Why is the omnipotence dogma important?

[JDaniel]

“Commandeering” sounds like something a dogmatist would do, use a thing for his own ends without regard for its original meaning or intent.

Greylorn:

Some might.

I invite you to use my words freely, but responsibly. Use them only with respect to original context and intent. Attribute them to Greylorn Ell, courtesy and with permission of the Catholic Answers Forum.

I wasn’t planning to be in the presence of the listener or reader that long!

The same idea appears in the book which you won’t read, with different wording. Skirting copyright laws with a little change here and there is easy— Bill Gates made a fortune doing the same thing with other people’s computer code. Any writer with integrity will always attribute the ideas of others correctly, and in context. Writers with no integrity will reword the ideas of others and attribute them to themselves. Or they will use them out of context to denigrate the author. That’s on the same level as shooting someone in the back while he’s taking a leak.

Yeah, and look where that got him. As my old friend, David, used to say, he may be rich, but, he’s not happy.

The ideas I presented in my first book are now being attributed to others who claim to have invented them, thinking me dead. It does not matter, as I’ll be dead soon enough, and while my ideas may be of value, ultimately I am not.

Well, if that should happen, I hope there are many at your funeral.

I believe, personally, that ideas should be properly attributed, by a writer, to the person who that writer got them from. This is not always possible.

(See above!)

The basis for the entire set of my theories came from a ten page short story in a SF magazine that I read in 1960. I cannot recall the magazine name or story title, but can freely thank the writer, probably as dead as I’ll be in a few ticks, for ruining my life with his insights.

Well, you see, that’s the whole problem.

If you believe your beliefs, meet death being honest about what you know, what you believe, and who you learned it from. I don’t know that there is a judgment. But if it exists,do you want to make that visit coming from the assumption that the judges are the transplanted fools and sycophants from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, or the U.S. Supreme Court,

No thanks: no 9th Circuit for me!

There’s always a judgement. Everything that is human: that is eschatological, is subject to a judgement, or judgements. We can only hope that we make good ones and that God deems our exposition of Charity sufficient. Anyway, that’s my opinion and it is free.

God bless,
jd

 

[greylorn]

No dictionary is going to explain your reasoning to me. Please answer the question I asked, Bolded here.

Yeah, no dictionary will help you. A tautological statement is an inherently self-fulfililng statement. It is always correct, but it conveys no additional meaning.

For example, A = A. 2 = 2. Most any nitwit can figure that out. But curiously enough, there are some nitwits, dumber than the norm, who imagine that a tautology conveys additional meaning.

 

[greylorn]

Greylorn:
… Anyway, that’s my opinion and it is free.

And worth every peso. Thanks, nevertheless.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Yeah, no dictionary will help you. A tautological statement is an inherently self-fulfililng statement. It is always correct, but it conveys no additional meaning.

For example, A = A. 2 = 2. Most any nitwit can figure that out. But curiously enough, there are some nitwits, dumber than the norm, who imagine that a tautology conveys additional meaning.

I said

The Divine Attributes are functions of logical thought, they derive from the nature of G-d

Where in this do you find an invalid tautology?

 

[MartinThinking]

…Knowledge and power would be relative. If God was not all powerful and all knowledgeable. …God would exist in conformity of that which he (or she) is not in dominion of.

Therefore a notion which suggests that God exists in a condition of reliance would negate the description of an all powerful God and so on…moreover said or suggested “laws” which are hypothetically installed for this idea would basically exercise a greater power. Laws of course are fundamental issues of communication. Gravity finding its role in the one, definitive
& necessary requirement of a universe. Reflecting the One God origin of all. Dogma consistent with science or science consistent with dogma?
The mentioned notice with simple to crude…via evolution if I’m assuming correctly, is logical in the emerging qualitative nature of an All God.

All knowing…All powerful, would be in-complete
without, Perfect Order.

Without simple to crude, a dis-order is introduced in a relative sense re mans available knowledge in the nature of things.

I think sometimes words can help a little, as well words such as powerful and knowing …can loose meaning in context. Try…Perfect Order and perhaps the query re God-Creation may
introduce further potentiality in creativity.

Are you suggesting a Father or force greater than God?..I think the thinking is suggesting a God which is within a perimeter… in order to satisfy
a universe out of simply the occurrence of gravity.

.Fit "Perfect Order and see if that makes any sense. A perfect unfolding order… I think the knowledge and the knowing would be the lesser or off-shoots of the underlying Perfect complete within itself…Order…

Knowledge and Power are words that may be relative to understanding .which is limited in the limited “quantity” of Power and Knowledge. Interested to see creative feedback.

 

[greylorn]

I said Where in this do you find an invalid tautology?

It is not an invalid tautology. It is a tautology.

You seem to have the opinion that because “tautology” is a 4-syllable word, it is meaningful for your limited purposes. Maybe it is.

The philosophical statement, “An armpit is an armpit,” is a tautology.

I’m impressed.at your grasp of subtle philosophical nuances.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

It is not an invalid tautology. It is a tautology.
…

I said…

The Divine Attributes are functions of logical thought, they derive from the nature of G-d.

. Can you demonstrate the tautology you see in this statement?

 

[greylorn]

I said… “The Divine Attributes are functions of logical thought, they derive from the nature of G-d.”

Can you demonstrate the tautology you see in this statement?

The nature of God == the divine attributes.

Or if you prefer— the divine attributes describe the nature of God.

Even worse, IMO the attributes = nature currently assigned to the Creator are a consequence of the most dreadfully *illogical *mental processes that humans have ever dared to call “thought.”

By way of evidence, read the stuff on this thread. All replies to the OP are dogmatic reversions to Aquinas’ faulty logic, or just naked dogmatic assertions. The properties of God are derived from nothing deeper than human emotional need, the need to declare, “My God is bigger and stronger and smarter than your gods.”

 

[greylorn]

When one “regresses” does one really become more stupid? An inquiring mind wants to know.

And the inquiring mind is, who, exactly? Thought I knew both of those who post hereabouts.

The nature of regression work requires that an individual be returned to an earlier point in this or previous lifetimes. If the individual is normal, he would have learned a few things since that point, acquiring both knowledge and intelligence in the process.

Therefore from his/her current perspective, the previous self would be seen as less intelligent, less knowledgeable.

Were I to be regressed to a state, let’s say, ten years back, I sincerely hope that I would find that version of myself stupider than the current version.

Similarly, a regression into previous lifetimes should disclose a stupider self. Else, nothing has been learned.

I have performed one regression on a person who seems not to have learned anything since the middle ages. That could easily be true for you, or for anyone so full of himself that his enormous ego dominates whatever passes in him for mind, leaving space for dogma, but no room for the conceptual understanding of complex concepts, or anything that conflicts with the all-powerful dogma.

I am sorry for you. There seems no point in continuing our conversation. I shall regard my inability to trigger any new neurons in your brain as a failure on my part to communicate better.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The nature of God == the divine attributes.

Or if you prefer— the divine attributes describe the nature of God.

 

[Of_Medford]

May my love for the true answers to noble questions be free from the filth of pride, that my speech be a sweet song ascending. May I speak only as I am capable and go no further than that which is possible, for the grave temptation crouches, enticing the speaker beyond his ability into lies and falsehoods.

That this temptation be avoided, the bounds of this argument ought to be laid firstly, for those of us living, as the Philosopher says, “by the art and reasonings” of judgment, live by orderly plans springing forth from firm foundations.

The less knowable in itself is that which is most knowable by us and is immediate. From that which is known by us, we come to a knowledge of those things which are unknown immediately but that are more knowable in themselves.

In order to answer any question about “All”, do I know “All” or do I know many particular things? If I were to know “All” qua everything, what we have said prior holds not, for I would not come to know what is unknown but more knowable in itself by that which is known but less knowable in itself; rather, I would know that which is more knowable in itself and deduce those things which are less knowable in themselves. This violates our principle of investigation whereby all intellectual learning comes from previously existing knowledge and that previously existing knowledge for us is immediate and less knowable in itself.

We must then ask how it is that a man speaks of “All” if it is that he knows not of what “All” consists. That men do know something of “All” is evident by the very asking of this question. That I know certain particular things too is evident upon self-reflection, but that I do not know all things is known by experience and a reductio ad absurdum, for if I knew all things, I would not find anything unknown, but learning is the discovery of the unknown and the process by which it becomes known. This I have experienced, and continue to experience. This is the experiential knowledge of learning. The reductio follows thusly: Until such time as I know that I will no longer experience learning, I hold that I do not know all things.

We see then that my knowledge of “All” is not a positive knowledge. I know it not by accounting of what it consists. Instead, I speak of “All” denying by principled reasoning certain things of myself, namely a perfection in my Intellect.

In like manner, the theologian too speaks of “All”, not via positiva but via negativa, depriving the term of incompleteness, though it is not clear in what way the term is complete, but only knowing that it cannot be incomplete.

This is true of our knowledge of things. We firstly know that a thing is, then we know what it is, thus the Philosopher says that “ . . . we cannot grasp what it is to be something without grasping the fact that it is . . . “ and also “ . . . to seek what it is without grasping that it is, is to seek nothing.” And in another place, “ . . . insofar as we grasp that it is, to that extent we also have some hold on what it is.”

The first way, proposed by the Angelic Doctor, whereby we know that God is, shows how it is we deny certain finite predicates in what appears to be positive terms.

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God” (STh. Prima Pars Q II A iii).

The Holy Doctor teaches that a thing put in motion necessarily is finite in some way. In his conclusion to the argument from motion, he denies of the first mover this finitude, for if that first mover were to be moved, it would be finite in some way and not the first mover. This appears to us without careful reading to be a positive claim by saying “first mover“, but it is via negative that the Doctor denies of that which is a finite predicate.

 

[Of_Medford]

(Continued)

From this denial of finite predicates, it follows that God is lacking not in power, for a thing is said to have a power insofar as it is in act, for it cannot move (actualize potential) any other thing lest it be in act. Thus we might say what it is that omnipotence is and what it is not.

i. Power is said in reference to possible things and in two ways:

a. in relation to some power
b. absolutely (as the terms stand)

ii. A thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another.

a. possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject
b. absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject

iii. To each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded.

iv. Contradictions in terms are unrelated to any power for they fall short of the nature of possibility.

From what has been said above, it follows that omnipotence is the power whose proper object is all that is possible, and that God, who is pure act, must necessarily be omnipotent.

[Cf. STh Prima Pars Q. xxv, A. iii ; A. iv]

This is the importance of the doctrine of omnipotence. Were we not to deny to the Creator the finite predicates of creation, we would deny of Him that He is Creator, for whatever is the Creator that we know by the arts and reasonings of judgment, must be free from finitude, lest He be put in motion by another.

 

[JDaniel]

And the inquiring mind is, who, exactly? Thought I knew both of those who post hereabouts.

Greylorn:

Well, I guess you can now see just how wrong you can be!

The nature of regression work requires that an individual be returned to an earlier point in this or previous lifetimes.

Why do we need reincarnation?

If the individual is normal, he would have learned a few things since that point, acquiring both knowledge and intelligence in the process.

As the modern kids like to say, “ya think?”

Therefore from his/her current perspective, the previous self would be seen as less intelligent, less knowledgeable.

IMHO, that is quite presumptive.

Were I to be regressed to a state, let’s say, ten years back, I sincerely hope that I would find that version of myself stupider than the current version.

I wish you luck!

I have performed one regression on a person who seems not to have learned anything since the middle ages. That could easily be true for you, or for anyone so full of himself that his enormous ego dominates whatever passes in him for mind, leaving space for dogma, but no room for the conceptual understanding of complex concepts, or anything that conflicts with the all-powerful dogma.

On the contrary, I should think that everything just stated more aptly describes you, monsieur.

I am sorry for you. There seems no point in continuing our conversation. I shall regard my inability to trigger any new neurons in your brain as a failure on my part to communicate better.

Better yet, consider your failure as just one of many you will likely encounter if don’t stop thinking as if standing on the precipice of the wall of the box, rather than inside or outside of it.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

…We see then that my knowledge of “All” is not a positive knowledge. I know it not by accounting of what it consists. Instead, I speak of “All” denying by principled reasoning certain things of myself, namely a perfection in my Intellect.

In like manner, the theologian too speaks of “All”, not via positiva but via negativa, depriving the term of incompleteness, though it is not clear in what way the term is complete, but only knowing that it cannot be incomplete.

This is true of our knowledge of things. We firstly know that a thing is, then we know what it is, thus the Philosopher says that “ . . . we cannot grasp what it is to be something without grasping the fact that it is . . . “ and also “ . . . to seek what it is without grasping that it is, is to seek nothing.” And in another place, “ . . . insofar as we grasp that it is, to that extent we also have some hold on what it is.”

The first way, proposed by the Angelic Doctor, whereby we know that God is, shows how it is we deny certain finite predicates in what appears to be positive terms.

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God” (STh. Prima Pars Q II A iii).

The Holy Doctor teaches that a thing put in motion necessarily is finite in some way. In his conclusion to the argument from motion, he denies of the first mover this finitude, for if that first mover were to be moved, it would be finite in some way and not the first mover. This appears to us without careful reading to be a positive claim by saying “first mover“, but it is via negative that the Doctor denies of that which is a finite predicate.

Welcome Of Medford to CAF:

The words of Thomas Aquinas, a Saint of the Living Catholic Church! Hard to mistake that for “dogma.” That is philosophy, although the OP thinks some flailing rationales are better. There are Sophists and there are simply muddy thinkers. A Sophist truly understands things but responds with clever twists of meanings. The muddy thinker is someone for whom a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. I know very little about computer programming, so I stay out of those discussions. There are others, not referring to you Of Medford, who should stay out of philosophy and Theology for the same reason.

There is a line in the above translation of Aquinas that I wish was different. It says, “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.” That is an unfortunate rendering, in my opinion. For motion is really “the act of the potential precisely as potential.” This rendering describes motion not as simply potency, which has yet to move, nor as “act,” where the motion is completed, but describes it, without being tautological, as it is when in process. In other words, it more aptly describes moving.

Thoughts?

Happy Easter & God bless,
jd

 

[Of_Medford]

Welcome Of Medford to CAF:

The words of Thomas Aquinas, a Saint of the Living Catholic Church! Hard to mistake that for “dogma.” That is philosophy, although the OP thinks some flailing rationales are better. There are Sophists and there are simply muddy thinkers. A Sophist truly understands things but responds with clever twists of meanings. The muddy thinker is someone for whom a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.

Thank you for your kind welcome. I hope that my posts do not muddy these waters.

There is a line in the above translation of Aquinas that I wish was different. It says, “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.” That is an unfortunate rendering, in my opinion. For motion is really “the act of the potential precisely as potential.” This rendering describes motion not as simply potency, which has yet to move, nor as “act,” where the motion is completed, but describes it, without being tautological, as it is when in process. In other words, it more aptly describes moving

I have thus far been led in my readings of the Philosopher and the Angelic Doctor to believe that motion is neither in act nor in potency but it is the middleground between potency and act, the actualization of potency. Were it in act already, there would be no motion for it cannot be reduced to that which it already is. If it were the potency of a thing, reduction would not be required of it to be in motion, thus there would be no need for a mover that is in act, which we know to be untrue, for all motion requires a mover.

This can be seen in the change of place. If A is located in place alpha, it is not located in place beta, and when it rests in place beta, it no longer is located in place alpha, but its movement from alpha to beta is neither alpha nor beta.