Why is Probabilism not Laxity?

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fakename

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That is, why is the less probable belief (that an obligation exists) possibly choose-able when there is greater probability in the opposite thesis? Wouldn’t this lead to laxity?

Did I get the definition of probabilism wrong? Does it imply that the less probable opinion is, from some higher vantage point, actually the more probable? Or does it literally mean that the less sure opinion can be chosen in itself w/o extrinsic probability being affixed?
 
I have a theory that the reason is, that when moral rules are uncertain then this allows one to choose any rule since the uncertain is not binding.

But then, what does this make of the concept of moral certainty?
 
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