What is wrong with Maritain?

[Geremia]

I think that this is a false principle. Aquinas is essentially correct. But this does not mean that Aquinas’ thoughts do not need development or additions; especially in light of modern day science. Its quite simply false to say that Aquinas said all that can be said through the method of metaphysics.

Compare the two quotes in the OP of this thread.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

What happened to the discussion of what is wrong with Maritain?

Personally, I think Maritain was always on pretty solid ground in his writing, and certainly in his character. As a young man I corresponded with him for about four years when he was in his seventies, and I always found him to be the soul of patience and encouragement.

If anything was amiss for me, it was in his writing style, which was sometimes obscured by overlong and complex sentences. I have heard that one reason for this defect was in the fact that his early translators were not the best, and that later translations have very much overcome this defect. I wouldn’t know, as I have not gone back to re-read him.

Maritain has been a very hard philosopher to pigeonhole. Just when you think he leans firmly toward orthodoxy, he says something to suggest he is a bit soft in his thinking.

I suspect his importance as a philosopher will always be more for the influence he has had on other philosophers, than on any original thought of his own. If there is any exception to this generalization, it would be in his writing on aesthetics (such as Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry), where I think his genius was most fully revealed.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

All essences do not nessecarily exist.

Then they recieve their existence from that which is existence by nature, and they are sustained in the existence of that which is existence by nature, since contingent beings are not existence by nature of there “essense”. If they existed in virtue of their essense, they would always exist uncreated. Therefore there is a definite difference between the act of reality and the potential essense of something. Thus the esse/essense distiction neccesarily applies. If not, then it is meaningless to think of God as ultimate-reality. That which is ultimately real is reality itself/the root of all being, without which there would be absolutly nothing. That which potentially or contingetly exists has no choice but to particpates in the reality of that which is ultimate. It is not its own reality. There is no escaping this fact.

I don’t know where this argument comes from, but Aquinas argues that the unity is one of analogy and not equivocacy or univocity. The fact is, to deny univocity; one denies that God shares the same being as us, or the same “goodness” as us.

One is not denying univocity; but rather i am denying the context in which you are applying it. Goodness is not something that exists separetly from Gods being; Good is Gods nature. Anything that begins to exist, partcipates in Gods nature and is good only in viture of that which is most fundemental, and that is God. Good is meaningless without God. There is no theological or philosophical sense in applying the word good to creatures without regonising they are not the root or the reason for that good. There is good because there is a God.

In the same way as a though does nto have material dimensions, yet an essence can live in it; an essence exists even outside of thought as a real thing.

You are correct that an idea is an example of how something can be immaterial and yet contain knowledge of an essense. But i think there is a big contextual difference in your use of the word essense and the existence of ideas. An idea or concept of something is mind/intellect dependent; it exists insofar as there is such a thing as a mind building and defining that concept or idea out of our “knowledge” of nature. It seems clear to me that you are confuesing the idea of something with the thing we are having an idea about; since the fact remains that we are having an idea about actual thing that exists outside of that idea in the world of the senses. You are claming that because we can abstract the essense of something from the material actuality of something, that therefore this is evidence that an essense can exist by itself enitirely in viture of its nature. But, apart from the fact that you haven’t shown evidence of this, we are not talking about the essense that is an idea, but rather we are talking about something that can exist without anything having knowledge it or defining. An essense is identical to its dimensions and function since a things essense as we percieve it in nature is by definition its finite dimesions and functions. A thing is according to how we percieve it. Thus it needs no mind to define it. But out side of an idea, there is nothing to define an essense except for its union with the actuality of the defining aspects of matter. Your arguement therefore ammounts to nothing more than saying that a concept of something can exist outside of the mind; which i think is for good reason false. Otherwise i don’t see how you can meaningfully infer a real essense, as you describe it, without its material definition, and yet it not be synonmous in nature to a concept. If i cannot percieve the essense or form of a biological organism, then there is no form or essense of a biological organism for the simple fact that this particular essense is by nature dependent on its demensions in order to be what it is. In otherwords if a thing is its demensions or function then we should be able to have knowlege of it without the existence matter.

Other then that, your use of the word essense appears to me to be meaningless.

 

[JohnDamian]

Then they recieve their existence from that which is existence by nature, and they are sustained in the existence of that which is existence by nature, since contingent beings are not existence by nature of there “essense”. If they existed in virtue of their essense, they would always exist uncreated.

The substance of the form is accidental to the existence of the form itself, not essential; and consequently it is true that they do not exist (materially) in light of their essences but they exist nonetheless; as the conception of their essences is merely recognative and not generative; and in no way causally linked to the existence of the essence, as it does not exist for or because of the conception; it’s existence is prior to conception - and conception; like materiality is an accident to it’s reality. The essence is identical to it’s existence; and the mental-formation and material-formation an accident, this is because the essence is not caused to be by either of these, as these are merely cognative and material manifestations of something, and these manifestations are posterior to the essence itself; which, has being as the first object of it’s nature (as all things do), and so the essence / existence distinction is not a real distinction, but only a formal distinction.

One is not denying univocity; but rather i am denying the context in which you are applying it. Goodness is not something that exists separetly from Gods being; Good is Gods nature. Anything that begins to exist, partcipates in Gods nature and is good only in viture of that which is most fundemental, and that is God. Good is meaningless without God. There is no theological or philosophical sense in applying the word good to creatures without regonising they are not the root or the reason for that good. There is good because there is a God.

Being is certainly the first and prime thing in the heirachy of existence; and the Goodness that is God is only different by degree than by quality. It is true that without God there is no Goodness, as God is the infinite degree of that Goodness; I only apply univocity in this to illustrate that the nature of the predicate “good” is identical in quality in both finite and infinite beings, and not equivocal or allegorical. It is insensible to posit that Goodness could exist without God (as you rightly say), but it does not follow from this that the goodness is not univocal in quality.

You are correct that an idea is an example of how something can be immaterial and yet contain knowledge of an essense. But i think there is a big contextual difference in your use of the word essense and the existence of ideas. An idea or concept of something is mind/intellect dependent; it exists insofar as there is such a thing as a mind building and defining that concept or idea out of our “knowledge” of nature. It seems clear to me that you are confuesing the idea of something with the thing we are having an idea about; since the fact remains that we are having an idea about actual thing that exists outside of that idea in the world of the senses. You are claming that because we can abstract the essense of something from the material actuality of something, that therefore this is evidence that an essense can exist by itself enitirely in viture of its nature.

An essence is not the product of the idea or a thought, and any thoughts on essences are just recognitions. Essences are things which differentiate other things by their individuating principles; perhaps our disagreement comes from the fact you feel that essences are abstracted concepts (conceptualism) instead of real things. We can only sensibly abstract from a thing it’s essence if it’s essence is innate to be abstracted, or else we apply to it a conceptual essence based upon our own understanding; therein, if an essence can be abstracted it is a real thing. However, if an essence is not a real thing; it is an applied thing, a conceptual construct and as such is conceptually distinct from it’s existence, and as such is not really distinct at all.

Therein; either the essence is innate (in which case, as being is the first object of it’s existence is a real thing; it’s essence is not really distinct from it’s existence, but only formally distinct.
Or, the essence is applied as a concept of the intellect, in which case as it is distinct conceptually, but not really; as the object cannot be contemplated on until it is contemplated as.

In either way; the essence / existence is not really distinct, as it cannot be conceived that what a thing is without considering it as an object in existence.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

The substance of the form is accidental to the existence of the form itself, not essential;

Can you show me an argument that proves this to be the case? Or is this just something you believe? Outside of a conceptual abstraction, i see no reason to think that the form of a sphere continues to exist apart from the actuality of its physical dimensions.

and consequently it is true that they do not exist (materially) in light of their essences but they exist nonetheless

As what exactly?

as the conception of their essences is merely recognative and not generative;

What does that mean exactly?

so the essence / existence distinction is not a real distinction, but only a formal distinction.

You haven’t really proven your case. All you have done is assert that an essence is something that exists of its own accord. You are saying that it is its own existence whether it is experienced through physics or not. But you admitted that essences such as spheres are contingent. Thus i do not see how it is possible that essences such as spheres do not receive their existence. If they receive their existence, which they must do if they are not God, then they do not exist of their own accord or nature and thus they must participate in, and be generated by, that which is existence by nature. Otherwise they cannot exist. Therefore the distinction must stand by force of logic.

Being is certainly the first and prime thing in the heirachy of existence; and the Goodness that is God is only different by degree than by quality. It is true that without God there is no Goodness, as God is the infinite degree of that Goodness;

God is goodness by nature of Gods being.

I only apply univocity in this to illustrate that the nature of the predicate “good” is identical in quality in both finite and infinite beings, and not equivocal or allegorical. It is insensible to posit that Goodness could exist without God (as you rightly say), but it does not follow from this that the goodness is not univocal in quality.

Only God is good.

As for univocity; It depends on the context in which apply the term. When we speak in general, Categorically, anything that exists is a being; and thus you could apply the term univocity if you only intend to say that anything that exists is united in the act of existing. But a potential nature either has the explanation for its existence in itself or in the existence of something else. A contingent nature obviously does not exist because of its own nature. It is not an intrinsic expression of its nature to exist for the simple fact that it is contingent on something else in order to be real. There is only one being that exists according to its nature. Its essence is identical with its existence, because it is the source of reality, and this what we call God. Every other nature that exists only does so via the fact that there is such a thing as existence by nature. Contingent beings participate in existence, but they are not, via that fact, existence itself. Thus ontologically speaking, when speaking about contingent natures, we can only apply the word existence analogically; since existence only belongs to God. Outside of Gods existence nothing can exist.

An essence is not the product of the idea or a thought, and any thoughts on essences are just recognitions. Essences are things which differentiate other things by their individuating principles; perhaps our disagreement comes from the fact you feel that essences are abstracted concepts (conceptualism) instead of real things.

I never said that essences are abstract ideas. I said that essences, such as spheres, would have to be if we are to make any logical sense of them existing apart from the materials through which we come to understand something as possessing a particular form. For me, this is the only way that your argument can survive, since abstract thought is the only principle by which i can understand a spheres nature as existing apart from objective physical reality.

You assume that the materials have no casual influence on the existence of the form, and because the form is that by which we know things as having a particular nature that therefore the existence of the form comes before the existence of its materials. It is the form alone that allows something to be something. But you have exaggerated the causal power of the form. You have not given any argument whatsoever that proves your line of thinking. It is certainly not evident to me that i would require the preexistence of a spheres essence in order to carve one from a piece of wood. All i need is the laws of physics and the possibility to create a sphere. The possibility is provided by the principles of physics. Why would i need to think that a ghostly sphere exists?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

We can only sensibly abstract from a thing it’s essence if it’s essence is innate to be abstracted, or else we apply to it a conceptual essence based upon our own understanding; therein,

I am not sure what you are actually talking about here. what do you intend to imply by saying a thing is innate.

if an essence can be abstracted it is a real thing.

An essence is real, but it is real by the existential power of God alone. God is making it real.

In either way; the essence / existence is not really distinct, as it cannot be conceived that what a thing is without considering it as an object in existence.

You are saying that because you cannot know of a thing apart from its existing that therefore the thing you know is existence. I don’t see why that must necessarily be the case. As i have said before there is nothing conceptually contradictory in thinking that a contingent being is real through the existence of something else. Just like an idea cannot meaningfully or logically exist without the mind, it is also the case that a contingent being has no reality without the existential act of God.

 

[JohnDamian]

Can you show me an argument that proves this to be the case? Or is this just something you believe? Outside of a conceptual abstraction, i see no reason to think that the form of a sphere continues to exist apart from the actuality of its physical dimensions.

What individuates a sphere as what makes it distinct is not contingent upon it’s existence or conception; for conception and reality are instances, which are not causally generative of the form of a sphere itself. Think of it this way; imagine there are no spheres in the material world, the conception of a sphere could still exist mentally - now, in the same way that this real sphere is not dependant upon the conceived sphere; the form of a sphere is not dependant upon either the material or the conception.

Substance is prior to accident, whatever explains a things being in a heirachical substantial order must itself be in the category of substance; ie- I am an individual in the species human, in the genus animal. No accident explains any of these features; the addition of accidents to the species human, for instance would not produce an individual human but a mere accidental union of the substance of human being and those accidents. This is likewise true that actual existence is not what individuates, since actual existence is too extrinsic to any creatures nature, and is therefore accidental to it - and although matter counts as substance and not matter; matter only individuates as an accident in regards to the explanation of the individuation of substances. The same is true for conception, which is causally as irrelevant as matter.

What does that mean exactly?

The process of intellection is a recognition; not a generation - of fact.

You haven’t really proven your case. All you have done is assert that an essence is something that exists of its own accord. You are saying that it is its own existence whether it is experienced through physics or not. But you admitted that essences such as spheres are contingent. Thus i do not see how it is possible that essences such as spheres do not receive their existence. If they receive their existence, which they must do if they are not God, then they do not exist of their own accord or nature and thus they must participate in, and be generated by, that which is existence by nature. Otherwise they cannot exist. Therefore the distinction must stand by force of logic.

An essence cannot be without existance; hence they are not really distinct. They are formally distinct. One cannot conceive existence without an essence; although the conception is accidental, and visa versa.

God is goodness by nature of Gods being.

God is goodness, but the same univocal goodness that is ours; only differing in degree and not in equivocal or allegorical terms.

Only God is good.

As for univocity; It depends on the context in which apply the term. … Outside of Gods existence nothing can exist.

The predication of contingency or finitude is accidental to the univocal nature of universals such as Goodness; which although they are through and from God; are not diminished qualitatively, but by degree. For; the goodness of the finite man is univocal and identical to the goodness that God has; even if the aquisition or means through which the Goodness is gained; or the modes through which it is manifest may differ in quantity or quality; the essential universal and univocal nature of Goodness is not allegorically different in man and God. Without univocity of being and universals the construction of a posteriori proofs are impossible.

Let us take perfection; either it is 1) Proper to creatures and inapplicable to god, 2) Proper to God and inapplicable to creatures,3) Univocally applicable to God and creatures.

1. Is obviously false, as God is the most perfect to conceive perfections proper to creatures and not God, then God would not be the most perfect of all beings possible; this is untrue.
2. If pure perfections are proper to God, we must determine which attributes are pure perfections by seeing if God has them. However, this precludes Theology, as we would not be able to determine if an attribute is a pure perfection or apply it aptly to God.
3. Therefore, Univocity is essential if Theology is to be a purposive and real pursuit.

Therein, using Univocity we can apply the Modal Distinction to the disparity between man and God’s Goodness, rather than a Real Distinction.

I never said that essences are abstract ideas. I said that essences,… i can understand a spheres nature as existing apart from objective physical reality.

Essences, like common natures exist independantly from, but are contracted in individuators. However, their difference is really distinct from materials or conceptions. This is because their is no demonstrable contingency between these pairs.

You assume that the materials have no casual influence on the existence of the form, and …principles of physics. Why would i need to think that a ghostly sphere exists?

Even absent from cognition; fire generates fire. The generating fire and the generated would have unity of form; this unity gives is a case of univocal causation; these instances have a mind-independant common nature with a less than numerical unity; and by consequence the essence is really distinct from conceptions. Likewise, in the absence of materials one can conceive the form of fire; which means that essences are really distinct from materials.

It does not follow however that they must be nessecary, but it is certain that essences are not contingent upon the genra of matter or thought.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

I have skiped some of what you have written because i don’t see it as immediatly relivant to the esse/essense distinction.

An essence cannot be without existance; hence they are not really distinct.

This does not follow. You are ignoring the fact that if it is an intrinsic aspect of a things nature to exist, then it exists neccesarily, since it is in its nature to exist and thus to be otherwise would be to contradict its true nature. It is therefore metaphysically impossible that existence is an intrinsic aspect of a contingent nature. Contingent natures do not exist neccesarily; thus they require that which has the power to share its existence; this is what we call God; and God is love; and thus God shares.

They are formally distinct. One cannot conceive existence without an essence.

Nobody is argueing that all “essenses” are distinct from existing. But contingent natures obviously are, given their absolute dependence on Gods existence. They particpate in existence, they are not existence. If you disagree, then you imply that a contingent essense can exist without the existence of God and that therefore God is not the principle of existence. This is false, both theologically and philsophically.

God is goodness, but the same univocal goodness that is ours; only differing in degree and not in equivocal or allegorical terms.

What is our “goodness”? What do you mean when you apply the term to created things?

 

[JohnDamian]

You are ignoring the fact that if it is an intrinsic aspect of a things nature to exist, then it exists neccesarily, since it is in its nature to exist and thus to be otherwise would be to contradict its true nature.

There is no certain reason that contingency is nessecarily predicated to essences; it is entirely possible that they exist nessecarily; or indeed it is entirely possible to speculate that they exist contingently. The matter is that we know essences exist; and we know they are really distinct from matter, and we also know that they are really distinct from concepts; and that their essence and existence are therefore only formally distinct; therefore their existence is somehow seperate from the mediums of concept and matter; and by nessecity as they are really distinct from things to which we can apodeictically predicate contingency upon; they cannot be sensibly predicated.

Nobody is argueing that all “essenses” are distinct from existing. But contingent natures obviously are, given their absolute dependence on Gods existence. They particpate in existence, they are not existence. If you disagree, then you imply that a contingent essense can exist without the existence of God and that therefore God is not the principle of existence. This is false, both theologically and philsophically.

I certainly agree; but as we can see clearly that essences are really distinct from both concepts and materials, and yet formally distinct from existence I do not see how we can predicate them with either nessecity or contingency sensibly. What is certain is that presently they exist as seperate from both matter and concept; however it does not follow causally from this that they are either nessecary or contingent, and could be either.

What is our “goodness”? What do you mean when you apply the term to created things?

When a Saint does a “good” deed. His deed shares in the genus of Goodness that God is. It is true that this Goodness is different by degree, but it is essentially the same goodness that God or Jesus had, and is not some equivocally or allegorically seperate goodness. To speculate that it is would be to undermine practical theology; therefore we must accept a univocity of goodness at least.

 

[steamboatp]

Maybe what some people see as a flaw in Maritain is that he departs from St. Thomas’ position that natural science is a type of philosophy. Maritain sees science as complementary to, but not entirely part of, philosophy. From the little that I have read, it seems like the status of natural science is a big debate in today’s Thomism.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

There is no certain reason that contingency is necessarily predicated to essences.

Its not predicated to all essenses; it is predicated to those essenses which are contingent on Gods existence.

It is some how true that one can have a concept of a sphere based on the sense knowledge of physical reality. But you have given no intelligible reason to think that essences such as spheres can exist separately from there definite physical dimensions. You have tried to liken an essence to a concept in-order to justify your argument, but it amounts to fallacy because a concept of a sphere is not separate from our knowledge of the forms of physical reality. We “know” a sphere as defined by its physical dimensions and not otherwise. Thus there is no logically justfiable reason, as well as it being meaningless, to think that a sphere could exist apart from its physical actuality.

however it does not follow causally from this that they are either necessary or contingent, and could be either.

The point is, if you believe in God, then you cannot argue honestly that those forms which you perceive in physical reality are not contingent on God. If God exists then your argument is necessarily wrong and heretical. A Catholic Philosopher does not deviate from God as a guiding principle.

When a Saint does a “good” deed. His deed shares in the genus of Goodness that God is.

God is good by Gods intrinsic nature of being and act; we are not intrinsically good. Are actions are not good by their own nature. They are good only insofar as they reflect the nature of God. If God didn’t exist, moral actions would be meaningless. Thus “Good” has nothing to do with us having our own power, nature, or actions. We do good only by participating in that which is truly good by nature. That which is truly good is perfection by nature. By ourselves we are nothing. All glory belongs to God. If that is true, then humanity can do no good without God. It is the same with existence. We have no existence by ourselves. We exist because God allows us to participate in Gods existential act; but by doing so we attain no glory for ourselves; since we by ourselves are not the act of existence or Good. It all belongs to God.

It is true that this Goodness is different by degree,

It isn’t just different by degree; it is ontologically different.

but it is essentially the same goodness that God or Jesus had.

No it is not. It is the nature of God that makes things good; not the nature of creation.

and is not some equivocally or allegorically seperate goodness. To speculate that it is would be to undermine practical theology;

You are undermining theology fullstop.

 

[JohnDamian]

Its not predicated to all essenses; it is predicated to those essenses which are contingent on Gods existence.

It is some how true that one can have a concept of a sphere based on the sense knowledge of physical reality. But you have given no intelligible reason to think that essences such as spheres can exist separately from there definite physical dimensions. You have tried to liken an essence to a concept in-order to justify your argument, but it amounts to fallacy because a concept of a sphere is not separate from our knowledge of the forms of physical reality. We “know” a sphere as defined by its physical dimensions and not otherwise. Thus there is no logically justfiable reason, as well as it being meaningless, to think that a sphere could exist apart from its physical actuality.

As I said, an essences contingency or nessecity is not verifiable if it is held that essences are really distinct from materials. The genus of “essence” is itself not wholly contingent, nor nessecary - for it is certain that God’s essence, as indistinct from his existence is not contingent.

Furthermore, a conceived sphere has an essence. So we can know that materia and essences are really distinct. And, as earlier said; we can know that they are really distinct from conceptions too.

The point is, if you believe in God, then you cannot argue honestly that those forms which you perceive in physical reality are not contingent on God. If God exists then your argument is necessarily wrong and heretical. A Catholic Philosopher does not deviate from God as a guiding principle.

I say that the genus of “essence” contains both nessecary and contingent essences. God’s is a nessecary essence, I do not know, but I believe that other essences are contingent; even though I know them to be really distinct from materials.

It isn’t just different by degree; it is ontologically different.

Why?

You are undermining theology fullstops.

Suppose person P is certain of one concept, and in doubt of others. Because a single concept cannot be both certain and dubious, the concept P is certain of must be different from the ones P is in doubt over. However, P can be certain that god is a being, but in doubt about whether God is a finite or infinite, created or uncreated being. Therefore, this concept of being that P is certain of is different from all the other concepts; but included in them and therefore univocal.

The same goes for all predicates logically applied to God, this in no way denies divine transcendence, for the numerical diversity of finite and infinite bodies essentially means that we are wholly distinct.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

As I said, an essences contingency or nessecity is not verifiable if it is held that essences are really distinct from materials.

That all physical essences are really distinct from there physicality is false and unintelligible.

The genus of “essence” is itself not wholly contingent, nor nessecary - for it is certain that God’s essence, as indistinct from his existence is not contingent.

Gods essence is identical to Gods existence; it is impossible that the two can be separate.

Furthermore, a conceived sphere has an essence. So we can know that materia and essences are really distinct.

Esse and contingent essences are distinct insofar as contingent reality is dependent on that which is necessary in order to be real. But we cannot know or make intelligible the idea that an essence can “exist” apart from its physical dimension by likening it to a concept or an idea, because the principle of an idea is contingent on the actuality of the mind and the acquisition of the knowledge of real actual things with physical dimensions.

And, as earlier said; we can know that they are really distinct from conceptions too.

You are confusing distinction with independent existence. The principle of ideas allows us to abstract essences, but only from our knowledge and memory of actual physical essences. It is a subjective mirroring, a copy, a conceptual representation of that which has a physical extension. We have memories. Thus we conceive of a physical thing with physical dimesnions when we think about them because that is what they are. The kind of essence you are speaking about is not a concept. It is not defined by memory or knowledge. It is its own definition. But the nature of an actual sphere is defined by its physical dimensions without which it is not a sphere at all. Thus it is unintelligible, meaningless, and illogical to think that a sphere can meaningfully exist without its physical actuality; unless you wish to suppose that an essence is fundamentally synonymous to a concept or an idea of something. This is the only way you can meaningfully preserve the possibility of having the essence of something without its actual physical dimesnions. But as I have said, ideas are dependent on the actuality of minds.

I say that the genus of “essence” contains both nessecary and contingent essences. God’s is a nessecary essence, I do not know, but I believe that other essences are contingent; even though I know them to be really distinct from materials.

Then you must admit of the esse/essence distinction as applied to contingent things.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Suppose person P is certain of one concept, and in doubt of others. Because a single concept cannot be both certain and dubious, the concept P is certain of must be different from the ones P is in doubt over. However, P can be certain that god is a being, but in doubt about whether God is a finite or infinite, created or uncreated being…

I know what the concept of God entails. I must prove the concept of God as expressed by my understanding of what God is. Otherwise I have not proven the existence of God according to what Catholics believe.

 

[JohnDamian]

That all physical essences are really distinct from there physicality is false and unintelligible.

Absolutely not.

Whilst it is true that they do not share the same form of existence, it is demonstrably certain that common natures & essences exist in reality, at least it is certainly clear to myself. I am certainly not alone in holding this position.

Gods essence is identical to Gods existence; it is impossible that the two can be separate.

Yes.

Esse and contingent essences are distinct insofar as contingent reality is dependent on that which is necessary in order to be real.

Existence and essences (of any form) are not really distinct, although materials and essences are. Existence and essences are only formally distinct.

Thus it is unintelligible, meaningless, and illogical to think that a sphere can meaningfully exist without its physical actuality; unless you wish to suppose that an essence is fundamentally synonymous to a concept or an idea of something.

We know that there is a real distinction between a concept and an essence. I don’t know why you brought that up. It is perfectly logical to posit a sub-individual existance of essences & common natures, that are not in a real and numerical unity; but in unity nonetheless - this is clearly distinct from Platos theory of forms.

Then you must admit of the esse/essence distinction as applied to contingent things.

As I have said, they are only formally distinct, not really distinct.

I know what the concept of God entails. I must prove the concept of God as expressed by my understanding of what God is. Otherwise I have not proven the existence of God according to what Catholics believe.

But if predicates are not univocal the extrapolation of experiences are impossible and any a posteriori understanding of God is nessecarily flawed. One has to accept univocity and variance of degrees to come to understand God in any meaningful sense.

 

[Geremia]

I think I have discovered what is wrong with Maritain: he was friends with the satanist revolutionary Saul Alinsky and corresponded with him. (He was Satanist because the dedication page of his book Rules for Radicals said it is “dedicated to the first radical, Lucifer.”) Alinsky also influenced Giovanni Montini (Pope Paul VI) and the USCCB. The smoke of satan has indeed entered the Church. Check this out for more info.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Absolutely not.

Whilst it is true that they do not share the same form of existence, it is demonstrably certain that common natures & essences exist in reality, at least it is certainly clear to myself. I am certainly not alone in holding this position.

Assertions will never make it clear to me

Existence and essences (of any form) are not really distinct, although materials and essences are. Existence and essences are only formally distinct.

So you keep saying, but you have not demonstrated this. And I have demonstrated your position to be false. I haven’t yet seen any good reason that you should disagree with my position.

As I have said, they are only formally distinct, not really distinct.

Saying it will not make it true, and it certainly won’t convince me…

But if predicates are not univocal the extrapolation of experiences are impossible and any a posteriori understanding of God is nessecarily flawed.

That depends on the context in which you are speaking about predicates.

One has to accept univocity and variance of degrees to come to understand God in any meaningful sense.

One needs to understand that only God is good. To see good in created things is to see the good of God; not the created thing.

We are obviously not going to agree on any of these points. So we should agree to disagree, and leave it at that.

Peace be with you.

 

[JohnDamian]

We are obviously not going to agree on any of these points. So we should agree to disagree, and leave it at that.

Peace be with you.

Peace be with you too.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

I think I have discovered what is wrong with Maritain: he was friends with the satanist revolutionary Saul Alinsky and corresponded with him. (He was Satanist because the dedication page of his book Rules for Radicals said it is “dedicated to the first radical, Lucifer.”) Alinsky also influenced Giovanni Montini (Pope Paul VI) and the USCCB. The smoke of satan has indeed entered the Church. Check this out for more info.

You can’t be serious. Having a friend, who happens to be brainwashed by the devil, is in no way evidence of there being something wrong with the works of Maritain. Has it been legitimately shown that Maritains works are against the teachings of the church? Wait…don’t tell me…your anti-evolutionist.

 

[Geremia]

You can’t be serious. Having a friend, who happens to be brainwashed by the devil, is in no way evidence of there being something wrong with the works of Maritain. Has it been legitimately shown that Maritains works are against the teachings of the church? Wait…don’t tell me…your anti-evolutionist.

True, but I am just to make sense of why some seemingly top-notch Thomist philosophers do not consider Maritain a good philosopher. For example, the Society of Scholastics refuses to mention him as a notable Thomist in their constitution; they were the ones who told me that Maritain’s definition of philosophy, as a reduction to metaphysics, is wrong.