Why Scientism is a Faith

[tonyrey]

no, i haven’t read most posts on this forum, but since scientism is so easily dispatched as self-refuting, it is hard for me to believe that once one is presented with the problem that the scientific method can’t be proven true with the scientific method that one could remain scientistic in the sense presented in this thread. so i still think this is a straw man issue, and refuting scientism doesn’t say anything about the truth of any religious dogma.

On this very thread there have been challenges to produce a form of knowledge other than science, implying that there isn’t any… For a materialist there can be no other form of knowledge because there is nothing else to know besides matter and its products.

the OP presented faith as belief that has no basis in reason. showing that scientism has no basis in reason does not prove that people generally ought to believe things that are unsupported by reason. they shouldn’t, and they generally see making claims that are unsupported by reason as a bad thing. why make an exception for religious dogmas? it is my experience that religious people generally do think that they have good reasons for their religious beliefs. what i can’t figure out is why the OP is trying to make a case that it is good to believe things when we have no reason to believe. he calls that faith, but i see that as demeaning to the concept of faith. it is the atheist caricature of faith that the OP is buying into and and trying to sell.

The OP stated that “the element of faith… is basic to all belief” because in every subject we “start off with postulates or axioms, statements that are presumed to be self-evident and don’t need proof (that is, statements that one takes on faith)”. Do you disagree? If so why?

 

[Spock]

On this very thread there have been challenges to produce a form of knowledge other than science, implying that there isn’t any… For a materialist there can be no other form of knowledge because there is nothing else to know besides matter and its products.

Right on the money. Now assume that we, materialists are all small children, who are nevertheless willing and eager to learn. Show us what other method is there, and show us how can it lead to true assessments about reality (whatever it may be). But, please, do not try to say nonsense like: “if you are willing to believe what we say, and are willing to pray for guidance and enlightement, then eventually God will provide the necessary evidence”. Even if we are ignorant (but willing to learn) we are not stupid, and pseudo-answers like this are not satisfactory. Be specific. Show us what method you use to separate true statements about reality from the false ones. Tell us how do you decide if a statement about reality is true or not.

The OP stated that “the element of faith… is basic to all belief” because in every subject we “start off with postulates or axioms, statements that are presumed to be self-evident and don’t need proof (that is, statements that one takes on faith)”. Do you disagree? If so why?

(Emphasis mine). That is a really bad way to start the teaching process. Twisting words to your own purposes is hardly a good way to establish common ground. Faith has many meanings, but to intentionally confuse it with “reasonable assumption” is not one of them. Better make a different start.

 

[Betterave]

In this case, I’m in agreement with you.

We can get into the controversy again in a bit, but for now I’m just going to savor this moment: we agree about something!

 

[Betterave]

Alright. So do you agree, then, that there is no better method of answering questions about the world around us than evidence-based inquiry, even if it may indeed be limited and not capable of answering all questions?

I could agree, but the point is that this kind of abstract formal agreement would be inadequate to our purposes here.

It’s not just that ‘evidence-based inquiry’ is limited in the sense of “not capable of answering all questions.” It’s that it is problematic even with respect to the fundamental questions to which it must give us answers, if our appealing to it as normative is to make any sense - in particular, for our purposes here, questions about what ‘evidence-based inquiry’ actually is.

Here’s what I think you need to think about: The world doesn’t present itself to us in nice neat categories of ‘evident’ and ‘not-evident.’ So claims about the world likewise do not present themselves to us in nice neat categories of ‘evidence-based’ and ‘not-evidence-based.’ WE often present the world and our claims about it to ourselves in those terms, but the way in which we do so often turns out to be controversial, and for substantive reasons (although we are most often inclined to ignore this).

 

[Betterave]

Of course not. That is the whole point. That is why the feedback loop is of utmost importance. If the interpreter’s assessment is false, it will be “pointed out” by the negative result of acting on the interpretation (which may even result in death, if the error is serious enough).

but you’re still fixated on survival. Why should death be considered an indication of falsity? These are totally incommensurate notions (one is a physical event, the other an epistemic ascription).

Of course it is a simplistic answer. You cannot expect a whole treatise within the constraints of a post. But it was not to be taken in a literal fashion. What this simplistic argument was supposed to illustrate is that we arrive at a result through trial and error. We discern if a hypothesis (or model) was “good enough” (not perfect) for our purposes.

Two problems here: you apparently ignored the question of method and you gave a specific answer (which, b.t.w., seems not to make sense) to a general question.

Your question was: “how do we know if our assessment produces a correct result?”.

No. Here was my question: what is your answer to the general question?: how do we ever know that our methods are sound and that our conclusions are actually true?

I simply (or simplistically) chose the extreme example when a wrong decision will have the immediate repercussion of death. I thought that the illustration is sufficient. Maybe it was not. So, in greater detail: any model which allows one to survive is good enough. Any model which propagates the well-being of the individual is good enough. It does not have to be “perfect”.

I think Antitheist has already spotted what seems to be wrong with the model you offer here, although as you add details, further problems seem to be arising. Take the vague notion of “well-being of the individual”: do you really think that gives us a usable epistemic criterion or can be used as the basis for an epistemological method? How? It’s not that it’s wrong, but surely it’s deeply problematic in its application?

 

[Betterave]

In this case, I’m in agreement with you. It’s not merely the fact that we can “survive” that confirms that our models are accurate (after all, believing falsehoods can be equally conducive to survival) – it’s the fact that our models allow us to manipulate reality. There are literally billions of examples of our models allowing us to have control over reality, and – since each of these models was determined through evidence-based inquiry – these billions of examples are incredibly strong evidence that evidence-based inquiry works. In fact, it’s the only method of knowing things about the world that is consistently reliable (which, to be clear, doesn’t mean 100% consistent or 100% reliable).

Two(ish) questions:

1. How do we know, in general, if a model allows us to manipulate or have control over ‘reality’? (What are our criteria for ‘reality’ and for ‘control’/‘manipulate’?)
2. Why do you think that knowledge must imply control? How is it possible for you to make this claim? What do you take to be the epistemic status of this alleged implication?

 

[Spock]

No. Here was my question: what is your answer to the general question?: how do we ever know that our methods are sound and that our conclusions are actually true?

Well, here is another “simplistic” answer: “the proof of the pudding is that it is edible”.

As long as our predicted outcome coincides with the actual result, the model was sufficiently correct. To question this you would have to ask: “how do we know that our ability to compare the predicted outcome with the actual outcome is valid?”. That kind of a question would rapidly approach universal skepticism, which is not a tenable position.

We all assume (not on “faith”, of course) that our perception (if not the interpretation) of reality is sound. If we hold our hand into a flame, it would be ludicrous to say: “well maybe I immersed my hand in ice-cream, and not in fire, though it surely feels like fire”.

No, I am not “fixated” on survival, it is just the best way to illustrate the process.

 

[Rocinante]

Two(ish) questions:

1. How do we know, in general, if a model allows us to manipulate or have control over ‘reality’? (What are our criteria for ‘reality’ and for ‘control’/‘manipulate’?)

reality itself is a concept that is derived from our successes and failures in trying to do stuff.

1. Why do you think that knowledge must imply control? How is it possible for you to make this claim? What do you take to be the epistemic status of this alleged implication?

because that is what knowledge is. it is defined as justified true belief, but for all intents and purposes, knowledge is power.

at least that’s how a pragmatist like myself wields these terms, and it sounds like that is where antitheist and spock seem to be coming from as well.

 

[Rocinante]

On this very thread there have been challenges to produce a form of knowledge other than science, implying that there isn’t any… For a materialist there can be no other form of knowledge because there is nothing else to know besides matter and its products.

i haven’t been following all the posts on “evidence based inquiry,” but let me say this. “evidence” is that which is aimed at getting consensus with other inquirers. getting consensus with others is not always part of the goal of inquiry, so all knowledge pursuit is not evidence based inquiry. this of course applies to materialists as well as those who believe in the supernatural. for both sorts, though we don’t seek consensus with others for lots and lots of our beliefs, the moment we start trying to get others to share particular beliefs is the moment we enter into the evidence game.

The OP stated that “the element of faith… is basic to all belief” because in every subject we “start off with postulates or axioms, statements that are presumed to be self-evident and don’t need proof (that is, statements that one takes on faith)”. Do you disagree? If so why?

this all goes back to how you want to define faith. if you want to define faith as any belief that we can’t prove with 100% certainty, then everything is faith and faith is therefore a pretty worthless concept since it applies to everything rather than distinguishing something from something else. but the concept immediately becomes dangerous rather than worthless when it is used to then promote the false notion that since believe things that aren’t proven it is a virtue to believe things that have, in the OP’s words, “no basis in reason.” he held up a fools-gold standard of 100% certainty to show that none of our beliefs measure up, and then twists the notion as support for the idea that no belief is any better justified than any other–that is is somehow a good thing to have beliefs that we can’t justify. this is an insult to most “people of faith” who claim to have strong justification for their religious beliefs or they wouldn’t hold them.

we don’t actually have “postulates or axioms, statements that are presumed to be self-evident and don’t need proof” that are taken on faith (in the OP’s sense) since all of our beliefs are subject to being held in doubt to see if we are justified in believing them. we can’t of course question all our beliefs at once, but there is no belief that cannot be held in doubt. there is no belief that simply must be held on faith in the OP’s lousy and demeaning (to religious folks) usage of the term.

the argument that is proposed in the OP is basically that we believe lots of things without proof so it is okay to not be able to prove our religious beliefs. but though we believe things without proof, we don’t believe things that aren’t well-justified. the beliefs we hold are the ones we feel we are most justified in believing. this applies to declarations of faith such as, “jesus is the true, the light, and the way” as well as any other sort of belief like “the eagles have a strong offense, but their defense will prevent them from being successful in the playoffs.” we either have good reason to believe what we do or we don’t. and this notion pushed by the OP that it is somehow good to believe things that we have no good reason to believe is ridiculous.

 

[Betterave]

Well, here is another “simplistic” answer: “the proof of the pudding is that it is edible”.

So if I manage to eat my sock, then I’ve proven my sock is pudding? (That sounds silly maybe, but these are things you need to seriously think about.)

As long as our predicted outcome coincides with the actual result, the model was sufficiently correct. To question this you would have to ask: “how do we know that our ability to compare the predicted outcome with the actual outcome is valid?”. That kind of a question would rapidly approach universal skepticism, which is not a tenable position.

These are questionable claims, at best, but you’re really missing the point here. If our model is of the kind such that we predict an outcome and then run some test to see if our prediction is correct, that’s fine; that’s what we’ll do. The question is: does that kind of procedure accurately characterize every inquiry after knowledge? (I think the answer should be obvious: no, it doesn’t.) And: do such procedures actually constitute the sufficient grounds for rational inquiry? (Again: I think the answer is clearly no - and I’m pretty sure Rocinante can tell you at least one reason why not.)

No, I am not “fixated” on survival, it is just the best way to illustrate the process.

To illustrate *what *process? I don’t see that you’ve illustrated anything except conceptual confusion. You certainly haven’t responded to my objections to your claims.

 

[Betterave]

reality itself is a concept that is derived from our successes and failures in trying to do stuff.

I don’t think that’s wrong, but it’s certainly awfully vague. What do you include under the heading “trying to do stuff”?

Is trying to figure out what ‘reality’ should be taken to refer to one of the things which we “try to do”? How do we gauge our success or failure in trying to do this? How does ‘control’ enter into this? How do you think the notion of ‘manipulation’ or ‘control’ is related to that of ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ when it comes to things like this?

He who succeeds in “doing stuff” may know something about reality, but he might not know what he knows and he might not know what he doesn’t know - and these lacunae in his knowledge may be far more important, of far graver concern, than what he does know (whatever that is - all WE know, it seems, is that he DID something).

because that is what knowledge is. it is defined as justified true belief, but for all intents and purposes, knowledge is power.

Okay. So what is power?

 

[Rocinante]

I don’t think that’s wrong, but it’s certainly awfully vague. What do you include under the heading “trying to do stuff”?

everything we try to do.

Is trying to figure out what ‘reality’ should be taken to refer to one of the things which we “try to do”? How do we gauge our success or failure in trying to do this?

sure it is. the way we judge our success in characterizing reality (that which pushes back on us and is inferred based on our success or failure when we try to do stuff) is in terms of how well our characterizations help us predict and control (and generally to do stuff).

How does ‘control’ enter into this? How do you think the notion of ‘manipulation’ or ‘control’ is related to that of ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ when it comes to things like this?

knowledge as power is an alternative theory of knowledge from knowledge as holding concepts with the correct correspondence to reality. knowledge as correspondence leaves us skeptical about how we could know that we know. (when can we say we are in proper relation to the essence of a thing? what can that even mean?) while knowledge as power leaves us confident that we know a thing if we know how to use a thing. knowing more about the thing is knowing how to do more with it.

Okay. So what is power?

the ability to do stuff.

 

[Betterave]

sure it is. the way we judge our success in characterizing reality (that which pushes back on us and is inferred based on our success or failure when we try to do stuff) is in terms of how well our characterizations help us predict and control (and generally to do stuff).

Okay… so ‘reality’ is “that which pushes back on us and is inferred based on our success or failure when we try to do stuff.” How do we know that that’s what ‘reality’ is (whatever it means*)? Apparently we know it based on a judgment of “how well our characterizations help us to do stuff.” So how do we judge how ‘well’ our characterizations are helping us to do ‘stuff’?

*(What do you mean by “pushes back on us”? Is “that which pushes back on us” any different from “that which we believe to be real”? How do we know when something is “pushing back on us”?)

knowledge as power is an alternative theory of knowledge from knowledge as holding concepts with the correct correspondence to reality. knowledge as correspondence leaves us skeptical about how we could know that we know. (when can we say we are in proper relation to the essence of a thing? what can that even mean?) while knowledge as power leaves us confident that we know a thing if we know how to use a thing. knowing more about the thing is knowing how to do more with it.

Here’s another alternate theory of knowledge: knowledge is believing something and believing that you’re justified in believing it. So as long as I believe that my belief is justified, I know it. But that’s just not credible, surely. And neither, it seems, is the claim that knowledge is power. Power is power, not knowledge. If you want to say that knowledge is power, how is this different from skepticism? You’ve still defined knowledge out of existence by replacing it with power.

Your claim (bolded) entails that if I own a slave and I “know how to use him,” then I know him. But I wouldn’t know him, not really. And if I can make him do more stuff, that doesn’t necessarily mean I know him better. And that’s what it could mean to say that I’m “not in a proper relation to the essence of the thing.”

the ability to do stuff.

I thought you might say that. Now what do you mean by ‘stuff’? You can’t possibly really mean whatever could possibly fall under the heading of ‘stuff’ - right?

 

[JDaniel]

In this case, I’m in agreement with you. It’s not merely the fact that we can “survive” that confirms that our models are accurate (after all, believing falsehoods can be equally conducive to survival) – it’s the fact that our models allow us to manipulate reality. There are literally billions of examples of our models allowing us to have control over reality, and – since each of these models was determined through evidence-based inquiry – these billions of examples are incredibly strong evidence that evidence-based inquiry works. In fact, it’s the only method of knowing things about the world that is consistently reliable (which, to be clear, doesn’t mean 100% consistent or 100% reliable).

Again, as one of billions of examples, I’m sending a message through the internet on a computer that was designed thanks to evidence-based inquiry. The fact that I can do this is evidence that we have an accurate understanding of how electrons work, and since evidence-based inquiry allows us to do this, it is part of the evidence that evidence-based inquiry is consistently reliable (the rest of the evidence is the other several billion examples I could use).

However, that we were here today, holding this conversation, is both real and true. And, simply because the event is concluded does not mean that the reality and truth of the event evaporated into thin air. The evidence for this activity is that it is saved on the CAF server for years to come.

Now, let’s say that, six months from now, the CAF server - and all backups - take a swan dive into a waterless pool, destroying all of our electronic verification. That we had this conversation is still true and real, although past, goes without saying. But, where’s the evidence? We can inquire all we want, but it will be to no avail.

Here, then, is an example of irreparable falsification. Therefore, we should be able to say, with authority and confidence, that “Today, a conversation between us did not take place.” But, can this statement be true? Can what took place here today be said to never have existed?

Rocinante says that reality is that which pushes back against us. That is the definition of “object,” which is from the Latin, objectum: to push back against. I see where he is coming from here. But, my question is, how does what took place today, but is lost tomorrow, lose Reality and thus, Truth? Today we can surely, and might well, say, “By tomorrow morning, we will have concluded today’s meeting.” And the statement would be undeniably true.

Where does the objectum go? What is left to push back against us? Where do we look to seek to inquire?

God bless,
jd

 

[Rocinante]

Okay… so ‘reality’ is “that which pushes back on us and is inferred based on our success or failure when we try to do stuff.” How do we know that that’s what ‘reality’ is (whatever it means*)? Apparently we know it based on a judgment of “how well our characterizations help us to do stuff.” So how do we judge how ‘well’ our characterizations are helping us to do ‘stuff’?

“reality” is a word, and therefore its meaning is equivalent to its usage. in the above, i was recommending a definition for the term. reality doesn’t hand us definitions of words like “reality.” we make words to serve certain of our human purposes. how good a given definition is will depend on how well it fulfills whatever purposes the term was coined to help achieve.

*(What do you mean by “pushes back on us”? Is “that which pushes back on us” any different from “that which we believe to be real”? How do we know when something is “pushing back on us”?)

it is a term that stands for the fact that what we will does not always come to pass. it stands for our lack of control and our desire for more control.

Here’s another alternate theory of knowledge: knowledge is believing something and believing that you’re justified in believing it. So as long as I believe that my belief is justified, I know it. But that’s just not credible, surely.

right. it doesn’t account for the fact that what we are justified in believing often turns out not to be so. we usually therefore think of knowledge as including three terms–justified, true, and belief.

And neither, it seems, is the claim that knowledge is power. Power is power, not knowledge. If you want to say that knowledge is power, how is this different from skepticism? You’ve still defined knowledge out of existence by replacing it with power.

it’s a metaphor, an analogy. where power comes in with “justified true belief” is that beliefs are help for purposes and true beliefs are more likely to fulfill our purposes than false ones.

Your claim (bolded) entails that if I own a slave and I “know how to use him,” then I know him. But I wouldn’t know him, not really. And if I can make him do more stuff, that doesn’t necessarily mean I know him better. And that’s what it could mean to say that I’m “not in a proper relation to the essence of the thing.”

i don’t understand. you say you’ve explained what it means to be in proper relation to the essence of a thing, but i don’t find that explanation anywhere.

i was talking about knowing a claim or an object. to talk about using a person is in bad taste, so to know a person usually means to know a bunch claims that are true about the person and to be able to predict to greater or lesser extent what a person will do.

I thought you might say that. Now what do you mean by ‘stuff’? You can’t possibly really mean whatever could possibly fall under the heading of ‘stuff’ - right?

in terms of power, being able to do stuff refers to being able to do whatever it is we want to do.

 

[Betterave]

“reality” is a word, and therefore its meaning is equivalent to its usage.

True.

in the above, i was recommending a definition for the term.

and I was asking for an explanation of your definition, which was so vague that it didn’t seem to define anything!

reality doesn’t hand us definitions of words like “reality.”

What does that mean?

we make words to serve certain of our human purposes.

sometimes, but this is not typical. Usually we are given words. Very rarely do we make them. And sometimes we don’t know how to use the words we’ve been given properly.

how good a given definition is will depend on how well it fulfills whatever purposes the term was coined to help achieve.

For what purpose was the term ‘reality’ coined (what act of ‘coining’ are you referring to here?), and how well does your definition fulfill this purpose??

You’ve completely failed to answer my questions here, it seems: how do we judge how ‘well’ your characterization of ‘reality’ is helping us to do ‘stuff’?

[Please note that scare quotes indicate terms which are problematic, which you seem to be using in ill-defined ways.]

it is a term that stands for the fact that what we will does not always come to pass. it stands for our lack of control and our desire for more control.

so now you’re saying that ‘reality’ is that which does not reliably come to pass when we will it, that which we do not control but wish to control? That seems radically different from what you were saying before.

right. it doesn’t account for the fact that what we are justified in believing often turns out not to be so. we usually therefore think of knowledge as including three terms–justified, true, and belief.

So let’s say that on this account justification consists in the sincerity of my belief and justified beliefs are thought to be true. False statements are explained by a lack of sincerity. It still seems no more arbitrary than your model.

it’s a metaphor, an analogy. where power comes in with “justified true belief” is that beliefs are help for purposes and true beliefs are more likely to fulfill our purposes than false ones.

A metaphor… so knowledge is like power, not literally power? How so? When you say that true beliefs are more likely to fulfill our purposes than false ones, that implies that if I want to believe X, then X is ipso facto more likely to be true, because its being true will fulfill my purpose of wanting to believe it. Do you understand that?

i don’t understand. you say you’ve explained what it means to be in proper relation to the essence of a thing, but i don’t find that explanation anywhere.

Sorry you missed it, I though it was obvious: you are in proper relation to another human being when you know what a human being is. When you don’t know this, you are liable to treating human beings in a way in which human beings ought not to be treated.

i was talking about knowing a claim or an object.

So was I! Here’s a claim: “This woman is an object which I own.” Here’s another: “I know how to make her do what I want her to do.”

to talk about using a person is in bad taste, so to know a person usually means to know a bunch claims that are true about the person and to be able to predict to greater or lesser extent what a person will do.

Bad taste?! Maybe, but why ignore my point: isn’t it in “bad taste” because it *objectively *does not place us in proper relation to the essence of the human being?

in terms of power, being able to do stuff refers to being able to do whatever it is we want to do.

And you don’t see any problems with that?

 

[Rocinante]

So let’s say that on this account justification consists in the sincerity of my belief and justified beliefs are thought to be true. False statements are explained by a lack of sincerity. It still seems no more arbitrary than your model.

you can go ahead and try to define it that way if you want, but good luck getting other people to use the word that way.

When you say that true beliefs are more likely to fulfill our purposes than false ones, that implies that if I want to believe X, then X is ipso facto more likely to be true, because its being true will fulfill my purpose of wanting to believe it. Do you understand that?

no. that doesn’t make any sense.

Sorry you missed it, I though it was obvious: you are in proper relation to another human being when you know what a human being is. When you don’t know this, you are liable to treating human beings in a way in which human beings ought not to be treated.

i objected to the definition of knowing as being in proper relationship to a things essence because it doesn’t say how that is supposed to work (how would we know that we know?). you still haven’t cleared that up. you’ve just put it in context of knowing a person and reasserted knowledge as getting in touch with an essence.

So was I! Here’s a claim: “This woman is an object which I own.”

Bad taste?! Maybe, but why ignore my point: isn’t it in “bad taste” because it *objectively *does not place us in proper relation to the essence of the human being?

my objection is still that i can see no way of making sense of “getting in proper relation to an essence.” how do we know when we have done that?

And you don’t see any problems with that?

nope.

 

[Betterave]

Dear Rocinante,

Do you understand the difference between “that doesn’t make any sense” and “I don’t understand that”? (Please explain your answer.)

 

[Betterave]

you can go ahead and try to define it that way if you want, but good luck getting other people to use the word that way.

given the context, don’t you think that’s a bit of a silly remark? or is this supposed to be ‘relevant’ somehow?

 

[Rocinante]

Dear Rocinante,

Do you understand the difference between “that doesn’t make any sense” and “I don’t understand that”? (Please explain your answer.)

yes.

you were proposing your purpose of believing something as wanting to believe it. that still doesn’t say why you’d want to believe it.