One might immediately say, "But in the very first line you said “God’s knowledge is dependent on the actual result,” and then you end with saying “God’s knowledge is not dependent on extra-divine things. That’s a contradiction!”
It definitely appears to be a contradiction on the surface, but it’s not. It’s simply a limitation with language. To say something like:
Bagheera;11246320:
I say that God’s knowledge of our actions is **contingent **
upon what we do.
is not very useful in itself. “God’s knowledge of our actions depends on our actions.” That’s like saying “The answer of 4 to the math problem 2 + 2 depends on the sum of 2 + 2.” The answer was 4 before the student adds 2 + 2 together. It was 4, it is 4, and it will always be 4. The reality of 4 being the sum of 2 + 2 did not come into existence when the first rational being figured out how to count and add. To say so is silly, because that would imply that 2 + 2 did not equal 4 until this primal mathematician caused it to be so.
In the same way we can say that God has all knowledge
of extra-divine things. His knowledge is of everything and always has been.
If one insists that God’s knowledge of extra-divine things is dependent on those extra-divine things, because without those extra-divine things He would not have knowledge of them (only knowledge of the possibility of them), then it should be noted that this concept cannot be a source of contradiction for dogma #33. Obviously God cannot have knowledge of extra-divine things if those extra-divine things did not exists. He would have knowledge of their possibility, but not knowledge of their actuality.
But to claim this contradicts dogma #33 is to read something into this dogma that isn’t there. If this is the sense of dependence that dogma #33 was speaking about, then nothing could actually exist. Such an interpretation of this particular dogma only allows for God to have knowledge of possibilities and does not allow anything other than God to actually exist. Obviously the Catholic church does not believe in such an idea, so it can be understood that this is not the correct sense of the dogma. Therefore, dogma #33 is not contradicted.
At this point, I can foresee the objection of “How do you
know what the sense of dependency in dogma #33 is intended to be? Perhaps you are wrong!” Indeed, a perfectly fine objection. The only way to answer it is to study the actual writings where this summarized dogma #33 is taken from. I’ll try to find the actual document(s) that establish(es) this dogma and post what I discover. Just don’t expect it any time soon, because I have kids, work, and tons of reading to do for school, so not very much free time.