What's wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

[Abba]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

 

[tonyrey]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

#2 is a false premise. If the main purpose of life is to determine our own destiny we have to be free to choose what to believe and how to live. Therefore it must be possible to be reasonable and not believe because if the evidence were coercive we would be compelled to believe. In other words we have to be at an epistemic distance from God, i.e. in a state of semi-ignorance.

I’m amazed that a professor of philosophy has overlooked such an elementary point but he is probably not a theologian - and even the most learned person has his blind spots, especially if he has preconceived ideas about religion (which is far from rare in the secular environment of the UK).

I have just discovered he has written:

The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007
The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

His recent published papers and book chapters include:
‘How To Be an Atheist and a Skeptic, Too: Reply to McCreary,’ Religious Studies 46 (2010).
‘Philosophy of Religion: A State of the Subject Report,’ the Canadian Theological Society’s Inaugural Jay Newman Memorial Lecture in Philosophy of Religion, Toronto Journal of Theology 25 (2009), 95-110.
‘Why Am I a Nonbeliever? – I Wonder…’ in Udo Schuklenk and Russell Blackford, eds. 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
‘The Evolutionary Answer to the Problem of Faith and Reason,’ in Jonathan Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009).

Those facts speak for themselves…

http://twitter.com/gotothemount

 

[FidesSpesCarita]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

1: false, there is nothing that says God MUST be all loving and only revelation tells us that He is.

2: reasonable non-belief can occur in any system however rational. Reasoned and logical arguments can be devised to support or undermine anything. Look at the holocaust deniers, sometimes they have sound logical arguments (although easily disproven).

3: true

4: false because of numbers 1 and 2

5: see above.

 

[Perplexity]

I think Schellenberg more than adequately answers these concerns in his book.

 

[ASimon]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

#2 and #3 are the major issues, it seems to me. While I obviously agree that reasonable non-belief does exist, I don’t quite see how that’s the result of God not being all-loving.

For that matter, I don’t see why God must necessarily be all-loving (unless this proof is directed toward the Christan God, in which case, the all-loving bit is presupposed).

 

[icouch]

I would say that, to a certain extent, that makes sense. There are a lot of reasonable arguments out there as to why people are skeptical of religion. Does that mean that you can always tell what’s on a person’s mind, or what’s behind their disbelief?

I know many people who feel morally fulfilled as religious skeptics.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.

While I sort of agree with this premise, it seems odd that an atheist would make this claim. It is a major assumption for an atheist.

1. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.

This is a false assumption, Unless he can provide a rational argument (which I assume he hasn’t) to arrive at the conclusion which this premise states.

1. Reasonable non-belief occurs.

No qualms here.

1. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.

This conclusion assumes premise 2 is true, which he hasn’t proven. So, this is closing in the line of the “fallacy of expediency”. In other words, it aint matter how we get there, only that we get there.

1. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Well, at least, the conclusion follows from the premises. That fact doesn’t make it true though.

It seems odd that an atheist would assume premise one. While may be true, it seems that this professor is only after disproving the Judeo-Christian God. As any atheist would rightly point out, there is belief in many other gods as well. And they would disagree with 1, 2, 4 and/or 5.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

No.

No. It logically proves nothing.

I am glad you caught it.

He makes large intellectual leaps, which are usually either really good or really bad. I will give you two guesses, but you’re only going to need one.

 

[ThereWasADream]

I think Schellenberg more than adequately answers these concerns in his book.

How can he possibly do that? In his #2 he basically commands God to destroy free will or else he will not believe. Lol.

 

[tonyrey]

I think Schellenberg more than adequately answers these concerns in his book.

An unsubstantiated opinion nothing to further the discussion…

 

[tonyrey]

I would say that, to a certain extent, that makes sense. There are a lot of reasonable arguments out there as to why people are skeptical of religion. Does that mean that you can always tell what’s on a person’s mind, or what’s behind their disbelief?

I know many people who feel morally fulfilled as religious skeptics.

“feel” is the key word! It gives them a sense of absolute freedom… although they don’t realise they run the risk of becoming slaves to themselves. Everyone worships something or some one…

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Abba

Herein lies the error.

3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.

This is begging the question. Of course no atheist is going to admit that his belief is not reasonable.

But, using abstract reason, he cannot prove that God does not exist. Atheism therefore is not reasonable in the strict sense of the term. That syllogism certainly is not reasonable.

If one define “reasonable non-belief” as something we can understand, given the circumstances of a person’s upbringing or personal bias, reasonable non-belief could be admitted. That is, the person has “reasoned” himself into non-belief for any number of subjective reasons. But as the Psalms says, he fools only himself, no one else.

 

[Perplexity]

I’m going to try and defend Schellenberg’s argument from some objections I’ve seen on this thread. My citations will be from his book.

Let’s start with premise 1:

1. If God exists, then God is perfectly loving.

FideSpesCarita objects to (1) as follows:

“1: false, there is nothing that says God MUST be all loving and only revelation tells us that He is.”

Schellenberg argues that because God is unsurpassably great, he must possess those properties which if he failed to possess them, God would not being unsurpassably great. So, perhaps we can formalize the following argument whose conclusion is (1).

1’. If God exists, then God is unsurpassably great.
2’. If God is unsurpassably great, then God is perfectly loving.
3’. Therefore, if God exists, then God is perfectly loving.

Moving on to premise 2:

2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then reasonable non-belief does not occur.

Here, we find several objections and I’ll try to take each in its turn.

The first objection to (2) comes from tonyrey:

#2 is a false premise. If the main purpose of life is to determine our own destiny we have to be free to choose what to believe and how to live. Therefore it must be possible to be reasonable and not believe because if the evidence were coercive we would be compelled to believe.

I could rebut this objection by either saying the main purpose in life isn’t to determine your own destiny in the way described, or by saying (2) isn’t incompatible with the purpose of life being what tonyrey described it as.

Let’s get clearer on what reasonable non-belief is first, I think this will help with all the responses to (2) actually.

“S is inculpably in doubt about the truth of G if (1) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and not-G, and (2) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self deceptively) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.” - p. 64.

This is what Schellenberg means by ‘reasonable non-belief.’

Having cleared that up, I’ll offer two responses to tonyrey:

1. An all loving God wouldn’t make the main purpose in life such that it involves the real possibility of reasonable non-belief. Therefore, if the purpose of life does involve potential reasonable non-belief, then this is reason to doubt God’s existence.

The idea here is that if God loved his human creations, he’d desire to enter into an explicit relationship with them. This is a necessary condition of love. Further, if the humans were in a position to enter into such a relationship and didn’t neglect God, then they would be in such a relationship. But, you can’t be in an explicit loving relationship with someone you don’t even believe exists. Therefore, if God loved his human creations, they’d all either be in a loving relation with him or culpably not be. There would be no inculpable non-belief.

1. This doesn’t mean humans wouldn’t be free to determine their own destiny. They could still reject God. This is because a relation with God is essentially developmental. The belief in God’s existence every human would have would be at least the weakest possible. Therefore, it could be overruled by things like deception, or the problem of evil etc. (depending on what else you think). This in no way would stunt free-will. In fact, one of Schellenberg’s assumptions is libertarian free-will.

The other objectors to (2) were Gregg and ASimon. But, Gregg thinks (2) is an assumption when it’s a premise and only says it’s false without explaining why so I won’t respond to that. ASimon wondered why reasonable non-belief means God isn’t all loving. I think my above explication responds to that as well.

Finally, 3:

3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.

Charlegmange II is the main objector here. But, given the clarification of what Schellenberg means by reasonable non-belief, I don’t think his objections apply anymore. There certainly are individuals which mean the description.

“Perhaps the majority of theologians would go father still and allow that inculpable disbelief occurs. Take, for example, the view of theologians at Vatican II, as reported by Karl Rahner: “The council makes no reference to the traditional textbook view that positive atheism cannot be entertained for any considerable period of time by a fully developed person of normal intelligence without involving blame on his part. The Council actually* assumed a contrary thesis*, i.e. that it is possible for a normal adult to hold an explicit atheism for a long period of time-even to his life’s end-without this implying moral blame on the part of such an unbeliever.”” - p. 69.

 

[FightingFat]

You might find this useful, interesting and relevant!

youtube.com/watch?v=e-XWgp2Xxcg&feature=related

 

[Perplexity]

Here’s another point to chew on:

Don’t respond to this argument by appealing to a specific form of theism. That is, don’t try and use Christian theology to rebut this argument. This is because if you leave bare theism unguarded, this argument will pull the rug out from under your specific theism’s feet.

Let me explain. A core belief of Christianity is theism. Theism is not the same thing as Christianity, it is a common component of Judaism and Islam. If you cannot establish that God even exists, you certainly can’t establish that he raised Jesus from the dead (etc.). Therefore, if bare-theism has no defense against this argument, then all specific theism’s get sharply undermined.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m going to try and defend Schellenberg’s argument from some objections I’ve seen on this thread. My citations will be from his book…

Moving on to premise 2:

2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then reasonable non-belief does not occur.

The first objection to (2) comes from tonyrey:

I could rebut this objection by either saying the main purpose in life isn’t to determine your own destiny in the way described, or by saying (2) isn’t incompatible with the purpose of life being what tonyrey described it as.

Your objections are arbitrary unless you give a reason why my view of the purpose of life is false.

Let’s get clearer on what reasonable non-belief is first, I think this will help with all the responses to (2) actually.

“S is inculpably in **doubt **about the truth of G if (1) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and not-G, and (2) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self deceptively) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.” - p. 64.

This is what Schellenberg means by ‘reasonable non-belief.’

The key word is “doubt” - which is not equivalent to disbelief.

1. An all loving God wouldn’t make the main purpose in life such that it involves the real possibility of reasonable non-belief. Therefore, if the purpose of life does involve potential reasonable non-belief, then this is reason to doubt God’s existence.

Why not?

The idea here is that if God loved his human creations, he’d desire to enter into an explicit relationship with them. This is a necessary condition of love. Further, if the humans were in a position to enter into such a relationship and didn’t neglect God, then they would be in such a relationship. But, you can’t be in an explicit loving relationship with someone you don’t even believe exists. Therefore, if God loved his human creations, they’d all either be in a loving relation with him or culpably not be. There would be no inculpable non-belief.

1. This doesn’t mean humans wouldn’t be free to determine their own destiny. They could still reject God. This is because a relation with God is essentially developmental. The belief in God’s existence every human would have would be at least the weakest possible. Therefore, it could be overruled by things like deception, or the problem of evil etc. (depending on what else you think). This in no way would stunt free-will. In fact, one of Schellenberg’s assumptions is libertarian free-will.

I refute both of those objections after your next point.

3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.

Charlegmange II is the main objector here.

I enjoyed your typo - although I’m not sure whether Charleg has found a tasty morsel - perhaps a variety of blancmange - or whether he is the tasty morsel!

But, given the clarification of what Schellenberg means by reasonable non-belief, I don’t think his objections apply anymore. There certainly are individuals which mean the description.

“Perhaps the majority of theologians would go father still and allow that inculpable disbelief occurs. Take, for example, the view of theologians at Vatican II, as reported by Karl Rahner: “The council makes no reference to the traditional textbook view that positive atheism cannot be entertained for any considerable period of time by a fully developed person of normal intelligence without involving blame on his part. The Council actually* assumed a contrary thesis*, i.e. that it is possible for a normal adult to hold an explicit atheism for a long period of time-even to his life’s end-without this implying moral blame on the part of such an unbeliever.”” - p. 69.

I agree with the Council because normal adults are not infallible nor does God expect them to be infallible given their inevitable limitations of intelligence and knowledge. If you are born into a secular society dominated at every turn by pseudoscientific propaganda that we are “sparks in the dark” the odds against you believing in God are overwhelming. You can certainly be an inveterate atheist until your very last breath on this earth…

But that does not dispose of your opportunity for a loving relationship with God…

Why not?

Because you are not “a spark in the dark”.

Death is not the end of your existence…

 

[tonyrey]

Here’s another point to chew on:

Don’t respond to this argument by appealing to a specific form of theism. That is, don’t try and use Christian theology to rebut this argument. This is because if you leave bare theism unguarded, this argument will pull the rug out from under your specific theism’s feet.

Let me explain. A core belief of Christianity is theism. Theism is not the same thing as Christianity, it is a common component of Judaism and Islam. If you cannot establish that God even exists, you certainly can’t establish that he raised Jesus from the dead (etc.). Therefore, if bare-theism has no defense against this argument, then all specific theism’s get sharply undermined.

Another point for you to chew on - but you may find it indigestible (!) :

Schellenberg’s argument is specifically directed at the Christian belief in a loving God:

“If God **loved **his human creations, he’d desire to enter into an explicit relationship with them. This is a necessary condition of love.”

The loving Father certainly hasn’t created “sparks in the dark”…

 

[Perplexity]

tonyrey:

Correct me if I’m wrong, but you’re response is that (2) is still false because as long as reasonable non-belief doesn’t “dispose of your opportunity for a loving relationship with God”, then reasonable non-belief isn’t reason to think a loving God doesn’t exist?

“(4) A further misunderstanding that readers should beware of involves conflating what my argument claims-that if God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur-with “If God exists, reasonable nonbelievers receive evidence sufficient for belief.” What the former claim says is that if God exists, there is never a time when someone inculpably fails to believe (belief is made available as soon as there is a capacity for relationship with God). In other words, if there is a God, there are no reasonable nonbelievers about who may be treated in the imagined fashion. So it is no use showing that God would not interrupt the lives of reasonable nonbelievers with evidence; what we need is a way of understanding how God could have permitted them to become reasonable nonbelievers in the first place.” - p. ix.

Also, Schellenberg explicitly says he’s focused on theism’s God. This is why Paul Moser’s replies to Schellenberg are strange…it doesn’t matter if the Christian God would ‘hide’ etc. if the bare theistic deity falls prey to this argument, there’s no point in appealing to a Christian God.

 

[ThereWasADream]

An all loving God wouldn’t make the main purpose in life such that it involves the real possibility of reasonable non-belief. Therefore, if the purpose of life does involve potential reasonable non-belief, then this is reason to doubt God’s existence…

Along with tonyrey’s question, I’d like you to define love.

For people who don’t believe in God, you non-theists sure seem to make a lot of demands about what God should and shouldn’t do or should and shouldn’t be.

 

[Perplexity]

Along with tonyrey’s question, I’d like you to define love.

For people who don’t believe in God, you non-theists sure seem to make a lot of demands about what God should and shouldn’t do or should and shouldn’t be.

I couldn’t do Schellenberg’s analysis of love justice. I recommend buying the book, he spends pages citing theologians, and offering insightful considerations on what love is. I don’t think it’s fair to critique an argument you’ve not spent adequate time reflecting on. There is a massive literature out on the topic of Divine Hiddenness, all sorts of objections and responses have been published. For now, let me cite Schellenberg on this:

“A basic point to remember is that the central notion of “reasonable nonbelief” emerges from reflection on Divine love. I do not start with reasonable nonbelief as philosophers might ordinarily think of it, arguing that such exists but would not exist if there were a God. Rather, I begin with reflection on Divine love and allow the problematic phenomena to receive its shape therefrom, as I work out what hiddenness-related facts would be absent from the world if such love were present in it.”

It’s his reflection on love that I’d have to explain if I were to tell you what love means here. There’s simply too much to summarize, I’d essentially be copying and pasting the book itself. So, again I recommend reading it, it’s been called one of the most important developments in philosophy of religion for years, and has generated an extensive discussion.

 

[empther]

1. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.

“There’s nothing so ridiculous it can’t be found in the books of philosophers.” --Marcus Tullius Cicero

We don’t need to read a book. We don’t need to look at Perplexity’s reams and reams of meaningless bluster.

Statement (2) is so obviously false and blatantly misleading no discussion is needed.
It’s wrong. Period.