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EnterTheBowser
Guest
You’re right; I should modify my original statement to restrict it to current evidence and theistic arguments I am aware of.This seems like an awfully dogmatic statement. Are you willing to concede that you are the dogmatist here?
Same comment.
Just as a quick question: are you familar with the arguments from divine hiddennes, nonbelief, and physical minds?I have never seen this demonstrated successfully - I have only seen shallow reasoning and childish arguments. I look forward to seeing what you bring to the table, and hope it’s not of the same caliber.
Pascal would disagree with you for similar reasons.
I will confidently assert that Pascal’s Wager is a really bad argument. In a sense, it can be used to show that it is reasonable to believe in everything. Watch:
Imagine that God, instead of demanding acknowledgment of his existence as a condition of infinite reward, demands that we acknowledge proposition X as true. It is possible that such a God exists - basically, some creature capable of dealing out infinite reward (and perhaps infinite punishment) in exchange for belief in some proposition. The problem is that I can put in any statement for X. And so, if Pascal’s Wager is a good argument, it is reasonable to believe that the Sun is an orange, that the sun is not an orange, and so forth - every statement, and its negation. So there seems to be problems. Now, it might be replied that I can only stick in statements for X of which we are not entirely sure - but in reality, all knowledge is, to some extent or another, doubtful - or at least enough knowledge is that this modified Wager would declare it reasonable to believe in A and ~A, for some A or other.
For a more amusing yet equally serious response to the Wager, read this:
infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/heaven.html