P
Passionknight
Guest
Sorry… “The Principle”
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T
tonyrey
Guest
An invalid deduction which overlooks divine transcendence and creativity.
To exist necessarily is not the same as to **act **necessarily.
T
tonyrey
Guest
God did not kill His Son nor does He want to redeem sinners who hate Him…
B
belorg
Guest
I have heard this assertion countless times, Tony, but up till now nobody has been able to explain what exactly that means.
Perhaps you can give it a try?
E
empther
Guest
It never ends! 
Post 24
tonyrey’s post 22
Do you see, friends, how post 24 changes, and indeed completely erases, the meaning of tonyrey’s post 22 by eliminating belorg’s ----
It never ends!
Post 24
tonyrey’s post 22
Do you see, friends, how post 24 changes, and indeed completely erases, the meaning of tonyrey’s post 22 by eliminating belorg’s ----
? :bigyikes: :banghead:
It never ends!
B
belorg
Guest
You are of course also welcome to give it a try, empther.It never ends!
Post 24
tonyrey’s post 22
Do you see, friends, how post 24 changes, and indeed completely erases, the meaning of tonyrey’s post 22 by eliminating belorg’s ----
? :bigyikes: :banghead:
It never ends!
T
tonyrey
Guest
B
belorg
Guest
Sure I can.
What is being wanted is this universe, ‘the way it is’.
Actually I probably am ‘compelled’ to want what I want. I don’t see any reason why, under the exact same circusmatnces, the exact same me would do anything different.
I want what I want because I am who I am.
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empther
Guest
Sure I can.
:coffeeread:
J
jochoa
Guest
From my studies of God, the main meaning for us, resulting from the way the creation was done, is giving us freedom from God’s friendship, while giving us the assistance to guide us back to friendship with God.
A couple examples of how creation serves both purposes:
The freedom from God’s friendship can be obtained through perceiving the possibility of complex life forms forming from non-living existence.
God’s assistance in guiding us back can be perceived in the universality of all life forms:
All life forms have needs. Freer life forms have wants. When life forms get what is needed, the life forms experience contentment. When life forms get what is wanted, the life forms experience joy.
Therefore, the universal pinnacle of any living being is getting everything needed and an unlimited number of wants fulfilled for the experience of unbreakable peace with unending joy AKA God’s Heavenly Kingdom.
Thanks for sharing the interesting question! I look forward to further discussion.
T
tonyrey
Guest
[/QUOTE]
E
empther
Guest
:coffeeread:
OK. We’ve waited long enough.
Let’s see how long it takes me to find the answer…
Oh, look! It took me two minutes.
Aquinas: Summa Theologica
Question 19. The will of God
Article 3 Does God necessarily will what he wills?
newadvent.org/summa/1019.htm#article3
Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.
supposition: something that is supposed; assumption; hypothesis. i.e., not absolutely necessary to exist ]
From the 'I answer": Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change. ]
Objection 2. Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
Reply to Objection 2. Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.
Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (2, 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
Reply to Objection 3. It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.
Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
Reply to Objection 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.
Objection 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
Reply to Objection 6. As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
B
belorg
Guest
E
empther
Guest
???
:coffeeread:
Just give us the post #
:coffeeread:
Didn’t notice my post 32 ?
H
hope19
Guest
Yeah, without God, we are nothing.Well it works!
I also like to think that God wants us to realize how small we are in the universe.
How much large are we compared to God?
B
belorg
Guest
#28, and your #32 is a beautiful illustration of what I mean by assertions.???
:coffeeread:
Just give us the post #
:coffeeread:
Didn’t notice my post 32 ?
E
empther
Guest
#28 is your own post ! :bigyikes:
:extrahappy:#32 is all Aquinas. Can you refute him?
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belorg
Guest
You asked me to “Just give us the post #” in which I justified my assumption.#28 is your own post ! :bigyikes:
I did so in my post #28.
There is hardly any argument in #32, so if you don’t mind, I am not going to waste my time on assertions.#32 is all Aquinas. Can you refute him?
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