Whether all knowledge is absolutely certain knowledge?

[Birdmanman]

It would seem that all knowledge, legitimately so called, is absolutely certain knowledge:

1. Knowledge is (a.) true (b.) belief that is (c.) sufficiently justified (Definition of knowledge)
2. Absolute Certainty (or an absolutely certain belief), means that a belief cannot possibly be false. (Definitional)
3. What is true cannot be actually shown to be false and is not actually false. (Self-evident)
4. A belief which cannot be shown to be false and is not actually false is absolutely certain. (From 2. and 3.)
5. All knowledge, as properly defined in 1. (satisfying conditions a,b, and c), is absolutely certain. (From 1., 3., and 4.)

Thus, there is no probable knowledge, but only probable belief.

Does anyone have any objections? I would love to learn more or be corrected on this matter.

 

[meltzerboy]

It would seem that all knowledge, legitimately so called, is absolutely certain knowledge:

1. Knowledge is (a.) true (b.) belief that is (c.) sufficiently justified (Definition of knowledge)
2. Absolute Certainty (or an absolutely certain belief), means that a belief cannot possibly be false. (Definitional)
3. What is true cannot be actually shown to be false and is not actually false. (Self-evident)
4. A belief which cannot be shown to be false and is not actually false is absolutely certain. (From 2. and 3.)
5. All knowledge, as properly defined in 1. (satisfying conditions a,b, and c), is absolutely certain. (From 1., 3., and 4.)

Thus, there is no probable knowledge, but only probable belief.

Does anyone have any objections? I would love to learn more or be corrected on this matter.

I would contend just the opposite: that all knowledge is UNCERTAIN, whether in science, religion, philosophy, the arts, and so on. Since knowledge is filtered and interpreted by means of the human (or non-human) mind of the thinker and observer within a temporally and spatially constrained socio-cultural environment and context, it has been and is subject to revision, change, and re-interpretation. Philosophically speaking, I suppose, even such a statement is uncertain and thus we have a logical conundrum, if logic is even or always applicable to attaining knowledge. The best we can probably do is strong belief based on reason and evidence, which we may understand to be knowledge or certainty for the time being.

 

[Daniel_Lysinger]

That’s completely crazy. If all knowledge is uncertain, then how come we are supposed to believe that that piece of your knowledge is absolutely certain? What, all knowledge BUT this knowledge (that all knowledge is uncertain) is uncertain? PLEASE.

 

[meltzerboy]

That’s completely crazy. If all knowledge is uncertain, then how come we are supposed to believe that that piece of your knowledge is absolutely certain? What, all knowledge BUT this knowledge (that all knowledge is uncertain) is uncertain? PLEASE.

I included that possibility, based on the uncertainty of logic, in my post.

 

[Daniel_Lysinger]

Ah I see it now, apologies for not reading the rest. Still, I see that approach is illogical.

 

[meltzerboy]

Ah I see it now, apologies for not reading the rest. Still, I see that approach is illogical.

Admittedly, I don’t think complete skepticism regarding knowledge is an approach toward life that is functional, let alone able to provide a sense of well-being. That’s why we must make certain assumptions and have certain beliefs, still subject to change, however.

 

[WillYart]

With reference to your question, I find section 2.4, Degree of Belief, helpful, in this article:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/#2.4

Perhaps one may possess knowledge whose belief component is fractional (i.e. a probability between 0 and 1).

 

[Ruthie_again]

No, you have not proven your proposition.

1. Knowledge is (a.) true (b.) belief that is (c.) sufficiently justified (Definition of knowledge)

This definition is wrong; we can have a belief that is sufficiently justified, but isn’t true. (See Merriam-Webster’s definition.) For example, I have sufficient justification (based on the observations I have made) to believe the sun orbits the earth. The only reason I don’t believe that is that I am willing to trust others, who have methods I don’t have.

1. Absolute Certainty (or an absolutely certain belief), means that a belief cannot possibly be false.

This definition is also wrong. I am absolutely certain that my husband and I will never divorce. Could that possibly be false?

1. What is true cannot be actually shown to be false and is not actually false. (Self-evident)

Close. I would have used “absolutely true” instead of “true.”

1. A belief which cannot be shown to be false and is not actually false is absolutely certain.

See my comment on #2.

1. All knowledge, as properly defined in 1. (satisfying conditions a,b, and c), is absolutely certain. (From 1., 3., and 4.)

Wrong, because #1 and #4 are wrong.

Thus, there is knowledge which is probable, and your argument fails.

 

[WillYart]

Birdmanman, I want to agree, but when I stop and consider that if one’s belief is fractional the knowledge does not seem so pure and unadulterated as might be desired.

Given entities I and II, proposition P, justifications Ji and Jii (there is no need to enforce uniqueness of the justification, although we are not excluding the possibility that Ji=Jii) and belief levels Bi and Bii, I’s and II’s knowledge vis-à-vis P, Ik and IIk, might be written, given that T(P) = True (otherwise Ik and IIk are not knowledge):

Ik = (Ji, T(P), Bi)
IIk = (Jii, T(P), Bii)

So if Bi = 1 but Bii = 0.5, then Ik is not equal to IIk (I’s and II’s knowledge are not equivalent). In fact… when expressed this way it seems that Ji not equal to Jii has the same effect!

 

[Birdmanman]

Birdmanman, I want to agree, but when I stop and consider that if one’s belief is fractional the knowledge does not seem so pure and unadulterated as might be desired.

Given entities I and II, proposition P, justifications Ji and Jii (there is no need to enforce uniqueness of the justification, although we are not excluding the possibility that Ji=Jii) and belief levels Bi and Bii, I’s and II’s knowledge vis-à-vis P, Ik and IIk, might be written, given that T(P) = True (otherwise Ik and IIk are not knowledge):

Ik = (Ji, T(P), Bi)
IIk = (Jii, T(P), Bii)

So if Bi = 1 but Bii = 0.5, then Ik is not equal to IIk (I’s and II’s knowledge are not equivalent). In fact… when expressed this way it seems that Ji not equal to Jii has the same effect!

Hi WillYart, thanks for your responses!
I think my original post was misleading…I did not mean to claim that all knowledge is had with absolute certitude, but that all propositions known were absolutely certain. I should not have employed the word “certainty” in that unclear way. We can see here that newadvent.org/cathen/03539b.htm I should probably more properly say "all knowledge has absolute, objective certitude, rather than subjective certitude.

I would say that the level of belief (Bi and Bii) corresponds to subjective certitude (or what Newman would just call “certitude”), where this kind of certitude is had when Bi = 1.
I would say further that the truth of the proposition T(P) does not admit to degrees like the level of belief does, and so is either not certain (has no objective certitude) and thus untrue (and therefore does not really admit to knowledge), or is true (and so admits to knowledge) and therefore has objective certitude (what Newman would simply call “certainty”).

So, if by absolute certainty, I mean “the proposition believed has total security from error” (taking one part of Wikipedia’s definition of certainty), then do you think that my statement “that all knowledge is absolutely certain” is accurate? That is, once something is known, and not simply believed, then it follows that the proposition is, in reality, true. But a true proposition is not false, and cannot be shown to be false, at least at the instant that it is true; so if the true proposition has total security from error, likewise knowledge (properly so called) has total security from error, since it cannot be false. Anything else which would admit to error would be belief, even justified belief, but not knowledge.

I guess a way I can state this far more simply is by asking “Whether false knowledge is not knowledge”? To which I respond yes, it is not knowledge, if knowledge entails the truth of the proposition believed.

 

[Birdmanman]

No, you have not proven your proposition.

Thanks for your response Ruthie! I was looking for criticism

This definition is wrong; we can have a belief that is sufficiently justified, but isn’t true. For example, I have sufficient justification (based on the observations I have made) to believe the sun orbits the earth. The only reason I don’t believe that is that I am willing to trust others, who have methods I don’t have.

I think this can be resolved by me identifying which definition of knowledge I am using, which is the classical definition by Plato (Knowledge is justified, true, belief). I can rephrase my question to “whether all propositional knowledge, according to Plato’s definition, is absolutely certain?”

This definition is also wrong. I am absolutely certain that my husband and I will never divorce. Could that possibly be false?

I think this deals with my misleading use of the word “certainty”. If you look at my recent response post to WillYart, I hope you will see what I mean. The ‘knowledge’ you have that your husband and you will never divorce is certitude, or “subjective certitude”, you have 100% belief that your husband and you will never divorce. What I am discussing is what I (and I guess Newman) call certainty, or “objective certitude”; this means that the proposition itself could not possibly be false, it is certain, but the person believing it may or may not be certain. If the future is known by God, and the truth of the future is set, then it is either true or false that you and your husband and you will divorce in the future. If it is true, then what is true is not false, and your subjective certitude is not real knowledge (since truth is required for this definition of knowledge), but merely justified belief. If it is false, then your subjective certitude meets an objective certitude, and your belief is legitimately called knowledge.

Close. I would have used “absolutely true” instead of “true.”

What is true, at the moment it is true, is not false, and is not possibly false (at least at that moment). What is absolutely true is not possibly false. I agree that, to be clearer, I may want to use “absolutely true”, and I hope you will assume I mean “absolutely true” here, but I think it is debatable whether a properly detailed true proposition can ever become false. (That is, whether all truth is absolute truth).

Thanks again!

 

[Birdmanman]

I would contend just the opposite: that all knowledge is UNCERTAIN, whether in science, religion, philosophy, the arts, and so on. Since knowledge is filtered and interpreted by means of the human (or non-human) mind of the thinker and observer within a temporally and spatially constrained socio-cultural environment and context, it has been and is subject to revision, change, and re-interpretation. Philosophically speaking, I suppose, even such a statement is uncertain and thus we have a logical conundrum, if logic is even or always applicable to attaining knowledge. The best we can probably do is strong belief based on reason and evidence, which we may understand to be knowledge or certainty for the time being.

Thanks for responding, meltzerboy. I hope you see from my other responses that when I say certain, I do not mean that the person believing it is necessarily certain (they may not have certitude), but I mean that the proposition, or thing being believed, is certain in itself (though the person believing it may not be certain) and true.

Do you think that what is true is certainly true (that is, not possibly false), at least at the instant it is true? If this is so, and you justifiably believe that thing, at that moment, then, according to my definition of knowledge (and Plato’s and others) and my use of “certain” (and Cardinal Newman’s), you have knowledge that is certain, but you may not have certitude of your certain knowledge. I hope that helps to clarify things a bit?

 

[Mount_Carmel]

Birdmanman - Your model/example while certainly percieved still cannot be ‘certain’ knowledge - all percieved knowledge, much as is the case with percieved truth, contains uncertainty - this uncertainty bound up in the fallible nature of our humanity - that is why we believe and why science needs constant testing and updating/revising. -Although there are certain items of knowledge such as 2+2 = 4 seeming to be a known constants.

ps. Here is a thought:

60 seconds = 1 minute, 60 minutes = 1 hour, etc… And yet since ‘now’ is an infinitely small phenomenon of time, it must take an infinite number of ‘nows’ to make up one second and also to make up one minute - so why do they appear of different value, and indeed why/how can these ‘times’ ever be traversed from one side to the other, given the infinite number of ‘now’ moments required? “Curiouser and curiouser”, said Alice.

 

[Birdmanman]

Birdmanman - Your model/example while certainly percieved still cannot be ‘certain’ knowledge - all percieved knowledge, much as is the case with percieved truth, contains uncertainty - this uncertainty bound up in the fallible nature of our humanity - that is why we believe and why science needs constant testing and updating/revising. -Although there are certain items of knowledge such as 2+2 = 4 seeming to be a known constants.

ps. Here is a thought:

60 seconds = 1 minute, 60 minutes = 1 hour, etc… And yet since ‘now’ is an infinitely small phenomenon of time, it must take an infinite number of ‘nows’ to make up one second and also to make up one minute - so why do they appear of different value, and indeed why/how can these ‘times’ ever be traversed from one side to the other, given the infinite number of ‘now’ moments required? “Curiouser and curiouser”, said Alice.

Hi Mount Carmel, thanks for your post!
Are you saying it is certain that all perceived knowledge is uncertain ?
All I am really saying is, what is true is certainly true and not possibly false, at least at the instant it is true. If it is merely a perceived truth, an apparant truth, and not an actual truth, then I would say it is not true, but false.​

Regarding the fun thought you brought up, this sounds very similar to if not the same as Zeno’s Paradox. I think Zeno’s Paradox can be resolved, whether traversing space or time, by simply assuming a “smallest unit of space” and a “smallest unit of time”. In fact, I think that Zeno’s Paradox demands that we assume this. Essentially, I deny that “now” is an infinitely small phenomenon of time, but is a definable yet small unit of time. I’m sure there are other threads about this though!

 

[Ruthie_again]

I’m thinking I need to read me some ancient Greeks… Plato… Zeno… I know very little about them, and haven’t studied philosophy at all. I’m just good at logic (except the terms) and semantics. WillYart went way over my head!

 

[WillYart]

Hello Birdmanman,

Regarding: > So, if by absolute certainty, I mean “the proposition believed has total security from error” (taking one part of Wikipedia’s definition of certainty), then do you think that my statement “that all knowledge is absolutely certain” is accurate? That is, once something is known, and not simply believed, then it follows that the proposition is, in reality, true.

Ok, we have a simple tautology: by our definition of knowledge, there is only knowledge of true propositions. I think it’s odd to say that knowledge makes something true; it seems that the truth of a proposition is anticedent to the possibility of knowing it. However that’s been denied; see the anthropic principle, some version of which states that our very existence is imposed by the possibility of our consciousness.

The definition of knowledge we have embraced here is certainly not the only one available! There is a distinction made between knowledge of a proposition and knowledge of a thing-in-itself. The latter kind of knowledge might be unavailable for some or all things; according to Kant, between us and things stands our mind, which separates us from things-in-themselves. In that case perhaps it is easier to be enthusiastic about the possibility of “self knowledge” than about “other knowledge”.

 

[Weissystems]

That is why we must have Faith!
WWW.CATHOLICPRAYERGROUP.NET

 

[Prodigal_Son]

OK, Modal Police here…

Your premise (2) is ambiguous. You could be saying either of two things:

(a) Necessarily, an absolutely certain belief is true.

This makes sense. But then you cannot validly conclude that “A belief which cannot be shown to be false and is not actually false is absolutely certain.”

(b) An absolutely certain belief is a belief that is necessarily true.

But does this mean that the object of the belief (the proposition) is necessarily true? Surely not. It could be absolutely certain that the sun is shining, even though the sun could have (modally) not been shining.

Then it must mean that it is necessarily the case that, necessarily, if some proposition is known, it must be true. But this is trivial and uninteresting.

 

[Mount_Carmel]

Hi Mount Carmel, thanks for your post!
Are you saying it is certain that all perceived knowledge is uncertain ?
All I am really saying is, what is true is certainly true and not possibly false, at least at the instant it is true. If it is merely a perceived truth, an apparant truth, and not an actual truth, then I would say it is not true, but false.​

Regarding the fun thought you brought up, this sounds very similar to if not the same as Zeno’s Paradox. I think Zeno’s Paradox can be resolved, whether traversing space or time, by simply assuming a “smallest unit of space” and a “smallest unit of time”. In fact, I think that Zeno’s Paradox demands that we assume this. Essentially, I deny that “now” is an infinitely small phenomenon of time, but is a definable yet small unit of time. I’m sure there are other threads about this though!

Ah, in our fallible and limited minds, just what is the interplay and nature of percieved truth and reality?

I think the answer to the ‘now paradox’ is that time as ‘we’ know and experience within physical and temporal dimensionality is bound to particles and periodic motion, which always takes up ‘space’ and are ‘inter-influenced’. I do however believe that ‘other’ dimensions/states/realities exist that support and can/could ‘explain’ the apparent paradox of our existence even though ‘surrounded’ by infinity/eternity - in effect a brief moment of ‘time’ within what ‘we’ would refer to as timelessness. If we were in possession of complete knowledge we would be faced with no paradoxes. There are no paradoxes in God’s mind - He may however still ponder His own acaused existence.

 

[Birdmanman]

Hello Birdmanman,

Regarding: > So, if by absolute certainty, I mean “the proposition believed has total security from error” (taking one part of Wikipedia’s definition of certainty), then do you think that my statement “that all knowledge is absolutely certain” is accurate? That is, once something is known, and not simply believed, then it follows that the proposition is, in reality, true.

Ok, we have a simple tautology: by our definition of knowledge, there is only knowledge of true propositions. I think it’s odd to say that knowledge makes something true; it seems that the truth of a proposition is anticedent to the possibility of knowing it. However that’s been denied; see the anthropic principle, some version of which states that our very existence is imposed by the possibility of our consciousness.

The definition of knowledge we have embraced here is certainly not the only one available! There is a distinction made between knowledge of a proposition and knowledge of a thing-in-itself. The latter kind of knowledge might be unavailable for some or all things; according to Kant, between us and things stands our mind, which separates us from things-in-themselves. In that case perhaps it is easier to be enthusiastic about the possibility of “self knowledge” than about “other knowledge”.

Thanks for the post, Willyart! Yes, my main contention in this thread is really either a tautology or something that seems like a tautology and is probably trivial to most, but it is important/relevant to me (see my other thread on “God can be know with certainty by the natural light of human reason” for the relevance). Also, I would not say that the truth of the proposition comes after the possibility of knowing it, but is simultaneous with the possibility of knowing it. I will need to look more into the anthropic principle, but from what I have heard of it before it seems to apply only to sitautions in which there are many actually realized possibility, like a multiverse, or quantum mechanics when the ‘many worlds interpretation’ is used (I do not care too much for either idea, and particularly and strongly hate or dislike the ‘many worlds interpretation’, as it implies incredibly mean things about both of our mothers).