santa Claus is not real, neither is Jesus.

With respect to religion, neither of my parents was religious even though they were baptized Christians. We seldom attended church services. My brief contact with a priest was frightening, so there was no appeal there. Since religion was almost never discussed at home, it was an aspect of our society that was missing in my upbringing.

 

[nmgauss]

I think that many human beings have difficulty thinking in terms of abstractions

 

[Portofino]

Can it be demonstrated that fetus is conscious and has a memory? What is to be done with multiple fetuses created during the process of in vitro fertilization. The ones not implanted are dumped. Is this abortion?]
Portofino;10824277:

No, medical consensus (which is not infallible, granted) seems to be that a fetus does not have the physiological mechanisms for feeling pain until at least week 20 of pregnancy. As for conscious awareness, I believe we’re talking even later.

My understanding is that opponents of abortion do not want to hang their hat on the issue of fetal pain, since someone could tell them, “so if it can be demonstrated to your satisfaction that fetuses are not conscious before week __, and feel no pain, will you revise your stance on abortion?”
nmgauss;10824440:

Do you feel the same way about escargot, lobster, crabs, scallops, and clams? How about trout that you catch with a fishing pole and prepare for the frying pan?

I admit that, a few years ago, I couldn’t help but smile when a friend of mine told me, “I’m starting to feel guilty about eating seafood.” My attitude, as I expressed it in the previous post, was based not so much on moral principle as on feeling – it would be difficult to slaughter a goat or a lamb; difficult, even, to slaughter a pig (I suppose not consuming dogs or cats is also based largely on strong emotion (and repugnance) in people, rather than on moral principle).

Guilt – not to mention squeamishness – is certainly allayed when you do not have to do it yourself, but can have others do it for you. Even in terms of the application of the death penalty, there are many more in support of it than would actually want to be the ones to “pull the switch” (a friend of mine once informed me that, in some states where electrocutions take/took place, there were multiple individuals pulling multiple switches, with only one of them being “active”; the idea was not to burden the conscience of the would-be executioner). I imagine a jury member might feel the same way, about assigning the death penalty – “they should give him the death penalty, just not me”-- even though there are 12 jurors, who are collectively responsible for the decision.

 

[nmgauss]

Here is a work that sheds light on the credulity of the masses in the Roman Empire. This piece was written by a PhD. in Ancient History at Columbia University:
infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/kooks.htmlinfidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/kooks.html

"We all have read the tales told of Jesus in the Gospels, but few people really have a good idea of their context. Yet it is quite enlightening to examine them against the background of the time and place in which they were written, and my goal here is to help you do just that. There is abundant evidence that these were times replete with kooks and quacks of all varieties, from sincere lunatics to ingenious frauds, even innocent men mistaken for divine, and there was no end to the fools and loons who would follow and praise them. Placed in this context, the gospels no longer seem to be so remarkable, and this leads us to an important fact: when the Gospels were written, skeptics and informed or critical minds were a small minority. Although the gullible, the credulous, and those ready to believe or exaggerate stories of the supernatural are still abundant today, they were much more common in antiquity, and taken far more seriously.

If the people of that time were so gullible or credulous or superstitious, then we have to be very cautious when assessing the reliability of witnesses of Jesus. As Thomas Jefferson believed when he composed his own version of the gospels, Jesus may have been an entirely different person than the Gospels tell us, since the supernatural and other facts about him, even some of his parables or moral sayings, could easily have been added or exaggerated by unreliable witnesses or storytellers. Thus, this essay is not about whether Jesus was real or how much of what we are told about him is true. It is not even about Jesus. Rather, this essay is a warning and a standard, by which we can assess how likely or easily what we are told about Jesus may be false or exaggerated, and how little we can trust anyone who claims to be a witness of what he said and did…"

 

[polytropos]

I will grant you, that is disturbing in its implications; so would those same individuals take issue if there were not enough abortions? Would they encourage more? I suppose they would also be pro-contraception and would question whether it is moral to bring a child into the world without having the reasonable means to feed and clothe that child; they would associate overpopulation with the suffering of children. It does give pause, though, to hear someone conclude, “it would be better not to be born at all,” even though I assume someone who is pro-life would not take the suffering of children lightly, and there is sure to be some hypocrisy on the other side, as well (such as the allegation that some pro-lifers suddenly lose interest in the welfare of the child, once it is born, at least in terms of the social policies that they support).

I have heard some such arguments - I don’t know exactly how common they are and exactly how seriously they would like to limit the population through contraception and abortion.

Part of the argument from economic viability (contraception and abortion save the state more money because less healthcare, education, etc. must be offered to poor children) is that all of the children contraceived or aborted would instead be born, and a condom or an abortion costs a lot less than raising a child. And yes, more children would be born - but the increase would not be equal to the current amount of abortions and contraceptions. What would happen is that people would stop having sex - which, I suppose, is a frightening prospect for many.

(There are of course practical limitations, ie. if abortion and contraception could be outlawed, people would still manage to practice them.)

Sex without consequences; this has normally been the prerogative – not the moral prerogative, but the practical one – of men. A man has a choice that a woman doesn’t – when he impregnates a woman, he can either face up to his responsibilities, or leave town.
A woman can say, with full awareness, “every time I have sex, I could get pregnant.” A not particularly thoughtful, or simply irresponsible, man could say, “yes, every time we have sex, she could get pregnant.” Unfortunately, in a way, a man always has the freedom of choice that a woman lacks – the freedom to have nothing to do the pregnancy.

I agree. And this is part of the problem with no-fault divorce, which was implemented to protect women, and a culture of temporary marriage and premarital sex (although much of this single-mother parenting certainly happens for other reasons).

I think that many human beings have difficulty thinking in terms of abstractions. The prospect of their own death is an abstraction; for a smoker or a drinker, the prospect of terminal illness or of premature death is an abstraction (with some societies actually putting graphic pictures on their cigarette cartons); just so, for many, the pre-natal life of a fetus is an abstraction, which I know many pro-life advocates try to remedy, by showing ultrasounds and the like.

I think that they do. As an atheist I nominally supported abortion and would say such things as “I don’t personally support abortion, but as a male it’s not my place to tell a woman what to do with her body.” I certainly did not think of a fetus as a human life and I did not consider it as having the rights ascribed to other humans - but when I actually did hear a strongly stated pro-life argument, I realized that I could not reconcile humanism and a pro-abortion stance.

 

[polytropos]

Can it be demonstrated that fetus is conscious and has a memory?

At all stages - no. But from the materialistic standpoint, choosing consciousness and memory as qualifications for humanity is baldly arbitrary. That is a materialistically untenable stance in itself.

This is not really to suggest that materialism is necessarily wrong, though it does demonstrate that it is ill-equipped to inform policy.

What is to be done with multiple fetuses created during the process of in vitro fertilization. The ones not implanted are dumped. Is this abortion?

Perhaps not abortion in the medical sense of the term. But I (and the Catholic Church, and anyone else who ascribes value to all genetically human and unique life) would consider it murder.

If one were to accept a secular argument against abortion, this would be why you would as a corollary disallow in vitro fertilization: if you don’t use all of the fetuses, it’s murder.

 

[polytropos]

I don’t know which is more influential in a child’s belief system, Santa Claus or Jesus. It has been said that Santa Claus can be such a powerful belief that learning that he is a myth can shatter a child’s credulity. I know it worked that way with me. Perhaps that is why I became such a confirmed skeptic. I figured that if Santa Claus is not real, neither is Jesus.

Gotta love that induction and all of the completely reliable conclusions it yields.