The problem there is when you have heterosexual individuals who cannot reproduce naturally. While the CC may or may not permit such individuals from getting married, you see no cry from say, Evangelicals, to prevent such individuals from getting married. Marriage is not about procreation scripturally speaking. Its about preventing fornication.
The reasoning in the article does not in any way lead to the conclusion that infertile individuals cannot get married.
Also, if you don’t mind, in this thread I will not be addressing the Catholic Church, Scripture, Evangelicals, fornication, etc. in this context. We’re dealing here with matters of public policy in the United States, which means that religious motives and reasons - while not irrelevant - cannot Constitutionally be the basis for laws. With that principle I at least wholeheartedly agree.
That’s a matter of semantics because individuals who wish to marry persons of their same gender are prevented from doing so.
But to put it that way - “individuals who wish to marry persons of their same gender” - presupposes in the first place that it is valid to speak of such an arrangement as “marriage.”
That is the very thing in dispute, so to call it semantics is to beg the question.
What private organizations do and what the government does are not always the same, nor is failure the provide a service the same thing as using the law to prevent certain services to be provided.
(1) True, but if eHarmony’s limited options did not constitute discrimination, neither does a state’s refusal to legally restructure the existing institution of marriage.
(2) Concerning the providing of “certain services,” I agree that people should be able to leave their property to whomever they want, give power of attorney to whoever they want, permit hospital visitation rights to whomever they want, etc. But that’s not the same thing as gay marriage, or even gay civil unions, which single-out same-sex relationships specifically and which we do not need to fix the law to ensure that individuals’ practical rights - whatever the context - are protected.
Same to you actually, I didn’t even plan to enter into other ‘debates’ on this thread, I just saw this and it caught my attention. Thanks for posting the material.
No problem. Both sides of this debate are guilty of caricaturing the other and of legally dubious rationales, so I wanted to inject into the debate what I consider the actual valid argument for maintaining the traditional marriage structure.
Well, yes it does, the current system in some areas do not permit marriage between people of the same sex. Regardless of whether that is the way it has always been, it is still preventing homosexual marriage.
Well, this is the very thing in dispute. If a relationship between two same-sex individuals cannot constitute what marriage is and ought to be understood
to be, then by definition it’s not “marriage” that’s being prevented.
But I respectfully acknowledge that therein lies the dispute: a relationship between two same-sex individuals can indeed be a valid marriage according to what George in the article I linked to calls “the revisionist view” of marriage.
It’s just that many people in this country - including me - hold rather to what George in the article calls “the conjugal view,” i.e. the one that sees organic bodily union and procreative potential as basic reasons for legally recognizing any particular kind of sexual relationship in the first place.
Indeed, why is it preventing that? How is that a good thing to do? The reasons it offered in the abstract … discriminate against homosexuals by preventing them the same rights of heterosexuals.
Well, no. If marriage is - and again, I acknowledge this is the very thing in dispute - an exclusive and permanent union between two individuals capable of organic bodily union that is the type of act which naturally results in human reproduction, then it’s not discrimination to refuse to recognize under the umbrella of the institution other kinds of sexual relationships.
In other words, it’s only discrimination according to the newer view of marriage, and as the definition of marriage itself is what is in dispute, neither side should legally be allowed to offer reasons that presuppose either definition. The charge of discrimination
does presuppose what George in the article calls “the revisionist view.”
The term “conjugal” does not necessarily imply male and female, it implies marriage
True, sorry for the ambiguity. In the context of the article I linked to above - which sparked our particular exchange - “conjugal” is used according to the legal and social context that necessarily includes the capacity for organic bodily union. Obviously this is not something same-sex individuals are capable of - which is not to discredit or belittle in any way the love a same-sex couple have for each other.