Why don't the ends justify the means but God can permit evil to draw out a greater good?

[Peter_Plato]

If I ponder about one of my opinions and then decide to discard it, it doesn’t mean that I didn’t believe in that opinion. It just means I changed my mind; that is, I used to believe it, and then I didn’t believe it. It’s extremely convoluted to argue that I never “truly” believed it to begin with. (It’s reminiscent of the “No True Scotsman” fallacy.) What, then, would be your definition of “opinion”?

Why the compunction to “believe” things, then? Especially when you have a reasonable assurance that you will change your mind in the foreseeable future?

It seems to me that a better MO is to begin with a certain level of skepticism and withhold confident assent until the ideas have proved themselves worthy of some level of assurance. Opinions would concern those beliefs that haven’t proven themselves completely but are, at this point, better than any of the alternatives. This way, there is no need to backtrack on “beliefs” because the truth and what constitutes it would have been the foremost aim.

As to the “no true Scotsman” fallacy, the only reason it seems worthy of mention is because a weak definition of “Scotsman” was assumed to begin with. Why not merely take the time to clearly define what a ‘Scotsman’ is to begin with?

The same, by the way, applies to the “no true ‘Catholic’” argument I foresee arising from your demographic view of what a ‘Catholic’ is to mean. There are different ‘senses’ to what the word ‘Catholic’ refers and the problem is that some will use it in the loosest possible sense to denigrate the core teachings of the Church as if the failure of some to live up to them reflects poorly on the validity of the teachings themselves. It would seem, to me at least, that if an identifiable set of teachings is clearly set forth by the Church then the validity of those teachings can only be judged by the ‘Catholics’ who fully exemplify them.

It is why this group of Catholics exists that ought to provide the “predictor” data for “their religion” since they are the ones who truly endorse it. Why would data concerning those who are only nominally “Catholic,” or less, be used as key data since the conclusion seems to be a trivial one. Those "Catholics” born in Catholic countries will be more likely to be those born in Catholic countries. How meaningless is that?

A more important question is, “What are the principle reasons that those who adhere closely to religious beliefs do so?” I seriously doubt that the reason “I give my body to be burned in defense of my belief in God” will have “because I was born in a Catholic country” as its supporting clause.

 

[VonRupp]

Well, God created everything, right? He knew everything we would do the moment he created us. Indeed, he could have made us differently if he didn’t like whatever outcome he foresaw. Since he made everything, every event is a consequence of God’s actions.

There’s really no way that statement could be false with a creator god. In order for an event to not be a consequence of God’s actions, it would have to occur independently of God’s creation. In metaphysical terms, it would have to be another necessary being. But in Christian theology, God is the only necessary being.

But my question is, do you think that we have grounds to understand that creation and the totality and aggregation of all the consequences of Creation, when you said before that we humans can hardly guess at the consequences of our own individual actions? You seem to be coming from a viewpoint that we have adequate enough knowledge of this material world to make a judgment on the morality of the Creator of it. That claims just seems ridiculous, considering that so many people don’t consider the consequences of things like smoking, not brushing, overeating, etc.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Well, God created everything, right? He knew everything we would do the moment he created us. Indeed, he could have made us differently if he didn’t like whatever outcome he foresaw. Since he made everything, every event is a consequence of God’s actions.

There’s really no way that statement could be false with a creator god. In order for an event to not be a consequence of God’s actions, it would have to occur independently of God’s creation. In metaphysical terms, it would have to be another necessary being. But in Christian theology, God is the only necessary being.

These are weak arguments, at best, since they presume a “hampered” God to begin with. That is, God could not have the potency to bring good out of evil, would not tolerate free agency and would not allow any state of existence except a directly causal order. Your view of God seems much like a parent who will NOT tolerate, much less allow, a child to learn by trial and error as if indoctrination, coercion or Skinnerian behaviorism would be the only means open to “omniscience” and “omnipotence.” The way I read your argument is that in your view, “omnipotence” must be limited to what YOU can carry out and “omniscience” limited to what YOU can conceive. I have no reason to accept either of those presumptions, BUT am fully willing to allow that God, properly conceived, is not limited to the ways and means that a finite being, like me, CAN conceive or realize.

 

[Oreoracle]

Why the compunction to “believe” things, then? Especially when you have a reasonable assurance that you will change your mind in the foreseeable future?

That’s like asking why we have theories in science when we know they’ll be revised later. We acknowledge them as approximations of the truth. If you try to wait until you’re absolutely certain of a theory before you’re willing to use it, well, let’s just say humanity wouldn’t have made it very far. You certainly wouldn’t have a computer with which to type, for example, because the creation of computers requires the application of theories of which we aren’t certain. Almost all beliefs are provisional.

And if we are “sure enough” of a theory to be willing to use it with the confidence that it won’t somehow backfire, it seems reasonable to say we believe it. We might acknowledge that it isn’t completely true down to the smallest details, but we certainly believe the gist of it.

I’ll give what I think is a very telling example. I just need you to answer one question first: Do you believe that the arithmetic you were taught in school is correct? That is, you believe in it as more than a matter of opinion?

 

[Oreoracle]

You seem to be coming from a viewpoint that we have adequate enough knowledge of this material world to make a judgment on the morality of the Creator of it.

If we can recognize even one consequence as being evil, that is enough to get the Problem of Evil off the ground. This is because, if you’re omnipotent and omniscient, evil is never necessary to bring about any good. Since the universe could be perfect, any imperfection suggests that God is slacking off.

So we don’t have to be correct about every aspect of the universe. We just need to be correct about a single detail.

 

[tonyrey]

It’s not an assumption. But it’s true that I didn’t explain it, so I will explain now.

The world works the way it does ultimately because of the interplay between the laws of physics. It is important to realize that the laws of physics are NOT the laws of logic–they are contingencies. God could change the laws of physics, and thus the workings of the universe, at his whim.

He could make death impossible, bacteria and viruses unnecessary, reproduction painless and voluntary, nutrition optional, the tectonic plates stable at all times, etc. This might seem difficult to arrange for a human, but everything is infinitely simple to an omniscient being.

Omnipotence does not imply inconsistency which would defeat the purpose of creating the laws of nature. The immense complexity of the universe necessarily entails coincidences which cause misfortunes. An earthly Utopia is a fantasy.

 

[Peter_Plato]

That’s like asking why we have theories in science when we know they’ll be revised later. We acknowledge them as approximations of the truth. If you try to wait until you’re absolutely certain of a theory before you’re willing to use it, well, let’s just say humanity wouldn’t have made it very far. You certainly wouldn’t have a computer with which to type, for example, because the creation of computers requires the application of theories of which we aren’t certain. Almost all beliefs are provisional.

And if we are “sure enough” of a theory to be willing to use it with the confidence that it won’t somehow backfire, it seems reasonable to say we believe it. We might acknowledge that it isn’t completely true down to the smallest details, but we certainly believe the gist of it.

I’ll give what I think is a very telling example. I just need you to answer one question first: Do you believe that the arithmetic you were taught in school is correct? That is, you believe in it as more than a matter of opinion?

You do understand that mathematic functions are “proofs” in the sense that they cannot be false. I am not clear that my “belief” in them makes any difference as to their truth, it only functions to put into doubt my competency regarding logic and mathematics. There are some ideas that cannot be false. The logical law of non-contradiction is one of these. It makes no sense to ask, “Do you believe in the law of non-contradiction?” as if a rational person had an option.

The problem here is that the question, “Do you believe that truth exists?” is seriously being asked as an aspect of epistemological relativism as if “truth” is an optional belief for a rational being.

 

[Oreoracle]

Omnipotence does not imply inconsistency which would defeat the purpose of creating the laws of nature. The immense complexity of the universe necessarily entails coincidences which cause misfortunes.

A “coincidence” is a term we humans use because we can’t foresee all outcomes. But God can if he’s omniscient–there are surely no coincidences from his point of view.

 

[Oreoracle]

You do understand that mathematic functions are “proofs” in the sense that they cannot be false.

Proofs work as long as whatever assumptions you make are consistent. So are the axioms of arithmetic consistent? It turns out, rather remarkably, that we can’t demonstrate the consistency of Peano arithmetic (arithmetic with addition and multiplication). This is a result from a logician named Gödel. You can prove the consistency of weaker sets of axioms, like Presburger arithmetic (which uses only addition), but not for any system as complicated as Peano arithmetic.

So we don’t actually know whether or not there are contradictions in the math we learned in school. If there are, the proofs are irrelevant, as you can prove anything with inconsistent axioms. So you can’t claim to “believe” arithmetic with certainty. So if you claim that 1+1=2, well, that’s just your opinion.

See how annoying it is to insist on absolute certainties?

 

[Peter_Plato]

That’s like asking why we have theories in science when we know they’ll be revised later. We acknowledge them as approximations of the truth. If you try to wait until you’re absolutely certain of a theory before you’re willing to use it, well, let’s just say humanity wouldn’t have made it very far.

This doesn’t follow. Science is predicated on tentative hypotheses and open to the possibility that the “full story” is not available even though there is enough functional knowledge to know that things will work in, more or less, predictable patterns. You need to look into the history of science to see this in action. Having “opinions” or “reasoned beliefs” does not preclude acting on them. We do it all the time. Getting into your car and driving is more an act of faith, though unconsciously so, than it is an act of reason. We just disassociate from the possibilities we don’t want to consider in order to get about with life. That does not mean we have to pretend that we have certainty about everything just to make us feel better. I happen to think living while being conscious of all the uncertainties makes me less likely to take things for granted as if the way things are is fully in accord with my view of reality. They aren’t, which is why I have faith, not in myself, but in the “hidden” God who is behind it all AND I remain fully open (at least as much as I am capable) to the “fact” that God is far beyond what I expect him to be, even though I may have, from time to time, decidedly oblique glimpses that provide certainty that he does exist.

 

[Peter_Plato]

A “coincidence” is a term we humans use because we can’t foresee all outcomes. But God can if he’s omniscient–there are surely no coincidences from his point of view.

To quote your own words, “well, that’s just your opinion.”

 

[VonRupp]

If we can recognize even one consequence as being evil, that is enough to get the Problem of Evil off the ground. This is because, if you’re omnipotent and omniscient, evil is never necessary to bring about any good. Since the universe could be perfect, any imperfection suggests that God is slacking off.

So we don’t have to be correct about every aspect of the universe. We just need to be correct about a single detail.

I really don’t understand how the existence of a world we deem non-utopian means God is slacking off. It is such an illogical jump.

Do you think you have the knowledge to make the criticism that the existence of a utopian world is more “good” then the existence of a universe of free-will? How can we make value judgments on such a matter? It seems only logical to accept that both are a possibility and both lead to different ends, and since we weren’t provided with complete knowledge like God’s first Creation, judgment is absurd.

 

[Oreoracle]

To quote your own words, “well, that’s just your opinion.”

You see, the difference between me and you is that I can claim to believe in arithmetic without being a hypocrite. For you, it’s just an opinion since you only profess to believe certainties.

Do you think you have the knowledge to make the criticism that the existence of a utopian world is more “good” then the existence of a universe of free-will? How can we make value judgments on such a matter?

The ability to make value judgments is implicit in any attempt to moralize. Whenever you first decided to be Christian and deemed Christian morality “good”, you were making a value judgment.

 

[oldcelt]

On the subject of Utopia, a Catholic saint, Sir Thomas More, wrote a book on the subject. He also had people burned and tortured, but that is another subject.

 

[Peter_Plato]

You see, the difference between me and you is that I can claim to believe in arithmetic without being a hypocrite. For you, it’s just an opinion since you only profess to believe certainties.

The ability to make value judgments is implicit in any attempt to moralize. Whenever you first decided to be Christian and deemed Christian morality “good”, you were making a value judgment.

Well, you see, this is what baffles me. You are quite willing to accept that simple mathematical statements are merely opinions, but you are, nonetheless, equally willing to take profound and difficult issues, such as the implications of omniscience, as if these truly profound questions can be decided with absolutely undeniable certainty, unlike the simple arithmetic equations you accept are mere opinions.

Now, I won’t venture a value judgement (to counter your attempt to moralize) that you are being hypocritical, (your willingness to paint others with that label, notwithstanding,) but I do question the consistency with which you make judgements concerning the alleged “certainty” of your beliefs.

Of course, any being who sees no logical problem with the competency of finite thinkers to draw definitive conclusions about the implications of omniscience could, I guess, in principle, have no qualms doubting the certainty of simple arithmetic, since assent to either one involves a consistent application of logic, which you would likewise claim is merely an opinion in any case.

All that is left, then, is for you to freely admit that your thoughts concerning the implications of omniscience and omnipotence have no cogency since they are merely opinionated expressions of inconsistently formulated beliefs.

In other words, we shouldn’t take anything you say seriously because everything you say is opinion that is formulated without regard to any substantial or consistent certainty because none is to be had where knowledge is concerned. At least that would be a consistent statement.

 

[Oreoracle]

Well, you see, this is what baffles me. You are quite willing to accept that simple mathematical statements are merely opinions…

No, I’m not. That’s the entire point of my argument. Your definition of “opinion”, as you explain it, is essentially a provisional belief. You reserve the term “belief” for certainties–matters that are completely settled. My example with arithmetic shows that these definitions are absurd. We claim to believe things far less certain than arithmetic all the time, even though the validity of arithmetic hasn’t been settled.

My argument is meant to show that beliefs needn’t be as strict as your definitions require. We can believe in things such as arithmetic even though the belief is provisional.

My own conception of belief is much weaker than yours, in the sense that my standards are not as high. I’m fully willing to admit than I believe many things which aren’t certain, because, as I’ve demonstrated, very little is certain.

 

[VonRupp]

The ability to make value judgments is implicit in any attempt to moralize. Whenever you first decided to be Christian and deemed Christian morality “good”, you were making a value judgment.

But I am asking if you really feel we have the information necessary to make statements that imply that we don’t live in a “most optimally good” universe, something you are quite sure of. Even as someone who believes in a Christian God and purpose, I cannot propose to make such judgments, they are in a realm completely outside of ours.

 

[Oreoracle]

But I am asking if you really feel we have the information necessary to make statements that imply that we don’t live in a “most optimally good” universe, something you are quite sure of. Even as someone who believes in a Christian God and purpose, I cannot propose to make such judgments, they are in a realm completely outside of ours.

I have the ability to claim that an outcome is evil just as you have the ability to claim that God is good. So, just answer the question “Why do I have enough information to claim that Christian morality is correct?” and you’ll have answered the question you posed to me.

 

[Amandil]

On the subject of Utopia, a Catholic saint, Sir Thomas More, wrote a book on the subject. He also had people burned and tortured, but that is another subject.

As Lord Chancellor of England under Henry VIII it was his duty to administer the secular laws of England.

During his term four people were burned and for relapsing with whom he had no legal power to reprieve.

And the accusations of “torture” is based on protestant accusations which have never been substantiated.

Here again you show your bias and prejudice.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I have the ability to claim that an outcome is evil just as you have the ability to claim that God is good.

You have the ability to claim that an outcome is or appears evil from your perspective in time. You don’t have the perspective from which to proclaim that an omniscient and omnipotent being is powerless to bring a greater good out of what appears to you to be evil. In fact, to insist that there is no possible good that could justify or warrant the existence of temporary evil is to limit “goodness” to merely a conception that you DO have and not the reality that God COULD be capable of bringing about or, in fact, BE.

So, just answer the question “Why do I have enough information to claim that Christian morality is correct?” and you’ll have answered the question you posed to me.

The problem here is assuming that the goal of sanctity is the same as the implications it has for human morality, which may, in fact, be two different things. Morality, if it means acceptable behaviour while living out an earthly existence, is not the final representation of what human destiny encompasses. In fact, one could be very clear about what it means to “be moral,” (i.e., what is allowable or not) at the same time as having an entirely “open” view of what the ultimate end of personal sanctity or destiny involves.

Morality may present a kind of lowest common denominator, the threshold, so to speak, while leaving open what is on the other side. Whether God is delimited by that LCD is a completely separate question from whether and how we ought to be concerned with it.
The whole debate about the “letter of the law” vs “the spirit of the law” ought to, at least, give pause to think there is much more to the matter than mere verbal descriptions of good and evil or carefully worded statements about morality can possibly depict.