I’m not sure about this. Around 1971, there was a civil
war between East and West Pakistan resulting in East Pakistan breaking off and forming Bangladesh. CBS News correspondent Hughes Rudd said he couldn’t understand why starving people would spend money on war instead of food. His only conclusion was “people are just no damned good.”
In any event, I don’t know what data you have, but this researcher
hawaii.edu/powerkills/ attributes the world’s violence to power.
As a side note, see also
hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM.
A book on criminal violence:
“Why They Kill” by Richard Rhodes.
Rhodes reviews the research of criminologist, Lonnie Athens, and his theory of “Violentization” that basically explains the 4 environmental factors that Athens believes are important in the development of violent criminals.
A book on war psychology called: “The Psychology of War” by LeShan reviews some of the difficulty that armies have had in training people to kill. One example is his discussion of Civil War battles where it was found that many fallen soldiers refused to fire their weapons, and even double and triple loaded their rifles, rendering the rifle useless. Essentially, many soldiers chose to disarm and die, rather than kill.
Thus, the weight of the literature that I have read suggests that when individuals become violent, it is because of the environment, or specific training.
However, interstate war is discussed in a different academic arena from criminal violence, and the cause of interstate war is unknown. There are several theories that are based on nations behaving rationally, and acting in their own self interest.
Power is a factor in that a couple theories of war causation, and suggest that war is more likely during a transition of power – either away from a “balance of power”, or away from “hegemonic stability” where one powerful nation “keeps the peace”.
One particular discussion of interstate war that is intriguing, but receives only limited attention in the foreign policy arena, is the statistical parameters that seem to govern interstate war casualties. The distribution is called a power law distribution and it basically means that war casualties and war frequency have an inverse relationship such that a logarithmic plot of war casualties vs frequency is a straight line. This distribution has held for interstate wars studied for several hundred years.
This implies that war is not some “random event” but may have an underlying unknown cause behind it. It also implies that periods of “relative peace” are likely to be followed by periods of intense warfare, at least until the cause of the distribution is understood and defused.
For example the two most commonly discussed power law systems in nature include earthquakes and forest fires. In each of these systems, a fueling factor (fuel in the forest or tension in the Earth’s crust) builds up over time and is released in “cascades”.
A review of the literature on power law distributions and interstate war:
www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/LarsErikCederman.ModelingSizeOfWars.pdf
Thus, if there is some unknown “fuel” that builds up over time and explodes into a war, the identity of the fuel is unknown. If there is a cure that would act like an “antibiotic”, the identity of the cure is unknown.
Cederman speculates on the identity of the “cause of war” as “technology”. He does not guess at any sort of cure.