The things our bodies do, the way our bodies act in the world is really the substantial basis upon which our ‘selves’ are built - we can have all the thoughts we like, but what do they mean if they do not result in action? Action requires bodies.
Very nice. I am a body. I am not two entities - a cogito and an “external” body. Just one entity - a body, a human body. But this body is mine, and not someone’s else’s. Where does the sense of “mineness” come from?
This question leads into another question. What is the meaning of “person”?
We know that a “human being” has traditionally been defined in terms of a genus and a specific difference (“rational animal”), and so designates an instantiation of a concept, a member of a class.
A “person” is a “human being” and is thus a member of a class.
But a “person” qua “that person” is not a member of a class, is not a “sortal” noun, is not definable in terms of a genus and specific difference, or a set of concepts.
Consider John Doe. Granted that he is a human being and, as such, is a member of a class, and is definable in terms of a genus and a specific difference, or some set of criteria used to identify human beings qua human beings.
But John Doe qua John Doe, not qua a human being, is not definable in terms of a genus and specific difference. There is no class or category of John Doe’s; John Doe is not an instantiation of a “John Doe” concept that could apply to other particulars. “John Doe” is not a sortal noun.
John Doe is unrepeatable and totally unique (qua John Doe).
That’s why there’s a big problem with proper names in logic.
And isn’t this why “self” is such a philosophical conundrum?
So, again, where does my sense of “mineness”, of being totally unique and unrepeatable, come from?
