Why pray if God has already made up his mind?

[belorg]

I’m back in town . . . with a suggestion.

Lest we get too amorphous and out of focus, let’s pick 3 clearly-formulated proposed contradictions of the many in this discussion and try to settle the 3 first; and then move on.

I don’t have time for this to turn into a philosophy of everything book for every post, and you probably don’t either.

Given that we both reasonable, we should be able to decide when an issue is settled, or something over which reasonable people can disagree before moving on. As I have been doing I will make every effort to acknowledge areas where we can agree or where clarification can resolve the proposed contradiction. I assume you will too.

OK

I would offer this:

In the pursuit of testing the doctrine involved in CCC, #600 for internal coherence/consistency there are two rather clearly proposed contradictions to settle:

(1) The doctrine involved in CCC, #600 involves God in a vicious circle of efficient causes…as you detailed it.
No, I am not moving between two types of causality. God’s intention (A)is an efficient cause for the pray-er (B) (the one who prays) and the pray-ers prayer (C)is an efficient cause for God’s intention.(A) Now the pray-er is causally prior to the prayer and the prayer is causally prior to God’s intention but God’s intention is logically prior to the pray-er.
So we have A -->B → C → A

Let’s take an example.

Let’s assume a pray-er P praying for rain.
Then, causally prior to everything, God’s plan includes:The pray-er P, the prayer R and God’s answer to this prayer, which is to make it rain.

Since P is in God’s immutuable intention and God is omnipotent. God is an efficient cause of P .
P prays for rain. P is an efficient cause of his prayer for rain (R)
R is a, efficient cause for God’s knowedge of R (God is omniscient)
Since God knows, causally and logically prior to everything, that He will make it rain, and , according to you, God’s decison to make it rain is a result of R,R is an efficient cause for rain. you cannot escape this by saying that God could also have decided not to make it rain, because that is not true. Hwt is true is that human knwoledge is insufficient to know what God has decided to do.
So, G(od’s decision) -->P → C → G still stands.And we have, a vicious circle here.

(2) CCC, #600 entails determinism. Yet the CC rejects determinism. I understand “determinism” as defined and developed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Yes, it does entail determinism. If God knows that X will do Y, then Y is true before X chooses to do Y, in which case X can only choose Y. The only thing left to discuss is what exactly determines Y.

(3) I’m not so clear about what #3 might be . . .
–God does not have just one plan.
–it is impossible for an infinite being, God, with an infinite intelligence to foresee future contingents, i.e., free acts of free human beings praying.
–other possibilities for #3 . . . or 1 and 2.

Well, I think your schema entails that God has at least two plans. Plan A, not including R, and plan B, including R, because A is logically prior to R and B is logically posterior to R.
“it is impossible for an infinite being, God, with an infinite intelligence to foresee future contingents, i.e., free acts of free human beings praying.” is the same as #2.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Let’s assume a pray-er P praying for rain.
Then, causally prior to everything, God’s plan includes:The pray-er P, the prayer R and God’s answer to this prayer, which is to make it rain.

Since P is in God’s immutuable intention and God is omnipotent. God is an efficient cause of P .
P prays for rain. P is an efficient cause of his prayer for rain (R)
R is a, efficient cause for God’s knowedge of R (God is omniscient)
Since God knows, causally and logically prior to everything, that He will make it rain, and , according to you, God’s decison to make it rain is a result of R,R is an efficient cause for rain. you cannot escape this by saying that God could also have decided not to make it rain, because that is not true. Hwt is true is that human knwoledge is insufficient to know what God has decided to do.
So, G(od’s decision) -->P → C → G still stands.And we have, a vicious circle here.

Thanks for taking the time to spell out your thinking.
I’ll number the premises in your example for convenience. If I am inaccurate or unfair in any way, let me know.

(1) Let’s take an example.
(a) Let’s assume a pray-er P praying for rain.
(b) Then, causally prior to everything, God’s plan includes:The pray-er P, the prayer R and God’s answer to this prayer, which is to make it rain.
(2) Since P is in God’s immutuable intention and God is omnipotent. God is an efficient cause of P .
(3) P prays for rain. P is an efficient cause of his prayer for rain (R)
(4) R is a, efficient cause for God’s knowedge of R (God is omniscient)
(5) Since God knows, causally and logically prior to everything, that He will make it rain,
(6) and , according to you, God’s decison to make it rain is a result of R,
(7) R is an efficient cause for rain.
(8) you cannot escape this by saying that God could also have decided not to make it rain, because that is not true.
(9) Hwt is true is that human knwoledge is insufficient to know what God has decided to do.
(10) So, G(od’s decision) -->P → C → G still stands.And we have, a vicious circle here.

(1)(a) OK, first sentence sets the stage. (b) Certainly logically prior to everything. “Causally prior” alone?–ambiguous: it depends on what you mean for each player. Obviously, at the extreme, if God by causal determinism necessitated every player and event in your example, He would be creating a deterministic theatrical performance on earth and there would be no vicious circle of efficient causes. Given your charge it’s safe to assume you don’t mean this.

So I’m going with “logical priority” (a term we usually use) for clarity. We’ll sort out the causes as we go.

(2) It is true to say in RCD that God is the efficient cause of the execution of His plan. But in RCD God, being spirit, pure act and infinite, He is simple. His plan is His knowledge. Better yet He is infinite truth/knowledge, love, power, etc. God’s actions and attributes are identical with His substance, not caused by His substance.

(3) True.

(4) In human knowledge involving communication among free agents (the analogy at work in our human understanding of God re prayer), when P communicates a request to R, P is the efficient cause of the perceptible sense data employed as media in which the message is found (sounds in speech, visible writing, etc.), the intelligible content of the message is the formal cause informing the agent, the information as a goal or motive is the final cause of the agent’s action, and the agent is the efficient cause of his action.

So even in a human being bound by sense perception, as in the case of one’s wife asking for milk, the information in the perceptible message medium caused by his wife is only a final cause (a goal or motive) of the free agent’s action.

In communication there is no chain of efficient causality from causing the message medium to be employed to a free agent acting for a provided goal. If there were, this would be a command to a robot.

No goal or motive communicated to a free agent is an efficient cause of his action. As a goal or motive, it is, by definition, a final cause.

(5) True, as in God knows from all eternity that He will cause rain at a particular point in space-time.

(6) True, broadly understood as involving at least one of the four causes.

(7) Not entailed in communication of goals among free agents, as per response to (4).

(8) Self-evidentially true, but not the point I make here. Of course since God, in your example, has already freely decided among alternatives to answer with rain, He can’t “also have decided not to make it rain.” [Principle of Contradiction]

The point I am making re RCD is that God was not constrained to choose to answer the particular prayer for rain with rain when He formed His plan, nor was he constrained to decide to answer prayers at all in the first place when creating. He is a free agent in forming His plan.

(9) Agreed.

(10) So far as I can see CCC, #600 does not necessitate your charge of a vicious circle of efficient causes.

Yes, it does entail determinism. If God knows that X will do Y, then Y is true before X chooses to do Y, in which case X can only choose Y. The only thing left to discuss is what exactly determines Y.

The way to phrase it that accurately reflects what RCD teaches here would be (assuming a normal healthy individual–not psychotic, OCD, etc):
If God knows that X will freely (by all we know freedom to be from 1st person data and the only way we can define it) do Y, then the proposition “X will freely do Y” is true in the mind of God before X freely chooses to do Y in time. In which case God knows for certain that X will freely choose (by all X knows freedom to be from 1st person data) to do Y. Phrased accurately the way a RC understands it, it’s hard to find determinism as it is generally defined.

So if you mean by “determinism” X will do Y by a deterministic series of created causes, i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore X is constrained to do only Y by such necessitation, then RCD does not at all entail determinism.

*Now if you mean that in RCD I do not have the power to choose freely to do something that God doesn’t already know from all eternity that I will freely choose to do and that this state of affairs contradicts a definition of libertarian free will you hold, then I agree.

But since divine foreknowledge doesn’t necessitate behavior nor detract from the only way we can know our behavior to be free (inner 1st person experience) as you have agreed, perhaps you need to define what “libertarian free will’ is over and above the only way we can know our behavior to be free.

*Also if you mean God has determined (in the sense of discerned or known) that X will freely do Y, and God has determined (in the sense of freely decided) what His response is from all eternity, and is determined (in the sense of is not changing His plan) to carry it out, then yes it entails “determinism” in this unusual sense of the term.

My surmise is this. The usage found in philosophical literature employing secular categories would place your concerns under the heading of fatalism not determinism. The heading “strong fatalism” entails determinism in a causal chain. “Weak fatalism” entails divine foreknowledge and governance giving a (divinely known) destiny for agents who are created free and perform free acts. In those categories I plead guilty to weak fatalism.

Well, I think your schema entails that God has at least two plans. Plan A, not including R, and plan B, including R, because A is logically prior to R and B is logically posterior to R.

At this stage of the discussion my response to you re this proposed contradiction was:
• “That mean that God’s intention to create human beings is His plan A and, depending on whether/how they pray, there is plan B.”
As I’ve said before in RCD it has always held that God is infinitely intelligent, sees all of time at once because He is outside of time; that is He foresees all that will (to us future) happen: His infinite knowledge is intuitive.
Therefore we have both agreed that there is a logical priority A over B, not a temporal priority. Further B is not the only goal or motive factored into (included in) God’s plan: minimally there are other choices of free created agents to say nothing of God’s other goals. B operates within a broader set of goals.

Your response was “There is no “operating within” in a singular intention.”

OK, why?

If my plan (A) for the day involves a set of several goals or tasks (a1, a2, a3, a4, . . .) in logical priority and I do them all, I had only one plan and each task operated within that one plan. There was not a plan (Y).

 

[belorg]

Thanks for taking the time to spell out your thinking.
I’ll number the premises in your example for convenience. If I am inaccurate or unfair in any way, let me know.

For brevity’s sake, I am only going to respond to the things you don’t agree with

(1)(a) OK, first sentence sets the stage. (b) Certainly logically prior to everything. “Causally prior” alone?–ambiguous: it depends on what you mean for each player. Obviously, at the extreme, if God by causal determinism necessitated every player and event in your example, He would be creating a deterministic theatrical performance on earth and there would be no vicious circle of efficient causes. Given your charge it’s safe to assume you don’t mean this.

God is omnipotent, so, whatever is in God’s intention must happen. So, I think it’s both logically and causally prior.

(2) It is true to say in RCD that God is the efficient cause of the execution of His plan. But in RCD God, being spirit, pure act and infinite, He is simple. His plan is His knowledge. Better yet He is infinite truth/knowledge, love, power, etc. God’s actions and attributes are identical with His substance, not caused by His substance.

I don’t think that changes 2 in any significant way.

(4) In human knowledge involving communication among free agents (the analogy at work in our human understanding of God re prayer), when P communicates a request to R, P is the efficient cause of the perceptible sense data employed as media in which the message is found (sounds in speech, visible writing, etc.), the intelligible content of the message is the formal cause informing the agent, the information as a goal or motive is the final cause of the agent’s action, and the agent is the efficient cause of his action.

I was talking about knowledge. Since God knows every fact, the ocurrence of a particular fact is an efficient cause of God’s knowledge of that fact, isn’t it?

(7) Not entailed in communication of goals among free agents, as per response to (4).

Then it should be possible that under R, it won’t rain. But you admit that it isn’t.

(8) Self-evidentially true, but not the point I make here. Of course since God, in your example, has already freely decided among alternatives to answer with rain, He can’t “also have decided not to make it rain.” [Principle of Contradiction]

That’s my point. So, R is an efficient cause of rain.

The point I am making re RCD is that God was not constrained to choose to answer the particular prayer for rain with rain when He formed His plan, nor was he constrained to decide to answer prayers at all in the first place when creating. He is a free agent in forming His plan.

Sure, but how does that solve the OP question? God has either made up His mind logically prior to the prayer or not. If He has, praying is useless. If He hasn’t then His plan is not immutable.

(10) So far as I can see CCC, #600 does not necessitate your charge of a vicious circle of efficient causes.

I think it still does/

So if you mean by “determinism” X will do Y by a deterministic series of created causes, i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore X is constrained to do only Y by such necessitation, then RCD does not at all entail determinism.

I would also include ‘fixed by the laws of supernature’.

*Now if you mean that in RCD I do not have the power to choose freely to do something that God doesn’t already know from all eternity that I will freely choose to do and that this state of affairs contradicts a definition of libertarian free will you hold, then I agree.

It does not just contradict a definition of LFW that I hold, it contradicts LFW altogether.

But since divine foreknowledge doesn’t necessitate behavior nor detract from the only way we can know our behavior to be free (inner 1st person experience) as you have agreed, perhaps you need to define what “libertarian free will’ is over and above the only way we can know our behavior to be free.

LFW means that, in a given situation, X can choose either A or B and that this choice is not dermined. So, before the choice is made, their is no truth about the choice. And consequently, “X freely chooses A” cannot be known untiol the choice is actual.

My surmise is this. The usage found in philosophical literature employing secular categories would place your concerns under the heading of fatalism not determinism. The heading “strong fatalism” entails determinism in a causal chain. “Weak fatalism” entails divine foreknowledge and governance giving a (divinely known) destiny for agents who are created free and perform free acts. In those categories I plead guilty to weak fatalism.

I think it entails strong fatalism. It means nobody alive today and nobodt alive at any moment in the future will actually have achoice between A and B. At this moment in time, the whole futire is fixed.

Your response was “There is no “operating within” in a singular intention.”

OK, why?

If my plan (A) for the day involves a set of several goals or tasks (a1, a2, a3, a4, . . .) in logical priority and I do them all, I had only one plan and each task operated within that one plan. There was not a plan (Y).

By operating within, I mean that there can be no internal conditional in the plan. God’s plan A entails everything and it cannot be so that part of the plan is changed by a conditional outcome of another part of the plan. e.g. the plan cannot include ‘If X prays for rain, it wil rain’, because then it would also include ‘if X does not pray for rain…’ and the plan would be mutable depending on the ouitcome of a conditional.
So, God’s plan, if it is immutable, must contain ‘X is going to pray for rain’ and ‘I am going to make it rain(or not)’. But if God’s plan contains these, God’s plan is an efficient cause for ‘X is going to pray for rain’ , which means the parying is not freely done by X.

 

[migueltojose]

your point /counterpoints are maddening. IT IS A MYSTERY. you may get know at some point (not of this earth) but until then you can’t and you won’t. pray for enlightenment.

---

Tune In - to the Holy Spirit; Turn On - to Jesus Christ; Drop Out - of the culture of death…

 

[belorg]

your point /counterpoints are maddening. IT IS A MYSTERY. you may get know at some point (not of this earth) but until then you can’t and you won’t. pray for enlightenment.

---

Tune In - to the Holy Spirit; Turn On - to Jesus Christ; Drop Out - of the culture of death…

Who is this addressed to?

 

[CaptFun]

That question is not from the good side.

“John Calvin! Stand in the corner - and stop disrupting the class!”

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

God is omnipotent, so, whatever is in God’s intention must happen. So, I think it’s both logically and causally prior.

If you understand God as creating free agents who can perform free acts as defined by the fundamental, first-person experiential data at the heart of our awareness of freedom.

I was talking about knowledge. Since God knows every fact, the ocurrence of a particular fact is an efficient cause of God’s knowledge of that fact, isn’t it?

Even if it were, as it is for the sense data of a message in the example I gave (which is not the case with God for a variety of theological reasons), you still have to show why the content of the message which gives God a goal or motive for a free practical choice is not a final cause when that is in the very definition of a final cause.

Then it should be possible that under R, it won’t rain. But you admit that it isn’t.
. . . .
That’s my point. So, R is an efficient cause of rain.
. . . .
Sure, but how does that solve the OP question? God has either made up His mind logically prior to the prayer or not. If He has, praying is useless. If He hasn’t then His plan is not immutable.

God made up His mind taking into account my future prayer. Therefore my prayer at that time can’t help but be useful and His plan immutable. I think this does solve the OP’s question.

In RCD God is present to all of time at once in a single vision. To me in my existential situation in time He foresees the future: for Him in His existential situation in eternity it is all the present. This means that God in eternity is present to me in my present (now) and freely responds based on Who He is to my free prayers now. Yet, I won’t be in or know my future until it is the present at which time God will respond in my present moment then to free prayers as He does now. The only prayer I can offer is in the present and God is present to it. His plan is based on His presence to all of time at once, not on the foreknowledge of all of time from a single limited point in time at the beginning.

[Let’s make ES=existential situation]

“Then it should be possible that under R, it won’t rain. But you admit that it isn’t.”
I admitted that God can’t have a plan that calls for both rain and not-rain at the same time.

Second, if P prays for rain and God grants it, there is no causal necessitation by any way we can naturally discover causal necessitation for there to be either rain or not-rain. Either is a possible, a contingent event. Whatever God freely does do is done through creatures as He made them–events involving natural necessity; contingent events; events involving creatures capable of voluntary actions; events involving free agents and their free acts.

Let’s say, in response to a prayer (unknown to me) of someone, God’s plan is that I meet them. It’s not as if in the course of my day He pushes the remote control button and I zombie-like robotically drive to the site. It just works out that in the course of my day and its normal-flow-of-thought free decision-making in the stuff life throws at us I happen to end up there. Is my ending up there a necessary event? In no way. I’m not saying I can comprehend how God is able to pull that off. I’m just saying that the conviction that He can and has (à la RCD) does not necessitate causal determinism as it is normally defined: i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t in the world, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore I was constrained to do only what I did (meet that person) by such necessitation.

Now if, similar to the discussion below about LFW, you hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures as He made them lest there be determinism, then under that definition of “determinism” I would have to plead guilty.

Back to the vicious circle issue.

“That’s my point. So, R is an efficient cause of rain.”
God is the primary efficient cause of rain. R is a final cause. Again, we agree on the definition of a final cause.

So the bottom line here as I see it so far is: for the vicious circle argument to hold you have to show that a motive or goal provided to a free agent (God in this case) for a practical choice is not a final cause for that free agent.

I would also include ‘fixed by the laws of supernature’.
. . . .
It does not just contradict a definition of LFW that I hold, it contradicts LFW altogether.
. . . .
LFW means that, in a given situation, X can choose either A or B and that this choice is not dermined. So, before the choice is made, their is no truth about the choice. And consequently, “X freely chooses A” cannot be known untiol the choice is actual.

But, as you have said–and I agree: “I never claimed foreknowledge makes something happen.” “I never claimed foreknowledge makes first person experiential data impossible.” “I have never claimed that foreknowledge alters anything.”

So, I believe, we both agree:
–there is no truth about the future (free) choice in a human mind–except perhaps in some way in the mind of the free agent;
–that an infinite intelligence Who from my existential situation foresees free choices in no way threatens their experienced first-person ontology–the only way we can know our behavior to be free;
–that an infinite intelligence Who from my existential situation foresees free choices does not necessitate in ones experience the choices they make: they are not causally determined, i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore X is constrained to do only Y by such necessitation.
–that “human knowledge is insufficient to know what God has decided to do.”

If LFW requires further that there is absolutely no truth about a future free choice in any mind including the divine mind (“supernature”), then RCD does not meet that criteria. But given all of the above, I don’t see that as problematic for human freedom in the only way we can know or experience it. I should point out though that not all philosophers maintaining LFW subscribe to the further requirement you insist upon.

I think it entails strong fatalism. It means nobody alive today and nobodt alive at any moment in the future will actually have achoice between A and B. At this moment in time, the whole futire is fixed.

It is to our ES foreknown. But, as you have said, “never claimed foreknowledge makes something happen.” “I never claimed foreknowledge makes first person experiential data impossible.” “I have never claimed that foreknowledge alters anything.”
There is no causal determinism in any way we understand it. God does not create only necessary events: He also creates free agents who perform free acts, albeit foreknown.

The bottom line here as I see it so far is: the RCD involved in CCC, #600 only violates the more restrictive requirements of LFW. I freely admit that.

By operating within, I mean that there can be no internal conditional in the plan. God’s plan A entails everything and it cannot be so that part of the plan is changed by a conditional outcome of another part of the plan. e.g. the plan cannot include ‘If X prays for rain, it wil rain’, because then it would also include ‘if X does not pray for rain…’ and the plan would be mutable depending on the ouitcome of a conditional.
So, God’s plan, if it is immutable, must contain ‘X is going to pray for rain’ and ‘I am going to make it rain(or not)’. But if God’s plan contains these, God’s plan is an efficient cause for ‘X is going to pray for rain’ , which means the parying is not freely done by X.

True, there can be no internal conditional in a plan that is by definition all-embracing and immutable; although there can be logical priority as we have said. But, given the fact that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, outside of time in RCD, He needs no internal conditionals.

In RCD God is the efficient cause of X’s existence as a free agent (by all first person data we have re what constitutes freedom). And God’s plan from His ES in all eternity foresees (according to our ES in time) that X will freely pray for rain because He is present to all moments in time and has already freely factored into His plan a response to X’s prayer for rain. Through all of this there was nothing constraining X’s will to pray for rain or not; by any way he (or anybody) knows his behavior to be free in his experience He is truly free.

Now I do agree that if you define LFW as requiring further that there is absolutely no truth about a future free choice in any mind including the divine mind, then X in the RC view does not enjoy LFW. But again not all philosophers holding LFW insist on this requirement.

So, the bottom line here as I see it so far is: (a) True, there can be no internal conditional in a plan that is by definition is all-embracing and immutable. (b) God creates free agents and knows and has already factored future free pray-ers’ prayers into His one plan. (c) If one defines LFW as requiring further that there be absolutely no truth about a future free choice in any mind including the divine mind, then X in RCD does not enjoy LFW.

 

[belorg]

Second, if P prays for rain and God grants it, there is no causal necessitation by any way we can naturally discover causal necessitation for there to be either rain or not-rain. Either is a possible, a contingent event. Whatever God freely does do is done through creatures as He made them–events involving natural necessity; contingent events; events involving creatures capable of voluntary actions; events involving free agents and their free acts.

Which are all present in his immutable plan and, since God is omnipotent, are all effeciently caused by God.

Let’s say, in response to a prayer (unknown to me) of someone, God’s plan is that I meet them. It’s not as if in the course of my day He pushes the remote control button and I zombie-like robotically drive to the site. It just works out that in the course of my day and its normal-flow-of-thought free decision-making in the stuff life throws at us I happen to end up there. Is my ending up there a necessary event? In no way. I’m not saying I can comprehend how God is able to pull that off. I’m just saying that the conviction that He can and has (à la RCD) does not necessitate causal determinism as it is normally defined: i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t in the world, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore I was constrained to do only what I did (meet that person) by such necessitation.

It means that God has pushed the remote control button when He made his immutable plan. It’s in His plan that you meet Him, and since God is omnipotent, everything that’s in His plan will work out. So it this case, there is a clear causal connection between God’s plan and you meeting this person. You meeting this person is clearly not a libertarian free choice by you.

Now if, similar to the discussion below about LFW, you hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures as He made them lest there be determinism, then under that definition of “determinism” I would have to plead guilty.

I hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures lest there be determinism. In your own example, God determines that you meet this person. If it was you libertarian free decision, then it could be that you choose not to meet the person, in which case God could not carry out His planned response to the prayer.

But, as you have said–and I agree: “I never claimed foreknowledge makes something happen.” “I never claimed foreknowledge makes first person experiential data impossible.” “I have never claimed that foreknowledge alters anything.”

Of course foreknowledge does not alter things. Whether God knows something or Madame Soleil does not make a difference. But factual foreknolwegde is only possible if there is a fact to be known. That means the fact of a free decision has always existed and is part of God’s plan, which means determined by God.
So, I believe, we both agree:

–there is no truth about the future (free) choice in a human mind–except perhaps in some way in the mind of the free agent;
–that an infinite intelligence Who from my existential situation foresees free choices in no way threatens their experienced first-person ontology–the only way we can know our behavior to be free;
–that an infinite intelligence Who from my existential situation foresees free choices does not necessitate in ones experience the choices they make: they are not causally determined, i.e., given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of the laws of nature, and therefore X is constrained to do only Y by such necessitation.
–that “human knowledge is insufficient to know what God has decided to do.”

I think we have a major disagreement about what constitutes free will. First person ontology does not suffice for what I consider genuine free will.

If LFW requires further that there is absolutely no truth about a future free choice in any mind including the divine mind (“supernature”), then RCD does not meet that criteria. But given all of the above, I don’t see that as problematic for human freedom in the only way we can know or experience it. I should point out though that not all philosophers maintaining LFW subscribe to the further requirement you insist upon.

If something is true before it happens, it cannot be the result of a free choice. You are, in fca, describing some sort of compatibilism.

It is to our ES foreknown. But, as you have said, “never claimed foreknowledge makes something happen.” “I never claimed foreknowledge makes first person experiential data impossible.” “I have never claimed that foreknowledge alters anything.”
There is no causal determinism in any way we understand it. God does not create only necessary events: He also creates free agents who perform free acts, albeit foreknown.

You seem to confuse necessary event with determined events. If God creates an event, it is, by definition, determined in that it cannot possibly not happen.

The bottom line here as I see it so far is: the RCD involved in CCC, #600 only violates the more restrictive requirements of LFW. I freely admit that.

The more restrictive requirements of LFW are in fact necessary for catholicism to work. If free will merely means that we have a first person experinece, then we cannot be held responsible for anything we do. The free will defense against the problem of evil would also fail then.

In RCD God is the efficient cause of X’s existence as a free agent (by all first person data we have re what constitutes freedom). And God’s plan from His ES in all eternity foresees (according to our ES in time) that X will freely pray for rain because He is present to all moments in time and has already freely factored into His plan a response to X’s prayer for rain. Through all of this there was nothing constraining X’s will to pray for rain or not; by any way he (or anybody) knows his behavior to be free in his experience He is truly free.

I am not disputing that in his experience he is truly free. It does not make sense philisophically to say he is free

Now I do agree that if you define LFW as requiring further that there is absolutely no truth about a future free choice in any mind including the divine mind, then X in the RC view does not enjoy LFW. But again not all philosophers holding LFW insist on this requirement.

That is true, but , as i said, a Catholic should insist on this requirement in order for Catholicism to make any sort of sense.

 

[Jelrak_TB]

your point /counterpoints are maddening. IT IS A MYSTERY. you may get know at some point (not of this earth) but until then you can’t and you won’t. pray for enlightenment.

---

Tune In - to the Holy Spirit; Turn On - to Jesus Christ; Drop Out - of the culture of death…

Not sure he can pray…unless God might have preordained it for all of eternity…

 

[Jelrak_TB]

Which are all present in his immutable plan and, since God is omnipotent, are all effeciently caused by God.

It means that God has pushed the remote control button when He made his immutable plan. It’s in His plan that you meet Him, and since God is omnipotent, everything that’s in His plan will work out. So it this case, there is a clear causal connection between God’s plan and you meeting this person. You meeting this person is clearly not a libertarian free choice by you.

I hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures lest there be determinism. In your own example, God determines that you meet this person. If it was you libertarian free decision, then it could be that you choose not to meet the person, in which case God could not carry out His planned response to the prayer.

Of course foreknowledge does not alter things. Whether God knows something or Madame Soleil does not make a difference. But factual foreknolwegde is only possible if there is a fact to be known. That means the fact of a free decision has always existed and is part of God’s plan, which means determined by God.
So, I believe, we both agree:

I think we have a major disagreement about what constitutes free will. First person ontology does not suffice for what I consider genuine free will.

If something is true before it happens, it cannot be the result of a free choice. You are, in fca, describing some sort of compatibilism.

You seem to confuse necessary event with determined events. If God creates an event, it is, by definition, determined in that it cannot possibly not happen.

The more restrictive requirements of LFW are in fact necessary for catholicism to work. If free will merely means that we have a first person experinece, then we cannot be held responsible for anything we do. The free will defense against the problem of evil would also fail then.

I am not disputing that in his experience he is truly free. It does not make sense philisophically to say he is free

That is true, but , as i said, a Catholic should insist on this requirement in order for Catholicism to make any sort of sense.

If one watches a favored video to the extent that one is able to recall events that will happen in future scenes, would this knowledge in any way negate the free will of those who chose to act out the parts?

Could an alleged “eternal-now” state of God potentially be in any way similar?

Of course, even solving for this possibility would still not resolve the eternal causality loop you have previously outlined.

Further, if God possesses infinite information, would it not require infinite time to process or collect? Even if existing in a non-time state, would not some level of before and after exist (such as before Jesus re-opened the gates of Heaven and after)? If so, would not such suggest a form of sequential-occurrences which would require some type of consideration?

Finally, if God is in an “eternal-now” would this not mean that he could potentially change what we would consider to be the past at any time? Would not this new past become our recognized past and so have been changed largely without our notice? Could one not then logically pray that a disastrous event be “undone”?

 

[belorg]

If one watches a favored video to the extent that one is able to recall events that will happen in future scenes, would this knowledge in any way negate the free will of those who chose to act out the parts?

No, but that’s not relevant here. What’s relevant here is that, in order for someone to know what will happen in these future scenes, these futire scenes must exist.
And that’s my major point. In order for one event (say a prayer) to have a causal (name removed by moderator)act on the ‘whole video’ it is impossible that the whole video already exists and is unchangeable. but in order for God (or anyone else) to know what will happen in the video, the video must exist.

Could an alleged “eternal-now” state of God potentially be in any way similar?

Not if God is supposed to interact with the video.

Of course, even solving for this possibility would still not resolve the eternal causality loop you have previously outlined.

No, it won’t.

Further, if God possesses infinite information, would it not require infinite time to process or collect? Even if existing in a non-time state, would not some level of before and after exist (such as before Jesus re-opened the gates of Heaven and after)? If so, would not such suggest a form of sequential-occurrences which would require some type of consideration?

It would sure be an actual infinity, something thta, according to most theists cannot exist.

Finally, if God is in an “eternal-now” would this not mean that he could potentially change what we would consider to be the past at any time? Would not this new past become our recognized past and so have been changed largely without our notice? Could one not then logically pray that a disastrous event be “undone”?

Not if God’s intention is immutable.

 

[migueltojose]

Who is this addressed to?

---

all y’all… see rule number three of the forum rules…

“3. Messages should be short. Do not post lengthy replies (including replies that consist largely of quotes from an earlier message).”

the exercise can be worthwhile if there is any indication of traction or learning but it doesn’t appear that there is any movement in any direction rxcept circular…

---

Tune In - to the Holy Spirit; Turn On - to Jesus Christ; Drop Out of the culture of death…

 

[JDaniel]

God is omnipotent, so, whatever is in God’s intention must happen. So, I think it’s both logically and causally prior.

Belorg:

Good repartee, I will admit.

I think it’s important that we tighten up a bit the terms being used herein. ‘Intention’ is not something in God. ‘Intention’ cannot be separated from time. It presumes thought before act. There can be no such thing in God. God is simultaneous thought and will, not sequential thought and then will.

I was talking about knowledge. Since God knows every fact, the ocurrence of a particular fact is an efficient cause of God’s knowledge of that fact, isn’t it?

Think this through. If God, who you admit is omniscient, were to know every fact and that said knowledge was somehow an agent, then everything would be occurring as a continuous explosion of facts-coming-to-be. And this may be what it’s like for God; we don’t know. But, for us, there would be no timing, or roll-out, of existentiality. For us, it would all happen so fast and furiously that we’d be crushed under the weight of just some of the changes.

Then it should be possible that under R, it won’t rain. But you admit that it isn’t.

I don’t think God answers minor prayers. But, if you’re using rain just as an example of prayer, then I understand. However, it’s important to separate answerable from typically un-answerable prayers.

That’s my point. So, R is an efficient cause of rain.

The fact of rain is not an efficient cause. It is a far cry from being an agent, per se. An efficient cause is that cause that by its actions brings out the potencies in matter and, in doing so, educes matter’s form. Knowledge of the factical of rain is not an agent of its action. Nevertheless, I believe that God is the ultimate agent of such things as rain, and that he works to bring about the composition of matter (hydrogen and oxygen) into a new form that we call water. But, he works through a series of subordinate efficient causes, each of which may have its own specific and unique function, but subordinate to Him.

Sure, but how does that solve the OP question? God has either made up His mind logically prior to the prayer or not. If He has, praying is useless. If He hasn’t then His plan is not immutable.

Prayers of supplication may or may not be efficacious. Let’s use your example of rain. On the same block where you live (the one who is praying for rain) I may live. Now, let’s say that I want to participate in some outdoor activity that does not include rain, so I pray for no rain. God will listen, but his Divine Providence has already set the clouds in motion to rain, or not. God will do what he wants based upon his knowledge of the entirety of the natural circumstances.

It does not just contradict a definition of LFW that I hold, it contradicts LFW altogether.

If one wishes to define free will as LFW, then, no, there is but one set of situations where it can occur: the choice to sin or not.

LFW means that, in a given situation, X can choose either A or B and that this choice is not dermined. So, before the choice is made, their is no truth about the choice. And consequently, “X freely chooses A” cannot be known untiol the choice is actual.

It is known by God, but not by the rest of humanity.

I think it entails strong fatalism. It means nobody alive today and nobodt alive at any moment in the future will actually have achoice between A and B. At this moment in time, the whole futire is fixed.

Except for sin. Sin is not an external, physical action. It is an internal activity that usually results in a separate, external, sometimes physical action. Earlier you spoke about “intention.” Sin is mental activity that results in the purchase of an intention, which, except in the presence of a strong will, may be carried out. The “sin” is the “intention” purchased. The severity of the sin my change based on whether or not one stops oneself, but the conformed intention is the sin.

By operating within, I mean that there can be no internal conditional in the plan. God’s plan A entails everything and it cannot be so that part of the plan is changed by a conditional outcome of another part of the plan. e.g. the plan cannot include ‘If X prays for rain, it wil rain’, because then it would also include ‘if X does not pray for rain…’ and the plan would be mutable depending on the ouitcome of a conditional.
So, God’s plan, if it is immutable, must contain ‘X is going to pray for rain’ and ‘I am going to make it rain(or not)’. But if God’s plan contains these, God’s plan is an efficient cause for ‘X is going to pray for rain’ , which means the parying is not freely done by X.

I’m not good with your analogy, but, I’ll agree with you but on the basis that the analogy is bad. Praying for rain is no sin; it is simply one the the myriads of other things that creatures so. Rape is no sin. It is an activity that is taking place at that exact same time 50 million times. It is the intention to deprive another person of that which is rightfully theirs to control that constitutes the sin, although the act my land a guy in prison for a long time. But, sin is committed the moment the will conforms to the intention to commit a rape - whether or not it is actually committed. Telling this to the Priest, in confession, may allow enough grace to enter that soul to steel his mind from ever committing one.

God bless,
jd

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Which are all present in his immutable plan and, since God is omnipotent, are all effeciently caused by God.

God is the efficient cause of the existence of free agents. Based on their created nature they perform free acts that are foreseen by God and already factored into His providential plan.

Doing things in a little different order to keep logical continuity.

I think we have a major disagreement about what constitutes free will. First person ontology does not suffice for what I consider genuine free will.

I believe this is a forthright and correct assessment re the definition of freedom. It may be something over which we may respectfully have to agree to disagree.

At the end I list a number of propositions most of which I think we can agree upon.

I am not disputing that in his experience he is truly free. It does not make sense philisophically to say he is free

The description of his mental state and every mental and physical act he performed would meet any definition of freedom.

Further the only foundational data there is for the philosophical study of human freedom is the first person data. How else could any definition–and even further stipulations–make sense except in relation to this data? Our understanding of other persons’ freedom is in relation to our own sense of our freedom. The same is true of our understanding of other persons’ accounts of a lack of freedom: the loss or absence of the faculties and mental capabilities that we know by experience to be integral to freedom.

In fact many philosophers do consider first person data to be sufficient for a definition of freedom.

Two examples:

“Human freedom is the unique ability, made possible by a first-person perspective, to reflect on and evaluate our desires and to choose one course of action over another.” Although, given her scientific causal determinism, she regards her position as compatibilist. –“What is Human Freedom?” Lynne Rudder Baker, a paper at Philosophical Workshop on Free Will, San Raffaele University, Milan (Italy), June 1, 2005.

John R. Searle also defines freedom from first-person phenomenological data (Mind: A Brief Introduction, Chaps. 7-8)

The philosophical debate is ongoing. But using first-person data as a foundation for defining freedom or as a sufficient definition itself is a major school of thought even in current secular philosophical circles. To say that it does not make philosophical sense w/o reference to the fact that even in secular philosophical circles there are multiple sides on this issue argued with equal rigor and vigor I think is inaccurate. Also it is impossible to ignore the fact that any definition of human freedom minimally has to make reference to the first-person data to make sense.

Yet I agree that a properly philosophical study of the issue would attempt to resolve the plurality of opinion. But the issue here is consistency within RCD not philosophy per se.

If something is true before it happens, it cannot be the result of a free choice. You are, in fca, describing some sort of compatibilism.
. . . .
You seem to confuse necessary event with determined events. If God creates an event, it is, by definition, determined in that it cannot possibly not happen.

“Compatibilism” as it is usually used today is a stance largely vis-a-vis scientific causal determinism, as the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy shows. RCD rejects scientific causal determinism and affirms human freedom. Philosophically it is problematic anyway due to a number of issues not the least of which is quantum indeterminacy.

You said, “I hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures lest there be determinism.” Fair enough. But this is slightly different then the position in RCD which is God providentially works through creatures as He made them because His action doesn’t affect the fundamental basis for our definition of freedom and even some sufficient definitions. Be that as it may, since it would probably still be a form of “determinism” according to the definition you and some others employ, RCD would entail a form a “compatibilism” given that definition.

That God creates free agents is indeed necessarily true. But He foresees their free acts. He doesn’t thereby turn created free agents into zombified robots and their acts into necessary and compulsive acts. Nonetheless I grant, that if LFW is defined such that any providential action of God, even those where God works through creatures as He made them, constitutes a form of “determinism,” then the RCD involved in CCC, #600 fits into this definition of “determinism.”

The more restrictive requirements of LFW are in fact necessary for catholicism to work. If free will merely means that we have a first person experinece, then we cannot be held responsible for anything we do. The free will defense against the problem of evil would also fail then.

Not so at all. As I pointed out the ultimate foundation for any understanding of freedom is the first person data. Current secular schools of thought also regard it as a sufficient definition. I am aware that I can choose between alternatives simultaneously with the simultaneous awareness that I am not being compelled, driven, controlled, taken over by another agency or set of forces in making the decision. There is no other way for me to know I am free, to have an awareness of my freedom. This means that since my behavior is known by experience to be under my rational control, I am accountable and responsible for it.

It means that God has pushed the remote control button when He made his immutable plan. It’s in His plan that you meet Him, and since God is omnipotent, everything that’s in His plan will work out. So it this case, there is a clear causal connection between God’s plan and you meeting this person. You meeting this person is clearly not a libertarian free choice by you.

True, it is not LFW as you have defined it, but it was a free choice based on all the foundational data we have to define freedom (and responsibility) philosophically and sufficient philosophical definitions in some secular schools of thought. The description of my mental state and every mental and physical act I performed in my day would meet any definition of freedom.

I hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures lest there be determinism. In your own example, God determines that you meet this person. If it was you libertarian free decision, then it could be that you choose not to meet the person, in which case God could not carry out His planned response to the prayer.

Again, the description of my mental state and every mental and physical act I performed in my day would meet any definition of freedom. As I said God works in my present moment and that process described in the previous sentence was used by God to answer the prayer.

Now all the data we naturally have access to qualifies the acts as free. But if added to that the proposition taken in faith that God who is present to every moment worked with that set of mental and physical acts as they are to get done what He wanted done creates a violation of LFW as defined by you and some others thus making it “deterministic,” I acknowledge that.

Of course foreknowledge does not alter things. Whether God knows something or Madame Soleil does not make a difference. But factual foreknolwegde is only possible if there is a fact to be known. That means the fact of a free decision has always existed and is part of God’s plan, which means determined by God.

No, it means, in RCD, the fact of a free decision has always been foreseen and factored into God’s plan. The free decision in the human agent was not thereby turned into a necessary, compelled, robotic, uncontrollable act. So the free decisions I made in my example met all the foundational conditions involved in a truly philosophical definition of human freedom and even a truly sufficient definition.

Again, if the RCD proposition regarding providence added to all the data we naturally have access to qualifying the acts as free creates a violation of LFW as defined by you and some others thus making it “deterministic,” I acknowledge that.

The bottom line as I see it so far is: The issue before us here is the concern that CCC, #600 entails determinism. Yet the CC rejects determinism. Ergo, a contradiction.
(a) The differing positions we hold regarding human freedom are both represented in major schools in secular philosophical thought today.
(b) It has not been shown in any way that the RCD involved in CCC, #600 entails scientific causal determinism.
(c) It has not been shown that CCC, #600 involves a contradiction with the RCD definition of human freedom or responsibility.
(d) It has been shown that the definition of human freedom involved in CCC, #600 and at its basis DOES square with some definitions of it in current secular philosophical circles which view first-person data as supplying a sufficient definition.
(e) It is true that the definition of human freedom involved in CCC, #600 DOES NOT square with some definitions of it in current secular philosophical circles; and so CCC, #600 would entail determinism under those definitions or at least compatibilism.

 

[migueltojose]

---

“3. Messages should be short. Do not post lengthy replies (including replies that consist largely of quotes from an earlier message).”

the exercise can be worthwhile if there is any indication of traction or learning but it doesn’t appear that there is any movement in any direction rxcept circular…

---

Tune In - to the Holy Spirit; Turn On - to Jesus Christ; Drop Out of the culture of death…

Please allow me to rescind the above… while your posts are lengthy, they are worthwhile… Thanks…

 

[belorg]

Doing things in a little different order to keep logical continuity.

I believe this is a forthright and correct assessment re the definition of freedom. It may be something over which we may respectfully have to agree to disagree.

I have no problem with that.

“Compatibilism” as it is usually used today is a stance largely vis-a-vis scientific causal determinism, as the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy shows. RCD rejects scientific causal determinism and affirms human freedom. Philosophically it is problematic anyway due to a number of issues not the least of which is quantum indeterminacy.

That’s true, but not really relevant. Of course RCD rejects scientific causal determinism, otherwise RCD would be a scientific theory, which it isn’t. The problem I have with your approach or RCD’s for that matter is not that it may or may not contradict science, or that I think my take on free will is the only one that philospically make sense. I fact, I don’t think the notion of LFW I described makes any sense at all. What I meant by ‘it does not make sense philosophically that he is free’ is not that it does not make sense under some philosophical definition of free will, but that it does not make sense under a doctrine that holds people responssible for choices that, upon closer look were the only possible choices that they could make or have made.

You said, “I hold that not even God can work providentially in the world through creatures lest there be determinism.” Fair enough. But this is slightly different then the position in RCD which is God providentially works through creatures as He made them because His action doesn’t affect the fundamental basis for our definition of freedom and even some sufficient definitions. Be that as it may, since it would probably still be a form of “determinism” according to the definition you and some others employ, RCD would entail a form a “compatibilism” given that definition.

But if some scientist creates a robot and manages to programme it so that in situation S it will always choose A and that it experiences this choice as its own, and as a result of this programme, the robot murders someone, would it be fair, provided we know about the programme and the scientist, to punish the robot (and not the scientist).
I should think not, yet, that is exactly what the Catholic God is sipposed to do. He throws people into hell for doing exactly as He programmed them to do, but does not punish Himself

That God creates free agents is indeed necessarily true. But He foresees their free acts. He doesn’t thereby turn created free agents into zombified robots and their acts into necessary and compulsive acts. Nonetheless I grant, that if LFW is defined such that any providential action of God, even those where God works through creatures as He made them, constitutes a form of “determinism,” then the RCD involved in CCC, #600 fits into this definition of “determinism.”

I can be argued that this isn’t determinism under a strict definition, as in ‘determiend by natural laws’, but it is even worse: it is the hardest from of fatalism I can think of.
Your view enetails that humans beings are puppets on strings, but that the fact that we cannot see the strings, somehow makes us free and responsible.

Not so at all. As I pointed out the ultimate foundation for any understanding of freedom is the first person data. Current secular schools of thought also regard it as a sufficient definition. I am aware that I can choose between alternatives simultaneously with the simultaneous awareness that I am not being compelled, driven, controlled, taken over by another agency or set of forces in making the decision. There is no other way for me to know I am free, to have an awareness of my freedom. This means that since my behavior is known by experience to be under my rational control, I am accountable and responsible for it.

Well, that would be fine for me. I would accept a sort of responsibility under your definition of freedom because it’s the only wat responsibility makes some sense from a human perspective., which of course, under atheism is all teher is. But under theism, and more specifically, under Catholicism, there is another perspective to be taken into account. There is also God, an omniscient being who, unlike human beings can see the strings (He has even attached them)

The bottom line as I see it so far is: The issue before us here is the concern that CCC, #600 entails determinism. Yet the CC rejects determinism. Ergo, a contradiction.
(a) The differing positions we hold regarding human freedom are both represented in major schools in secular philosophical thought today.

Secularr philosophy is not concerned with internal consistnecy of a theistis doctrine.

(b) It has not been shown in any way that the RCD involved in CCC, #600 entails scientific causal determinism.

I have already answered that. I do not knwo of too many Catholics who would think that God can only work through natural causes.

(c) It has not been shown that CCC, #600 involves a contradiction with the RCD definition of human freedom or responsibility.

That’s not what I want to show. What I want to show is that the RCD cannot account for the metaphysical responsibility that is on of the main foundations of that same RCD.

(d) It has been shown that the definition of human freedom involved in CCC, #600 and at its basis DOES square with some definitions of it in current secular philosophical circles which view first-person data as supplying a sufficient definition.

See above

(e) It is true that the definition of human freedom involved in CCC, #600 DOES NOT square with some definitions of it in current secular philosophical circles; and so CCC, #600 would entail determinism under those definitions or at least compatibilism.

Not only with current secular philosophical circles. Alvin Plantinga, r.g. would not agree with you, as his free will defense requires the sort of LFW I described.

 

[belorg]

Please allow me to rescind the above… while your posts are lengthy, they are worthwhile… Thanks…

A philosopical discussion sometimes requires some length in order to have any sort of depth. One-liners do not usually suffice.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I can be argued that this isn’t determinism under a strict definition, as in ‘determiend by natural laws’, but it is even worse: it is the hardest from of fatalism I can think of.
Your view enetails that humans beings are puppets on strings, but that the fact that we cannot see the strings, somehow makes us free and responsible.
. . . .
Well, that would be fine for me. I would accept a sort of responsibility under your definition of freedom because it’s the only wat responsibility makes some sense from a human perspective., which of course, under atheism is all teher is. But under theism, and more specifically, under Catholicism, there is another perspective to be taken into account. There is also God, an omniscient being who, unlike human beings can see the strings (He has even attached them)

I think these two do get at the underlying issue. And in my opinion it also shows the importance of recognizing the different existential situations not only of God and man, but also those of atheism and Catholicism. For a RC the existence of God as infinite and all-knowing, all-loving, all powerful, etc., and provident suggests a different image than a puppet master: one of integration of me, as I am created with the definition of freedom and responsibility we both accept, into a bigger picture or order. For example, a hydrogen atom in a human body has the same properties as one in an inorganic molecule. Nonetheless within the human body it is integrated into a bigger picture that leaves intact its essential nature and properties.

I can see how in an atheistic ES the idea of God threatens human freedom where in addition to freedom from a human perspective which we both acknowledge it is also includes in its definition “the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes.” Given this I can see how the Catholic ES appears to an atheist to make us puppets in a divine play. I get that.

But it seems to me you’re looking at RCism through the lens of an atheistic ES and find a lack of freedom and responsibility because we don’t view ourselves as the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of our own ends or purposes, and then you double back and say we contradict ourselves because we at the same time hold that we are free and responsible. You can’t substitute one definition for another and then claim inconsistency.

IMO the root of the difference here is the claim regarding human freedom (over and above the definition we both agree to) that it also means the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes.

So rather than “finding” an inconsistency that really isn’t there when RCD is viewed on its own terms, I think it is more productive to admit the difference in first principles (a definition in this case) and argue for the value of the atheistic definition of freedom.

That’s true, but not really relevant. Of course RCD rejects scientific causal determinism, otherwise RCD would be a scientific theory, which it isn’t. The problem I have with your approach or RCD’s for that matter is not that it may or may not contradict science, or that I think my take on free will is the only one that philospically make sense. I fact, I don’t think the notion of LFW I described makes any sense at all. What I meant by ‘it does not make sense philosophically that he is free’ is not that it does not make sense under some philosophical definition of free will, but that it does not make sense under a doctrine that holds people responssible for choices that, upon closer look were the only possible choices that they could make or have made.

We both agree that foreknowledge doesn’t force or create a necessary choice. “I never claimed foreknowledge makes something happen.” We agree on a definition of free will and moral responsibility from a human perspective–the definition RCD employs. How can you then also make the statement that a free choice that God merely foresees and/or integrates into a bigger picture is “the only possible choices that they could make or have made”? That does not follow.

But if some scientist creates a robot and manages to programme it so that in situation S it will always choose A and that it experiences this choice as its own, and as a result of this programme, the robot murders someone, would it be fair, provided we know about the programme and the scientist, to punish the robot (and not the scientist).
I should think not, yet, that is exactly what the Catholic God is sipposed to do. He throws people into hell for doing exactly as He programmed them to do, but does not punish Himself

In RCD God does not program, command, or encourage anyone to freely choose evil; and not only that, He appeals to their freedom with commands telling them to do good and avoid evil, and supplies them with the spiritual power to fulfill the commands. And on top of all that, the word and example He gave us in Christ was to live selflessly for the good of others–to love one another.

But you seem to be saying RCD adds up to: God creates free agents and they do bad things freely (against all His commands, the example of Christ, and His inspirations!) and so God is at fault? This just doesn’t make any sense as a summary of RCD or what it adds up to.

That’s not what I want to show. What I want to show is that the RCD cannot account for the metaphysical responsibility that is on of the main foundations of that same RCD.

We agree on the philosophical anthropology of freedom. RCD holds that my eternal destiny does depend on how that freedom is exercised because, having been taught through word and example by God and empowered by God (if I so choose to use it), I and I alone am ultimately responsible for my eternal destiny.

Again IMO you’re looking at RCism through the lens of an atheistic ES and find a lack of freedom and responsibility because we don’t view ourselves as the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of our own ends or purposes, and then you double back and say we contradict ourselves because we at the same time hold that we are free and responsible. I’d say: admit the difference in first principles and argue for the value of the atheistic definition of freedom.

I can certainly acknowledge that if I lived in an atheistic ES the definition of human freedom that includes both freedom from a human perspective and further the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes would not be an incoherent ideal. In fact one directly follows from the other. That is because I attempt to view it on its own terms.

Living in the Catholic ES I can also see that on its own terms RCD does not involve the contradictions we have discussed that give you concern.

As far as first principles go, we will have to agree to disagree.

Classes are about to start and perhaps we should move toward wrapping this up. My time is already being eaten alive.

My points about getting first principles out in the open and testing a different existential situation for consistency on its own terms and not through the lens of another would be the summary points I would like to make in this discussion on RCism and determinism.

How about if you respond and finish with some summary points and we can part friends until we engage in another stimulating discussion like this one. Sound Good?

 

[belorg]

I think these two do get at the underlying issue. And in my opinion it also shows the importance of recognizing the different existential situations not only of God and man, but also those of atheism and Catholicism. For a RC the existence of God as infinite and all-knowing, all-loving, all powerful, etc., and provident suggests a different image than a puppet master: one of integration of me, as I am created with the definition of freedom and responsibility we both accept, into a bigger picture or order. For example, a hydrogen atom in a human body has the same properties as one in an inorganic molecule. Nonetheless within the human body it is integrated into a bigger picture that leaves intact its essential nature and properties.

The same holds for an electron in a rock and the same kind of electron in a computer, which makes my point about the robot scientist.

But it seems to me you’re looking at RCism through the lens of an atheistic ES and find a lack of freedom and responsibility because we don’t view ourselves as the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of our own ends or purposes, and then you double back and say we contradict ourselves because we at the same time hold that we are free and responsible. You can’t substitute one definition for another and then claim inconsistency.

No I don’t substitute one definition for another. the inconsistency is in RCD’s use of a definition of freedom that does not entail we are the ultimate creators and sustainers of our ends and purposes, and the use of a definition of resposibility that holds us responsible for our purposes and ends, which by your own admission, we did not cretae not sustain.

In RCD God does not program, command, or encourage anyone to freely choose evil; and not only that, He appeals to their freedom with commands telling them to do good and avoid evil, and supplies them with the spiritual power to fulfill the commands. And on top of all that, the word and example He gave us in Christ was to live selflessly for the good of others–to love one another.

If there were more than one possibility for a human being to choose, God could not know which I will choose. Hence there is only one possible choice.And a God who punishes someone for making the only possible choice he could have made, is simply an incoherent idea.

But you seem to be saying RCD adds up to: God creates free agents and they do bad things freely (against all His commands, the example of Christ, and His inspirations!) and so God is at fault? This just doesn’t make any sense as a summary of RCD or what it adds up to.

Why wouldn’t the ultimate cerator of our ends and purposes not be responsible if these ends and puposes turn out evil?

We agree on the philosophical anthropology of freedom. RCD holds that my eternal destiny does depend on how that freedom is exercised because, having been taught through word and example by God and empowered by God (if I so choose to use it), I and I alone am ultimately responsible for my eternal destiny.

Your eternal destiny is alreday in God’s eternal plan. Your eternal destiny exsietd before you were born, even before any human being was around.

I’d say: admit the difference in first principles and argue for the value of the atheistic definition of freedom.

The difference is in RCD inconsistent notion of resposibility.

How about if you respond and finish with some summary points and we can part friends until we engage in another stimulating discussion like this one. Sound Good?

OK. Thank you for the very interesting discussion. I very much enjoyed it.

 

[HannahS]

Possible, except that God has told us that some of His actions will be in response to our prayer. So it cannot be from lack of faith, because faith tells us to pray. You could ask why it is that God has decided to act this way, but that’d be a different question.

Hello, please let me know where in the Bible it tells us that God has told us that some of His actions will be in response to our prayer - This has been a question I’ve had for years (why do we pray if God has already determined the outcome?) and no one can answer it for me. Many thanks ~