Why do you doubt the Ontological Argument?

[MindOverMatter]

mfefasdfasdfawfqwefqwfqwfrqwefeqwwwwwwwwwwwwwweqevgfbasjdfgasjkfhoehiaiowehfkl;awefh;pqfhpqehiopwefhoqwiehffhwdiovfhsdipfhwpeiofrhwe;fhl;akhFO;ghpowerghpsdhfoehjroftrqweftr9pqwefy8903yr5-239ryq39-fjnf’opefthpdegyu34957t573ry0-3th-293t9qef0-tu-24u000000000000000000000111111111178348489-------------292838021342400000000000000002312730000000000030000000000110000000000011110100000101000001010010100101001010101001001010101010100000000010101010010110110000000000011100000000000000000000000000000000!!!:hypno: :hypno: :hypno: :hypno: :hypno: :hypno:

 

[cpayne]

How can any reasonable person dare even concieve of questioning the notion that Being is greater then non-being?!!

It seems pretty obvious to me, as obvious as the notion that i exist; so i must be missing something?

Let me re-phrase.

When thinking of the Greatest Conceivable Being, one has to think of the properties that make something great. (Philosophers, in their typical clumsy fashion, sometimes refer to these as “Great-Making Properties.” )

Kant pointed out that existence as such is not a great-making predicate or property. For example, it wouldn’t seem to make much sense for me to say, “My car is gold-colored, about ten years old, runs well, and also exists in reality.” The other predicates imply the last one, and the last one doesn’t really add anything to the description. So existence as such is not a meaningful predicate even of a Greatest Conceivable Being.

People who support the Ontological Argument, however, point out that NECESSARY existence actually is a “great-making property,” and so the Greatest Conceivable Being would possess necessary existence.

This is what I was mentioning in my other post. Hope this helps.

 

[1holycatholic]

Let me re-phrase.

When thinking of the Greatest Conceivable Being, one has to think of the properties that make something great. (Philosophers, in their typical clumsy fashion, sometimes refer to these as “Great-Making Properties.” )

Kant pointed out that existence as such is not a great-making predicate or property. For example, it wouldn’t seem to make much sense for me to say, “My car is gold-colored, about ten years old, runs well, and also exists in reality.” The other predicates imply the last one, and the last one doesn’t really add anything to the description. So existence as such is not a meaningful predicate even of a Greatest Conceivable Being.

People who support the Ontological Argument, however, point out that NECESSARY existence actually is a “great-making property,” and so the Greatest Conceivable Being would possess necessary existence.

This is what I was mentioning in my other post. Hope this helps.

Wouldn’t necessary existence be the greatest conceivable attribute of the greatest conceivable being? :coffeeread:

 

[MindOverMatter]

the Greatest Conceivable Being would possess necessary existence.

In order for anything to exist, there has to be such a thing as existence or being. If the greatest conceivable being only exists because there is such a thing as existence, then it is not by its nature the greatest conceivable being. The greatest conceivable being is that which allows other things to exist and has no cause other then itself; therefore the greatest conceivable being is existence; for it exists by its nature of being existence itself, and so cannot fail to exist and niether can it be cause by anything else.

 

[MindOverMatter]

dfghfggwdgergaerbhegwgwgergwg!!!

 

[Ghosty]

Let me re-phrase.

When thinking of the Greatest Conceivable Being, one has to think of the properties that make something great. (Philosophers, in their typical clumsy fashion, sometimes refer to these as “Great-Making Properties.” )

Kant pointed out that existence as such is not a great-making predicate or property. For example, it wouldn’t seem to make much sense for me to say, “My car is gold-colored, about ten years old, runs well, and also exists in reality.” The other predicates imply the last one, and the last one doesn’t really add anything to the description. So existence as such is not a meaningful predicate even of a Greatest Conceivable Being.

People who support the Ontological Argument, however, point out that NECESSARY existence actually is a “great-making property,” and so the Greatest Conceivable Being would possess necessary existence.

This is what I was mentioning in my other post. Hope this helps.

Those of us who follow a more Thomistic philosophy, however, would point out that “exists in reality” is indeed a reasonable property, since something can “exist mentally” and still be real. An idea is indeed real, and has real properties, and can interact really with other ideas (I can mentally set a house on fire, for example), but that doesn’t mean that these things exist really outside the mind.

This is why I say that even “necessary existence” is not necessarily an “actuality making” property, since it can exist in a mental idea without necessitating that the mental idea exist outside the mind that conceived it. So while existence is indeed a real property, and is greater than non-existence (I think Kant’s entire philosophy is weak, especially in this instance), it’s not necessary for a mentally-conceived “necessary being” to exist outside the mind. This is the heart of St. Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of the GCB argument.

The only way for the GCB to do what it’s intended to do would be in the Platonic metaphysical model were indeed true, but I think the Platonic model is soundly refuted by other models, most notably Aristotle’s.

Peace and God bless!

 

[cpayne]

and so cannot fail to exist

Yes.

 

[cpayne]

it’s not necessary for a mentally-conceived “necessary being” to exist outside the mind. This is the heart of St. Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of the GCB argument.

The only way for the GCB to do what it’s intended to do would be in the Platonic metaphysical model were indeed true, but I think the Platonic model is soundly refuted by other models, most notably Aristotle’s.

Peace and God bless!

Well, yeah. I think I already agreed with this. I don’t think the OA accomplishes all that Anselm had in mind. But it does show that if God exists, God exists necessarily—and this could lead to the other argument I mentioned back in post 37.

 

[JDaniel]

The Greatest Conceivable Being is still, by definition, imagined and not actual. It’s real, but only real in the mind; it doesn’t necessarily have its own actual reality, and therefore “necessary existence” remains an imagined trait of an imaginary being, not something that turns an imagined being into an actual being.

Peace and God bless!

Good morning, Ghosty:

Try not to think of the definition of “conceive” as only meaning, “conjuring up”. Here is its definition:

“1 a: to become pregnant with (young) b: to cause to begin : originate <a project conceived by the company’s founder>
2 a: to take into one’s mind b: to form a conception of : imagine
3: to apprehend by reason or imagination : understand
4: to have as an opinion
intransitive verb
1: to become pregnant
2: to have a conception —usually used with of” - Merriam-Webster

I belive that what Anselm meant was from the earlier definition of the word, which would be (for things mental) definitions number 2 and 3. Thus, the GCB does not have to be simply “imagined”. It is “apprehended” in the same sense as, when observing a tree, we apprehend it as a tree.

Does this make the OA have more sense?

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

 

[JDaniel]

Ever since Kant, the answer has been: Probably not. But most people who argue for the Ontological Argument change the question slightly: “Is the quality of NECESSARY existence greater than non-existence, or greater than simply existing?” The anwer to this is: “Probably.” So the debate over the OA continues.

Correct. In fact, it changed the question to: “Is the quality of “necessary” existence greater than the quality of “contingent” existence, as contingent existence is essentially the same as non-existence.”

And, this IS the more proper question. Clearly, necessary existence is greater than contingent existence.

As you so adroitly said, “So the debate over the OA continues.”

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

 

[JDaniel]

How can any reasonable person dare even concieve of questioning the notion that Being is greater then non-being?!!

It seems pretty obvious to me, as obvious as the notion that i exist; so i must be missing something?

Of course, you’re missing a good dose of “non-reality”. Sort of like the jurors on the OJ court case :imsorry:

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

 

[JDaniel]

Those of us who follow a more Thomistic philosophy, however, would point out that “exists in reality” is indeed a reasonable property, since something can “exist mentally” and still be real. An idea is indeed real, and has real properties, and can interact really with other ideas (I can mentally set a house on fire, for example), but that doesn’t mean that these things exist really outside the mind.

This is why I say that even “necessary existence” is not necessarily an “actuality making” property, since it can exist in a mental idea without necessitating that the mental idea exist outside the mind that conceived it. So while existence is indeed a real property, and is greater than non-existence (I think Kant’s entire philosophy is weak, especially in this instance), it’s not necessary for a mentally-conceived “necessary being” to exist outside the mind. This is the heart of St. Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of the GCB argument.

The only way for the GCB to do what it’s intended to do would be in the Platonic metaphysical model were indeed true, but I think the Platonic model is soundly refuted by other models, most notably Aristotle’s.

Peace and God bless!

Hi, Ghosty:

You are an astute Thomist! I have to agree with everything you mentioned above. I have one problem though . . . I can’t imagine that Anselm arrived at his argument without considering the amalgamation of all of the attributes of God simultaneously.

Thus, the OA would be a posteriori (inductive) reasoning. In the example given earlier of the car: “it is red, 10 years old, runs smoothly, and exists,” existence would be a pre-supposition and unnecessary to iterate. But, the car actually exists.

Thus, if the OA is really an a posteriori argument, would not the existence of existence merely be self-admitting? In other words, would not the OA then be an “apprehension” of existence, rather than a “creation” of it?

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

 

[MindOverMatter]

Of course, you’re missing a good dose of “non-reality”. Sort of like the jurors on the OJ court case :imsorry:

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

Do you disagree with me?

Let me clarify.

Non-being is not a being. This at least means that if there are beings, there is at least one being that is the greatest, insofar as it cannot fail to exist and is greater then all other beings. Otherwise, we would be getting something from nothing. We would get potentiality from nothing, since with out neccesity, nothing would exist absolutely; providing nothing and strangling potentiality by the throat. There for ultimate reality does not exist potentailly but absolutely. In this respect, so far as the principle of potentaility cannot be applied to ultimate being, Ultimate being is greater then none being; because it cannot fail to exists. I can make this distinction baring in mind the fact of neccesity and its absolute opposition to non-being as a concept. Correct? Thus such a being is perfect.

In fact, Gods being is synonomous with perfection and neccesity. There really is no difference. And once you realise this, the OA is understood correctly. God does not have perfection as a property, but is perfection. He is perfection. Perfection is that which cannot fail to exist; there for perfection exists. no?

Perhaps the OA really doesn’t work?

 

[JDaniel]

Do you disagree with me?

NO, I don’t disagree. I agree. That’s why I used the word, “non-reality”!:bigyikes:

Merry Christmas and
God Bless,
JD

 

[Ghosty]

Cpayne:

Well, yeah. I think I already agreed with this. I don’t think the OA accomplishes all that Anselm had in mind. But it does show that if God exists, God exists necessarily—and this could lead to the other argument I mentioned back in post 37.

I should say that my post wasn’t so much directed towards convincing you of anything, but merely at using your post as a jump-off point to highlight one of my problems with the GCB argument.

JDaniel:

Thus, if the OA is really an a posteriori argument, would not the existence of existence merely be self-admitting? In other words, would not the OA then be an “apprehension” of existence, rather than a “creation” of it?

This is an interesting point, and one I hadn’t considered as a support of the GCB argument, but I do think that ultimately it fails.

The reason I think it fails is that I don’t see how we actually apprehend the “Greatest Conceivable Being” through any kind of rational thought. We simply can’t know “absolute necessary existence” on a rational, philosophical level; it’s utterly outside of anything we can naturally experience or comprehend. We can construct a mental category based on “apophatic” reasoning (meaning that we can make a place-holder for the idea by defining what it’s not, i.e. it doesn’t depend on anything else for existence), but we don’t have any first-hand experience of this idea apart from the direct experience of Grace and the sharing of Divine Life (and even then it goes beyond our rational ability to define).

In other words, when we speak rationally about the “Greatest Conceivable Being”, we’re not talking about something we apprehend or experience, but rather about something we ***don’t ***and can’t (on a natural, rationalistic level, whether purely mentally, or through our senses). What we’re talking about is actually nothing more than a mental construct, just as much as if we were talking about the ice-cream cone the size of the universe. In fact, it’s even more of a purely mental construct since it’s built from negations and not from anything that can actually be known in a rational way.

I’ll stress that I do believe that there are sound philosophical, rational, metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, such as the “First Cause” arguments (these arguments, in essence, were the beginning of the end of my “devout Atheism”), and also that I do believe that through Grace we do in fact have a direct experience of the Greatest Being, but I don’t believe that the Ontological Argument adequately expresses either.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Blade_and_Blood]

Wow! Thanks:thumbsup: . But whats up with jealousy? Thats not an attribute of God.

Oh yeah, it is. Many Christians refer to God as being a jealous God. Keep the Commandments in mind.

Ironically Yours.

 

[Dameedna]

Uh, because another member - whose (name removed by moderator)ut I value - suggested it.

God bless,
JD

Sorry then my apologies.

There is really no “doubting” it. It’s just meaningless that’s all.

my 2cs