R
Ron_Conte
Guest
Are you saying that the use of abortifacient contraception is not the sin of abortion? Do you propose that abortifacient contraception does not have two evil moral objects?If they choose to ‘contracept’ in that way, they choose conception avoidance and they choose its backup mechanism of creating an environment unable to sustain life.
The ordering is not captured solely in the exterior, observable events. There are innumerable examples of this: Surgeries, hysterectomies, killings, etc.
The moral object needs to be distinguished from consequences.
Rau, you are taking much the same position on this issue as Fr. Rhonheimer. The problem is that you (and he) reduce the concrete act to a mere physical process (“exterior observable events”), and then imbue it with moral meaning by the intention of the person. If you wish to argue that version of ethics, fine. But it is factually not the position of traditional moral theology.
The traditional view is that the concrete act includes not only the physical process or observable events, but an interior ordering of the concrete act towards a proximate end. And that end has its moral meaning from its conformity (or lack thereof) to right reason. We can also phrase this, as VS does, such that the object (finis actus) is good if it is capable of being ordered toward God.
The intention of the person does not enter into the calculus of whether the act, its inherent ordering, and its object are good or evil, except that the person does not sin unless the act is intentionally knowingly chosen.