Why God should be infinite?

[STT]

So I was reading about the Spinoza’s proof of God being infinite from a book. Here is the paragraph which argues the infinitness of God:

To suppose that a substance could be limited; but limitation entails that part of the explanation, and thus of the cause, for the substance being as it is does not lie within it, but depends on another thing outside it explaining its limitation; but then something limited like that could not be a true substance because true substance is by definition fully self-explanatory.

The idea is that infiniteness grants self-explanatory which is one requirement for God. I don’t understand why a finite being cannot be self-explanatory?

Any other argument about infiniteness of God is also welcome.

 

[TheAmazingGrace]

Christians regard God as the “uncaused cause”: in order for Him to proceed everything that ever existed and succeed everything that will exist, and be the “Creator” in the proper sense, He can have no beginning or end. Therefore, it is only logical to assume that He is an Infinite Being.

 

[StJoseph8]

In regards to infinite, infinite means having no boundaries, both external and internal. This implies that nothing infinite can have parts since parts limit. I believe the Catholic understanding is that God is utterly simple and has no parts, so that’s one way of showing that God is infinite. Frank Sheed’s Theology and Sanity is a good book to pick up for this question.

 

[Tomdstone]

Is God infinite in extent? For example, does God exist inside and throughout an evil creature?

 

[Abba]

Is God infinite in extent? For example, does God exist inside and throughout an evil creature?

From Aquina’s Summa Theologica:

Question 8. The existence of God in things

Is God in all things?
Is God everywhere?
Is God everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
Does it belong to God alone to be everywhere?
Article 1. Whether God is in all things?

Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Psalm 112:4), “The Lord is high above all nations,” etc. Therefore God is not in all things.

Objection 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that “in Him things are, rather than He is in any place.”

Objection 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.

Objection 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Corinthians 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.

On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Isaiah 26:12, “Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulgate: ‘for’] us.” Therefore God is in all things.

I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (I:7:1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.

Reply to Objection 1. God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.

Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply to Objection 3. No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.

Reply to Objection 4.** In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
**

I am still trying to understand now that the question has been raised; how, for instance, is it that God is not in poop or a seed etc… and if not, how can they exist or He be present without being in them or them in Him? I will have to read Aquinas a little more slowly.

 

[Tomdstone]

… it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
…

So God is infinite in extent, but it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in demons?

 

[Bradski]

If you start with the definitions of what God must be, then however He is explained, He will undoubtedly posess those very characteristics. Otherwise He is not God.

It’s the very definition of a circular argument.

 

[STT]

Christians regard God as the “uncaused cause”: in order for Him to proceed everything that ever existed and succeed everything that will exist, and be the “Creator” in the proper sense, He can have no beginning or end. Therefore, it is only logical to assume that He is an Infinite Being.

I am sorry but I didn’t get how you reach to the conclusion. There is a gap between your premises and your conclusion.

 

[STT]

In regards to infinite, infinite means having no boundaries, both external and internal. This implies that nothing infinite can have parts since parts limit. I believe the Catholic understanding is that God is utterly simple and has no parts, so that’s one way of showing that God is infinite. Frank Sheed’s Theology and Sanity is a good book to pick up for this question.

Why finite things should have parts?

 

[Wesrock]

So I was reading about the Spinoza’s proof of God being infinite from a book. Here is the paragraph which argues the infinitness of God:

The idea is that infiniteness grants self-explanatory which is one requirement for God. I don’t understand why a finite being cannot be self-explanatory?

Any other argument about infiniteness of God is also welcome.

To be finite is to be conditioned in some way, and so require an explanation external to itself to provide a sufficient reason for being a conditioned reality. Why is it conditioned in this way as opposed to another way? Any thing finite is one of any number of possible finite beings. It is a particular mode of existence, as instead of just being existence. Only an unconditioned reality does not require an explanation external to itself to explain it’s particular mode of existence, and an application of the law of identity, law of excluded middle, and law of non-contradiction, leads to the conclusion that there can only be one unconditioned reality. If there is more than one, they must be different from each other in some way, but if there is a difference between them, then they are conditioned in some manner, and so neither would actually be an unconditioned reality. But it can’t both be unconditioned and conditioned at the same time, so to avoid such a contradiction, there can only be one.

 

[Tomdstone]

To be finite is to be conditioned in some way,

Isn’t God conditioned in some ways. For example, He is conditioned to be present in the Eucharist as long as (with the condition that) the matter of the Eucharist be Bread and Wine. It is a condition that grape juice cannot be used. Other conditions are that you have to use grape wine, and AFAIK, you cannot use wine made from peaches and you cannot use bread made from some non-wheat grain?

 

[Wesrock]

Why finite things should have parts?

In Thomistic thought, all finite beings are a composition of existence and essence. Existence is “that” a thing is. Essence is “what” a thing is. In their existence, all things that exist have a principle of similarity. In their essence, things have a principle of difference. The essence is the principle that conditions a type or mode of being, a limiting factor on how existence is expressed.

I don’t know if it’s correct to call it “parts”, but it would be correct to say that all finite beings are composed, whether immaterial (should such beings exists) or material, of existence and essence.

God’s essence is unconditioned, and simply is equivalent to his existence. Things that have no difference between them are the same by identity, so God is not composed and so is metaphysically simple.

 

[Wesrock]

Isn’t God conditioned in some ways. For example, He is conditioned to be present in the Eucharist as long as (with the condition that) the matter of the Eucharist be Bread and Wine. It is a condition that grape juice cannot be used. Other conditions are that you have to use grape wine, and AFAIK, you cannot use wine made from peaches and you cannot use bread made from some non-wheat grain?

It sounds as if all the conditions you laid out on the side of the material factors.

What we are speaking of here is the divine essence itself, that is, the mode of existence of the divine essence in Its own Being.

 

[Tomdstone]

It sounds as if all the conditions you laid out on the side of the material factors.

What we are speaking of here is the divine essence itself, that is, the mode of existence of the divine essence in Its own Being.

Are there conditions on God or not? Is it not a condition that the Eucharist wine must be grape wine? I thought that the Eucharist was not purely material, but had spiritual elements?
Is there not a condition that Baptism be performed with water? It will not be effective if you use oil?

 

[davidv]

Are there conditions on God or not? Is it not a condition that the Eucharist wine must be grape wine? I thought that the Eucharist was not purely material, but had spiritual elements?
Is there not a condition that Baptism be performed with water? It will not be effective if you use oil?

Neither of these are conditions on God.

 

[STT]

To be finite is to be conditioned in some way, and so require an explanation external to itself to provide a sufficient reason for being a conditioned reality. Why is it conditioned in this way as opposed to another way? Any thing finite is one of any number of possible finite beings. It is a particular mode of existence, as instead of just being existence.

Assume that there exist a finite set, S, which includes all mode of existence, S is exhaustive. Why God cannot be S. We just don’t know if all modes of existence are finite or infinite.

Only an unconditioned reality does not require an explanation external to itself to explain it’s particular mode of existence, and an application of the law of identity, law of excluded middle, and law of non-contradiction, leads to the conclusion that there can only be one unconditioned reality. If there is more than one, they must be different from each other in some way, but if there is a difference between them, then they are conditioned in some manner, and so neither would actually be an unconditioned reality. But it can’t both be unconditioned and conditioned at the same time, so to avoid such a contradiction, there can only be one.

That I understand. But that is a proof for uniqueness of God so lets put it aside for sake of thread’s discussion.

 

[STT]

In Thomistic thought, all finite beings are a composition of existence and essence. Existence is “that” a thing is. Essence is “what” a thing is. In their existence, all things that exist have a principle of similarity. In their essence, things have a principle of difference. The essence is the principle that conditions a type or mode of being, a limiting factor on how existence is expressed.

I don’t know if it’s correct to call it “parts”, but it would be correct to say that all finite beings are composed, whether immaterial (should such beings exists) or material, of existence and essence.

God’s essence is unconditioned, and simply is equivalent to his existence. Things that have no difference between them are the same by identity, so God is not composed and so is metaphysically simple.

That is what I don’t understand. Why all mode of existence could not be finite?

 

[Wesrock]

If you start with the definitions of what God must be, then however He is explained, He will undoubtedly posess those very characteristics. Otherwise He is not God.

It’s the very definition of a circular argument.

It’s a matter of ruling out contingencies, conditioned modes of existence, external causes, etc… There’s no starting definition of God. In Thomism, the real starting point is an explanation of what change is from observation of reality, that is Act and Potential. Essentially deducing what is necessary to make reality as we know it intelligible and rational. It’s starting with the effects (reality) and eliminating everything that could not explain it. It doesn’t start with God and work back to itself in a circular fashion.

 

[davidv]

Assume that there exist a finite set, S, which includes all mode of existence, S is exhaustive. Why God cannot be S. We just don’t know if all modes of existence are finite or infinite.

This is a category error. God is not a member of a set. God cannot be defined with math. Which is why, to me, infinite is not a valid descriptor of God. God is eternal.

That I understand. But that is a proof for uniqueness of God so lets put it aside for sake of thread’s discussion.

 

[Wesrock]

That is what I don’t understand. Why all mode of existence could not be finite?

Because anything that is finite is therefore a composite of existence and essence and requires a reason external to itself to explain it being a such-and-such composite as opposed to something else. This would result in an infinite regress (essentially ordered) if there was no non-composite, unconditioned reality, and Thomism considers an essentially ordered infinite regress to be an impossibility, I believe due to it being a contradiction (in that it results in something being/having and not being/having at the same time).

That probably doesn’t directly answer your question. I’ll need to dig into what it means to be an unconditioned reality of pure act and what it means to be an “infinite being” further. At the moment I can’t recall if “infinite being” is a real metaphysical term in Thomism or not, and if it is I should get a proper explanation of it.