Who am I? Why am I here?

[kamz]

PLP:

You and John appear to be deep in the Metaphysics of Naturalism and Supernaturalism. There really isn’t an easy answer, but I’ll start a thread on Metaphysical Naturalism and Scientific Materialism soon.

In the meantime, I’ll post a quick thread on Empiricism and the Blind Man.

Wingman?? Sounds like someone is watching too much Top Gun

 

[PLP]

Maranatha:

The follow if from: Putting Relativity to the Test
…

Reading the history from the same site quoted above clearly shows the geneal acceptance of the GToR, logically proved, befoe experimentation. It was however observed to be consistent with reality. Your insistence that labratory proof was required before rational acceptance does not seem to be the case.

I’m not sure how you come to the conclusion that GToR was accepted on logical basis. The site you quote is all about the empirical evidence underlying acceptance of the theory.

 

[Mijoy2]

reen12:

What I do know, is this: I was told, at age 6, that there
was a God, Who created heaven and earth and all
that is therein. It made perfect sense, then.

Approaching 60, it still makes sense.

Just my thoughts,

Best,

reen12

We are not going to win any arguments, of course, with this thought. But, for some reason, I have grown comfortable with this simple yet satisfying thought

Somehow, it intuitively makes more sense then the almighty science alone theory.

 

[john_doran]

Sparetherod:

Morning, John,

Why not? We take normal rational people, indoctrinate them with certain beliefs…and we get holocausts and inquisitions. What can we then infer about those beliefs?

nothing about their truth or falsity, anyway. i mean, what can we tell about the truth value of the scientific method if we know it was believed by a genocidal megalomaniac?

Sparetherod:

Because otherwise we would still think genetic disease is punishment, that the earth IS flat, there probably are leprachauns, etc.

sure. but why is the scientific method the only legitimate manner in which to acquire knowledge? at the very least, you would need some other epistemological justification for the scientific method itself in order to avoid circularity…

Sparetherod:

This is just my point. The mind of a six year old is hardly able to doubt what is told to him…ie, Santa… like our primative ancestors. Deeply held beliefs are not then, and only later with difficulty, to be doubted, without some systematic way of testing beliefs. I’m sure you’ve discovered that convincing a 30 year old with a science background, of any of these beliefs is almost impossible.

for one thing, scientific pedagogy is, on the whole, terrible, and far too often passes off philosophy as science. second of all, i know plenty of people who have scientific backgrounds (e.g. at least 3 PhD’s in physics) who are believing christians. i myself am one of them.

and thirdly, the resolute refusal of many adults with scientific backgrounds to countenance the reasonableness of christian belief is equally good evidence that what you call the stubborn credulity of the six-year old very often becomes the stubborn credulity of the so-called sophisticated 30 year old intellectual.

 

[PLP]

john doran:

simplest how? conceptually? ontologically? logically? mathematically? simple for whom?

Simplest in terms of having the fewest premises, with each premise attributing exactly one property to one entity.

and what about the other values of theory-choice? like number of ad hoc revisions? explanatory power? predictive ability? fit with other generally accepted theories? which theories? how do you rank number of theories that fit with the relative importance of those theories? elegance? aesthetic appeal?

These mostly properties of imperfect knowledge. In the ideal case, we expect one simplest (fewest premises) Theory of Everything which accounts for all phenomena (maxium explanatory power). Given that we don’t have the ideal case, we invent secondary criteria to manage the imperfection of our knowledge.

The examination of these secondary criteria are important to the practical philosophy of science, but they aren’t really on point in a discussion of Metaphysical Scientific Materialism.

sort of like if he talked to a million people and they all professed belief in the existence of a god? the blind man would then be entitled to postulate the existence of such a being as the best explanation of his linguistic experience?

If the details of belief in God were independently consistent, then yes. But to the extent that the details of belief are consistent, they are not independent; to the extent they are independent, they are not consistent.

i’ll be interested to see the argument and what makes it “good”.

even were it true that maximal theoretical simplicity entailed truth, or at least maximal reasonableness of belief, it simply does not follow that other, less parsimonious theories have no good reasons recommending them for belief.

Well, one of two things must be the case. Either the simpler theory and the more complicated theory make exactly the same predictions, or they make different predictions.

If they make the exactly same predictions, then they are the same theory; the simpler theory is just a simpler way of stating the more complicated theory, and the positions are equivalent. It’s not even a matter of “preferring” one to another; I can’t prefer “ice cream” over “milk, sugar and flavoring stirred and frozen”. To say, “God created the Material Universe; God just exists” (and to say nothing more about God) is saying exactly same thing as “The Material Universe just exists.” The only prediction made by both is that the Material Universe does, in fact, exist.

If the theories make different predictions, then it should be possible to test those predictions; one of them is going to be true, the other false. In which case, one theory is preferable to the other on empirical grounds.

 

[john_doran]

PLP:

Simplest in terms of having the fewest premises, with each premise attributing exactly one property to one entity.

why should this matter, and why should it be the only measure of theoretical truth?

PLP:

These mostly properties of imperfect knowledge. In the ideal case, we expect one simplest (fewest premises) Theory of Everything which accounts for all phenomena (maxium explanatory power). Given that we don’t have the ideal case, we invent secondary criteria to manage the imperfection of our knowledge.

fine. whatever we might expect, we are, as you note, in irresolvably imperfect circumstances, which means that all of these other criteria do, in fact, come into play.

if you’ve ready the history or philosophy of science, or even current papers in peer reviewed journals, then you know that scientific models and theories are often believed on the basis of any number of the properties i listed.

PLP:

The examination of these secondary criteria are important to the practical philosophy of science, but they aren’t really on point in a discussion of Metaphysical Scientific Materialism.

they’re also not relevant to a discussion of whether miller lite should be preferred for tasting great or for being less filling…why should that matter?

PLP:

If the details of belief in God were independently consistent, then yes. But to the extent that the details of belief are consistent, they are not independent; to the extent they are independent, they are not consistent.

ahh, but they are: all believers in god share one independently consistent belief - namely that there is a god.

PLP:

Well, one of two things must be the case. Either the simpler theory and the more complicated theory make exactly the same predictions, or they make different predictions.

i’m afraid that this is utterly false. matrix mechanics and wave mechanics are formally identical, but wave mechanics got the nod. same goes for feynman’s and schwinger’s formalism for QED - feynman came out the winner there. and a lot of theorists love string theory despite the staggering complexity of its formalism because the theory is so elegant…

and the list goes on.

PLP:

If they make the exactly same predictions, then they are the same theory; the simpler theory is just a simpler way of stating the more complicated theory, and the positions are equivalent. It’s not even a matter of “preferring” one to another; I can’t prefer “ice cream” over “milk, sugar and flavoring stirred and frozen”.

even if you were right about this (and you’re not), the fact of the matter is that theorizing is something done on the fly, with differing theories proposing to explain the same phenomena having different properties recommending them. and it is between these theories that scientists must choose when deciding on what to spend their time in research. for example, string theory seems to explain more than loop quantum gravity, but loop quantum gravity is background independent, while string theory is not. how does one compare those two theories for likelihood of truth?

and two theories that are formally identical in that they make the same predictions and come up with the same answers can obviously differ in their ontologies, so that one involves different entities in more or less abundance than other theories. which obviously, then, makes it entirely relevant as to which you choose to believe paints an accurate picture of the world. unless, of course, you are an instrumentalist…

PLP:

To say, “God created the Material Universe; God just exists” (and to say nothing more about God) is saying exactly same thing as “The Material Universe just exists.” The only prediction made by both is that the Material Universe does, in fact, exist.

but the hypothesis that god exists isn’t a scientific theory - it’s an explanation. just like the hypothesis, “the butler did it” is an explanation of “lord fauntleroy was murdered in the library”; are you seriously suggesting that “the butler killed lord fauntleroy” and “lord fauntleroy was ‘just’ murdered” are (logically) equivalent?

 

[PLP]

Neithan:

Okay, consider such a hypothetical: human beings evolved without eyesight. Now, according to the simplest materialistic theory, the moon and stars do not exist. But they do in fact exist, right? This is sort of like that old cliche ‘if a tree falls and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?’ If something is imperceivable, does that mean it isn’t there?

I’ve posted a separate thread on this topic: Empiricism and the Blind Man

I suppose I’m begging the ontological question somewhat here but God, or some form of deity, is a nearly universal human idea–isn’t it probable that there is some truth in it?

Sure: There’s some truth. But what kind of truth? A truth about the existence of God? Or a truth about the psychological character of human beings? A truth about history? More examination is necessary.

Consider this hypothetical analogy building on the first: human beings have evolved without eyesight and therefore do not have any concept of the moon and stars. They can, however, feel the heat of the Sun, even though they cannot see it, nor the light it emanates. Where is this heat coming from? For these blind humans, it is impossible to discover the answer beyond a reasonable doubt–based on their four senses alone–any further than ‘somewhere far above the ground.’ Suppose most simply accept the concept of some great single source of this heat far above them, but a smaller segment point at the lack of directly perceivable evidence of such a concept, and decide to accept–for the sake of simplicity–that the heat is just there without a necessary single source. We could divide this blind humanity into ‘sunists’ and ‘asunists’ (respectively) based on their beliefs (or lack thereof) of a great source in the sky for the heat they feel.

But it’s not so simple as that. First, what is the empirical difference between those theories? A single source entails all sorts of observable differences from just general head, such as the presence and location-specificity of shade. We could show, for instance, correlations between areas of shadiness which were consistent with a single source.

On the metaphysical level, suppose their sensory modality were so limited that there could be no observable differences between the “single source” theory and the “diffuse heat” theory. In that case, their “single source” theories would be empirically identical to their “diffuse heat” theories. They could justly claim that, empirically speaking, there was simply no reason to believe that these theories actually meant different things.

Scientific Materialism doesn’t say that it is logically impossible for there to be unperceivable entities, or entities with unperceivable properties. It says, merely, that anything unperceivable is irrelevant, if not meaningless.

If it is utterly impossible to tell the difference between atheism and theism, then atheism means the same thing as theism; our choice is merely between the different wording of our slogans.

Replace the ‘Sun’ in this hypothetical with ‘God,’ ‘heat’ with ‘universe,’ and you have a rough comparison to the current theism/atheism debate. God (or ‘Deity’) is not directly perceivable to any of us, but it seems that most human beings, now and throughout human history, accept that some great intelligence is the source of our existence, of what we *do *directly perceive.

Again, my position is not just that God is not directly perceivable, but also empirically meaningless: A universe with God (under certain definitions) is utterly indistinguishable from one without a God on the basis of any perception, direct or indirect. The idea that some great intelligence is the source of our existence is either meaningless, irrelevant or false.

This just seems illogical and contradictory to our search for the ‘simplest explanation.’ This isn’t an explanation at all–it refuses to recognize that an explanation is even there.

Much depends on what you call an “explanation”. There’s deductive explanation, self-explanation, and no explanation at all. To the extent that self-explanation is coherent, Scientific Materialism holds that the material universe is self-explanatory; the theist holds that God is self-explanatory. But again, if we say nothing more about God than, “God explains the Material Universe; god is self-explanatory”, we are saying exactly the same thing as, “The Material Universe is self-explanatory”.

continued…

 

[PLP]

Neithan:

Doesn’t the Anthropic Principle suggest that we, as in human beings, are purposed?

Not really. The Weak Anthropic Principle says only that the material universe must have certain properties for people to be around to observe it. The Strong Anthropic Principle says that the existence of people to observe a universe is itself logically necessary. The WAP is pretty obvious; the SAP is very dubious in my opinion.

What about life? Isn’t it just good logic to conclude that life is a purpose of the universe?

Actually, it’s not only not logical to conclude that life is the purpose of the universe (there’s no logical justification for arbitrarily specifying the property of a part as an essential property of a whole), it’s empirically very weak. On a comparative scale, saying that terrestrial life (the only life we know about) is the purpose of the universe is like saying that a spot of mold in my shower is the purpose of all of Human Civilization.

Why are our human minds so consumed with purpose?

This is an entirely different question. To a certain extent, purposefulness (which is a property of all life) appears to be a property which some natural entities definitely have. Human purpose is explained simply by positing that we can anticipate the future, which follows logically from the existence of natural laws.

Where does this concept of purpose come from, if the origin of all things (the universe) is devoid of it?

As noted in my thread on First Cause arguments, this is a fallacy of decomposition: Just because a composite entity has (or lacks) some property, we cannot infer that its parts also have (or lack) that property.

Sometimes I think materialism is a major pandemic of ‘not seeing the forest for the trees.’ Materialists get lost in the little details of evolution, and fail to step back to admire the whole sweeping picture. What a marvel! How can it be an accident?

It’s not an “accident”. It’s a consequence of natural law. Many of the fine details are, of course, accidental.

A man convicted of murder and sentenced to death was told by the judge that he would be executed within a week, but the day of death would be a surprise…

This is an interesting paradox highlighting the self-referentiality of the use of “surprise” in this context. But I’m not getting the connection to your main point.

Vice versa, materialists may get lost in the tiny details of apparently random mutations in evolution… but when one looks at the whole of it, it is rather obvious that it is ordered. Order implies purpose!

The current diversity of life is not more ordered than we would expect from only the operation of mechanical (non-purposeful) natural law.

Is simplicity a ruler for truth?
Is science the measure of all truth?

If I define “truth” to be the simplest scientific theory, then it’s tautological. If you define “truth” to be something else, then perhaps not. But if you define “truth” in some other way, can you preserve the belief that truth should be objectively determinable, that it should be the same for everyone?

How can science rule out or ignore intelligent causes when it is itself caused and sustained by intelligences?

Well, science certainly doesn’t ignore intelligent causes. We can rule out intelligent causes for a specific phenomenaon rather easily, by fully explaining the phenomenon without reference to intelligence.

The physical universe can account for a source for our bodies–but what about our minds? Are they material too? Why can’t you see, feel, taste, hear or smell them, or do you think this will one day be possible?

Our minds are probably abstract material entities; they are specific arrangements of matter (neurons). We can certainly sense them indirectly, by sensing their effects. We should also probably have more positivistic evidence when our ability to “see” individual neurons at work improves a couple of orders of magnitude.

PoE certainly is a good argument, although theism has its counters (you might call em ‘cop-outs’ ). Feel free to add your take on it!

I will indeed!

 

[Sparetherod]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Sparetherod
Morning, John,

Why not? We take normal rational people, indoctrinate them with certain beliefs…and we get holocausts and inquisitions. What can we then infer about those beliefs?

nothing about their truth or falsity, anyway. i mean, what can we tell about the truth value of the scientific method if we know it was believed by a genocidal megalomaniac?

The scientific method is an amoral way of finding knowledge. Its’ practice doesn’t justify unethical behavior. Irrespective of their truth, we can infer Nazism and religion have justified unethical behavior. And continue to do so.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Sparetherod
Because otherwise we would still think genetic disease is punishment, that the earth IS flat, there probably are leprachauns, etc.

sure. but why is the scientific method the only legitimate manner in which to acquire knowledge? at the very least, you would need some other epistemological justification for the scientific method itself in order to avoid circularity…

I’m stumped…do you have another way to verify the cause of genetic disease?

i know plenty of people who have scientific backgrounds (e.g. at least 3 PhD’s in physics) who are believing christians. i myself am one of them.

and thirdly, the resolute refusal of many adults with scientific backgrounds to countenance the reasonableness of christian belief

I also know scientific christians, and as I wrote previously, I think I understand various possibilities for why people believe and have pleasant results with that belief. It always interests me, however to see where they draw the line between belief and scientific evidence that may refute some aspect of the Bible’s claims. I’m curious how you feel about literal interpretation of Genesis or the Flood, for example.

Rod

 

[reen12]

quote: Sparetherod

This is just my point. The mind of a six year old is hardly able to doubt what is told to him…ie, Santa… like our primative ancestors. Deeply held beliefs are not then, and only later with difficulty, to be doubted, without some systematic way of testing beliefs. I’m sure you’ve discovered that convincing a 30 year old with a science background, of any of these beliefs is almost impossible.

Of course you’re absolutely correct, in the above, quoted.

quote: Sparetherod

Deeply held beliefs are not then, and only later with difficulty, to be doubted, without some systematic way of testing beliefs

The operative word here, I think, is “testing.”

When an individual holds to logical positivism, if a given
“entity” can’t be:

weighed
measured
touched
seen

etc., - if same can’t be “tested” - then the entity, under
discussion, is ceded no “reality.”

I have no problem with this view. I just disagree with it.

As to:

I’m sure you’ve discovered that convincing a 30 year old with a science background, of any of these beliefs is almost impossible.

I once heard the following anecdote:

A young student of science was riding on a public
conveyance, when he noted an older man, sitting
nearby, who was saying a rosary.

The young man, full of a kind of pity, sat down
next to this man and said:

Please, sir, let me enlighten you. Do you not know
that science has proved that there is no God, and
no need for him?

The elder said to the younger: Really? Is that true?
I should like to hear more.

And he gave the young man his card.

When the older man had departed, the younger man looked
at the card. It read:

Louis Pasteur

a member of the Académie Française

…and one of the most respected scientists of his day.

An anecdote, admittedly, but it did give me a smile,
when I first heard same.

web.ukonline.co.uk/b.gardner/pasteur.htm

Best,

reen

 

[Philthy]

EnterTheBowser:

Is your question then: how does evolution explain the fact that humans have this weird concept of ethics, and how does it explain that no other animals do?

In response to the first question, humans are social creatures. In order for a group of animals to survive in such a context, there need to be some ground rules which cover behavior. In other words, those social creatures which evolve so that they have a natural inclincation towards, for example, not stealing from, or killing, or lying to other members of the group would have an advantage over an other group of social creatures which do not have these rules.
.

This is reasonable in a very limited sense. There is a very big difference between doing what is right - because it is the right thing to do - and doing something that is simply socially acceptable and conducive to community life. There is an even bigger difference when you sense a “moral obligation” to pursue “truth” which is not an observable behaviour.

EnterTheBowser:

In response to the second question - the fact that you want explained is false. Chimpanzees, for example, seem to hold to some ethical rules (such as justice). I don’t mean to say that they hold to them in the way humans do, but they do in fact hold to things that appear to be rather like justice.

They “seem to” in ways that “appear to be rather like” justice? That sounds pretty whimpy to me - especially when these “observations” by humans never involve a knowledge of the true motivations for the behaviour of the animal subjects. It sounds like the fact is that there is no conclusive proof of such knowledge, but you are selling your side of the story…

EnterTheBowser:

You might be interested in a book called “The Science of Good and Evil,” by Michael Shermer.

Thanks,

Phil

 

[reen12]

I note that my observation, following, has been left,
unaddressed, by those who hold the a-theistic
position.

quote: reen12

My experience is this: without a personal deity, the
world is a “box.” No exit. This world may be several
things: interesting, useful, even fascinating - but a
“box” it remains - again, in my experience.

I see no particular expansion of freedom in a-theism,
but rather a more limited view of the nature of human
existence. [Still, that is solely my “take” on this.]

When I was decades younger, I thought that the existence
of God was self-evident. I have come to realize -and
respect - the fact that this is not the case.

I can no more “prove” there is a God than sprout wings.

I find the fact that this observation has gone unaddressed, of more
than passing interest.

All the ink in the world can be spilled, IMHO, and the
existence of God cannot be proved.
I can “testify” to my* belief* that He exists.
I cannot ‘prove’ that He exists.

As I say:

My experience is this: without a personal deity, the
world is a “box.” No exit. This world may be several
things: interesting, useful, even fascinating - but a
“box” it remains - again, in my experience.

Prometheus Unbound gives rise to the risible, I think,
as life unfolds, physical pain increases, profound losses are
sustained, and death becomes a firm entry - in one’s personal
“to do” list.

Or perhaps the stance of the Existentialists is embraced:
*L’Homme révolté *! “Create” meaning, where none “exists.”

A kind of “hollow” ‘reality’ is encountered, in this stance,
I think, in terms of: “Who am I? Why am I here?”, the
thread topic.

The footfalls of time echo, hollowly, as the years advance.
[Better hallow than hollow, *n’est-ce pas?]

…Camus, call your office…
Sartre: “Hell is other people…” from the play No Exit.

“Waiting for Godot?” anyone?

While this kind of freedom has a certain surface ‘sparkle,’ it is,
in the end, [in my estimation] a dreary and hollow view of ‘reality.’

If one tries to “argue” for God’s existence, with a person
both skilled and learned, one is going to…lose - every time,
I hold.

[Many Catholics play the trump card: infallibility ! ]
[Many atheists seem to play the trump card: Prove it! ]

Both groups will win, in debate - IMO - but do they win
hearts, minds and souls? That remains to be seen.
[Of course the existence of the soul, might be challenged,
by one who holds the atheistic position. ]

I ‘believe’ God exists. I don’t ‘know’ that He exists.
If I ‘knew’…in that sense…faith would be irrelevant.

reen12

 

[hurst]

reen12:

I ‘believe’ God exists. I don’t ‘know’ that He exists.
If I ‘knew’…in that sense…faith would be irrelevant.

There is nothing wrong with believing He exists, and then basing your faith in Him on that belief.

However, we can demonstrate that something actually must have always been, and that logically all else that has not always been must at some point be derived from that eternally existing somethingness. In just about all cases of what various people assert “God” to be, that supreme being can be equated to this somethingness which must have always been. It is in this manner that we can know with certainty that “God” exists, though we cannot know with certainty what the nature and essence is, apart from some deduction whereby we can conclude He must be the source of all power, all knowledge, all conscoiusness, and likewise that He is eternal, infinite, uncomposed, and possesses a will. These (and probably more) can be known by the natural light of our reason, in conjunction with our natural senses and logic.

Having said that, there is still the need to have faith in that which we cannot know naturally about God. But it can and should be based on what we can know naturally about God.

In conclusion, being certain whether God exists is not contrary to faith, nor does it make faith irrelevant.

The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Summa Theologica
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Reply to Objection 1
catholicprimer.org/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A2THEP1

hurst

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Philthy:

This is reasonable in a very limited sense. There is a very big difference between doing what is right - because it is the right thing to do - and doing something that is simply socially acceptable and conducive to community life. There is an even bigger difference when you sense a “moral obligation” to pursue “truth” which is not an observable behaviour.

Humans have all sorts of natural inclinations (eg a sex drive, a need to eat, etc) - why not a “moral” one?

They “seem to” in ways that “appear to be rather like” justice? That sounds pretty whimpy to me - especially when these “observations” by humans never involve a knowledge of the true motivations for the behaviour of the animal subjects. It sounds like the fact is that there is no conclusive proof of such knowledge, but you are selling your side of the story…

…

Yeah, I was a little fuzzy on that one because I recall reading it somewhere, but I couldn’t find the source. As it stands, you can pretty much ignore the point until I do find what I was looking for.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

reen12: is your point as follows:
-There are no rational reasons to prefer theism to atheism
-There are no rational reasons to prefer atheism to theism (I’m not as sure about this one)
-Atheism is depressing
-Theism is “exciting” (whatever suitable set of words)
-Therefore you have faith that theism is true

 

[reen12]

quote: hurst

There is nothing wrong with believing He exists, and then basing your faith in Him on that belief.

However, we can demonstrate that something actually must have always been, and that logically all else that has not always been must at some point be derived from that eternally existing somethingness. In just about all cases of what various people assert “God” to be, that supreme being can be equated to this somethingness which must have always been. It is in this manner that we can know with certainty that “God” exists, though we cannot know with certainty what the nature and essence is, apart from some deduction whereby we can conclude He must be the source of all power, all knowledge, all conscoiusness, and likewise that He is eternal, infinite, uncomposed, and possesses a will. These (and probably more) can be known by the natural light of our reason, in conjunction with our natural senses and logic.

Having said that, there is still the need to have faith in that which we cannot know naturally about God. But it can and should be based on what we can know naturally about God.

In conclusion, being certain whether God exists is not contrary to faith, nor does it make faith irrelevant.

The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Summa Theologica
Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Reply to Objection 1
catholicprimer.org/summa/FP/…tml#FPQ2A2THEP1

Lovely reasoning, all lined-up and spiffy - in effect - but
a totally bootless approach, I think, towards “explaining”
realities, in the early 21st century.

quote: hurst

In conclusion, being certain whether God exists is not contrary to faith, nor does it make faith irrelevant.

Please re-read my last two sentences:

quote: reen12

I ‘believe’ God exists. I don’t ‘know’ that He exists.
If I ‘knew’…in that sense…faith would be irrelevant.

I recommend that you set aside St. Thomas, for a bit,
and read the Existentialists. This might give you a
better idea of the ‘real world’ positions - of so many of
our fellow human beings - in the early 21st century.

If Aquinas were alive, today, he’d be delving into Existentialism,
New Age, quantum physics, Quantum Psychology…to be
better prepared to ‘defend’ the faith.

Benedict XVI seems to understand that the schoolmen
must ‘decrease’ and the scriptures ‘increase’ - if souls
are to be ‘addressed’ where they are…

…and they are most definitely not in the 13th century,
with 13th century “issues.”

Just my thought. :tiphat:

reen12

 

[Sparetherod]

In just about all cases of what various people assert “God” to be, that supreme being can be equated to this somethingness which must have always been. It is in this manner that we can know with certainty that “God” exists, though we cannot know with certainty what the nature and essence is, apart from some deduction whereby we can conclude He must be the source of all power, all knowledge, all conscoiusness, and likewise that He is eternal, infinite, uncomposed, and possesses a will.

Oh, yea, and he hates condoms.

 

[chlotilde]

EnterTheBowser:

In order for a group of animals to survive in such a context, there need to be some ground rules which cover behavior. In other words, those social creatures which evolve so that they have a natural inclincation towards, for example, not stealing from, or killing, or lying to other members of the group would have an advantage over an other group of social creatures which do not have these rules.

This would hold water If we could observe the fact that actual behaviors were being selectively weeded out, but I see little evidence for either these behaviors disappearring from the gene pool or lessening.

 

[hurst]

reen12:

…and they are most definitely not in the 13th century,
with 13th century “issues.”

The fact is, we are still dealing with “issues” from the sin of Adam.

People are not much different from centuries ago, regardless of the technological advances.

hurst

 

[Sparetherod]

Quote:
Originally Posted by EnterTheBowser
In order for a group of animals to survive in such a context, there need to be some ground rules which cover behavior. In other words, those social creatures which evolve so that they have a natural inclincation towards, for example, not stealing from, or killing, or lying to other members of the group would have an advantage over an other group of social creatures which do not have these rules.

This would hold water If we could observe the fact that actual behaviors were being selectively weeded out, but I see little evidence for either these behaviors disappearring from the gene pool or lessening.

All of our present day emotional response capabilities are thought to have evolved in small hunter-gatherer groups and are actually still better adapted to life among small groups of known individuals. Once the human population exploded there is little chance for generalized genetic behavioral change…most behaviral changes will now be cultural and superficial. There is no real evidence that people with traits we like, like loyalty, have any higher fertility rates than others, so selection is nil at present. Not so, when we lived in small familial groups. All behavioral adaptations, even “sins” like envy, greed, or lust are designed to encourage propogation of the species. Naturally we share many behaviors with the apes…they just cant talk about them.