God is defined as changeless as well. Thus, the same argument applies in reverse as I already explained.
Well, I guess this could be approached in two different ways:
(i) God’s “changelessness” is of character or quality, not of action. If His changelessness was of action then He could never have any affect upon the universe that was a continual affect.
(ii) Even if God’s “changelessness” is of action because He is outside time and all moments in time are present to Him, there is no reason why He could not eternally affect changes at specific points along time, just as an author does with the plot of a book.
Yes it does, or else you are committing the special pleading logical fallacy…Yes it would be the case for a personal cause. Or else, you are committing the special pleading fallacy. It seems you have a bad habit of making illogical statements.
It’s not special pleading. A personal entity has a mind and can will things, whereas laws or abstract objects do not. It would only be true, if you assume the above argument (that is, that God is “changeless” and therefore cannot personally affect change) to be true.
If you’re going to deny personal causation as “special pleading”, then it’s like equating the decision of a small boy not to eat chocolate ice-cream but instead have vanilla with the law of gravity.
Ok, it has to be an immaterial cause. This doesn’t mean it has to be God. To make that claim, you would have to rule out all other immaterial possibilities, even ones that haven’t been thought up of yet
I agree, that’s why we have to consider abstract objects, laws, and so on. But I don’t see these as causally efficacious in the way a mind would be. How on earth is someone supposed to rule out immaterial possibilities that haven’t been thought up? Are you serious? Sure, I agree, we should keep an open mind but we always philosophise from what we know
now, not what we could hypothetically know in 5,000 years time, or else we could never say anything about anything. The question is: taking what we know, what is the most reasonable or likely cause? And I think it is some kind of mind.
Just because you cannot think of anything else, doesn’t mean there isn’t anything else. This is called the argument from ignorance logical fallacy you are committing.
Now who’s special pleading! Agnostic, if you can give me even one example that is causally efficacious, that’s something, but I think it’s unfair to expect somebody to deny the most reasonable conclusion based on hypothetical possibilities that we don’t even know.
It doesn’t look like a true dichotomy, because this notion has not been defended. Also, you are switching the burden of proof. I do not have to show it’s a false dichotomy, you have to show it’s a true dichotomy. Regardless, it’s a false dichotomy, because a non-sentient per-universe has not been ruled out. Until you rule this out logically or metaphysically, then what you are proposing isn’t a true dichotomy.
Well, it looks like a dichotomy to me, and not to you, and since neither of us seem to be able to prove to the other’s satisfaction, we may just have to agree to disagree. I’m willing to assume it’s a false dichotomy but I do need something to back this us.
False-analogy. Using what we know of, makes sense when dealing with what we know. However you are trying to use what we know, in an area we don’t know (no space or time). Thus, this analogy is not valid.
I don’t think so. What if hypothetically there is a quality that is neither wet nor dry and it is in fact
this quality that water has, but we just don’t know. Is this logically impossible? I guess not. So we have to keep an open mind on the matter. To me, this sounds like nonsense and makes a hash of all attempts at knowing the world. I think the issue with the cause is the same.
Now, what do we know about a “pre-universe” state: there’s no space and no time, essentially
nothing material. Okay. we need to look at all possibilities, keeping an open mind. However, just because there could be all sorts of logical possibilities that we don’t know (just as with water being wet or dry or X), it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t opt for the most likely possibility.
This is a logically contradictory statement. Nothing means non-existence, thus a pre-universe cannot be non-existence, because the pre-universe would exist…Switching the burden of proof fallacy. If you claim a pre-universe is nothing, you have to explain why. You cannot make a statement, and then ask me to prove you wrong. That’s illogical. If you make a statement, you have to prove it correct.
Okay, I should have said “nothing material”. But even so, what is this “pre-universe”? If it exists, what is it? What properties does it have that are causally effective?
I’m asking that if you want to suggest a third possibility, it has to be a live possibility. If there was a pre-universal state from which the universe began (as an efficient cause) it would have to be causally efficacious. Okay, how could it be so?
That’s not shifting the burden of proof, that’s trying to see whether such a pre-universal state is actually a live option. I mean, I could say, “Before the universe, there existed the state: ‘3’ as an abstract object” but obviously the state ‘3’ would not be able to cause anything because it’s an abstract object, so it’s not a live option.