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Peter_Plato
Guest
This, Bradski, is precisely the crux of the difference between a morality founded on God and one that is not. It is the differing ontologies upon which the two moralities are based that make all the difference.We all think there’s a purpose to life. It wouldn’t disappear if we all suddenly found out that there was no God. You can try this if you like. Tell your wife that if there wasn’t a God then there wouldn’t be any purpose in staying together. There wouldn’t be a purpose in loving her and the children. There would be no reason not to hop into bed with that cute girl down the supermarket who seems to like you. Tell her that your life would become utterly meaningless.
Make sure the bed in the spare room is made up before you do. You’ll be spending a lot of time in there.
If God does not exist and eliminative materialism is true then human beings are “merely” complex processing machines and in the end the value of any particular human simply ends when the component parts stop functioning. “Value” is simply an endowed characteristic that in reality is ephemeral and only as meaningful as the valuer can muster and only for the duration that they do.
If God, as intentional ground of being itself, exists and the value of human beings is grounded in the nature of being itself as the valuing Ground of existence, then that makes a great difference in terms of what it means to value another person and why we do. If a human person is potentially immortal, has subsistent subjective existence and valued because their personhood is integral to their nature, then the nature of “valuing” is set to a completely different standard.
The point being that the nature of the object of value determines the objective value that is imputed to it. If human beings are, in reality, NOTHING BUT complex chemical processes then the inherent value imputed to human beings has a certain degree of warrant, but that degree of value is far below the value warranted if human beings are immortal and have inherent value imputed by the intentional nature of Being itself.
I would argue that it is the very nature of the object valued that reasonably determines its value, so the view that we have about that nature makes all the difference in terms of the value we are warranted to impute to the “things” we value.
Given that a “devalued” concept of what a human being is is an essential aspect of atheistic materialism, I would argue that atheistic morality is, in principle, deficient relative to theistic morality.
This says nothing of the actual moral stance taken by any particular atheist since the manner in which a particular person is valued by another may far exceed the warrant of their ideology. Similarly, a theist may not fully realize the implications of their belief system and woefully underestimate the value of others in moral determinations.
What I am arguing is that the belief systems themselves make a difference in terms of the moral warrant those who subscribe to a particular belief system have for “valuing” others, since the belief systems make very different claims about the nature of who or what it is that is valued.
It is simply false to conclude that a belief system that endows absolute value on human existence will, in the final analysis, have no different moral implications than a belief system that claims human beings are nothing but chemical processes with no enduring existence.