For objective truths I would add three particular criteria.The simplist and perhaps the most useful definition of truth that I have encountered is: Truth = That which is.
I believe that there a 2 categories of truth, objective and subject.
Objective truths are, whether anyone knows thems, likes them, or agrees with them
Subjective truth are, that which is for the subject stating them, such as “I like chocolate chips cookies.”
Hiedegger makes the point that truth is a property of statements, e.g. the statement “The boy is redheaded” may be true, but the thing itself- the color of the boy’s hair- cannot be subjected to the criteria of ‘truth’.What makes a statement true or false? Stated another way, what must there be in order for a statement like “the boy is redheaded” in order to make the state true? Correspondence to verifiable date? what is the criteria for “truth”?
The Aristolelian-Thomistic view would be that Truth comes from the conformity of the intellect with Reality. The Redheadedness is an existent property of the the boys hair which is independent of whatever colour I may think his hair is. It is true in so far as it actually exists and insofar as intellect grasps this fact correctly. The objective reality remains the same regardless, but the truth/flasehood of the judgment depends on whether or not my intellect correctly grasps reality. I.e. the hair is red whether I recognise that fact or not.What makes a statement true or false? Stated another way, what must there be in order for a statement like “the boy is redheaded” in order to make the state true? Correspondence to verifiable date? what is the criteria for “truth”?
That is an assumption on Heidegger’s part, that what we perceive cannot be the way it is. He may be quite incorrect about that. The thing itself can be subjected to a criteria of truth, what is, i.e., being itself or reality itself. To say, as you do below, that truth is “only” a property of language is to assume that statements about reality necessarily don’t or can’t match reality.Hiedegger makes the point that truth is a property of statements, e.g. the statement “The boy is redheaded” may be true, but the thing itself- the color of the boy’s hair- cannot be subjected to the criteria of ‘truth’.
This is only true if the words have no actual referent in reality, which is entirely assumed by your nominalistic world view. No one, likely not even you, really believe that when statements or claims are made they are not made “about” a corresponding entity in reality but only “about” other statements. Pardon my bluntness, but that notion borders on psychotic delusion.If truth is then a property of language, it seems important to recognise that language is always used within particular language games, the rules of which establish the validity of ‘moves’. Now, in some forms of the language game, an external referent is involved in determining the acceptability of a ‘move’, e.g. the statement ‘The boy is redheaded’.
In other forms of the language game (and I would suggest philosophy is one), it would seem that it is entirely internal- the relationship of the words themselves (without reference to an external referent) is the sole criteria for the acceptability (i.e. truth) of any move within the language game.
In Mailer’s short book, The Gospel according to the Son, Mailer has Christ answering that “in truth there is no peace and in peace there is no truth”. Do you believe that to be so? Is it that in truth there is always conflict and without conflict, there can be no truth?Pilate asked the exact question of Jesus…
I agree that statements can be “true” either objectively or subjectively. However, while I more or less agee with your description, I might state it differantly.The simplist and perhaps the most useful definition of truth that I have encountered is: Truth = That which is.
I believe that there a 2 categories of truth, objective and subject.
Objective truths are, whether anyone knows thems, likes them, or agrees with them
Subjective truth are, that which is for the subject stating them, such as “I like chocolate chips cookies.”
We are in agreement. You just used different, and more, words to describe the categories.such statements can be “true” either objectively or subjectively. However, I disagree as to how you have described each category.
The way a statement can be “true” in an objective mode is if the statement corresponds to reality. Examples are:" The boy is redheaded"; “the cat is on the table”; “it is cold outside”. As long as we have a mutual understanding of the meaning of the words used, statements can thus be made which correspond to those understood meanings and the statements made are either true or false.They are objectively true or false because we mutually understand the meaning of “redheadness” or “cat” or what we mean when we say it is “cold”.
The second way a statement can be “true” is if it reveals something meaningful about ourselves or something and about which there is no common experience. While we might understand the words in one of Byron’s poems and even have an appreciation of the common meaning of the words used, the meaning of the poem itself is a purely subjective experience. Like looking at a sunset, there is a subjective connection with “beauty” which cannot be shared because each participant has his/her own seperate experience of the beauty. And, of course, the sunset is a form of “truth” because it “reveals” something about the abstract notion of beauty.
Yes, I saw that we did agree so I tried to edit myself into conformity–but, you were too quick for me. And you are also correct I am verbose.We are in agreement. You just used different, and more, words to describe the categories.
In response to the first point, consider the statement “That tree is tall.” (pointing to a particular tree). The quality of ‘truth’ may or may not be in the statement. The thing itself, the tree, is what it is. Turth is not in the tree, but in the statement about the tree.That is an assumption on Heidegger’s part, that what we perceive cannot be the way it is. He may be quite incorrect about that. The thing itself can be subjected to a criteria of truth, what is, i.e., being itself or reality itself. To say, as you do below, that truth is “only” a property of language is to assume that statements about reality necessarily don’t or can’t match reality.
This is only true if the words have no actual referent in reality, which is entirely assumed by your nominalistic world view. No one, likely not even you, really believe that when statements or claims are made they are not made “about” a corresponding entity in reality but only “about” other statements. Pardon my bluntness, but that notion borders on psychotic delusion.
Only to the extent that the meaning in the statement matches the reality of the tree, otherwise the statement has no meaning at all. To claim the truth is found only in the statement about the tree is simply false, because without reference to the actual tree the statement says nothing.In response to the first point, consider the statement “That tree is tall.” (pointing to a particular tree). The quality of ‘truth’ may or may not be in the statement. The thing itself, the tree, is what it is. Turth is not in the tree, but** in the statement about the tree**.
Yes, but the statement alone can be true or false (which, yes, does involve its relationship to the tree). The tree itself is not subject to the criteria of true of false.Only to the extent that the meaning in the statement matches the reality of the tree, otherwise the statement has no meaning at all. To claim the truth is found only in the statement about the tree is simply false, because without reference to the actual tree the statement says nothing.
The tree itself is assumed to “be.” It cannot be denied which is why it is not subject to criteria of any sort, unless one is psychotic and wondering whether its existence is only an illusion.Yes, but the statement alone can be true or false (which, yes, does involve its relationship to the tree). The tree itself is not subject to the criteria of true of false.
No, but one could ask, “Does it exist?” or “Is it real?” as the ontological form of, “Is it true?”Truth pertains to statements, not to objects. If was to show you a tree and ask “True of false?”, there is no meaningful way to answer. But if I was to give you a statement, and ask “True or false”, you could answer.
Yes, the question of truth may involve comparison of the statement with an external referent. But the quality of truth or falsehood ultimately pertains to the statement, not the referent.