Why couldn't the first state of the universe just exist?

[Luke_K]

I’ve had a terribly hard time understanding and accepting the cosmological argument. Most explanations I’ve encountered seem to just define the universe as “contingent” and “unnecessary” and God as “actual” and “necessary” without successfully explaining why the distinction is valid. Yes, every state of the universe (after the first one) is contingent on a previous state for its existence. Does that necessarily mean that the FIRST state is also contingent?

What is logically inconsistent with asserting that there was a first state to the universe and that it just. was? Every particulate of matter and energy just existed in their respective places with potential and kinetic energies that defined the first state, and it all went from there to today. No external cause was needed, because it’s just the nature of the universe to change in a certain way based on the initial state.

Why can’t it just be the nature of the universe to exist in an initial state and go from there to the present day?

 

[Hastrman]

Because there is nothing inherent in the nature of the universe, in any form, that “existence” can be automatically predicated of it. Therefore it is, of necessity, contingent upon something of which “existence” can automatically be predicated. Namely, God—who is Existence. That’s why his name is I AM.

 

[Ghosty]

It can be a difficult thing to wrap one’s mind around, but I’ll give a shot at trying to explain it.

Anything is contingent if it is not the cause of its own being, and if something is the cause of its own being then it wouldn’t be subject to change. This is because it is already being itself perfectly; if it changes then its being is imperfect, because it can’t be itself in all its permutations at once.

Since the universe was being in one state and then in another, being itself is not part of the nature of the universe. If absolute, necessary being in itself were part of the nature of the universe then one state couldn’t pass out of being, and another state pass into being. The fact that the universe has one state of being and then another is incompatible with being as a fundamental aspect of the nature of the universe.

Only a being that is fundamentally unchanging in its nature can be said to have necessary being by nature. The universe doesn’t fit this description, and therefore nothing within the universe fits this description. We must look outside the universe, beyond anything we know from within the universe, for a necessary being that can explain contingent things like the universe.

Incidentally, even if the universe existed continuously without a beginning it would still be a contingent being for the reasons above, just as a ball that is forever held aloft by a changeless hand is still not the cause of itself being up in the air.

Hope that helps!

Peace and God bless!

 

[danserr]

The first thought is to make sure which version of the cosmological argument you are talking about. There are at least three, so some people don’t like one but prefer another.
1). The Thomist cosmological argument seeks a first cause in terms of causal priority. It says that having a bunch of intermediate causes is like having a huge number of gears in a clock, no matter how many intermediate gears you have, unless you have a first cause, the clock won’t run.
2). The Leibniz Cosmological Argument (Also sometimes called the cosmological argument from contingency). reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5847
It deals with necessity and contingency. It says that 1. everything that exists has an explanation of it’s existence (either in the necessity of its own existence or in an external cause), 2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence that explanation is God 3. The universe exists, has an explanation of it’s existence, and that explanation is God.
3). The Kalam Cosmological argument (my favorite, though I think Leibniz is good too). 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause, 2. the universe began to exist 3. the universe has a cause. reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5174

So the answer to your question is different depending on which version of the argument you use.
2). As applied to Leibniz’s argument, If every subsequent state is contingent (something else explains its existence), why should the first state be an exception? What magically makes that the case? Every apple tree is contingent on the previous, but the first is magically necessary?

• And at any rate, this form of the argument, takes the universe as a whole, and observes that everything in the universe is contingent, so why should the universe be an exception? To suggest that the universe is an exception is to commit the taxicab fallacy (the causal principle is not something you can dismiss like a cab when you have arrived at your destination).

3). As applied to the Kalam argument, “why can’t the first state just have existed.” If this is true, then the universe did not begin to exist because that first state would be part of the universe, and so the universe would always have existed for an infinite length of time. So what your question really does is to deny that the universe had a beginning. I find arguments that the universe had a beginning persuasive (impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition, Big Bang cosmology and the expansion of the universe etc.). If the arguments that the universe began to exist are good, then the universe had a cause; this is God. The first state isn’t a cause of the universe because it is part of the universe. So what you are really saying is that the universe had no cause. But if the Kalam argument is good, this is untenable.

–another problem. This may also help. If the first state were the sole cause of the rest of the universe, then we should be observing the universe as infinitely old, not 13 billion years old. Why? Because if the first state always existed, it would always have been causing its effect, namely the subsequent state. So if the universe had no beginning and the first state of it was the cause of the rest, then we should be observing the universe as infinitely old. The only way to escape this seems to be to suppose a personal creator, since a man could be sitting down from all eternity and then choose to stand up. This would account for a 13 billion year old universe.
-finally, You ask if there is anything logically inconsistent in asserting that the first state “just was.” In the sense that there is no contradiction involved in making the statement, no. But that is not the question. The question is, is it “metaphysically” possible, or if you prefer, is it really possible, I think the answer is no.

 

[Luke_K]

"Hastrman:

Because there is nothing inherent in the nature of the universe, in any form, that “existence” can be automatically predicated of it. Therefore it is, of necessity, contingent upon something of which “existence” can automatically be predicated. Namely, God—who is Existence. That’s why his name is I AM.

Thank you for replying, but you have merely asserted the opposite of what I’m proposing, without giving an explanation. What leads us to conclude that existence is not inherent in the first state of the universe?

Anything is contingent if it is not the cause of its own being, and if something is the cause of its own being then it wouldn’t be subject to change. This is because it is already being itself perfectly; if it changes then its being is imperfect, because it can’t be itself in all its permutations at once.

Since the universe was being in one state and then in another, being itself is not part of the nature of the universe. If absolute, necessary being in itself were part of the nature of the universe then one state couldn’t pass out of being, and another state pass into being. The fact that the universe has one state of being and then another is incompatible with being as a fundamental aspect of the nature of the universe.

To my understanding of your post, you basically say that existence itself cannot change, which I agree with. But the universe is not existence itself. Why does something have to be existence itself in order to be uncaused?

 

[Luke_K]

So the answer to your question is different depending on which version of the argument you use.
2). As applied to Leibniz’s argument, If every subsequent state is contingent (something else explains its existence), why should the first state be an exception? What magically makes that the case? Every apple tree is contingent on the previous, but the first is magically necessary?

It’s the exception because the exception to contingency is necessary at some point. We reasonably conclude based on our observations that the present state of the universe is better explained by a state previous to it. But there comes a state eventually where it is superfluous to continue proposing past states, and that is defined as the first, uncaused state.

3). As applied to the Kalam argument, “why can’t the first state just have existed.” If this is true, then the universe did not begin to exist because that first state would be part of the universe, and so the universe would always have existed for an infinite length of time. So what your question really does is to deny that the universe had a beginning.

–another problem. This may also help. If the first state were the sole cause of the rest of the universe, then we should be observing the universe as infinitely old, not 13 billion years old. Why? Because if the first state always existed, it would always have been causing its effect, namely the subsequent state. So if the universe had no beginning and the first state of it was the cause of the rest, then we should be observing the universe as infinitely old.

This doesn’t make sense. By your logic, because the present state of the universe exists for the entire time that the present state of the universe exists (and during that time it is always causing its effect), it must be infinitely old.

 

[Hastrman]

Thank you for replying, but you have merely asserted the opposite of what I’m proposing, without giving an explanation. What leads us to conclude that existence is not inherent in the first state of the universe?

Because you can conceive of a universe with any number of different traits, including one that does not exist.

If anything can be conceived of as having a different trait, that trait is not logically necessary; since one can conceive of the universe not existing, its existence is not logically necessary. Thus it is contingent on something whose existence is logically necessary. However, to assert the non-existence of existence, is nonsense—it’s like saying water’s not wet or sugar’s not sweet. So existence—which is God—is the thing the universe is contingent upon, since its (his) existence is logically necessary, it being his very definition.

 

[Luke_K]

Because you can conceive of a universe with any number of different traits, including one that does not exist.

If anything can be conceived of as having a different trait, that trait is not logically necessary; since one can conceive of the universe not existing, its existence is not logically necessary. Thus it is contingent on something whose existence is logically necessary. However, to assert the non-existence of existence, is nonsense—it’s like saying water’s not wet or sugar’s not sweet. So existence—which is God—is the thing the universe is contingent upon, since its (his) existence is logically necessary, it being his very definition.

Thank you for elaborating. Why does the fact that something is not logically necessary mean that it cannot just exist? Just because it was not necessary that the first state of the universe existed, doesn’t mean that it did not just exist. You need to justify the bold sentence.

And besides, does it even mean anything to say that existence itself is the cause of the universe? One can ask, “What caused the universe to be the way that it is?” and answer “God did.” Then the same question can be asked of God, “What caused God to cause the universe to be the way that it is?” and the answer is “Nothing. He just did.” Why not answer “It just did.” to the first question? It offers the same explanatory power without a superfluous step.

 

[danserr]

It’s the exception because the exception to contingency is necessary at some point. We reasonably conclude based on our observations that the present state of the universe is better explained by a state previous to it. But there comes a state eventually where it is superfluous to continue proposing past states, and that is defined as the first, uncaused state.

-At least one problem with this thought, is that if the first state is necessary, then so are the other states, since they flow necessarily from the first state. So you are really suggesting that the universe as a whole is necessary. But this is very implausible. A different universe seems conceivable. It seems possible, for instance, that the universe might have expanded more quickly, slower, included a few more planets or a few less. But if this is true, then the universe does not exist necessarily. See the example in the link I gave you on quarks, where the author gives an example using quarks that shows it is not very plausible that the universe existed necessarily.

• Another problem, your objection seems to beg the question against theism. If we assume in advance that God does not exist, then observe the universe does, then we try to find a way to make sense of that. But if you do this, you are question-begging. On the other hand if you simply ask yourself what makes more sense, that there should exist some magical exception where all the state of the universe are contingent, but the first is necessary, (like a series of contingent apple trees where the first is somehow necessary, that is to say, it always existed, had to exist, and cannot have been otherwise), or that there is no exception, that all states are contingent and rather they are explained by something necessary, God,

This doesn’t make sense. By your logic, because the present state of the universe exists for the entire time that the present state of the universe exists (and during that time it is always causing its effect), it must be infinitely old.

 

[Luke_K]

-At least one problem with this thought, is that if the first state is necessary, then so are the other states, since they flow necessarily from the first state. So you are really suggesting that the universe as a whole is necessary. But this is very implausible. A different universe seems conceivable. It seems possible, for instance, that the universe might have expanded more quickly, slower, included a few more planets or a few less. But if this is true, then the universe does not exist necessarily. See the example in the link I gave you on quarks, where the author gives an example using quarks that shows it is not very plausible that the universe existed necessarily.

I don’t mean that the universe exists necessarily. I mean that it’s necessary just by logic that there be some state that is not contingent on another for its existence. There is no reason, no necessity, why the universe exists the way that it does, but does that really mean that it cannot just exist?

• Another problem, your objection seems to beg the question against theism. If we assume in advance that God does not exist, then observe the universe does, then we try to find a way to make sense of that. But if you do this, you are question-begging. On the other hand if you simply ask yourself what makes more sense, that there should exist some magical exception where all the state of the universe are contingent, but the first is necessary, (like a series of contingent apple trees where the first is somehow necessary, that is to say, it always existed, had to exist, and cannot have been otherwise), or that there is no exception, that all states are contingent and rather they are explained by something necessary, God,

It’s not question-begging. I am starting from the point of non-belief in a proposition with an openness to it being true. If God’s uncaused existence offers a better explanation than the universe’s uncaused existence, then we should believe in God.

We may be able to assert that the first state is an exception because we understand how the universe behaves. We can tell that the universe expanded from a singularity, and to talk of anything before that makes no sense and is superfluous. So we say that it just existed. Similarly, we can tell that we are not at the southernmost point on the earth. So we continue to walk south until we reach the south pole. Once we are there, we can’t talk about walking south anymore. We say that the south pole is just where the south begins, and that’s that.

I’m not sure you understand me here, let me try to clarify.
A

1. A feature of any necessary being (whether God or the first state) is that it never began to exist, otherwise it is not necessary.
2. Scientists believe the universe is 13 billion years old.
3. Therefore, the first state of the universe is 13 billion years old.
4. If the first state of the universe is 13 billion years old, then it began to exist.
5. If the first state of the universe began to exist, it is not necessary and dependent for its existence on something else.

The universe did not “begin” to exist, as if it once was not, and then it was. The first state just was, and then by its nature changed to another state.

On the other hand, if you claim that the first state of the universe always existed, then you are denying that the universe is 13 billion years old, which all scientists currently believe, so your view is very radical. Let’s suppose though, that to escape the argument you insist that the first state always existed, and is the cause of the universe. This leads to a substantial problem.

1. If the first state of the universe has always existed and is the cause of the rest of the universe, then you have a temporal effect from a timeless cause.

It is not a timeless cause. It is true that the first state existed at every moment of time which existed, up to that point. This is true just by definition, as time is a measure of change, and no change had occurred during the “time” that it had not changed. That does not mean whatsoever that it is eternal. The first infinitesimal amount of time, which was the first state of the universe, immediately passed onto the next instant of time because of the inherent nature of the particles to change from their initial state.

 

[danserr]

This is very interesting, but I think there are some important principles that you are misunderstanding that is a barrier for you accepting either the Leibniz cosmological. argument. (henceforth LCA) or the KCA. (Also, remember they are two indepdent arguments so an objection to one will not necessarily apply to another).

I don’t mean that the universe exists necessarily. I mean that it’s necessary just by logic that there be some state that is not contingent on another for its existence.

I think I understand you better now. I thought you were objecting to the LCA by arguing that the universe exists necessarily, (since in you first post you seem to imply that the first state could be necessary. Instead, you are asking if the universe could be a brute contingent thing. There is no explanation of its existence, it just does.
-But this denies the first premise of the LCA, “Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own existence, or in an external cause.” Now to be a good argument, you don’t have to prove this premise 100% mathematically, you just have to show that it is more plausible that this premise is true than not. And if it is, then the rational thing to do is believe in it. And this premise definitely seems more plausibly true than false. The Philosopher Richard Taylor gave the example of finding a translucent ball in the woods, you would find absurd the proposition that it just exists inexplicably, and increasing the size of the ball until it is co-extensive with the universe wouldn’t change that. Perhaps you say, “ah, but couldn’t that be true of everything in the universe, but not true of the universe itself.” But this is what Arthur Schopenhauer called “the taxicab fallacy.” Since he said that the causal principle is not something you can dismiss like a taxicab when you have arrived at your destination. So I think this first premise is more plausibly true than not.

If God’s uncaused existence offers a better explanation than the universe’s uncaused existence, then we should believe in God.

• I see, you are troubled by the idea “why can God be uncaused, but the universe not be?”

1. Keep which version of the Cos. Arg. we are discussing in mind, since the answer is different for each arg.
2. The LCA seeks an “explanation” for the universe. It shows that everything in the universe seems to require an explanation outside the necessity of its own existence. And we can give reasons for this, I give one above, for instance. The if the universe has an explanation it must transcend space, time, and matter (because the universe includes all space time matter), and so must be atemporal and immaterial. Only two things fall into the category, abstract objects (like numbers), and minds. Numbers don’t cause anything, so the cause of the universe is an un-embodied mind. But this is how we have always thought of God. On the other hand, though we have a reason to think the universe has an explanation of its existence, we have no comparable reason to think God does.
3. The KCA says everything that began to exist has a cause of its existence, and then seeks to show the universe began to exist (by philosophical arguments such as the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition or scientific arguments like the expansion of the universe from the singularity (big bang cosmology)). So you can see how this means the universe needs a cause, but God does not. God did not begin to exist. We have evidence that the universe began to exist, and things that begin to exist have causes, but we have no evidence that God began to exist, so we justly infer a cause for the universe, but have no reason to infer a cause for God, who is un-caused because He has always existed.

The universe did not “begin” to exist, as if it once was not, and then it was. The first state just was, and then by its nature changed to another state

-but this is very radical, big bang cosmology literally says the universe expanded from a singularity, that space, time, and matter all had their beginning out of nothing. That is to say, it did not exist, and then it did!

• If the first state “just was” then it never began to exist. If it never began to exist, then it is eternal, that is to say it always existed. If it existed unchangeably, and so was practically timeless (because it did not change and time is the measure of change), and is the cause of every subsequent state of the universe, then you have a temporal effect (the universe) from a timeless cause (the first state), and my argument in my previous post for why that cause must be personal still applies.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

What is logically inconsistent with asserting that there was a first state to the universe and that it just. was? Every particulate of matter and energy just existed in their respective places with potential and kinetic energies that defined the first state, and it all went from there to today. No external cause was needed, because it’s just the nature of the universe to change in a certain way based on the initial state.

This is not a solution to the problem of the Big Bang. If the universe always existed in its initial state, what caused the Big Bang to occur? That is, why was it transformed from an eternal static being into a dynamic exploding universe?

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Luke,

Whether finite in the past or infinite, we argue that the universe must be sustained by some temporally necessary being. The next step is to show that this temporally necessary being is plausibly God. Let’s start by defining these terms:

temporally contingent: if X possibly exists at one time and possibly fails to exist at another, then X is temporally contingent.

temporally necessary: if Y exists and cannot fail to exist an any time, then Y is temporally necessary.

Now, the argument:

1. Every existing being is either temporally contingent or temporally necessary. (Definition)
2. Something exists right now. (Premise)
3. Necessarily, if something exists right now, then something has always existed. (Premise)
4. Possibly, there was a time in the past at which nothing temporally contingent existed. (Premise)
5. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists. (Conclusion)
6. Every existing being is either omnipotent or non-omnipotent. (Definition)
7. Possibly, whatever is non-omnipotent can be generated. (Premise)
8. Necessarily, whatever is temporally necessary cannot be generated. (Premise)
9. Therefore, a temporally necessary and omnipotent being exists. (Conclusion)

The argument is logically valid, as demonstrated by reductio ad absurdum:

Assume (10): A temporally necessary being does not exist. (10) and (3) imply together with (1) and (2) that (11): Necessarily, a temporally contingent being has always existed. This contradicts (4), so (10) is false. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists. Let us call this being “N.”

Assume (12): N is non-omnipotent. (12) and (7) imply (13): Possibly, N can be generated. However, (13) contradicts (8). Therefore, N is omnipotent.

So, given the truth of each of these relatively uncontroversial premises, we have a compelling argument for the existence of a temporally necessary and omnipotent being, which as Thomas Aquinas quips, “everyone understands to be God.”

To answer your question, then, the universe cannot be self-sufficient or “just exist” as a brute fact, since the conclusion of (9) refers to a being* that cannot be identical with the universe. Nothing about the universe exemplifies omnipotence and, even if it did, that would be pantheism.

*Although I use the term, “being,” if you feel this word is too anthropocentric, feel free to use “thing” or “entity” instead.

 

[The_Exodus]

It can be a difficult thing to wrap one’s mind around, but I’ll give a shot at trying to explain it.

Anything is contingent if it is not the cause of its own being, and if something is the cause of its own being then it wouldn’t be subject to change. This is because it is already being itself perfectly; if it changes then its being is imperfect, because it can’t be itself in all its permutations at once.

Since the universe was being in one state and then in another, being itself is not part of the nature of the universe. If absolute, necessary being in itself were part of the nature of the universe then one state couldn’t pass out of being, and another state pass into being. The fact that the universe has one state of being and then another is incompatible with being as a fundamental aspect of the nature of the universe.

Only a being that is fundamentally unchanging in its nature can be said to have necessary being by nature. The universe doesn’t fit this description, and therefore nothing within the universe fits this description. We must look outside the universe, beyond anything we know from within the universe, for a necessary being that can explain contingent things like the universe.

Incidentally, even if the universe existed continuously without a beginning it would still be a contingent being for the reasons above, just as a ball that is forever held aloft by a changeless hand is still not the cause of itself being up in the air.

Hope that helps!

Peace and God bless!

Excellent explanation, though I fear it will fall on deaf ears. Many lack the time and desire to study metaphysics. Unfortunately they fail to recognize that the act/potency distinction and the theory of becoming are the best helps for understanding reality as such.

Your post ought to be a sticky. Please to read.

 

[Ghosty]

Luke K:

To my understanding of your post, you basically say that existence itself cannot change, which I agree with. But the universe is not existence itself. Why does something have to be existence itself in order to be uncaused?

If the universe isn’t existence itself, then there has to be a cause of it having existence, plain and simple. The color red doesn’t need an external (to its nature) cause for it being red, but a car that is red does (paint, lighting, ect).

Basically, if a trait isn’t an inherent part of something’s nature, then there must be an external reason for that thing to possess the trait. Since “being” isn’t an inherent trait of the universe, as the universe is constantly changing and its “being” in one moment is not the same “being” of the next, something external to the universe must be constantly giving being to the universe, just as the paint gives the car color. After all, if being was an inherent trait of the universe it shouldn’t change, because whatever state it had would have permanent being by definition, just as if “red” were part of the very definition of “car”, cars would always be red.

So just as the car is contingently red, the universe has contingent being. In short, the universe is not existence itself (as you yourself say), and therefore existence is something external to the universe.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

Hastrman:

Because you can conceive of a universe with any number of different traits, including one that does not exist.

You actually can’t conceive of a universe that doesn’t exist. If you can conceive it, it exists as an idea at the very least. Conversely, just because you can conceive of something doesn’t mean it exists as anything other than an idea. This is why St. Anselm’s “proof of God” falls flat, since just because we can conceive of something which is the greatest of all things doesn’t mean it exists outside the mind. Even our conception of it existing outside the mind is simply an idea and not an external necessity.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Hastrman]

You actually can’t conceive of a universe that doesn’t exist. If you can conceive it, it exists as an idea at the very least.

Sigh.

Something that exists only as an idea does not exist except potentially—this is why we can say “unicorns do not exist” even though there is nothing inherently self-contradictory about the concept of a unicorn; the only things which do not exist even as ideas are contradictions in terms, which are meaningless. A thing which only exists as an idea has no actual existence. One can conceive of a universe not existing; solecism—the proposition that only whatever observer is doing the thinking exists—is not an inherently contradictory position, it’s just extremely unlikely. Even in solecism, however, there must be the concept “existence”—because even in solecism there’s nothing intrinsic about the hypothetically-solely-existent observer that they should exist at all.

 

[Ghosty]

Sigh.

Something that exists only as an idea does not exist except potentially—this is why we can say “unicorns do not exist” even though there is nothing inherently self-contradictory about the concept of a unicorn; the only things which do not exist even as ideas are contradictions in terms, which are meaningless. A thing which only exists as an idea has no actual existence. One can conceive of a universe not existing; solecism—the proposition that only whatever observer is doing the thinking exists—is not an inherently contradictory position, it’s just extremely unlikely. Even in solecism, however, there must be the concept “existence”—because even in solecism there’s nothing intrinsic about the hypothetically-solely-existent observer that they should exist at all.

My point is that conceiving of something as not existing doesn’t mean that the thing can potentially not exist. I can conceive of God not existing, but this does not mean it’s possible for God not to exist; existence is inherent in the concept of God, but I can conceive of God not existing in actuallity. Likewise, conceiving of a universe with the trait of non-existence does not prove that the universe doesn’t have existence as an inherent trait, it just means that the universe in your idea does not.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Luke_K]

Luke K:

If the universe isn’t existence itself, then there has to be a cause of it having existence, plain and simple. The color red doesn’t need an external (to its nature) cause for it being red, but a car that is red does (paint, lighting, ect).

Basically, if a trait isn’t an inherent part of something’s nature, then there must be an external reason for that thing to possess the trait. Since “being” isn’t an inherent trait of the universe, as the universe is constantly changing and its “being” in one moment is not the same “being” of the next, something external to the universe must be constantly giving being to the universe, just as the paint gives the car color. After all, if being was an inherent trait of the universe it shouldn’t change, because whatever state it had would have permanent being by definition, just as if “red” were part of the very definition of “car”, cars would always be red.

So just as the car is contingently red, the universe has contingent being. In short, the universe is not existence itself (as you yourself say), and therefore existence is something external to the universe.

I’ll just have to wait and see if I don’t

Peace and God bless!

Fair enough. The first state cannot inherently exist because if existence were part of its nature it would not cease to exist. If, as I proposed in the original post, the first state inherently existed and inherently changed, then that is a contradiction. It can’t be the nature of something to just exist and then not exist.

I’ll just have to wait and see if I have a problem with accepting that later (after it has had time to soak in some more).
The Exodus:

Excellent explanation, though I fear it will fall on deaf ears. Many lack the time and desire to study metaphysics. Unfortunately they fail to recognize that the act/potency distinction and the theory of becoming are the best helps for understanding reality as such.

My ears are not deaf. Not all of us are meant to study metaphysics, but all of us should be able to understand through reason alone that God exists.

 

[Ghosty]

Luke:

Fair enough. The first state cannot inherently exist because if existence were part of its nature it would not cease to exist. If, as I proposed in the original post, the first state inherently existed and inherently changed, then that is a contradiction. It can’t be the nature of something to just exist and then not exist.

Exactly. I think you’ve got a good handle on the problem with a universe that “just exists” but is also constantly in flux. That understanding is what turned me away from atheism, incidentally. It’s a very easy thing to overlook though, and that’s why I think it doesn’t often come up in discussions with atheists. Once it’s brought up, however, I think it’s a game-changer in the discussion as it puts the atheist position clearly on the defensive.

I’ll just have to wait and see if I have a problem with accepting that later (after it has had time to soak in some more).

If you find an answer to it, please share it. I’ve noodled this one for years and I’m looking for a good hole in the argument. A fresh pair of eyes is always appreciated.

Peace and God bless!