What precisely Is the "self"?

[GaryTaylor]

When we say “what precisely is the self” perhaps its easier to state what it is not. Distinction between natural and supernatural seems out of place at the moment, since the prior is the concern. So then we are interested in the nature of our present state of being… the self.

Personally I have never known anything to exist unless I first have some concept in which the existence is confirmed. To be conscious, it is necessary to be aware of the external. In other words I am conscious of my leg, or for example “wisdom” must first have a prior conception of the subject in order to verify. Thus we have to look past attributes to understand how the former is conceived. How do we know a leg is a leg? And who told those who explained to us? We are either looking at a circle or infinite.

 

[Sair]

When we say “what precisely is the self” perhaps its easier to state what it is not. Distinction between natural and supernatural seems out of place at the moment, since the prior is the concern. So then we are interested in the nature of our present state of being… the self.

Personally I have never known anything to exist unless I first have some concept in which the existence is confirmed. To be conscious, it is necessary to be aware of the external. In other words I am conscious of my leg, or for example “wisdom” must first have a prior conception of the subject in order to verify. Thus we have to look past attributes to understand how the former is conceived. How do we know a leg is a leg? And who told those who explained to us? We are either looking at a circle or infinite.

It seems to me, from my perspective at least, that you’re onto something here - to understand what something is - genuinely understand it - we do need to have some conception of the contrary, that is what it is not, or what it would mean for that thing not to be.

Can we conceive of what it would be like not to have a self? Are there any advanced Buddhists on the forum?

But I think you are also right in suggesting that our understanding of what things are is contextually based. To use your example, could we know or understand what a ‘leg’ is without the context in which such an appendage operates? As it is, we seem to understand what a leg is in terms of its function, which is why, perhaps, we can look around the various animals we encounter and identify ‘legs’ which are often very different, in structure and appearance, to our own.

 

[Sair]

Very nice. I am a body. I am not two entities - a cogito and an “external” body. Just one entity - a body, a human body. But this body is mine, and not someone’s else’s. Where does the sense of “mineness” come from?

This question leads into another question. What is the meaning of “person”?

We know that a “human being” has traditionally been defined in terms of a genus and a specific difference (“rational animal”), and so designates an instantiation of a concept, a member of a class.

A “person” is a “human being” and is thus a member of a class.

I agree that we, as human beings, are not ‘two entities’.

But I think that the category of ‘person’, in which we include (almost) exclusively human beings, is in large part simply a product of the human propensity to classify the world into readily-comprehensible sets. We consider a particular group of characteristics as defining a set, and anyone who meets these criteria belongs to the set.

What, then, of human beings who do not meet certain criteria ascribed to ‘persons’, such as self-awareness, use of language and a certain level of intelligence? Or do we simply assume that all human beings belong to the set of ‘persons’ by default of species?

But a “person” qua “that person” is not a member of a class, is not a “sortal” noun, is not definable in terms of a genus and specific difference, or a set of concepts.

It could be said that particular persons both are and are not members of the category called ‘persons’ - we all exist as individual, indivisible entities, after all. But the same can be said of any individual member of a class or category - one dog is not identical with another dog (no matter how many people ignorantly perceive them that way), nor is one tree identical with another and so forth. Again, our tendency to generalise sits in occasionally uncomfortable proximity to our ability to recognise individuality. There’s a reason stereotypes exist, after all.

So, again, where does my sense of “mineness”, of being totally unique and unrepeatable, come from?

Because in the sense of being a unique individual, you are pretty much unrepeatable - the combination of matter and energy that makes up your particular body is unlikely to be repeated, and certainly won’t be within your lifetime. Having said that, I might also point out that you may be undervaluing the extent to which we conceive our identity by comparing ourselves to others and finding similarities…

 

[tonyrey]

When we say “what precisely is the self” perhaps its easier to state what it is not. Distinction between natural and supernatural seems out of place at the moment, since the prior is the concern. So then we are interested in the nature of our present state of being… the self.

Personally I have never known anything to exist unless I first have some concept in which the existence is confirmed. To be conscious, it is necessary to be aware of the external. In other words I am conscious of my leg, or for example “wisdom” must first have a prior conception of the subject in order to verify. Thus we have to look past attributes to understand how the former is conceived. How do we know a leg is a leg? And who told those who explained to us? We are either looking at a circle or infinite.

It is necessary to explain what a concept is before we can reach any firm conclusions about anything!

 

[levinas12]

… But the same can be said of any individual member of a class or category - one dog is not identical with another dog (no matter how many people ignorantly perceive them that way), nor is one tree identical with another and so forth.

Because in the sense of being a unique individual, you are pretty much unrepeatable - the combination of matter and energy that makes up your particular body is unlikely to be repeated, and certainly won’t be within your lifetime. Having said that, I might also point out that you may be undervaluing the extent to which we conceive our identity by comparing ourselves to others nd finding similarities…

Dogs and trees, while they may have “drives”, do not have a sense of “mineness”, of their own unique individuality and unrepeatability. This peculiar “self-relation” seems confined to “persons”.

Heidegger argues that the self-relation of “mineness” stems from a “being-towards-death” that characterizes only humans. Other living entities also die but humans have a unique relation to death, a relation which is not just a matter of subjective awareness but ontological.

In fact, according to Heidegger, without this “being-towards-death”, there would be no “time”, no world “being there” - because the “thereness” of entities is dependent upon ourselves being “here” - and our “being here” is bounded by the possibility of our “not being here”.

Clear as a bell, isn’t it?

 

[levinas12]

followup to previous posting #45

Heidegger’s thought seems preposterous. But ask yourself. Where does the “there” of things originate - there is only a “there” for a corresponding “here” - and where does the “here” originate - from ourselves because we provide the “here”.

“here”/“there”, “then”/“now”/“not yet” are “a priori” structures that in some way depend on us (but not "us"as a part of the world, but “us” as transcendental, as somehow “outside” the world). If we had never happened, these structures wouldn’t have happened either.

Heidegger adds that these structures are made “possible” by our peculiar “being-towards-death”, our “stretching along through life” towards “no longer being here”.

 

[GaryTaylor]

It is necessary to explain what a concept is before we can reach any firm conclusions about anything!

Right and also since Sair bought in animals, then we have two concepts closely resembling each other.

Unless these concepts are known distinctly and in total, then they cannot be known at all. So we have two concepts which seem similar, yet are different to one another, and yet at the same time perceived as one. Or we can compare through similarity and distinction, in which case they are perceived as distinct either prior to or simultaneously with the comparison, thus they are not perceived as one concept. Thoughts?

 

[tonyrey]

Right and also since Sair bought in animals, then we have two concepts closely resembling each other.

Unless these concepts are known distinctly and in total, then they cannot be known at all. So we have two concepts which seem similar, yet are different to one another, and yet at the same time perceived as one. Or we can compare through similarity and distinction, in which case they are perceived as distinct either prior to or simultaneously with the comparison, thus they are not perceived as one concept. Thoughts?

It has occurred to me, Gary, that concepts presuppose an ability to conceive! It isn’t self-evident they are physiological because they are intangible - unless it can be demonstrated otherwise. So what is it that creates them?

 

[tonyrey]

followup to previous posting #45

Heidegger’s thought seems preposterous. But ask yourself. Where does the “there” of things originate - there is only a “there” for a corresponding “here” - and where does the “here” originate - from ourselves because we provide the “here”.

“here”/“there”, “then”/“now”/“not yet” are “a priori” structures that in some way depend on us (but not "us"as a part of the world, but “us” as transcendental, as somehow “outside” the world). If we had never happened, these structures wouldn’t have happened either.

Heidegger adds that these structures are made “possible” by our peculiar “being-towards-death”, our “stretching along through life” towards “no longer being here”.

I agree with the transcendental argument because we can comprehend reality as if we exist beyond time and space but how does it follow we are “being-towards-death”?

 

[tonyrey]

A propensity is not a basis for responsibility.

Mentation alone is not sufficient for responsibility because we could be helpless observers of events.

Metaphysicians consider the will to be independent and perfect, but even civil society allows for “diminished responsibility.”

“diminished” presupposes that one is responsible “to a certain extent”.

 

[GEddie]

Mentation alone is not sufficient for responsibility because we could be helpless observers of events.

“diminished” presupposes that one is responsible “to a certain extent”.

Not sufficient but certainly necessary.

And if the “will” is perfect and independent, then it could never be “diminished”.

Even the Church allows for diminished volition. One cannot sin while intoxicated, for example (although getting intoxicated would be itself a sin).

ICXC NIKA

 

[tonyrey]

But I think that’s a different question concerning how the mind interacts with the body, and I would agree that this is not clear. But the question of what the mind is comparative to the brain is not a mystery once you recognise the absurdity that would result if one believes that the mind is identical in nature to the brain. Its like saying that ink is identical to the meaning found in written words. This should be enough to bring that question to a close.

I wouldn’t enjoy having to attempt to explain how the brain understands itself!

Not to mention that all rational will to the truth and any attempt to have a truly rational conversation that can end in genuine acknowledgement of truth becomes logically impossible. Science becomes impossible. In fact you have to presuppose a real distinction between the nature of the rational mind and the nature of the brain before we can even proceed to have rational conversations. Do you see what I am saying?

My brain doesn’t but I do.

The whole mind body debate is irrational to begin with since it is impossible to rationally know or acknowledge any truth if the mental activities in our brains are fundamentally made-up of non-rational activity.

I’m not sure whether it’s a scientific or metascientific conjuring feat - or both - but it is certainly abjuring insight.

 

[tonyrey]

A dog doesn’t have a “self”. He has no intellect and will.

But he or she has a mind.

Man’s habits of good and evil are part of what he is because quality is also a substance. God is goodness. God is love.

A man’s body and soul don’t change, but his habits can change. So his self can change in quality, but it’s still the same soul and the person has responsibility for his actions.

In other words a person - unlike a brain - has an enduring identity.

 

[tonyrey]

Not sufficient but certainly necessary.

And if the “will” is perfect and independent, then it could never be “diminished”.

Even the Church allows for diminished volition. One cannot sin while intoxicated, for example (although getting intoxicated would be itself a sin).

ICXC NIKA

The truth is found between the extremes of dependence and independence.

 

[GEddie]

But he or she has a mind.

In other words a person - unlike a brain - has an enduring identity.

But certainly what we call the human mind is just the aggregate of memory, intellect and will? (Plus whatever thought occupies the head at any given moment).

I am not sure that canines have a “conscious mind” as the term is used of human beings. I’d say, though, that they do have a “self” in that there is a physical and emotional being.

A person has an enduring identity, provided they have life to hold them together.

ICXC NIKA

 

[Robert_Sock]

But certainly what we call the human mind is just the aggregate of memory, intellect and will? (Plus whatever thought occupies the head at any given moment).

I am not sure that canines have a “conscious mind” as the term is used of human beings. I’d say, though, that they do have a “self” in that there is a physical and emotional being.

A person has an enduring identity, provided they have life to hold them together.

ICXC NIKA

How about the unconscious mind, which is irrational?

 

[GEddie]

How about the unconscious mind, which is irrational?

Although our unconscious mind is not subject to the will, it is still composed of memory, some of which our higher minds never see.

 

[Robert_Sock]

Where does conscience come into play with the mind. We can think of the conscience as what Freud described as the super ego. Both the conscience and the superego are moral based. Our ‘free’ will is subjective to these two concepts, and can punish the ego [self] with guilt for giving into the id.

 

[GEddie]

Where does conscience come into play with the mind. We can think of the conscience as what Freud described as the super ego. Both the conscience and the superego are moral based. Our ‘free’ will is subjective to these two concepts, and can punish the ego [self] with guilt for giving into the id.

Close enough.

 

[tonyrey]

But certainly what we call the human mind is just the aggregate of memory, intellect and will? (Plus whatever thought occupies the head at any given moment).

I am not sure that canines have a “conscious mind” as the term is used of human beings. I’d say, though, that they do have a “self” in that there is a physical and emotional being.

A person has an enduring identity, provided they have life to hold them together.

ICXC NIKA

I agree - provided life is not reduced to a physiological phenomenon.

One thing is certain. Self-control and self-determination are fantasies if the self doesn’t exist…