What would be your reaction?

[Bagheera]

The problem is that Bageera doesn’t accept our definition of God.

Incorrect. I accept it as a working hypothesis, and like to explore the ramifications of the definition.

He should realize that Our God does not play games. And if He did condescend to be tested He would make sure the tester would loose the game. He would prevent the tester from changing his mind.

By eliminating my free will? It is also a catholic teaching that God never does that… These arguments are worse than useless. You are the one who “rejects” the catholic dogma, not I.

 

[Bagheera]

You forgot to list the logician’s answer, which would be to point out that your syllogism here fails to mention about God having the actual power to do anything about needless suffering. Yeah, I get the point of the argument and that God’s omnipotence is implied by definition, but details are important and required in these kind of arguments.

First of all, I did not quote the full conversation, only the pertinent part, which showed that the person wished to take the hypothesis (God is perfectly good and loving) and also use it as an argument. You committed the same error.

You explored the ramifications of the two possible answers to a situation in which God made a foolish error. An error that is not in keeping with His proposed nature. It simply isn’t a well formed argument.

Of the only two possible answers. If you want a formalized analysis, here it comes.

Hypothesis #1: God dwells in an unchanging, eternal now, and he sees all our decisions, even those which have not happened YET.
Hypothesis #2: This knowledge is independent from the external reality, it does not depend on our actions.
Hypothesis #3: God does not interfere with the free will of the experimenter.

All three of these hypotheses are taken from the catholic teachings.

Scenario: The skeptical experimenter (“S”) asks a question from God. The question pertains to a future action of “S”, which has two possible outcomes, either “X” or “not-X”. “S” asks God, which of the two options does he “see” in his eternal unchanging now? Will “S” perform “X” or will he perform “not-X”? (The law of non-contradiction says that he cannot perform both, and the law excluded middle says that there are no further options.)

Analysis: God has the following two options: 1) Give an answer, or 2) Stay silent. (Law of excluded middle).

Option #1 (God gives an answer): There are two possible answers. He can say that he sees “S” performing “X” or performing “not-X”. (Again, law of the excluded middle.) No matter, which he chooses, “S” will perform the opposite (utilizing hypothesis #3), thereby invalidating the “prediction”. As such “hypothesis #1” is invalidated.

Option #2 (God stays silent): God’s silence is a tacit admission that any answer he COULD give WOULD lead to a contradiction (Refer back to Option #1). But this also means that God’s knowledge of the future act of “S” is contingent upon not making a prediction. And this invalidates hypothesis #2.
There are no more logical possibilities.

 

[Bahman]

First of all, I did not quote the full conversation, only the pertinent part, which showed that the person wished to take the hypothesis (God is perfectly good and loving) and also use it as an argument. You committed the same error.

Of the only two possible answers. If you want a formalized analysis, here it comes.

Hypothesis #1: God dwells in an unchanging, eternal now, and he sees all our decisions, even those which have not happened YET.
Hypothesis #2: This knowledge is independent from the external reality, it does not depend on our actions.
Hypothesis #3: God does not interfere with the free will of the experimenter.

All three of these hypotheses are taken from the catholic teachings.

Scenario: The skeptical experimenter (“S”) asks a question from God. The question pertains to a future action of “S”, which has two possible outcomes, either “X” or “not-X”. “S” asks God, which of the two options does he “see” in his eternal unchanging now? Will “S” perform “X” or will he perform “not-X”? (The law of non-contradiction says that he cannot perform both, and the law excluded middle says that there are no further options.)

Analysis: God has the following two options: 1) Give an answer, or 2) Stay silent. (Law of excluded middle).

Option #1 (God gives an answer): There are two possible answers. He can say that he sees “S” performing “X” or performing “not-X”. (Again, law of the excluded middle.) No matter, which he chooses, “S” will perform the opposite (utilizing hypothesis #3), thereby invalidating the “prediction”. As such “hypothesis #1” is invalidated.

Option #2 (God stays silent): God’s silence is a tacit admission that any answer he COULD give WOULD lead to a contradiction (Refer back to Option #1). But this also means that God’s knowledge of the future act of “S” is contingent upon not making a prediction. And this invalidates hypothesis #2.
There are no more logical possibilities.

I think it is easier to prove that God omniscience leads to determinism and as a result contradict our free will.

 

[Back2Church]

First of all, I did not quote the full conversation, only the pertinent part, which showed that the person wished to take the hypothesis (God is perfectly good and loving) and also use it as an argument. You committed the same error.

Of the only two possible answers. If you want a formalized analysis, here it comes.

Hypothesis #1: God dwells in an unchanging, eternal now, and he sees all our decisions, even those which have not happened YET.
Hypothesis #2: This knowledge is independent from the external reality, it does not depend on our actions.
Hypothesis #3: God does not interfere with the free will of the experimenter.

All three of these hypotheses are taken from the catholic teachings.

Scenario: The skeptical experimenter (“S”) asks a question from God. The question pertains to a future action of “S”, which has two possible outcomes, either “X” or “not-X”. “S” asks God, which of the two options does he “see” in his eternal unchanging now? Will “S” perform “X” or will he perform “not-X”? (The law of non-contradiction says that he cannot perform both, and the law excluded middle says that there are no further options.)

Analysis: God has the following two options: 1) Give an answer, or 2) Stay silent. (Law of excluded middle).

Option #1 (God gives an answer): There are two possible answers. He can say that he sees “S” performing “X” or performing “not-X”. (Again, law of the excluded middle.) No matter, which he chooses, “S” will perform the opposite (utilizing hypothesis #3), thereby invalidating the “prediction”. As such “hypothesis #1” is invalidated.

Option #2 (God stays silent): God’s silence is a tacit admission that any answer he COULD give WOULD lead to a contradiction (Refer back to Option #1). But this also means that God’s knowledge of the future act of “S” is contingent upon not making a prediction. And this invalidates hypothesis #2.
There are no more logical possibilities.

What the…?

None of those statements that you call hypotheses are actual hypotheses. They are propositions, or the premises, of your argument.

Here’s how an argument works: You have a set of premises and a conclusion. That’s it. Very simple.

Remember when you gave me a link so I could learn about mathematical induction? Now it’s my turn to give you a link to learn about arguments. It even has atheism in the url! You should like that.
atheism.about.com/od/logicalarguments/a/argument.htm

 

[Bagheera]

What the…?

None of those statements that you call hypotheses are actual hypotheses. They are propositions, or the premises, of your argument.

Here’s how an argument works: You have a set of premises and a conclusion. That’s it. Very simple.

Same difference. A hypothesis is an premise or a proposition, which serves as a starting point for an argument - whether they are validated, or not. We assume that they are true - TENTATIVELY or PROVISIONALLY, and the we use logical inferences ad see where it goes. We do NOT assume the absolute veracity of these premises or propositions.

Not every argument can be expressed as a simple syllogism. Like:

Premise: All elephants can play a violin.
Premise: Jumbo is an elephant.
Conclusion: Therefore Jumbo can play a violin.
It does not even need the universal qualifier (ALL) in it. It could be simpler using the existential qualifier (ANY), for example:

Premise: Any elephant can play a violin.
Premise: Jumbo is an elephant.
Conclusion: Therefore Jumbo can play a violin.
Both or these would be a logically **CORRECT **(or VALID) but **UNSOUND **argument - because some of the premises are not validated. And we do not care if an argument is logically VALID if it is not also logically SOUND. A logically valid (but unsound) argument is just a useless word game.

Now let’s see the correct version:

Hypothesis or Premise: All elephants can play the violin. (Or: Any elephant can play the violin.)
Fact or Premise: Jumbo is an elephant.
Testing: We give Jumbo a violin, and ascertain that he cannot play it.
Conclusion: The hypothesis was false.
And the argument I presented is **exactly **in this form, though it is a little bit more complicated. As such the ball is in your court. I gave all the logical corollaries coming from the starting hypotheses (or premises, if you prefer that word). All of them lead to a refutation to one or more hypotheses (or premises). Now you can either agree, or not. If you disagree, then it is incumbent upon you to show that there is logical error, and the final conclusion does NOT follow from the premises.

What you cannot do is perform the same “trickery” that the other theist did. You cannot say that the conclusion is correct, but since it contradicts one or more of the premises, therefore the conclusion must be discarded. You cannot present your hypotheses also as an argument.

 

[Xuan]

There are no more logical possibilities.

Hi Bagheera,

Yes there are.

I haven’t read the whole thread, but if you’re still talking about the question posed in post #31, God’s answer would be something like this:

G: Your first inclination is to pick the red one and the blue one and the roll would result in a 5, but since you know that I know this you will change your mind and your next inclination will be to pick the red one and the green one which would result in a 7, but you know that I know this so you will again change your mind and your next inclination will be to pick the blue one and the green one which would result in a 12, but you know that I know this so you will again change your mind and your next inclination will be…

The answer would continue for years, as long as the man is able to change his mind, until just a moment before his natural death. Then God would finish His answer “but you will fail to act on any of these inclinations because you will now die a natural death.” And “bingo” the man would die.

Since God foresees all the changes in the man’s mind, His answer must continue addressing them until the man stops changing his mind.

Xuan

 

[Back2Church]

We do NOT assume the absolute veracity of these premises or propositions.

Yes, you do, or else you not cannot establish an actual contradiction.

For instance:

1. Bagheera is an atheist.
2. If a person prays, then he is not an atheist.
3. Bagheera is also a person of prayer.
4. Bagheers is not an atheist. (modus ponens, lines 2 and 3)
5. Therefore Bagheera is an atheist and Bagheera is not an atheist. (conjunction, lines 1 and 4)

The conclusion points out a contradiction in the argument. The entire purpose of finding a contradiction is to show that one or more premises cannot possibly be true. The contradiction is only possible if all the premises of the argument are assumed as true. If the contradictory element of the argument is false, then there is no contradiction.

So if you want to show a contradiction within Catholic dogma, you have to work on the assumption that all of the premises are true. Otherwise, you cannot arrive at a logical contradiction.

Not every argument can be expressed as a simple syllogism.

Simple? No, not always. But every argument can most definitely be expressed as a series of premises (and possibly inferences based on those premises) leading to a conclusion. Because that’s what an argument is.

Both or these would be a logically **CORRECT **(or VALID) but **UNSOUND **argument - because some of the premises are not validated. And we do not care if an argument is logically VALID if it is not also logically SOUND. A logically valid (but unsound) argument is just a useless word game.

A logically valid argument is far from useless. Sound arguments are much stronger, sure, but valid arguments are by no means just useless word games. As I showed above, even if you do not know the truth value of all premises, you can still establish whether they can even possibly be all true or not, by way of contradiction.

I find it rather ironic that you want to bring up the idea of sound arguments in this discussion, though. A sound argument is the same thing as a valid argument, except that all the premises are established or proven truths, rather than only assumed. Since the very aspects of Catholic dogma we are arguing are not empirically proven scientific truths, nor is the way in which God responds in your hypothetical exchange anything but conjecture, all you have to work with are assumptions.

In post #182, you blatantly stated that God chose an incorrect answer.

G: It is simple. There is no future for me, I can see (in this unchanging, eternal now) that you will perform X.

Since this is not a validated truth, only an assumed one, the argument cannot be sound by any means. So are you saying that your argument was just a useless word game?

Let’s look at your Jumbo the elephant “argument.”

Hypothesis or Premise: All elephants can play the violin. (Or: Any elephant can play the violin.)
Fact or Premise: Jumbo is an elephant.
Testing: We give Jumbo a violin, and ascertain that he cannot play it.
Conclusion: The hypothesis was false.
And the argument I presented is **exactly **in this form, though it is a little bit more complicated. As such the ball is in your court. I gave all the logical corollaries coming from the starting hypotheses (or premises, if you prefer that word). All of them lead to a refutation to one or more hypotheses (or premises). Now you can either agree, or not. If you disagree, then it is incumbent upon you to show that there is logical error, and the final conclusion does NOT follow from the premises.

First off, this isn’t even an argument. It’s an experiment. You start with a hypothesis, test the hypothesis, and then conclude the validity or non-validity of the hypothesis based on the results of the test. That’s very different from an argument.

So in order to take your experiment as an argument, it must be converted into one. Here’s your experiment in argument form:

1. All elephants can play the violin.
2. Jumbo is an elephant.
3. Jumbo is unable to play a violin.
4. If Jumbo is an elephant and is unable to play the violin, then not all elephants can play the violin.
5. Jumbo is an elephant and is unable to play the violin (conjunction of 2 and 3)
6. Not all elephants can play the violin (by way of modus ponens using 4 and 5)
7. Therefore all elephants can play the violin and not all elephants can play the violin (conjuction of 1 and 6)

The contradictory conclusion tells us that one or more of the premises are false. Notice how I had to assume all the premises were true in order to arrive at a contradiction? Common sense tells us that it’s the first premise that is false.

Hopefully you can understand the differences between an argument and an experiment. That’s not to say that experiments are not useful in arguments. They can be. But they are very different things. The thing about experiments, though, is that to have any true value, they must be carried out. Otherwise they remain nothing but hypothetical conjecture.

At this point, you’re going to say “If the experiment were actually performed, it still leaves God with only two possibilities of action, both which lead to contradiction.” Very well. Put it into the form of an argument and let’s deal with it. (Hint: You’ll find it easier to make two separate arguments, one for each possible response.)

PS: You never responded to post #260 or post #274. Did you have any further comments, or are you satisfied with those responses?

 

[Bagheera]

So in order to take your experiment as an argument, it must be converted into one. Here’s your experiment in argument form:

1. All elephants can play the violin.
2. Jumbo is an elephant.
3. Jumbo is unable to play a violin.
4. If Jumbo is an elephant and is unable to play the violin, then not all elephants can play the violin.

The whole argument could and should be stopped after line 4). The rest is **unnecessary **“fluff”. The point is that we are not interested in abstract games, we are interested in discussing reality. (At least I am.) Moreover in 3) you implicitly performed that “experiment”. How else would you know that Jumbo cannot play the violin? Just because you did not spell it out, the experiment is there.

The contradictory conclusion tells us that one or more of the premises are false. Notice how I had to assume all the premises were true in order to arrive at a contradiction? Common sense tells us that it’s the first premise that is false.

Common sense is useless when it comes to establish a proposition about reality. I can give you many examples where “common sense” leads to an incorrect conclusion. Here is one of them: Duplicate birthday

A logically valid argument is far from useless. Sound arguments are much stronger…

Which one of the premises is faulty cannot be established with this method. And a “logically valid” BUT explicitly unsound argument is definitely useless.

In post #182, you blatantly stated that God chose an incorrect answer.

What is the correct answer? That answer I chose was the direct corollary of the catholic dogma. What are we talking about?

So if you want to show a contradiction within Catholic dogma, you have to work on the assumption that all of the premises are true. Otherwise, you cannot arrive at a logical contradiction.

The problem is more complicated. There are several different possibilities: 1) At least ONE dogma is self-refuting (or nonsensical), 2) At least TWO dogmas contradict one another and 3) at least ONE dogma is contradicted by reality.

Since the very aspects of Catholic dogma we are arguing are not empirically proven scientific truths, nor is the way in which God responds in your hypothetical exchange anything but conjecture, all you have to work with are assumptions.

Just like any other thought experiment, except I am using the catholic assumptions.

First off, this isn’t even an argument. It’s an experiment. You start with a hypothesis, test the hypothesis, and then conclude the validity or non-validity of the hypothesis based on the results of the test.

It is a thought experiment.

That’s not to say that experiments are not useful in arguments. They can be. But they are very different things. The thing about experiments, though, is that to have any true value, they must be carried out. Otherwise they remain nothing but hypothetical conjecture.

This is/was a thought experiment. Einstein has performed many of them. A famous one was the thought experiment which established a NEGATIVE, namely that no spaceship can move faster than the speed of light. We deal with the same thing here. There an several catholic assumptions regarding God, and in these thought experiments we explore their ramifications.

PS: You never responded to post #260 or post #274. Did you have any further comments, or are you satisfied with those responses?

I am not satisfied, but I do not wish to make this conversation even more fragmented.

I am sure you are familiar with the concept of “indirect proof” in mathematics. Here is an example:
Theorem: There are no positive integers the ratio of which precisely equals the square root of two. Observe, it is negative statement.

Proof:

1. We assume the opposite, namely that there are two positive integers (“p” and “q”) which have no common divisor and their ratio is exactly square root of 2. p / q = sqrt(2)
2. Squaring both sides p[sup]2[/sup] / q[sup]2[/sup] = 2
3. Therefore p[sup]2[/sup] = 2 * q[sup]2[/sup]
4. As such p[sup]2[/sup] is an even number, and therefore p is also an even number, for example p = 2*a.
5. It follows that (2*a)[sup]2[/sup] = 2 * q[sup]2[/sup]
6. which equals 4 * a[sup]2[/sup] = 2 * q[sup]2[/sup]
7. and so 2 * a[sup]2[/sup] = q[sup]2[/sup]
8. which shows that “q” is also an even number.
9. But that contradicts that “p” and “q” have no common divisor and that proves that 1) is false, therefore the original theorem was true.
   Observe, this is NOT a formal argument. It is infinitely better, it is a formal proof. What I presented was exactly like this, except for the fact that I did not use mathematical axioms, I used the catholic dogmas as a basis…

That theist I referred to would have arrived at a different conclusion. At the last step 9) he would declare: “but that cannot be right, since it contradicts the “premise” expressed in 1)”. As you can see, the “hypothesis” does not even have to refer to a real-world, problem, it is applicable also in abstract sciences. Any proposed theorem or proposition is a hypothesis, unless it is a brute fact.

Now, if you would finally attack the proof I presented (in #280), instead of demanding to transform into a formal argument, I would be happy to see it. If you prefer to see it as a formal argument, you can do it.

 

[Wojo42]

I read through portions of this post and thought I should mention something. This whole argument could have been avoided if someone had told bagheera that the list of dogmas is not an accurate list. Particularly numbers 30, 31, 32, 33 are not dogmas of the church. Bagheera your understanding of Dogmas is inaccurate. Non of these things is either taught as divinely revealed by God or taught by the Church as to be held definitively. Particularly number 33. The only place I have seen that phraseology is in Ludwig Otts book and it may not even be accurate as this is a translation of his original work which was in German. That phrase does not appear in any other books on the theology of God that I can find. And further as far as I can tell it is a theological opinion that is open for debate among theologians.

I would alter the original list to read as follows:

1. God knows all things past, present and future, including the future actions of his creatures.(DS 3003)
2. And God is infinite in understanding and will. (DS 3001)

As far as I know these are the only De fide dogmas in reference to this particular subject.

 

[Back2Church]

The whole argument could and should be stopped after line 4). The rest is **unnecessary **“fluff”. The point is that we are not interested in abstract games, we are interested in discussing reality. (At least I am.)

The “fluff” lines are the steps that take you from the given premises to the contradiction. On their own, lines 1-4 are nothing more than statements, not an argument. The steps it takes to get from the statements to the contradiction are necessary. It only looks like fluff, because the contradiction is so obvious that you make those steps intuitively, without having to think about it. In propositional logic, intuition is not accepted and every step it takes to arive at a conclusion/contradiction is required.

Moreover in 3) you implicitly performed that “experiment”. How else would you know that Jumbo cannot play the violin? Just because you did not spell it out, the experiment is there.

Nope. I didn’t perform the experiment. The experiment had been done prior to the argument. The result of the experiment became one of the propositions in the argument.

I am sure you are familiar with the concept of “indirect proof” in mathematics.
…
Observe, this is NOT a formal argument. It is infinitely better, it is a formal proof. What I presented was exactly like this, except for the fact that I did not use mathematical axioms, I used the catholic dogmas as a basis…

Not quite. The purpose of an indirect proof is to prove something is true by showing that if this “something” were false, it would lead to a contradiction. You have givens, you assume the opposite of what you are trying to prove, and you list the logical steps leading to the contradiction. Post #280 was not “presented exactly like this.”

Now, if you would finally attack the proof I presented (in #280), instead of demanding to transform into a formal argument, I would be happy to see it. If you prefer to see it as a formal argument, you can do it.

Put #280 into a proper proof. You are the one making a claim here, not I. The burden of proof is on you.

 

[Back2Church]

I read through portions of this post and thought I should mention something. This whole argument could have been avoided if someone had told bagheera that the list of dogmas is not an accurate list. Particularly numbers 30, 31, 32, 33 are not dogmas of the church. Bagheera your understanding of Dogmas is inaccurate. Non of these things is either taught as divinely revealed by God or taught by the Church as to be held definitively. Particularly number 33. The only place I have seen that phraseology is in Ludwig Otts book and it may not even be accurate as this is a translation of his original work which was in German. That phrase does not appear in any other books on the theology of God that I can find. And further as far as I can tell it is a theological opinion that is open for debate among theologians.

I would alter the original list to read as follows:

1. God knows all things past, present and future, including the future actions of his creatures.(DS 3003)
2. And God is infinite in understanding and will. (DS 3001)

As far as I know these are the only De fide dogmas in reference to this particular subject.

My copy of the book has an imprimatur.

I finally picked up a copy of the CCC 2nd Ed. today, so I can finally start digging through it, marking, highlighting, and tabbing as I go, to compare the two.

 

[Bagheera]

The “fluff” lines are the steps that take you from the given premises to the contradiction. On their own, lines 1-4 are nothing more than statements, not an argument. The steps it takes to get from the statements to the contradiction are necessary. It only looks like fluff, because the contradiction is so obvious that you make those steps intuitively, without having to think about it. In propositional logic, intuition is not accepted and every step it takes to arive at a conclusion/contradiction is required.

#1) All elephants can play the violin.
#2) Jumbo is an elephant.
#3) Jumbo is unable to play a violin.
The contradiction is between #1 and #3 (with taking into account #2) and it is not something we need to take on “common sense” or need to apply some “intuitive” process. It is a glaring contradiction due to the law of non-contradiction.

Nope. I didn’t perform the experiment. The experiment had been done prior to the argument. The result of the experiment became one of the propositions in the argument.

Someone had to perform the experiment - as a “thought experiment”. Your previous argument was that I did not present a “formal argument”, that I presented “an experiment”. This is exactly what you said:

Hopefully you can understand the differences between an argument and an experiment. That’s not to say that experiments are not useful in arguments. They can be. But they are very different things. The thing about experiments, though, is that to have any true value, they must be carried out. Otherwise they remain nothing but hypothetical conjecture.
Now it seems that you incorporated the “experiment” (statement #3) - implicitly, of course, and you do not mind any more that the actual experiment was never carried out, that it was merely a “hypothetical conjecture”. I think that this is a good sign. It is rare that I see even such a minor (?) concession.

Not quite.

Not exactly, since the problem is more complicated. It has not one, but 3 hypotheses. And I allowed for the difference when I mentioned: “except for the fact that I did not use mathematical axioms, I used the catholic dogmas as a basis…” But the process is still the same.

The purpose of an indirect proof is to prove something is true by showing that if this “something” were false, it would lead to a contradiction. You have givens, you assume the opposite of what you are trying to prove, and you list the logical steps leading to the contradiction. Post #280 was not “presented exactly like this.”

Put #280 into a proper proof. You are the one making a claim here, not I. The burden of proof is on you.

**Theorem: **God can foresee what I am going to do in a dilemma situation AND this foreknowledge is independent from the external reality.

Catholic teaching #1: God dwells in an unchanging, eternal now, and he sees all our decisions, even those which have not happened YET.
Catholic teaching #2: This knowledge is independent from the external reality, it does not depend on our actions.
Catholic teaching #3: God does not interfere with the free will of the experimenter. (This is only implicitly exploited.)

Let “S” (skeptical experimenter) present the scenario to God: "I am about to perform one of two possible actions, namely “X” or “not-X”. According to CT#1 you already see which one of the two options will I carry out. “What does your eternal, unchanging now show about my action?”

At this point we need to examine 3 possible answers:

1. God answers: “You will perform X”.
2. God answers: “You will perform not-X”.
3. God stays silent.

Due to the law of excluded middle, there are no more possible cases to examine.

If God answers #1, “S” will perform “not-X”. This act refutes (contradicts) CT#1. Theorem is proven to be false.
If God answers #2, “S” will perform “X”. This act refutes (contradicts) CT#1. Theorem is proven to be false.
If God stays silent, it means that God cannot answer either 1) or 2) realizing that giving either answer would lead to a direct refutation of CT#1, which means that God cannot know what “S” will do IF he reveals the prediction. And that means that God’s knowledge is dependent upon **NOT **revealing the prediction which refutes (contradicts) CT#2. Theorem is proven to be false.
Your turn. No more excuses please.

 

[Wojo42]

back2church. An imprimatur has nothing to do with whether a statement is de fide or not. Number 33 is not a de fide truth of the church. It has no theological qualification after it as does some of the other statements and it seems to be a theological conclusion derived from the statement that God’s knowledge is infinite. But the actual statement " God’s knowledge is independent of extra divine things" is not a de fide statement. As I said before it is neither taught as divinely revealed by God nor is it taught as to be held definitively by the church.

 

[Back2Church]

#1) All elephants can play the violin.
#2) Jumbo is an elephant.
#3) Jumbo is unable to play a violin.
The contradiction is between #1 and #3 (with taking into account #2) and it is not something we need to take on “common sense” or need to apply some “intuitive” process. It is a glaring contradiction due to the law of non-contradiction.

Those are nothing more than three statements. The contradiction happens when you combine and compare them. Because the statements are so simple, you do this automatically without having to consciously think about it.

Someone had to perform the experiment - as a “thought experiment”. Your previous argument was that I did not present a “formal argument”, that I presented “an experiment”. This is exactly what you said:

Hopefully you can understand the differences between an argument and an experiment. That’s not to say that experiments are not useful in arguments. They can be. But they are very different things. The thing about experiments, though, is that to have any true value, they must be carried out. Otherwise they remain nothing but hypothetical conjecture.
Now it seems that you incorporated the “experiment” (statement #3) - implicitly, of course, and you do not mind any more that the actual experiment was never carried out, that it was merely a “hypothetical conjecture”. I think that this is a good sign. It is rare that I see even such a minor (?) concession.

I incorporated the result of the experiment into my argument, using it as one of the premises. But the point I mainly wanted to stress was that since the test itself was never actually carried out, I have assumed a “best guess” as the result. The argument cannot be sound if one of the premises is nothing more than a guess of what the results of a test would be. I’m merely pointing out that the very argument you are proposing in this thread cannot be sound, since it involves the results of a test you could never perform, and that it is ironic that you should consider an argument that is valid, but not sound, as a useless word game.

Not exactly, since the problem is more complicated. It has not one, but 3 hypotheses. And I allowed for the difference when I mentioned: “except for the fact that I did not use mathematical axioms, I used the catholic dogmas as a basis…” But the process is still the same.

**Theorem: **God can foresee what I am going to do in a dilemma situation AND this foreknowledge is independent from the external reality.

Catholic teaching #1: God dwells in an unchanging, eternal now, and he sees all our decisions, even those which have not happened YET.
Catholic teaching #2: This knowledge is independent from the external reality, it does not depend on our actions.
Catholic teaching #3: God does not interfere with the free will of the experimenter. (This is only implicitly exploited.)

Let “S” (skeptical experimenter) present the scenario to God: "I am about to perform one of two possible actions, namely “X” or “not-X”. According to CT#1 you already see which one of the two options will I carry out. “What does your eternal, unchanging now show about my action?”

At this point we need to examine 3 possible answers:

1. God answers: “You will perform X”.
2. God answers: “You will perform not-X”.
3. God stays silent.

Due to the law of excluded middle, there are no more possible cases to examine.

If God answers #1, “S” will perform “not-X”. This act refutes (contradicts) CT#1. Theorem is proven to be false.
If God answers #2, “S” will perform “X”. This act refutes (contradicts) CT#1. Theorem is proven to be false.
If God stays silent, it means that God cannot answer either 1) or 2) realizing that giving either answer would lead to a direct refutation of CT#1, which means that God cannot know what “S” will do IF he reveals the prediction. And that means that God’s knowledge is dependent upon **NOT **revealing the prediction which refutes (contradicts) CT#2. Theorem is proven to be false.
Your turn. No more excuses please.

This still isn’t exactly the exact same process as your math theorem from earlier. An indirect proof starts by assuming the negation of the proposition you wish to prove as true. By producing a contradiction under this condition, it shows that the original (non-negated) proposition cannot be false, and therefore must be true.

Yet here, you start with a positive theorem, list three dogmas, propose a test, and offer possible results of the test. The results are in contradiction with the dogmas, sure, but this looks more like a conditional proof, rather than an indirect proof.

As I’m sure you are well aware, a conditional proof that yields a contradiction does not automatically point out exactly which line is in error. It could be one of the propositions or it could be the condition. And since we cannot actually verify the condition as true, we are simply stuck with a… how did you put it?.. “useless word game.”

 

[Back2Church]

back2church. An imprimatur has nothing to do with whether a statement is de fide or not. Number 33 is not a de fide truth of the church. It has no theological qualification after it as does some of the other statements and it seems to be a theological conclusion derived from the statement that God’s knowledge is infinite. But the actual statement " God’s knowledge is independent of extra divine things" is not a de fide statement. As I said before it is neither taught as divinely revealed by God nor is it taught as to be held definitively by the church.

Ah, ok. I was under the impression that an imprimatur meant that the book was free of doctrinal errors, and that since this book is a list of dogmas the imprimatur in this case was a “stamp of approval” of what the book claims.

I reverted to Catholicism in April this year (had left the church, poorly catechized, at 15), so there’s still so much about the Catholic world that is new to me.

 

[Paddy_Walker]

"Wojo44:

I read through portions of this post and thought I should mention something. This whole argument could have been avoided if someone had told bagheera that the list of dogmas is not an accurate list. Particularly numbers 30, 31, 32, 33 are not dogmas of the church. Bagheera your understanding of Dogmas is inaccurate… And further as far as I can tell it is a theological opinion that is open for debate among theologians.

I would alter the original list to read as follows:

1. God knows all things past, present and future, including the future actions of his creatures.(DS 3003)
2. And God is infinite in understanding and will. (DS 3001)

As far as I know these are the only De fide dogmas in reference to this particular subject.

I did that on page 4 [this is page 20], but such trifles as facts have no affect on some people.

We’ve had this thread before. It ended poorly, I think. Much frustration.

1. God’s knowledge is independent of extra-divine things

When God’s knowledge is implied not to be contingent it appears to mean that knowledge comes from God, that God does not look elsewhere, outside of himself for knowledge.
When you ask God about the dice you are actually standing in God, living in him. He has total knowledge of you and the dice - because there is nothing else besides God. All knowledge of everything comes from him and because of him.

But I don’t find this one, number 33, in your exact wording, listed among the Attributes or Qualities of God. Also there is no Theological Grades of Certainty attached to this line of your post.

1. God knows all that is merely possible by the knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia simplicis intelligentiae). (De fide.)

Since all knowledge comes from him he knows all that is possible.

1. God knows all real things in the past, the present and the future (Scientia visionis). (De fide.)
2. By knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) God also foresees the free acts of the rational creatures with infallible certainty. (De fide.)
3. God also knows the conditioned future free actions with infallible certainty.** (Sent. communis)**

The Theological Grades of Certainty

• “Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma”
  by Ludwig Ott.

1. The highest degree of certainty appertains to the immediately revealed truths. The belief due to them is based on the authority of God Revealing (fides divina), and if the Church, through its teaching, vouches for the fact it a truth is contained in Revelation, one’s certainty is then also based on the authority of the Infallible Teaching Authority of the Church (fides catholica). If Truths are defined by a solemn judgment of faith (definition) of the Pope or of a General Council, they are “de fide definita.”
2. Catholic truths or Church doctrines, on which the infallible Teaching Authority of the Church has finally decided, are to be accepted with a faith which is based on the sole authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica). These truths are as infallibly certain as dogmas proper.
3. A Teaching proximate to Faith (sententia fidei proxima) is a doctrine, which is regarded by theologians generally as a truth of Revelation, but which has not yet been finally promulgated as such by the Church.
4. A Teaching pertaining to the Faith, i.e., theologically certain (sententia ad fidem pertinens, i.e., theologice certa) is a doctrine, on which the Teaching Authority of the Church has not yet finally pronounced, but whose truth is guaranteed by its intrinsic connection with the doctrine of revelation (theological conclusions).
5. Common Teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally.
6. Theological opinions of lesser grades of certainty are called probable, more probable, well-founded (sententia probabilis, probabilior, bene fundata). Those which are regarded as being in agreement with the consciousness of Faith of the Church are called pious opinions (sententia pia). The least degree of certainty is possessed by the tolerated opinion (opinio tolerata), which is only weakly founded, but which is tolerated by the Church.

With regard to the doctrinal teaching of the Church it must be well noted that not all the assertions of the Teaching Authority of the Church on questions of Faith and morals are infallible and consequently irrevocable. Only those are infallible which emanate from General Councils representing the whole episcopate and the Papal Decisions Ex Cathedra (cf D 1839). The ordinary and usual form of the Papal teaching activity is not infallible. Further, the decisions of the Roman Congregations (Holy Office, Bible Commission) are not infallible.

Nevertheless normally they are to be accepted with an inner assent which is based on the high supernatural authority of the Holy See (assensus internus supernaturalis, assensus religiosus). The so-called “silentium obsequiosum,” that is “reverent silence,” does not generally suffice. By way of exception, the obligation of inner agreement may cease if a competent expert, after a renewed scientific investigation of all grounds, arrives at the positive conviction that the decision rests on an error.

It appears that number 38 is; 5. Common Teaching (sententia communis) is doctrine, which in itself belongs to the field of free opinions, but which is accepted by theologians generally

A generally accepted doctrine, belonging to the field of public opinion, but not a Dogma proper.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Folks, the existence of God cannot be disproved or proven by a parlor game. Futher those who play such silly parlor games are being tempted by the Devil. It is not any different than playing with a Weegie Board or taking part in Seances. God will not be mocked. Those who try it will pay a dear price.

Linus2nd

 

[Darryl1958]

Let’s suppose that one of the (de fide) dogmas, which are taught “infallibly” by the church is proven to be incorrect. “Proven” in this case means that it is logically impossible. What would be your reaction? (Later I will give an actual example, but for the time being, just consider the hypothetical scenario.)

The scenario is of truth contradicting faith.
Since faith that is not based in truth is bad faith, and pretense, only by holding to truth as the primary value does it become possible to preserve both.

All dogmas become more and more nuanced over time as a result.

 

[rfournier103]

Let’s suppose that one of the (de fide) dogmas, which are taught “infallibly” by the church is proven to be incorrect. “Proven” in this case means that it is logically impossible. What would be your reaction?

It can’t happen.

That’s my first reaction, too. Honestly, I don’t think I can answer that until confronted with that situation. So, until THAT happens, I’ll have to say “Can’t happen” / “I have no idea.”

(Later I will give an actual example, but for the time being, just consider the hypothetical scenario.)

Why not now? Don’t keep us all in suspense…

It is pretty good fun to see the cowardly attempts to avoid hard questions by stating that they “cannot happen”. Par for the course…

Sounds like you have an agenda here, my friend. Would you care to share with the rest of the class?

 

[Bagheera]

Back2Church:

Those are nothing more than three statements. The contradiction happens when you combine and compare them. Because the statements are so simple, you do this automatically without having to consciously think about it.

What of it? The simple statement: “this proposition is false”, is just one statement in your phraseology, but it is a glaring contradiction nevertheless. The number of statements to highlight the contradiction is not relevant.

Back2Church:

I incorporated the result of the experiment into my argument, using it as one of the premises. But the point I mainly wanted to stress was that since the test itself was never actually carried out, I have assumed a “best guess” as the result. The argument cannot be sound if one of the premises is nothing more than a guess of what the results of a test would be. I’m merely pointing out that the very argument you are proposing in this thread cannot be sound, since it involves the results of a test you could never perform, and that it is ironic that you should consider an argument that is valid, but not sound, as a useless word game.

Einstein’s thought experiment about the lamp / mirror in the spaceship (which travels faster than the speed of light) was never carried out either (and cannot be carried out), and yet, no one would deny that it flatly disproves the possibility of traveling faster than light.

Back2Church:

Yet here, you start with a positive theorem, list three dogmas, propose a test, and offer possible results of the test. The results are in contradiction with the dogmas, sure, but this looks more like a conditional proof, rather than an indirect proof.

It is more complicated, that is true. What does it have to do with anything?

Back2Church:

As I’m sure you are well aware, a conditional proof that yields a contradiction does not automatically point out exactly which line is in error. It could be one of the propositions or it could be the condition. And since we cannot actually verify the condition as true, we are simply stuck with a… how did you put it?.. “useless word game.”

Just like in Einstein’s proof of the impossibility of faster-than-light travel. Of course, this is a more complicated scenario, since there are three preconditions. However, since the concept of “omniscience” is contingent on all three of them, it is sufficient to prove that at least one of them is incorrect – it does not really matter, which one is the “culprit”.

In a very good sense the similarity between the two thought experiments is striking. Einstein showed that there is a contradiction between the observations of the two observers, one in the spaceship (for whom the light from the lamp will be reflected by the mirror, since the spaceship is stationary for him – special relativity!) and the other one outside the spaceship (for whom the light from the lamp will be left behind, due to the speed of the spaceship). Since the result of the reality cannot be different based upon the position of the observers, we reached a contradiction – it is impossible that the spaceship could move faster than the speed of light.

In our current scenario, the “future” has already happened from God’s point of view, but it did not happen from our point of view. But there is only one reality, which is not contingent upon the position of the observer (in the space-time continuum, or in some nebulous eternal, unchanging now). And that is exactly the same kind of contradiction as the “does the light reach the mirror, or does it not” type of problem. The future has already happened, or it has not happened yet. The contradiction is there.

Now, it may very well be the case that this post will be my last one. Not because I wish to withdraw from the conversation, but because I will most probably be banned. My unforgivable “sin” is that I have been banned before and circumvention is another bannable offense. (No forgiveness around here. One strike and you are out. ) The trouble is that my gadget which allowed me to sign on with a dynamic IP address has croaked, and my usual static address is already on file. And this admission does not help me either. But, if we cannot continue, I wish to thank you for the conversation. You are one of the very few partners, with whom it is possible to converse on a rational level. It is not necessary to agree with someone in order to feel respect for them. Cheers, mate!