What makes an act intrinsically evil?

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If they choose to ‘contracept’ in that way, they choose conception avoidance and they choose its backup mechanism of creating an environment unable to sustain life.

The ordering is not captured solely in the exterior, observable events. There are innumerable examples of this: Surgeries, hysterectomies, killings, etc.

The moral object needs to be distinguished from consequences.
Are you saying that the use of abortifacient contraception is not the sin of abortion? Do you propose that abortifacient contraception does not have two evil moral objects?

Rau, you are taking much the same position on this issue as Fr. Rhonheimer. The problem is that you (and he) reduce the concrete act to a mere physical process (“exterior observable events”), and then imbue it with moral meaning by the intention of the person. If you wish to argue that version of ethics, fine. But it is factually not the position of traditional moral theology.

The traditional view is that the concrete act includes not only the physical process or observable events, but an interior ordering of the concrete act towards a proximate end. And that end has its moral meaning from its conformity (or lack thereof) to right reason. We can also phrase this, as VS does, such that the object (finis actus) is good if it is capable of being ordered toward God.

The intention of the person does not enter into the calculus of whether the act, its inherent ordering, and its object are good or evil, except that the person does not sin unless the act is intentionally knowingly chosen.
 
The moral object is the end toward which the act is inherently ordered. Sometimes that end is also in the reasonably anticipated consequences; sometimes it is also an intended end. If an end is in the consequences, it may or may not be in the object. And if an end is unintended, it may or may not be in the object. An end which is an “unintended bad consequence” can still be in the object. Therefore, the assertion that an end is an unintended bad effect does not prove that the act is moral; it could still have that bad effect also in its object, making the act intrinsically evil.
You are saying: sometimes it is this…somtimes it is that…it may or may not be in the object…

You seem to be making things up as you go, with no clear principles.

Please state clearly then Ron - what is the difference between the moral object and any foreseeable consequences?
In direct abortion to save the life of the mother, the intended end is to save her life (good), the death of the prenatal is not in the intended end. The death of the prenatal is a bad unintended consequence. However, that death is also in the object of the act, making the act intrinsically evil, despite having an unintended bad consequence.
No. The death is intended (willed); it is the moral object.

Rau and LongingSoul have already addressed your errors here.

Consider the difference between direct abortion and the removal of a folopian tube in ectopic pregnancy.

The direct abortion is immoral, because the death of the bady is directly willed (intended).

The removal of the tube is moral, with the death of the baby an unintended bad effect (not willed in the object chosen).

Your reasoning makes these two equivalent, when they are not.
 
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The traditional view is that the concrete act includes not only the physical process or observable events, but an interior ordering of the concrete act towards a proximate end. And that end has its moral meaning from its conformity (or lack thereof) to right reason.
The “interior ordering” is not necessarily observable from the pure events. What makes the interior ordering of one hysterectomy different from another? Or is it always the same?
 
The view you are expressing is “A” above (original post). That is the view of Fr. Rhonheimer, that an intrinsically evil act has an evil object, but the object takes its morality from the intention of the will.

The traditional view is “B” above, which is based on the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas: an object takes its moral species from whether or not it is in accord with right reason. Veritatis Splendor and the CCC do not take position “A”, but rather “B”. Intrinsically evil acts take their morality from the object, and the morality of the object is evaluated based on whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God.

The person knowingly and intentionally chooses an act, and by doing so, he chooses the concrete act, its nature, and its object. But in the traditional view, intrinsically evil acts are immoral due to their object, apart from intention. The acts are immoral, in and of themselves, by their very nature. VS and the CCC takes this view.

In “B”, the intrinsically evil act is not a sin unless the act is knowingly chosen, but the object need not be directly willed, or desired, or sought. In willing the concrete act, one necessarily at least implicitly wills its nature and object.
I don’t want to get confused and sidetracked by trying to find out who Fr Rhonheimer is so I’ll continue to just respond to what you propose.

So if you are saying that using a pill to cure a person is a pill that can also be used to contracept… that possibility makes all uses of it morally wrong. That pill has built in evil and every act of using it is an evil act although the actors culpability might be reduced for some reason?

Aquinas’s explanation of ‘double effect’, helps to make clear how the moral object is determined. If someone defending his own life chooses an act of defense with the unfortunate consequence of the aggressors death, he has not merely reduced his culpability whilst having chosen an intrinsically evil act… in fact the moral object of his act is the act of defense. A morally good act.

By your reasoning it seems to me that would render the American principle of handguns for self defense an intrinsically evil object. A handgun is a product designed for the portable, accessible, expedience in killing another. Therefore, according to your reasoning, any use of it for any reason even in self defense is evil. A gun is intrinsically evil by its final usual effect.
Some acts of murder contain the specific willed desire for that end, as when abortion is an end. In other acts of murder, some good end is willed and desired, and the death of the innocent is repugnant to the will; it is not desired; it is not the intended end. And yet these other acts of murder are still intrinsically evil. Euthanasia is murder with the intention of relieving all suffering. Direct abortion to save the life of the mother is murder with that good intention. There is no “specific willingness” to end a life in those examples, yet they are types of murder. So the approach you propose fails.
Again, double effect illuminates the dimensions of these acts. Euthanasia is murder because the moral object is to kill the person. The good intention of relieving suffering is just a consequence. By the same token, to administer drugs in dosages measured to relieve the suffering is an entirely different desire. The moral object here is to medically relieve suffering. The fact that that medication may stop the heart is the unwilled consequence. The drug is the same drug but willed to different ends.
In the traditional approach, certain acts are wrong by their very nature, due to an evil object, regardless of intention. So direct abortion has the object of the death of the innocent prenatal. If the person intentionally chooses direct abortion, they choose an intrinsically evil act. But the act is immoral due to its object, regardless of a “specific willingness” to attain that object.
Yes, abortion is always wrong regardless of any noble intention. Abortion, the willed killing of a living person in utero is intrinsically evil.
LongingSoul, the approach you suggest is not the traditional view of moral theology, and it is not the view taken by Saint Thomas, or Veritatis Splendor or the CCC. And your view becomes particularly problematic when there is more than one moral object, one good object and one bad object. The person can then say that he wills only the good object, and therefore the act is moral. But in the traditional view, if the act is ordered toward more than one object, and any one object is bad, the act is intrinsically evil.
In the traditional view, if you knowingly and intentionally (deliberately) choose a concrete act, you have chosen its moral species (moral nature) and its object, often implicitly. The person does not intend the object directly, but only by way of choosing a certain type of act.
How can there be two moral objects unless one is schizophrenic?
 
…In direct abortion to save the life of the mother, the intended end is to save her life (good), the death of the prenatal is not in the intended end. The death of the prenatal is a bad unintended consequence. However, that death is also in the object of the act, making the act intrinsically evil, despite having an unintended bad consequence.
The prenatal’s death was selected explicitly as the means to secure the mother’s well-being. So, while the participants did not want that ultimate end, they chose that end as a means.

Medical treatment (drug, surgery, radiation, etc.) to treat a patient is medical treatment with a good moral object. The curative effect does not rely on the couple becoming incapable of conceiving a child, though that may be a consequence of the treatment.
 
…So if you are saying that using a pill to cure a person is a pill that can also be used to contracept… that possibility makes all uses of it morally wrong. That pill has built in evil and every act of using it is an evil act although the actors culpability might be reduced for some reason?
No, he’s not saying that. He’s only saying the evil arises if you continue to or intend to continue to have sex. Eg. he has no difficultly with a single woman (assumed to not be having sex) taking the pill for a therapeutic reason. For the married, sexually active woman, he thinks of it as “ah hah, you have ‘objectively’ committed contraception” because:
  • you took a medication making you sterile; and
  • you decided to have sex while sterile.
 
An act can have more than one object. If any one object is evil, the act is intrinsically evil. Even if the evil object is in some sense unintended or not willed, if the person chooses an act ordered toward that object, he chooses the object.
Can anyone confirm this statement? To say that one act can have more than one moral object gives me a head spin. I would only think this could be true of someone suffering schizophrenia.
 
No, he’s not saying that. He’s only saying the evil arises if you continue to or intend to continue to have sex. Eg. he has no difficultly with a single woman (assumed to not be having sex) taking the pill for a therapeutic reason. For the married, sexually active woman, he thinks of it as “ah hah, you have ‘objectively’ committed contraception” because:
  • you took a medication making you sterile; and
  • you decided to have sex while sterile.
And yet he thinks it’s ok if one has a hysterectomy (that is medically necessary for reasons other than sterility), even though the analysis is the same:
  • you had a hysterectomy making you sterile; and
  • you decided to have sex while sterile.
Why is one OK and not the other? They are morally equivalent.
 
…Please state clearly then Ron - what is the difference between the moral object and any foreseeable consequences?
Yes, I think that would be helpful. In fact, we should aim to distinguish the moral object from what are even “certain” (100% sure) consequences.

I have touched on this subject earlier in making the following point. We know that if the Intended end (“Intention”) relies on (or flows from) an outcome, then that outcome cannot be dismissed as consequence. This is why in Euthanasia, we cannot dismiss the death of the patient as mere unfortunate consequence.
 
This link should be included in this thread: vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm

It is the description of the sources of morality from the Catechism. The language used may prove helpful in considering these issues further.

In particular, the description of the object:
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
Please note the terms “the will deliberately directs itself”, “chosen”, and “the act of the will”. The object is not merely what is done, but what is willed.
 
Can anyone confirm this statement? To say that one act can have more than one moral object gives me a head spin. I would only think this could be true of someone suffering schizophrenia.
Certainly, if one is inclined to view inevitable consequences as moral objects, then Ron’s assertion that an act can have multiple moral objects would certainly be true!

Here are some examples of multiple moral objects for an act: (sourced from Ron);

*For example, simple theft has an evil moral object, to deprive your neighbor of his rightful property. But suppose that someone were to steal a sacred object, such as a gold vessel used in the Mass. This one act would then have two evil moral objects, that of sacrilege as well as that of theft. So nothing prevents an act from having more than one moral object.

The good moral object of any moral sexual act is threefold: marital, unitive, and procreative. We can consider this to be one moral object with three components (as God is one yet three). Or we can simply consider them to be three separate but interrelated moral objects. In any case, all moral objects must be good for any sexual act to be inherently good, rather than inherently evil.*
 
The “interior ordering” is not necessarily observable from the pure events. What makes the interior ordering of one hysterectomy different from another? Or is it always the same?
A hysterectomy has a good moral object if it is medically necessary to treat a serious medical disorder (e.g. prolapsed uterus). The removal of the uterus directly treats the problem, healing the patient.

A hysterectomy has an evil moral object if it is not medically necessary; no serious medical disorder, treatable by that procedure exists. The bad moral object is the permanent deprivation of the procreative meaning from sexual acts.

The role of intention is to choose the act (or not). The morality of the act is not based on intention. It is based on the concrete act, removal of uterus, and its ordering toward an end. The ends differ in those two cases, making the inherent moral meaning of that same concrete act different. Notice that the end (object) gives the concrete act is moral meaning. The morality does not come from the intention, except in that the concrete act, with its inherent moral meaning and object, is chosen by the will.
 
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience

Please note the terms “the will deliberately directs itself”, “chosen”, and “the act of the will”. The object is not merely what is done, but what is willed.
Note the sentence: “It [the object] is the matter of a human act.” IN other words, the object imbues the act with its moral nature.

The second font has four parts:
a. the choice
b. of a concrete act
c. with its moral nature (moral species)
d. determined by its object.

The human person knowingly and intentionally (deliberately) chooses a concrete act, and by doing so necessarily also chooses its moral nature and its object. So the object is chosen by the will, but not directly and not independently. The will can only choose the object by choosing the act.

The issue here is that a person cannot choose one act, and a different object. Nor does the object obtain its morality from the will.

When the Magisterium speaks of intentional or deliberate acts, the meaning is the knowing deliberate choice of an act with its nature and object. But acts (b,c,d) have a morality apart from intention. That is why intrinsically evil acts are termed “intrinsically disordered,” “inherently immoral” and are said to be wrong “by their very nature” and “in and of themselves”.
 
A hysterectomy has a good moral object if it is medically necessary to treat a serious medical disorder (e.g. prolapsed uterus). The removal of the uterus directly treats the problem, healing the patient.
Compare that to this:

Hormonal treatment has a good moral object if it is medically necessary to treat a serious medical disorder (e.g. endomitriosis or PCOS). The hormonal treatment directly treats the problem, healing the patient.

I’m at a loss as to how you see any moral difference between these scenarios. They are morally equivalent. If you apply the same analysis of hysterectomy (as per your post above) to this (hormonal treatment) then you should arrive at the same conclusion that the rest of us do.
 
Note the sentence: “It [the object] is the matter of a human act.” IN other words, the object imbues the act with its moral nature.

The second font has four parts:
a. the choice
b. of a concrete act
c. with its moral nature (moral species)
d. determined by its object.
You can’t seem to escape circular definitions Ron.
The human person knowingly and intentionally (deliberately) chooses a concrete act, and by doing so necessarily also chooses its moral nature and its object. So the object is chosen by the will, **but not directly **and not independently. The will can only choose the object by choosing the act.
Be careful here Ron. The use of the term “not directly” may be consider a contradiction of what the Catechism says: “the will deliberately directs itself”.
Nor does the object obtain its morality from the will.
I’m not sure what you mean here, but the object does not even exist apart from the will. If you mean that good intentions do not make bad objects good, then we agree. If you mean that the will plays no role in the morality of the act, then you are incorrect.
 
Can anyone confirm this statement? To say that one act can have more than one moral object gives me a head spin. I would only think this could be true of someone suffering schizophrenia.
The three fonts of morality all have a similar structure. In each font, the human will is directed toward a different type of end:
(1) intended end, the goal or purpose for choosing the act.
(2) the moral object, the end in terms of morality toward which the chosen act is inherently directed, by its very nature
(3) the end results (consequences) of the act

Suppose a doctor treats a patient with an antibiotic. The three types of ends might be much the same: he intends to heal the patient, the chosen act is ordered toward healing the patient, and he anticipates that the patient will be healed.

So the fact that good or evil is in one font, does not exclude it from being in another font. That is why, in the principle of double effect, we must first determine if there is evil in the object. Knowing that an evil is unintended, and is a bad consequence, does not exclude that evil from being in the object.

Yes, an act can have more than one moral object. Rau gave some of my examples above. This should not be controversial. More examples:

Adultery is intrinsically evil because it is sex outside of marriage, and because it violates marital fidelity (the marital vows). It has two evil moral objects.

Natural marital relations has the unitive and procreative meanings, each is a good moral object, and of course the marital meaning is a good object also.

Theft of a holy item has two evil moral objects because it is theft and also a sacrilege.

Use of abortifacient contraception has two evil moral objects: depriving sexual acts of their procreative meaning, and the death of innocent prenatals.

Robbery has two evil moral objects, because it is theft accomplished by force or threat of force (violence against the innocent).
 
Compare that to this:

Hormonal treatment has a good moral object if it is medically necessary to treat a serious medical disorder (e.g. endomitriosis or PCOS). The hormonal treatment directly treats the problem, healing the patient.

I’m at a loss as to how you see any moral difference between these scenarios. They are morally equivalent. If you apply the same analysis of hysterectomy (as per your post above) to this (hormonal treatment) then you should arrive at the same conclusion that the rest of us do.
If the woman refrains from sexual relations, then there is no difference. But her deliberate knowing choice, to engage in sexual relations while taking an abortifacient contraceptive is a different case. Her acts are now ordered toward three moral objects:
  1. treating the disorder (good)
  2. depriving sexual acts of their procreative meaning (evil)
  3. the deaths of innocent prenatals (evil)
Any single evil object makes the act intrinsically evil. And this evil is avoidable, since she can refrain from relations while taking the pill. In the case of a hysterectomy, the sterilization is not avoidable, and no innocent prenatals die.

So the act is intrinsically evil (bad second font). Then when we evaluate the third font, the bad effects of the deaths of prenatals outweighs the good of being able to have sex. And since the good of treating the disorder can be obtained without these deaths, the treatment in no way justifies them. Also, the bad effect that sexual acts are deprived of their procreative meaning weighs in the third font.

Rau’s hypothetical birth control pill that is contraceptive but not abortive does not exist, as far as I know.
 
If the woman refrains from sexual relations, then there is no difference. But her deliberate knowing choice, to engage in sexual relations while taking an abortifacient contraceptive is a different case. Her acts are now ordered toward three moral objects:
  1. treating the disorder (good)
  2. depriving sexual acts of their procreative meaning (evil)
  3. the deaths of innocent prenatals (evil)
Any single evil object makes the act intrinsically evil. And this evil is avoidable, since she can refrain from relations while taking the pill. In the case of a hysterectomy, the sterilization is not avoidable, and no innocent prenatals die.

So the act is intrinsically evil (bad second font). Then when we evaluate the third font, the bad effects of the deaths of prenatals outweighs the good of being able to have sex. And since the good of treating the disorder can be obtained without these deaths, the treatment in no way justifies them. Also, the bad effect that sexual acts are deprived of their procreative meaning weighs in the third font.

Rau’s hypothetical birth control pill that is contraceptive but not abortive does not exist, as far as I know.
So you are saying it is immoral because of the abortifacient potential of the treatment, not because it is contraceptive. Ron, this is a change in what you have been previously arguing.

That is fine. It is worth noting that there are moral theologians who agree with you. But their treatment is different. They apply double effect and determine that the abortifacient potential of the Pill is not proportionally outweighed by the good effects. The issue is in the unintented bad effects, not in the object. It is not intriniscally evil, it is immoral via an analysis of double effect.

And now I will note that many moral theologians disagree that it fails double effect.

The reason that your analysis doesn’t lead into an analysis of doudble effect (the correct way to analyse this scenario) is that you still cannot separate the moral object from the unintended consequences.

You have been asked repeatedly to describe the difference between the moral object and any foreseeable consequences, but haven’t yet addressed this fundamental question.

For the record, this is the correct analysis:
  1. treating the disorder (good) - this is the moral object
  2. depriving sexual acts of their procreative meaning (evil) - this is not the moral object; it is an unintended effect (and Ron, why do you not apply this to the hysterectomy example? This remains an inconsitency)
  3. the deaths of innocent prenatals (evil) - this is not the moral object; it is the unintended bad effect that some theologians (many disagree) consider to make the act immoral, via analysis of double effect.
 
Yes, an act can have more than one moral object. Rau gave some of my examples above. This should not be controversial. More examples:

Adultery is intrinsically evil because it is sex outside of marriage, and because it violates marital fidelity (the marital vows). It has two evil moral objects.
To me this distorts the moral object beyond meaning. The end or object of the act is to have sex. The moral object or how that pertains to the conscience, is that it is illicit sex (outside of marriage). The moral object of the act is illicit sex. Violating marital fidelity is just part of the description of the moral object. Not another moral object.
Natural marital relations has the unitive and procreative meanings, each is a good moral object, and of course the marital meaning is a good object also.
Again in simple terms the object of the act is to have sex. The moral object is the licitness of that act of sex. The act to contracept is another act to be judged according to its end which is to will a sterile intercourse.
Theft of a holy item has two evil moral objects because it is theft and also a sacrilege.
And again, is the sacrilege willed by the thief or is it more the description of the nature of that particular theft. The thief wills the taking that isn’t rightly his for his benefit but is not willing the sacrilege.
Use of abortifacient contraception has two evil moral objects: depriving sexual acts of their procreative meaning, and the death of innocent prenatals.
While this example is not really helpful to the main question of the thread it does lead me to ask again about the issue I addressed up thread about the morality of self defense weapons. Your answer may shed some more light on the issue for us. In using an abortifacient contraception, the willed act is to have sterile intercourse the same as any other act of contraception but what of the known result of the deaths. Are they technically abortions or miscarriages.

So we know that guns especially the favoured handguns are effective and certain to kill when used correctly on a person. So if the willed act, the moral object in using a handgun is self defense… what do we make of the inevitable consequence which is probable death of other? Is it all regarded within the scope of self defense or is something that will inevitably bring about death really a murder weapon and intrinsically evil… leaving only the actors culpability to measure sin?
 
Certainly, if one is inclined to view inevitable consequences as moral objects, then Ron’s assertion that an act can have multiple moral objects would certainly be true!

Here are some examples of multiple moral objects for an act: (sourced from Ron);

For example, simple theft has an evil moral object, to deprive your neighbor of his rightful property. But suppose that someone were to steal a sacred object, such as a gold vessel used in the Mass. This one act would then have two evil moral objects, that of sacrilege as well as that of theft. So nothing prevents an act from having more than one moral object.

I think that perhaps it is a case of Ron thinking too hard on this question of the moral object and for too long and lost the distinction and the relationship between the actor, the act and the object.

When I think of the basic premise of the above. The act is to take something from someone else and its wrong because that thing doesn’t rightly belong to me. So basically, willing to take what is not rightly mine is the moral object.

Maybe the intention was to deprive the neighbour of his goods for vengeful reasons or even for good reasons like taking his cigarettes so he doesn’t get cancer…but more likely the intention was to benefit the self by the theft. Either way, the intention good, bad or indifferent has no influence on the evil end of the act ie. the taking of something that is not rightly mine.
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