What is wrong with Maritain?

[Geremia]

I have heard a lot of negative rap about the Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain, from the simple fact that he defined philosophy as metaphysics to the claim that his apparently incorrect interpretations of St. Thomas might have contributed to the rise of Modernism.

E.g., In his Introduction to Philosophy he says:

Philosophy is the science which by the natural light of reason studies the first causes or highest principles of all things—is, in other words, the science of things in their first causes, insofar as these belong to the natural order. …] we shall take philosophy to mean philosophy par excellence, the first philosophy or Metaphysics

My simple question is: What exactly is wrong with Maritain? What is Maritainism? Is he not a genuine Thomist? Pope John Paul II, after all, mentions him explicitly in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (74.). Thanks

 

[IntegraCatholic]

E.g., In his Introduction to Philosophy he says:My simple question is: What exactly is wrong with Maritain? What is Maritainism? Is he not a genuine Thomist? Pope John Paul II, after all, mentions him explicitly in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (74.). Thanks

I haven’t read enough Maritain (or any of the neo-Scholastics, for that matter) to be able to speak intelligently about this. I simply will say: beware of “Thomists” who “know” more than St. Thomas. While Gilson is much better, he, too, seems to stray into this error from time to time. I wish I had more particular information for you, but if you keep that particular thought in mind while reading the neo-Scholastics, you shouldn’t have much trouble discerning where their problems lie (so long as you are well-versed in St. Thomas’s actual thought and writings). N.B. John Paul II was not a Thomist, and Fides et Ratio was not an encyclical in favor of a pure Thomism (by any stretch). The same cannot be said of Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris.

 

[djeter]

A short bio of Jacques Maritain here:

payingattentiontothesky.com/2010/03/26/jacques-maritain-a-short-bio/

and reading selections from a few of his books I’ve read:

1. 
   *]The Sixth Way – Approaches to God
   
   *]The Living Thoughts of Saint Paul
   
   *]The Human Person and Society
   
   Other writings on topics I’ve been thinking about as I’ve been learning to be a Catholic are on the site. Haven’t seen anything “wrong” yet, but then again I don’t know that much…
   
   He did write a book, *Le paysan de la Garonne *, a work sharply critical of post-Vatican Council reforms, published in 1967 towards the end of his life – perhaps that might be the sticking point. Haven’t readd that one though…
   
   dj

 

[Geremia]

He did write a book, *Le paysan de la Garonne *, a work sharply critical of post-Vatican Council reforms, published in 1967 towards the end of his life – perhaps that might be the sticking point. Haven’t readd that one though…

Is that book in English? No, that wouldn’t be the sticking point because most people I have heard criticizing Maritain would probably agree with this book.

 

[Geremia]

He did write a book, *Le paysan de la Garonne *, a work sharply critical of post-Vatican Council reforms, published in 1967 towards the end of his life – perhaps that might be the sticking point. Haven’t readd that one though…

Apparently there is an Engilsh translation, but it seems rare.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Geremia,

djeter seems to suggest above that the fact that Maritain criticized some of what came out of Vatican II might be the cause of disdain for Maritain. But, my sense is that those who are wary of Maritain are themselves critical of Vatican II. So, wouldn’t there be some other reason that Maritain is looked unfavorably upon?

I’ve seen some mention of “humanism” and “naturalism” leveled as criticisms.

VC

 

[MindOverMatter2]

I haven’t read enough Maritain (or any of the neo-Scholastics, for that matter) to be able to speak intelligently about this. I simply will say: beware of “Thomists” who “know” more than St. Thomas. While Gilson is much better, he, too, seems to stray into this error from time to time.

I think that this is a false principle. Aquinas is essentially correct. But this does not mean that Aquinas’ thoughts do not need development or additions; especially in light of modern day science. Its quite simply false to say that Aquinas said all that can be said through the method of metaphysics.

 

[JohnDamian]

I think that this is a false principle. Aquinas is essentially correct. But this does not mean that Aquinas’ thoughts do not need development or additions; especially in light of modern day science. Its quite simply false to say that Aquinas said all that can be said through the method of metaphysics.

You are correct MindOverMatter; Aquinas was certainly not correct on every front. To give one example; Aquinas views on the Immaculate Conception were incorrect; as the later ex cathedera declaration (Pius IX, Ineffabilis Deus) on the subject was opposed to Aquinas position.

To give another example; Aquinas also taught against non-formal matter (primal), and incompletely (and arguably incorrectly) on individuation (not developing the distinctio intentionalis, despite recognising a need to)

To take everything Aquinas says as true or absolutely complete would be a mistake, whilst he was an excellent theologian & philosopher he was not infallible or omniscient.

 

[IntegraCatholic]

Pope Leo XIII directs philosophers to seek for truth and continue the work of the philosophia perennis through Thomism. There can be some development of the thought of St. Thomas, and it’s possible that St. Thomas may have erred on certain things (neither of which Mr. Damien seems to cover entirely), but nothing philosophically to date has been demonstrated as false in what he taught. There is a very good reason that the Church requires that seminarians learn Thomism. It is the continuation of the philosophia perennis begun under the pre-Socratics and continued to this day.

–

The Thomistic position on the Immaculate Conception is much more nuanced than what you present. There are good Thomists out there who explain why St. Thomas’s position is compatible with the definition of the dogma. At the very most, it is merely a misunderstanding of when the soul enters the body. This is misunderstanding is based more on the scientific evidence lacking during the Mediaeval times.

To give another example; Aquinas also taught against non-formal matter (primal), and incompletely (and arguably incorrectly) on individuation (not developing the distinctio intentionalis, despite recognising a need to)

This is your opinion. Would you care to elaborate about why you think this is incorrect?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

To give another example; Aquinas also taught against non-formal matter (primal), and incompletely (and arguably incorrectly) on individuation (not developing the distinctio intentionalis, despite recognising a need to)

Please teach me why he was erroneous in these parts.

To take everything Aquinas says as true or absolutely complete would be a mistake, whilst he was an excellent theologian & philosopher he was not infallible or omniscient.

I agree. I think it would be intellectually dishonest to treat Aquinas’ philosophy as a divine commandment. Some have even argued that there was a decline in interest toward Aquinas precisely because Thomism was given the appearance of dogma on basis that many Popes strongly encouraged Catholics to be Thomistic, rather then treating it as one possible philosophy among others.

However i think that Aquinas’s methodical approach to “being” is an indispensable tool for a successful Catholic philosophy.

 

[JohnDamian]

Please teach me why he was erroneous in these parts.]

Firstly, forms play two specific and distinct roles in the constitution of material particulars; the first is they are informative of matter; and on the other hand they are essential parts of the whole composite. These are not intrinsic features of Form, since we can see that form lacks these imperfections in the case of the divine, therefore Form can be self-sustaining; it is prior to matter; and prior to the composite; since each is an act through the form and not conversly. Thus, it has a being of it’s own; but form need not inform matter and has being of its own; it is then possible for a bodily form to exist independantly of matter; and by consequence be a prime matter.

Secondarily; Aquinas recognised the need for an intermediate distinction (between conceptual and real), but it was his contempory; Henry of Ghent, who supplied the intentional distinction.

However i think that Aquinas’s methodical approach to “being” is an indispensable tool for a successful Catholic philosophy.

Aquinas approach was particularily methodical, however I would have to say his conclusion on being seems incorrect; he saw a real distinction between essence and existence, wheras it seems only sensible that what something is really the same as its existence, and only distinct formally - not really.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Aquinas approach was particularily methodical, however I would have to say his conclusion on being seems incorrect; he saw a real distinction between essence and existence, wheras it seems only sensible that what something is really the same as its existence, and only distinct formally - not really.

It would seem that a ball existing is the fact that it is being a ball. But if being a ball and being real, instead of nothing, is ontologically identical, then it is impossible that it could have ever been the case that a ball would stop “being” a “ball” since the two are identical. Hence a metaphysical contradiction that cannot possibly be resolved unless we accept the ontological difference between reality and that which is potentially real. That which is only potentially real, cannot possibly be real by its own reality since it possesses no reality until it is given reality. Thus unless you are willing to say that a thing can come from nothing or be the cause of itself from nothing, there is no choice in the matter but to accept Aquinas’ distinction.

It is in this very fact that Aquinas is forced to make the distinction between the “act of reality” and potential essences. Potential essences are by them selves nothing. They are something only in so far as the participate in the act of that which is reality by nature. There is nothing contradictory about supposing a thing as being real through the reality of something else.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Its also important to note that when Aquinas speaks of there being a distinction, he is saying this in a relative sense. In other words he is only applying this distinction to those beings which potentially or contingently exist. Aquinas is not saying that there is a necessary difference between an act of reality and a things essence.

 

[JohnDamian]

It would seem that a ball existing is the fact that it is being a ball. But if being a ball and being real, instead of nothing, is ontologically identical, then it is impossible that it could have ever been the case that a ball would stop “being” a “ball” since the two are identical. Hence a contradiction that cannot possibly be resolved unless we accept the ontological difference between reality and that which is potentially real. There is no choice in the matter.

It is in this very fact that Aquinas is forced to make the distinction between the “act of reality” and potential essences. Potential essences are by them selves nothing. They are something only in so far as the participate in the act of that which is reality by nature. There is nothing contradictory about supposing a thing as being real through the reality of something else.

Aquinas accepted that in the case of infinites; the essence is identical to the existence; we cannot conceive of what it is to be something without nessecarily conceiving this something as existing; the act of existence and the essence of a thing; if we accept the principles of realism and the doctrine of univocity; or the primacy of being as found in the works of Proclus (and others) we cannot deny the fact that in reality they are identical. One can say that through the* distinctio intentionalis, distinctio formalis a parte rei* or the distinctio conceptus a potential distinction can be created; but not through the real distinction.

In my view there is no such thing as a potential essence, perhaps that is where the confusion comes from… An object has a form through which it is an act of being; and through this form it’s essence is; but as these essences are real and true universals (more true than the composite forms) then there cannot be any such thing as a potential essence; only an unactualised one; but even such an unactualised essence (that is one which is not being through a form) is still a real thing itself; and inseperable in it’s nature to it’s disposition; and it’s form is merely an accident.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Aquinas accepted that in the case of infinites; the essence is identical to the existence

Explain the context in which you think he meant infinities?

we cannot conceive of what it is to be something without necessarily conceiving this something as existing

I agree, but that doesn’t overcome the fact that a potential form becomes real only through the actual reality of something else; since out of nothing comes nothing.

the act of existence and the essence of a thing; if we accept the principles of realism and the doctrine of univocity;

Explain what you think univocity is and why it must apply in every conceivable case.

or the primacy of being as found in the works of Proclus (and others) we cannot deny the fact that in reality they are identical.

I have to deny your interpretation of the matter in so far as it applies to potentiality since there is evidently such a thing as potential reality.

One can say that through the* distinctio intentionalis, distinctio formalis a parte rei* or the distinctio conceptus a potential distinction can be created; but not through the real distinction.

Speak in English please, and please prove you case beyond assertion.

In my view there is no such thing as a potential essence, perhaps that is where the confusion comes from…

There is not a confusion. There is evidently such a thing as potential reality. I evidently did not always exist. Trees have not existed from all eternity.

but as these essences are real and true universals
(more true than the composite forms)

I don’t understand what you mean here.

then there cannot be any such thing as a potential essence; only an unactualised one;

What do you mean by an actualized essence? You have already said that a thing “is” according to the actuality of its “essence”.

but even such an unactualised essence (that is one which is not being through a form) is still a real thing itself.

There is no real meaning in what you have just said here. A thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. We can only speak of real essences in so far as they are actual. If a sphere is not actual, then there is no sphere/no essence, and no logical justification for saying that there is one. You can certainly say that the materials which could possibly be used to make a sphere exists, but a real sphere is only a sphere when it is in fact an actual sphere; and in so far as it is only potentially a sphere, it is receiving its reality from that which already has a reality (the materials).

Thus a real sphere is an actual sphere if we are to remain consistent and meaningful in our use of words. There is no such thing as a non-actual sphere. It potentially exists, but the essence that is a sphere is nothing until it is made real by that which is already actual. Until it receives a reality from that which is already actual there will never be such a thing as a real or actual sphere because an essence cannot bring itself into existence from nothing. This is necessarily the case.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

In my view there is no such thing as a potential essence, perhaps that is where the confusion comes from…

Another problem also arises from your rejection of potential forms. It seems to me to be the same problem that infected the work of John Scotus and is the reason why people like Alasdair MacIntyre express suspicion over johns philosophy

If there is no such thing as potentiality, then God cannot be thought of as creating anything.

 

[JohnDamian]

Explain the context in which you think he meant infinities?

Aquinas was talking about infinite beings, ie; God.

I agree, but that doesn’t overcome the fact that a potential form becomes real only through the actual reality of something else; since out of nothing comes nothing.

If a form exists, it’s presence in material reality is an accident to it’s essence, it is not essential. As I said earlier;

“therefore Form can be self-sustaining; it is prior to matter; and prior to the composite; since each is an act through the form and not conversly. Thus, it has a being of it’s own; but form need not inform matter and has being of its own; it is then possible for a bodily form to exist independantly of matter; and by consequence be a prime matter.”

So a form even if it has no matter is still a real thing. It’s essence is identical to it’s existence.

Explain what you think univocity is and why it must apply in every conceivable case.

Univocity, meaning with one voice - is the way in which predicates can be applied universally to both infinite and finite bodies; Aquinas denied this. ie; Aquinas says “Good” is different to God as it is to Man, I say that it is the same, “Good” is univocal, it is one word; and has one meaning regardless of the form it is predicated to.

I have to deny your interpretation of the matter in so far as it applies to potentiality since there is evidently such a thing as potential reality.

A potential reality is just as real as a non-potential reality, for a potential reality is recognised (not generated) by intellection, and exists as an abstract – this abstract’s actualisation in matter is irrelevant or accidental to it’s reality as a form. As earlier, matter is an accident of form.

Speak in English please, and please prove you case beyond assertion.

Sorry; these things are distinct only in concept, formality or intention, and not distinct in reality. Because as earlier, the potential form exists irrespective of it’s material actualsiation.

I don’t understand what you mean here.

The composition of forms is accidental to the universal nature of their parts. (such as Goodness or other univocally applied predicates).

What do you mean by an actualized essence? You have already said that a thing “is” according to the actuality of its “essence”.

I meant material actualisation; in that there is no such thing as a potential essence, only that we can create an intentional distinction between the (accidental) nature of the essence having material or not.

There is no real meaning in what you have just said here. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time. We can only speak of real essences in so far as they are actual. If a sphere is not actual, then there is no sphere/no essence, and no logical justification for saying that there is one. You can certainly say that the materials which could possibly be used to make a sphere exists, but a real sphere is only a sphere when it is in fact an actual sphere; and in so far as it is only potentially a sphere, it is receiving its reality from that which already has a reality (the materials).

A sphere is a form, this is it’s essence (that it is a 3d object which has a round surface), it is irrelevant in terms of the reality of it’s essence if the sphere in general is materially present. A Sphere is still a real thing even if all the spheres in the material universe were destroyed. The essence of sphere and it’s existence are one and the same.

Thus a real sphere is an actual sphere if we are to remain consistent and meaningful in our use of words. There is no such thing as a non-actual sphere. It potentially exists, but the essence that is a sphere is nothing until it is made real by that which is already actual. Until it receives a reality from that which is already actual there will never be such a thing as a real or actual sphere because an essence cannot bring itself into existence from nothing. This is necessarily the case.

A sphere is real even if no spheres exist in the universe, spheres would still be a real thing. The fact is, even though a sphere cannot bring itself into existence from nothing; it does not mean that without spheres in the material universe spheres do not exist. You appear to be making the mistake that reality only extends to that within the material universe; for reality extended to other things as well, such as “redness” which exists irrespective of weather there is a red thing in or out of the universe. By the essence of a thing existing, that thing exists as an essence, the form and matter are accidents.

 

[JohnDamian]

Another problem also arises from your rejection of potential forms. It seems to me to be the same problem that infected the work of John Scotus and is the reason why people like Alasdair MacIntyre express suspicion over johns philosophy

If there is no such thing as potentiality, then God cannot be thought of as creating anything.

It is hard to express this, “potential” (material) forms exist, just not “potential (real) forms”. As there is a distinction between the real universe and the material universe.

It is not surprising that people do not agree with Scotus on everything, even his own pupil; William of Ockham disagreed with him on this issue… It is the divider between Nominalism, Conceptualism and Realism, and I suppose it is something that comes rather intuitively to the people in each “camp”, and it seems unlikely I shall (with my poor rhetoric) be able to change anyones mind from nominalism or conceptualism to my realism.

The majority of realists would accept my position however.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If a form exists, it’s presence in material reality is an accident to it’s essence, it is not essential. As I said earlier;“therefore Form can be self-sustaining; it is prior to matter; and prior to the composite; since each is an act through the form and not conversely. Thus, it has a being of it’s own; but form need not inform matter and has being of its own; it is then possible for a bodily form to exist independently of matter; and by consequence be a prime matter.”

It seems to me that you are drowning in platonic idealism. You seem to think that because you can form an abstraction of something that therefore the form can meaningfully exist apart from its materials. You are certainly not a realist. Secondly; you are merely asserting things, you are not showing it to be the case. Your words imply that all essences necessarily exist because of what they are. They just exist for no reason. If they don’t exist for no reason, then you must admit that God created them. In which case these “essences” received reality and are not the origin of there own reality, since they had no reality of there own.

Univocity, meaning with one voice - is the way in which predicates can be applied universally to both infinite and finite bodies; Aquinas denied this. ie; Aquinas says “Good” is different to God as it is to Man, I say that it is the same, “Good” is univocal, it is one word; and has one meaning regardless of the form it is predicated to.

What you are saying implies that God is one and the same as his creation and thus the infinity of God can be know positively by finite minds; instead of negatively as Aquinas held our knowledge of God to be. John Scotus is wrong. I think that you are using the word univocal in wrong context; you refuse to accept that things can be spoken of analogically. God is goodness itself; man merely participates in the act of goodness and is not there by goodness itself, but is rather good by participation. Good clearly cannot be applied to God in the same way that is applied to man, because then man and God would become the same being; which they cannot be once you understand the Catholic definition of God.

A sphere is a form, this is it’s essence (that it is a 3d object which has a round surface), it is irrelevant in terms of the reality of it’s essence if the sphere in general is materially present. A Sphere is still a real thing even if all the spheres in the material universe were destroyed.

At first glance your arguments appear very powerful. However, they are ultimately flawed. You have an idea of a sphere and you are confusing that with an actual form.The essence of sphere cannot intelligibly exist apart from the material actuality of a sphere. It makes no sense to think that it can. First of all you should agree that the mental concept of a sphere is purely an abstraction of a sphere, and is not by that definition an actual material sphere or the essence of a sphere existing by itself. But a real sphere, existing apart the idea of a sphere, is contingent on its finite extension, since a real sphere by definition is finite in nature in that the existence of a sphere is defined by its limitations (Its geometric dimensions and shape). Without these finite definitions, we are not really talking about the existence of a sphere; essentially or otherwise. A pure “essence”, on the other hand, is completely immaterial, it has no finite dimensions. And thus it makes no sense to speak of an essence as having geometric dimensions; and thus it is impossible to meaningfully identify the existence of a sphere apart from the finite dimensions and materials from which a sphere can potentially exist in the actual world. On the other had, the idea of sphere can exist, but an idea is an expression of the mind and is contingent on the mind; it is not a reality by itself; and neither is it the cause of its self. The idea of a sphere exists in Gods mind and is only real through the “existence” of Gods mind.

 

[JohnDamian]

It seems to me that you are drowning in platonic idealism. You seem to think that because you can form an abstraction of something that therefore the form can meaningfully exist apart from its materials. You are certainly not a realist. Secondly; you are merely asserting things, you are not showing it to be the case. Your words imply that all essences necessarily exist because of what they are. They just exist for no reason. If they don’t exist for no reason, then you must admit that God created them. In which case these “essences” received reality and are not the origin of there own reality, since they had no reality of there own.

Platonic realism is the view that the instantiation of universals is not essential to their existance; wheras Aristotelian realism is that they only become real in their instantiation. All essences do not nessecarily exist; but their existance is not contingent upon material substances; redness is a real and universal predicate even if nothing red exists in the universe.

God is goodness itself; man merely participates in the act of goodness and is not there by goodness itself, but is rather good by participation

I don’t know where this argument comes from, but Aquinas argues that the unity is one of analogy and not equivocacy or univocity. The fact is, to deny univocity; one denies that God shares the same being as us, or the same “goodness” as us. This univocity follows that such predication is substantially different in terms of its degree, but not it’s form; Scotus argues that we share the same goodness as God; but substantially less of it; and though God’s goodness is infinite, and ours finite, it is the same goodness. Aquinas argues against this. I think it is rather insensible to say that goodness is not a univocal concept; goodness itself has one ultimate meaning; and though it’s actualisations in finite and infinite beings are different by degree; the quality of that goodness is one and the same, we are not good in a different way to God, we are just less good.

At first glance your arguments appear very powerful. However, they are ultimately flawed. You have an idea of a sphere and you are confusing that with an actual form.The essence of sphere cannot intelligibly exist apart from the material actuality of a sphere. It makes no sense to think that it can. First of all you should agree that the mental concept of a sphere is purely an abstraction of a sphere, and is not by that definition an actual material sphere or the essence of a sphere existing by itself. But a real sphere, existing apart the idea of a sphere, is contingent on its finite extension, since a real sphere by definition is finite in nature in that the existence of a sphere is defined by its limitations (Its geometric dimensions and shape). Without these finite definitions, we are not really talking about the existence of a sphere; essentially or otherwise. A pure “essence”, on the other hand, is completely immaterial, it has no finite dimensions. And thus it makes no sense to speak of an essence as having geometric dimensions; and thus it is impossible to meaningfully identify the existence of a sphere apart from the finite dimensions and materials from which a sphere can potentially exist in the actual world. On the other had, the idea of sphere can exist, but an idea is an expression of the mind and is contingent on the mind; it is not a reality by itself; and neither is it the cause of its self. The idea of a sphere exists in Gods mind and is only real through the “existence” of Gods mind.

I am not confusing the idea of an actual form with an actual form, as the idea of an actual form is merely a recognition of such a form, as abstraction is not generative. You assert that the essence of a sphere cannot exist outside of the material world, but is it not true that spheres still exist as a real thing; even if there are no spheres in existance? Take for example; the universal form of something which has become extinct; say a Thylacine which became extinct in 1936, even if no Thylacine’s exist, or no remains of them exist, even if no history or information on them is known or conceived the Thylacine is still a real and existing form; it just has no material actualisaton. To argue that the form of a Thylacine does not exist when it simply ceases materially and mentally appears to me to be unfounded. Likewise with the sphere, it’s form is a real thing that is not contingent upon consideration, knowlege or material for it’s existence. It’s existence in the minds of man or God is irrelevant, as above. In the same way as a though does nto have material dimensions, yet an essence can live in it; an essence exists even outside of thought as a real thing; to deny that redness or goodness are real and objective things seems to me to be wrong. Your argument that universals are not real things and only exist as materials or thoughts seems to be conceptualism.