Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[Betterave]

“Is” is peforming the role of predicating a property of an object. But I am doing the positing of the existence of that object by predicating a property to it. This is precisely why the judgment “Obama exists” would be trivially true for Kant.

“Obama exists” would be trivially true for Kant??? Anyway, you seem to agree that “is” has a predicative role here, but that YOU are doing the POSITING must obviously be understood in the context of *the world *that is the a posteriori condition of your positing. You are only positing insofar as the world shows (or presents/has presented) itself to you as something that you *can *posit (or re-present).

Absolutely. They are different notions. But I wouldn’t be predicating without also positing that that object exists about which I pass a judgment. This is exactly the whole point of my entire discussion!

Therefore, “existence” is implicitly univocal every time I make a judgment whether about Hamlet or Obama. So there is nothing informative about “existence” at all.

??? I don’t follow your reasoning.

Kant reserves to the reader the right to understand an author better than that author understood himself. I therefore feel free to take liberties with Kant’s own interpretation of Erfahrung so as to understand die Sache selbst, the subject at hand.

I read the central Kantian idea of a thing that possibly exists as being a thing that is the possible object of an Experience (Erfahrung), not just an Erlebnis (a kind of isolated experience that is not conceptually integrated into our complete view of the world by our faculty of understanding). I think that **literary experience **is a genuinely possible kind of Erfahrung. It is not at all the same as speaking about “nothing,” i.e., that which does not exist simpliciter. The concept of a possible King of Denmark or a literary King of Denmark contains no more nor less than that of an actual King of Denmark, but literary positing and the a posteriori grasping of the positing is one *way *of positing an object (Gegenstand) in itself - it is not a merely possible (“purely conceptual”) mode of existence. That is why true and false things may be said about Hamlet, no less than about Obama.

Kant, Akademieausgabe III, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft *… , Seite 402:

“Denn durch den Begriff wird der Gegenstand nur mit den allgemeinen Bedingungen einer möglichen empirischen Erkenntniß überhaupt als einstimmig, durch die Existenz aber als in dem Context der gesammten Erfahrung enthalten gedacht.”
(For through the concept, the object only comes to be in agreement with the general conditions of a possible empirical piece-of-knowledge in general; but through Existence, it comes to be thought as included in the context of the totality of Experience.)

As Hegel points out, being is not not-being. I don’t know if it will make a difference to you, but maybe it helps to think about the possibility of there being different ways of emerging from nothingness. We can conceive these different ways as a *result *of different things having different natures, but I don’t see how that gets us anywhere. Why should ‘having a nature’ be more primitive than ‘existing’ or ‘emerging from nothingness’? Anyway, according to Aristotle (Met. Bk.VII), isn’t it fair to say that ‘nature’ or ti estin just is what we *primarily *refer to when we talk about being (to on, ousia)? So how is talk about different natures different from talk about different ways of existing?

 

[Syntax]

“Obama exists” would be trivially true for Kant???

Yes! Because “Obama exists” is **NOT **a **well-formed judgment **for Kant!

I am really trying to stress the fact that Kant’s Theory of Judgment is central to Kant’s whole philosophical enterprise. Please see “Kan’ts Theory of Judgment” by Bob Hanna in Stanford. Hanna was my Critique of Pure Reason Kant professor last semester, and he is one of the foremost scholars on Kant’s Critique.

Anyway, you seem to agree that “is” has a predicative role here, but that YOU are doing the POSITING must obviously be understood in the context of *the world *that is the a posteriori condition of your positing. You are only positing insofar as the world shows (or presents/has presented) itself to you as something that you *can *posit (or re-present).

That sounds right. I don’t understand how that might be an objection to my view, though.

??? I don’t follow your reasoning.

Kant reserves to the reader the right to understand an author better than that author understood himself. I therefore feel free to take liberties with Kant’s own interpretation of Erfahrung so as to understand die Sache selbst, the subject at hand.

Ok, now we are getting into the differences between scholarly “Kantian” interpretations of Kant, and Kant’s own convoluted writing. Again, I would strongly suggest reading “Kan’t Theory of Judgment” by Robert Hanna in the Stanford. You should find Hanna’s entry very illuminating.

I read the central Kantian idea of a thing that possibly exists as being a thing that is the possible object of an Experience (Erfahrung), not just an Erlebnis (a kind of isolated experience that is not conceptually integrated into our complete view of the world by our faculty of understanding).

My german is not up to par like it should be. I understand “Erfahrung.” But can you illuminate further what “Erlebnis” is supposed to mean in the context of Kant’s theory of judgment, and what role that plays, if any? Are you talking about the non-conceptual/non-judgmental positing of the “thing-in-itself” apart from judgments of possible objects of experience? If you are, Kant says this is humanly and metaphysically impossible–and is a Dialectical Illusion.

I think that **literary experience **is a genuinely possible kind of Erfahrung.

When talking about fictional/literary entities as “possible objects of experience,” which I agree is a correct intepretation of Kant, it still seems quite speculative to say Kant actually thought Hamlet exists. If Kant did think Hamlet exists, then judgments made about him would be truth-valuable. If Kant did not think Hamlet exists, then judgments made about Hamlet would be truth-valueless. I’m quite sure Kant would find nothing problematic about our positing objects of possible of experience that don’t actually exist.

Like I continue to say, the disagreement between you and I comes down to merely **what it is **that exists. If Kant himself actually thought Hamlet himself exists as a possible object of experience, for which true and false judgments can be made, then that’s fine. But this still doesn’t affect his theory of judgment at all because existence is not a predicate.

I am merely contending, in spite of whatever Kant said, that Hamlet does NOT exist and that this has NO affect on a Kant’s Theory of Judgment or is inconsistent with his theory in any way–but is actually quite in tune with it.

I would surmise that Kant would say fictional entities are purportedly possible objects of experience, but there is a very good chance they don’t exist since it is obvious our very own intentional acts of purporting doesn’t make them exist.

It is not at all the same as speaking about “nothing,” i.e., that which does not exist simpliciter. The concept of a possible King of Denmark or a literary King of Denmark contains no more nor less than an actual King of Denmark, but literary positing and the a posteriori grasping of the positing is one way of posting an object (Gegenstand) in itself - it is not a merely possible (“purely conceptual”) mode of existence. That is why true and false things may be said about Hamlet.

I am not sure what Kant would say about fictional entities, so I think this is pretty much speculation at this point. Can you find where he talks about fictional entities perhaps? This would be great if we could find such a passage!

As Hegel tells us, being is not not-being. I don’t know if it will make a difference to you, but maybe it helps to think about the possibility of there being different ways of emerging from nothingness. We can conceive these different ways as a *result *of different things having different natures, but I don’t see how that gets us anywhere. Why should ‘having a nature’ be more primitive than ‘existing’ or ‘emerging from nothingness’?

You completely lost me. I don’t know what “emerging from nothingness” is suppose to mean other than perhaps “God’s creating X ex nihilo.” I never said “having an nature is more primitive than existing or emerging from nothingness.” I don’t know what that means either. “More primitive”?

Anyway, according to Aristotle (Met. Bk.VII), isn’t it fair to say that ‘nature’ or ti estin just is what we *primarily *refer to when we talk about being (to on, ousia)? So how is talk about different natures different from talk about different ways of existing?

Like I said, I strongly believe there are different ways of possessing a property, but there are not different ways of existing.

 

[Syntax]

“Obama exists” would be trivially true for Kant???

Yes! Because “Obama exists” is **NOT **a **well-formed judgment **for Kant! It is a malformed way of speaking if we intend it to mean or say anything.

I am really trying to stress the fact that Kant’s Theory of Judgment is central to Kant’s whole philosophical enterprise. Please see “Kant’s Theory of Judgment” by Bob Hanna in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hanna was my Critique of Pure Reason Kant professor last semester, and he is one of the foremost scholars on Kant’s Critique.

Anyway, you seem to agree that “is” has a predicative role here, but that YOU are doing the POSITING must obviously be understood in the context of *the world *that is the a posteriori condition of your positing. You are only positing insofar as the world shows (or presents/has presented) itself to you as something that you *can *posit (or re-present).

That sounds right. I don’t understand how that might be an objection to my view, though.

??? I don’t follow your reasoning.

Kant reserves to the reader the right to understand an author better than that author understood himself. I therefore feel free to take liberties with Kant’s own interpretation of Erfahrung so as to understand die Sache selbst, the subject at hand.

Ok, now we are getting into the differences between scholarly “Kantian” interpretations of Kant, and Kant’s own convoluted writing. Again, I would strongly suggest reading “Kan’t Theory of Judgment” by Robert Hanna in Stanford. You should find Hanna’s entry very illuminating.

I read the central Kantian idea of a thing that possibly exists as being a thing that is the possible object of an Experience (Erfahrung), not just an Erlebnis (a kind of isolated experience that is not conceptually integrated into our complete view of the world by our faculty of understanding).

My german is not up to par like it should be. I understand “Erfahrung.” But can you illuminate further what “Erlebnis” is supposed to mean in the context of Kant’s theory of judgment, and what role that plays, if any? Are you talking about the non-conceptual/non-judgmental positing of the “thing-in-itself” apart from judgments of possible objects of sense-experience? If you are, Kant says this is humanly and metaphysically impossible–and is a Dialectical Illusion.

Please understand that the positing of objects of possible experience for Kant means the positing of objects of possible sense-experience. This is why Kant thought metaphysics was a doomed enterprise from the start: metaphysics posits the existence of entities outside the domain of possible sense-experience. And, insofar as we know, fictional entities are not actual objects of sense-experience. Instead, they are metaphysical constructs. Therefore, fictional entities are not actual possible objects of sense-experience. They might perhaps be **logical possible **objects of sense-experience for Kant. But I would not presume to know unless I could find an actual passage from him. I would suggest that you be careful not to say anything about Kant, either, until we can find a passage about fictional entities

Actually, this is a good question. I am going to email Hanna about this and see what he thinks.

I think that **literary experience **is a genuinely possible kind of Erfahrung.

I am pretty sure Kant would disagree. He would accuse you of performing a Dialectical Error. All truth-valuable judgments can only be made within the bounds of sense-experience, not beyond that domain. (FYI, this is where I part with Kant, however. I believe metaphysics is possible.)

It is not at all the same as speaking about “nothing,” i.e., that which does not exist simpliciter. The concept of a possible King of Denmark or a literary King of Denmark contains no more nor less than an actual King of Denmark, but literary positing and the a posteriori grasping of the positing is one way of posting an object (Gegenstand) in itself - it is not a merely possible (“purely conceptual”) mode of existence. That is why true and false things may be said about Hamlet.

I am not sure what Kant would say about the alleged existence of fictional entities, so I think this is pretty much speculation at this point. Can you find where he talks about fictional entities perhaps? This would be great if we could find such a passage!

As Hegel tells us, being is not not-being. I don’t know if it will make a difference to you, but maybe it helps to think about the possibility of there being different ways of emerging from nothingness. We can conceive these different ways as a *result *of different things having different natures, but I don’t see how that gets us anywhere. Why should ‘having a nature’ be more primitive than ‘existing’ or ‘emerging from nothingness’?

You completely lost me. I don’t know what “emerging from nothingness” is suppose to mean other than perhaps “God’s creating X ex nihilo.” I never said “having an nature is more primitive than existing or emerging from nothingness.” I don’t know what that means either. “More primitive”?

Anyway, according to Aristotle (Met. Bk.VII), isn’t it fair to say that ‘nature’ or ti estin just is what we *primarily *refer to when we talk about being (to on, ousia)? So how is talk about different natures different from talk about different ways of existing?

Like I said, I strongly believe there are different ways of possessing a property, but there are not different ways of existing.

 

[Betterave]

Well I’m neither a Kant scholar, nor particularly interested in following Kant in all of his particular judgments. (I’m pretty sure nobody is!) That’s why I added my little caveat: I wasn’t intending to represent Kant’s own views in my comments on literary reality, but I’m trying to give an interpretation that does justice to reality, and that does not conflict with the ‘spirit’ of Kant’s philosophy (at least one reading of it), once we get beyond certain parochial hangups Kant may have had. In general, though, Kant scholarship contains some pretty big differences of opinion, from what I understand. Some writers definitely believe Kant’s practical philosophy is the core of his system, others completely reject that idea, insisting that it’s all about the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, I’ll read your profs article and get back to you.

 

[Syntax]

Some writers definitely believe Kant’s practical philosophy is the core of his system, others completely reject that idea, insisting that it’s all about the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, I’ll read your profs article and get back to you.

Yeah, I hear ya. Kant’s practical philosophy goes way beyond his repeated prescriptions that we ought not to be talking about the thing-in-itself in the Critique.

Be forewarned that Stanford entry can be kind of dense. Nevertheless, I find it very explicitly articulated.

I am curious about this fictional entity stuff, though. And to tell you the truth, I am working on some recent philosophy of language ideas that might actually lead me to believe fictional entities exist. But they would have to have a robust existence just like other linguistic entities such as concepts and propositions if “existence” is univocal. I simply have the hardest time letting go of the idea of existence being univocal for logical reasons. Such a notion turns so many other philosophical ideas upside down!!

This has been a really intersting and challenging discussion. And just so you know, I always take my ideas to be nothing but a work in progress…