Why Scientism is a Faith

[Betterave]

And that’s the sense I use the word in.

Okay, but you can’t just ignore the reasons I gave for not accepting that sense of the word as the relevant one for our primarily epistemological purposes here. As I said: “But we can really know things about imaginary entities (e.g., we can really know that a dragon is not the same as a mouse), so it seems clear to me that that sense is not the right one to fix upon here (where we are talking about reality as that which can be known).” Can you respond to that point?

It doesn’t make sense for you to just insist on using a sense of ‘reality’ that you’re comfortable with, even though that sense doesn’t fit in this context. Also please note that the opposition ‘real vs. imaginary’ doesn’t necessarily correspond to ‘fact vs. fantasy.’ It is possible to have ‘real facts’ vs. ‘imaginary facts,’ and ‘real fantasy’ vs. ‘imaginary fantasy.’ Right?

 

[Betterave]

I’ll get back to dragons after you respond to my point about the relevant sense of ‘reality’ here. In the meantime, there’s this:

Alright, I’ll try again. You said: “So suppose I believe that the purpose of owning a slave is to extract his labor - in this case, the more labor I can extract from him, the better I know him, according to your model.”

The error you’re making here is your equivocation on the phrase “know him better.” In everyday speech, when we say, “I know him well,” we mean that we know qualities about an individual’s personality (for example, that he’s funny or that he likes a certain kind of cheese or that his favorie movie is Faster Pussycat! Kill! Kill!).

It seems to me like you’re just projecting an equivocation onto me, but this charge of equivocation is really just a red herring. Do you have any reason for thinking that my use was equivocal? You’ve introduced an equivocal sense of ‘know,’ but I don’t see where I ever used that sense of the word…

The test you propose here doesn’t correspond to “knowing him” in that sense – it corresponds to knowing his abilities as a worker. And I agree, if by “know him” we mean “know how good a worker he is,” then yes, the amount and quality of labor he produces tells us how good a worker he is. We know how good a worker he is by observing the quality of the work he produces.

But I would never say that observing his work can let you “know him” in the sense of knowing his personality, which is an altogether different subject.

…So right, I never said that either (although that other sense of knowing him might be entailed by the ‘knowing him as an instrument of labor’ sense).

So again: 1) I did define ‘well’ for the purpose of my thought experiment and 2) there was obviously a prediction relative to that definition - so on your view, it seems, this should entail that I know my slave well to the extent that I can extract more labor from him. You agree with this, but then there’s no reason that I can see for you to deny that the optimal model for knowing my slave is the one by the use of which I can reliably extract the most labor from him. In other words, knowledge here, as you say, is just about making reliable predictions so I can get what I want. Most people will agree that that’s a kind of knowledge, but that by itself it’s inadequate.

 

[AntiTheist]

Okay, but you can’t just ignore the reasons I gave for not accepting that sense of the word as the relevant one for our primarily epistemological purposes here. As I said: “But we can really know things about imaginary entities (e.g., we can really know that a dragon is not the same as a mouse), so it seems clear to me that that sense is not the right one to fix upon here (where we are talking about reality as that which can be known).” Can you respond to that point?

I can, and I did. I will quote to you a section of my last post where I address this very point:

"When we say we know things about dragons, we’re saying that we know the kinds of things that people who have made up stories about dragons attribute to them.

"The stories about dragons indeed exist in reality, and those stories attribute qualities to these creatures. But what doesn’t exist are dragons.

"The stories are real, not the dragons.

“Similarly, if I invent a character and write a book about him, the character is not real. You can read my book and learn things about my imaginary character – which is to say, you can learn the qualities that I attribute to him in the story – but your learning things about him doesn’t make him any more real.”

Again: the book is real, and the story is real. The things described in the book and in the story are not real.

I want you to respond to this point. I will get to your other points, but not until we’re clear on this one.

 

[Betterave]

I’m not sure how you think you’ve addressed my point with this, but I’ll take a shot at responding to it.

I can, and I did. I will quote to you a section of my last post where I address this very point:

"When we say we know things about dragons, we’re saying that we know the kinds of things that people who have made up stories about dragons attribute to them.

We could be saying that, but not necessarily. We might well just be saying that we know about dragons, full stop. (If you want to deny this possibility, you need to provide some non-question-begging justification for doing so.)

"The stories about dragons indeed exist in reality, and those stories attribute qualities to these creatures. But what doesn’t exist are dragons.

Dragons don’t exist in one sense of exist. But my point is that we can still know about things that don’t exist in that sense. So that sense of ‘exist’ is not the relevant one where we are talking about what is ‘real’ as what we can know. Remember, the primary question here is “what can we know (and how)?”, not “what is real?/what exists?” So the first question sets the context for the relevant sense of ‘real’ or ‘exists’ in the second question (at least insofar as the second question is serving as an auxiliary to the first).

"The stories are real, not the dragons.

The dragons are not real in one sense - but for you to simply insist on using that sense is to beg the question. And the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the rest of this:

“Similarly, if I invent a character and write a book about him, the character is not real. You can read my book and learn things about my imaginary character – which is to say, you can learn the qualities that I attribute to him in the story – but your learning things about him doesn’t make him any more real.”

Again: the book is real, and the story is real. The things described in the book and in the story are not real.

I want you to respond to this point. I will get to your other points, but not until we’re clear on this one.

 

[gentle_atheist]

Can anybody explain to me what Betterave is talking about? I can follow what AntiTheist is saying but I can’t make sense out of Betterave’s posts. He must be a philosophy major.

 

[Betterave]

Can anybody explain to me what Betterave is talking about? I can follow what AntiTheist is saying but I can’t make sense out of Betterave’s posts. He must be a philosophy major.

LOL! Indeed. Sorry about that.
Any particular point that you’d like clarified?

 

[AntiTheist]

Dragons don’t exist in one sense of exist. But my point is that we can still know about things that don’t exist in that sense. So that sense of ‘exist’ is not the relevant one where we are talking about what is ‘real’ as what we can know.

Well, this is part of the reason that we’re talking past each other. You’re interested in talking about what people can know, including what people can know about totally made-up imaginary things.

In contrast, I’m talking about how we know things about non-imaginary stuff and – more fundamentally – how we go about distinguishing the imaginary from the non-imaginary.

When I define words, my “justification” for my definition always relies on two things: 1) General Usage – I typically use words in the way that they’re used by most people who communicate; if I radically alter a definition, I had better have a good reason for doing so, and 2) The Scope of My Interest in the Particular Topic Under Discussion.

Here, my usage of “real” to mean “non-imaginary” indeed accords with general usage. I would be willing to bet you that if we asked 500 random strangers on the street, “Are dragons real?” The overwhelming majority of them would answer “No” because practically all people operate under the definition of “real” as “non-imaginary.”

Further, the general usage of the word in this case precisely identifies the scope of my interests in this particular topic. We are, after all, on a forum that deals with religion, and we talk about a lot of religious claims. Pretty much all religious people think that their god is non-imaginary. So in discussions on forums like these, the relevant thing to talk about is how we determine things about the non-imaginary world.

My claim is that the only consistently-reliable method we have for evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world is evidence-based inquiry (and, for the record, “consistently reliable” does not mean 100% consistent or 100% reliable). By “evidence-based inquiry,” I mean the logical processes of induction and deduction, which must begin from premises supported by data from the non-imaginary world if they are to come to correct conclusions about the non-imaginary world, and the specific process of making predictions on the basis of a claim and gathering data from the non-imaginary world to support those predictions (which is, actually, a type of deduction), the most formal versions of which – practiced by very few people – are called “science.”

In addition to my claim that evidence-based inquiry is the only consistently-reliable method we have for evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world, I am also claiming that while evidence-based inquiry may be limited – we may never, for example, be able to use evidence-based inquiry to determine what came before the Big Bang – these potential limitations do not mean that there are other ways of coming to conclusions about the non-imaginary world.

 

[AntiTheist]

Just to be extra clear, here is what Betterave is saying:

Remember, the primary question here is “what can we know (and how)?”, not “what is real?/what exists?” So the first question sets the context for the relevant sense of ‘real’ or ‘exists’ in the second question (at least insofar as the second question is serving as an auxiliary to the first).

Here’s where we differ. For me, the primary question is “what can we know (and how) about the non-imaginary world?”

The reason that this is the primary question for me is that my interest here is specifically in evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world.

This primary question indeed gives context for my definition of “real” and “exists” – along with the general usage of these words, which perfectly accords with my interest in this context.

[Incidentally, even if we were talking about how we know things about imaginary creatures, the process still involves evidence-based inquiry. My conclusions about the attributes of dragons, for example, are induced from the evidence I’ve gathered from storybooks.]

 

[Betterave]

Just to be extra clear, here is what Betterave is saying:Here’s where we differ. For me, the primary question is “what can we know (and how) about the non-imaginary world?”

The reason that this is the primary question for me is that my interest here is specifically in evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world.

This primary question indeed gives context for my definition of “real” and “exists” – along with the general usage of these words, which perfectly accords with my interest in this context.

[Incidentally, even if we were talking about how we know things about imaginary creatures, the process still involves evidence-based inquiry. My conclusions about the attributes of dragons, for example, are induced from the evidence I’ve gathered from storybooks.]

Of course that’s fine if you want to inquire about what can we know (and how) about the non-imaginary world. But that’s irrelevant to my point, unless you have already provided an unproblematic criterion for determining what belongs to the non-imaginary world and what does not - i.e., what it actually is we want to know about when we ask the question, what can we know (and how) about the non-imaginary world. Since we don’t agree on this, obviously you’re just begging the question to introduce this distinction up front. What we want to figure out is precisely how to make this distinction or what this distinction consists of. That’s what I was pointing out when I said: So the first question sets the context for the relevant sense of ‘real’ or ‘exists’ in the second question (at least insofar as the second question is serving as an auxiliary to the first).

[Your “incidentally…” raises the question why you are insisting at all on a restriction of the question to “what we can know (and how) **about the non-imaginary world” - what is the purpose of this restriction?]

 

[Betterave]

Well, this is part of the reason that we’re talking past each other. You’re interested in talking about what people can know, including what people can know about totally made-up imaginary things.

In contrast, I’m talking about how we know things about non-imaginary stuff and – more fundamentally – how we go about distinguishing the imaginary from the non-imaginary.

I think the point I want to emphasize is that we must understand the story first, before we can know whether the referents of the story are real or imaginary or something else (metaphorical, allegorical, symbolic, etc.).

When I define words, my “justification” for my definition always relies on two things: 1) General Usage – I typically use words in the way that they’re used by most people who communicate; if I radically alter a definition, I had better have a good reason for doing so, and 2) The Scope of My Interest in the Particular Topic Under Discussion.

But the scope of your interest must be determined by what it is you want to prove. You can’t just artificially limit the scope of your interest to “things you accept as non-imaginary” if you’re trying to prove that it is these and only these things which we can justifiably admit as non-imaginary. Before you insist, “I’m not interested in X,” you need to be sure that X is in fact not relevant to what you are interested in.

Here, my usage of “real” to mean “non-imaginary” indeed accords with general usage. I would be willing to bet you that if we asked 500 random strangers on the street, “Are dragons real?” The overwhelming majority of them would answer “No” because practically all people operate under the definition of “real” as “non-imaginary.”

Of course that’s right. But there are other questions you can ask them which will lead them to realize that that dichotomy isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems. (That’s what I’m trying to do here.)

Further, the general usage of the word in this case precisely identifies the scope of my interests in this particular topic. We are, after all, on a forum that deals with religion, and we talk about a lot of religious claims. Pretty much all religious people think that their god is non-imaginary. So in discussions on forums like these, the relevant thing to talk about is how we determine things about the non-imaginary world.

I think I’ve said enough about this: as I said, I think you’re just begging the question here.

My claim is that the only consistently-reliable method we have for evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world is evidence-based inquiry (and, for the record, “consistently reliable” does not mean 100% consistent or 100% reliable). By “evidence-based inquiry,” I mean the logical processes of induction and deduction, which must begin from premises supported by data from the non-imaginary world if they are to come to correct conclusions about the non-imaginary world, and the specific process of making predictions on the basis of a claim and gathering data from the non-imaginary world to support those predictions (which is, actually, a type of deduction), the most formal versions of which – practiced by very few people – are called “science.”

And this just takes us back to the beginning and ignores the fact that problems have been raised with interpreting the notion of ‘evidence-based inquiry’ and these problems have not been dealt with.

In addition to my claim that evidence-based inquiry is the only consistently-reliable method we have for evaluating claims about the non-imaginary world, I am also claiming that while evidence-based inquiry may be limited – we may never, for example, be able to use evidence-based inquiry to determine what came before the Big Bang – these potential limitations do not mean that there are other ways of coming to conclusions about the non-imaginary world.

Yes, that is correct - wanting to know something doesn’t imply being able to know something.

 

[AntiTheist]

Betterave,

I am having problems following your overall point here. You are claiming, I take it, that the boundary between imaginary and non-imaginary things is difficult to distinguish in some cases? Or are you claiming that we don’t have a clear basis for distinguishing between imaginary and non-imaginary things?

After all, you write:

there are other questions you can ask [people] which will lead them to realize that that dichotomy [between imaginary and non-imaginary] isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems.

It sounds like you think that it can be difficult to distinguish between imaginary things and non-imaginary things.

But it really isn’t. We have good reasons, for example, to lock some people up in mental hospitals when they start hearing angels telling them to dance naked in the streets to prevent an alien invasion from beyond the stars.

I want to take a moment to contrast our writing styles:

When I write my posts, I do so in the clearest possible terms. I present my ideas as claims, and I clearly mark them as such, and I give very specific and concrete examples to clarify what I’m talking about. My goal is communication.

When you write posts, you do so in riddles. You make cryptic comments like, “that dichotomy [between imaginary and non-imaginary] isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems,” yet you never bother to explain what you mean. You need to actually say, in straightforward English, what’s “problematic” about it in your opinion. It would also help to give specific, concrete examples to clarify whatever it is that you’re on about.

I’ve said that my goal is communication; yours appears to be obfuscation.

I am forced to assume that the only reason you do not state your own claims as clearly as I do is that you do not have fully-formed opinions of your own on these subjects.

Please prove me wrong. Please make explicit claims with clear, concrete examples.

For example, write a sentence that begins, “I disagree with your claim that evidence-basd inquiry is the only consistently reliable method we have of learning things about the non-imaginary world because…” Finish it with a reason that supports your disagreement. Follow this reason with a specific example of what you’re talking about.

It’s really not that hard.

 

[JDaniel]

Reality is “that which appears to presents itself to us that continues to exist even when we are not consciously thinking it into existence.”

So, ‘reality’ isn’t actually real. It is merely us postulating it: “thinking it into existence.” Your definition destroys “reality.” It expresses that reality is illusion. It suggests that even the concept of reality is irrational, to a large extent.

“Control/Manipulate” means to modify reality in some fashion.

We know that a model allows us to manipulate reality when we decide to perform an action on the basis of a model and the results allow us to modify reality in ways that the model predicts.

So, for example, on the basis of our model of how electrons work, we’ve taken actions that – our model predicts – should allow us to do all kinds of neat technological things, like – wonder of wonders! – send messages at lightning fast speeds across the world.

This is impossible, based upon you definition. Reality is not illusion, although, by your definition, illusion is reality.

And, lo and behold! The results of taking these actions allow us to modify reality (in this case, send messages and do other cool technological things) that the model predicted would happen.

The more we can do this, the more evidence we have that the model accurately describes reality.

Nonsense.

[SNIP]

It’s not that knowledge implies control – it’s that control is evidence for knowledge in the manner I’ve already suggested above. [And, if you consult the bracketed portion above, it’s not just “control” – it’s any results that the model predicts]

I don’t know how to be any clearer about this. We all have, in our heads, models about how reality works.

Not a chance. This is all a muddled rationalization. Perhaps you should alter your definition.

[SNIP]

The process of obtaining knowledge is nothing more than working toward better and better models of reality – and by “better,” I mean models that are more capable of predicting how reality will react to our actions.

However, my current pain is an object of my knowing, my knowledge. What can I do with it, as an adaptational survival technique? Or, in other words, as an improved ‘model’ that helps predict how reality will react to anything?

If you mean something different by knowledge, now would be a good time to give a very clear and unambiguous definition of what you mean, with examples.

This question was for Betterave. But, certainly knowledge’s definition has to be more than JTB, more even than your conditional version(s) of that definition. How can we know that JTB is JTB, if there are no extent presuppositions? If there are no a priori intuitions?

God bless,
jd

 

[AntiTheist]

So, ‘reality’ isn’t actually real. It is merely us postulating it: “thinking it into existence.” Your definition destroys “reality.” It expresses that reality is illusion. It suggests that even the concept of reality is irrational, to a large extent.

No. You need to read again more carefully. I said that reality is “that which appears to presents itself to us that continues to exist even when we are not consciously thinking it into existence.” Another way of saying this is to say that “Reality is that which is not imaginary.”

So, for example, under this definition, the chair that I’m sitting in is real. The computer that I’m typing this message on is real. The thoughts and feelings I experience are real thoughts and feelings.

The storybook I read about dragons is a real storybook.

If I have a hallucination in which I think I see my toaster floating and singing the latest Lady Gaga song, then it’s a real hallucination. [If it wasn’t a real hallucination, I couldn’t experience it]

In those last two examples, the book is real and the hallucination is real, but what’s not real are the contents of the book and the hallucination.

This is the crucial point that no one seems to be understanding. I can learn things about storybooks and about hallucinations, but it doesn’t make the contents of those storybooks and hallucinations real – unless, of course, you choose to define “real” to mean “stuff I can learn things about, including imaginary things like dragons and Spiderman.”

The only reason, so far as I can see, that a person would choose to define “real” in that last sense is to give themselves an excuse for thinking that their fantasies actually exist, instead of being nothing more than the product of a fevered imagination.

I would respond to the rest of your points, but you don’t make any other points. It’s just a whole bunch of “nuh-uh! You’re wrong cause I say so!” If you actually wish to address my points, you need to give a reasoned explanation for your disagreement with examples. You can start by defining reality yourself and giving some examples to clarify your definition.

Incidentally, I’m glad that at least two people have been following this part of the thread. Please, others lurking here, speak up.

 

[Spock]

Incidentally, I’m glad that at least two people have been following this part of the thread. Please, others lurking here, speak up.

Oh, I follow it. But generally you express everything what I wanted to say, so there is no need to jump in and say the same thing.

Let’s stress something, however. The trouble is not the criticism, rather its empty, non-constructive manner. It is not enough to say that your definition of “real vs. imaginary” is somehow incorrect or deficient; rather the very minimum would be to offer an alternative definition, so the two sides might be able to work out a compromise, or at least arrive at some mutual understanding. And that’s what is sorely missing. That is why I stepped back from active participation, because it is futile. It is impossible to work out the definition of even a few basic concepts to mutual satisfaction, so that a meaningful dialog could be built on them.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave,

I am having problems following your overall point here. You are claiming, I take it, that the boundary between imaginary and non-imaginary things is difficult to distinguish in some cases?

That’s undeniably true, despite your claim below.

Or are you claiming that we don’t have a clear basis for distinguishing between imaginary and non-imaginary things?

That’s surely true in particular cases, but that’s not my point. My point is about what that general basis is which we have for distinguishing, namely, rational dialogue. Scientific method qualifies as a form of rational dialogue, but obviously is not the only form of rational dialogue, or the most fundamental form.

After all, you write: Originally Posted by Betterave
there are other questions you can ask [people] which will lead them to realize that that dichotomy [between imaginary and non-imaginary] isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems. It sounds like you think that it can be difficult to distinguish between imaginary things and non-imaginary things.

But it really isn’t. We have good reasons, for example, to lock some people up in mental hospitals when they start hearing angels telling them to dance naked in the streets to prevent an alien invasion from beyond the stars.

But it really is (sometimes)! The fact that you can cite cases where it is not is completely irrelevant to that claim. Can’t you see that? It’s like saying “all cats are black - you want proof? - look there’s a black cat right there.”

In addition, your dichotomy between imaginary and non-imaginary is not only difficult to know how to apply sometimes, it is also far to simplistic as a universal sorter or differentiator of claims with regard to their epistemic status. Can you see that? It’s also not clear what it’s role is even supposed to be in terms of an epistemic concept, for the obvious reasons which I’ve already pointed out repeatedly. The general goal of scientific inquiry cannot be accurately expressed as “to distinguish between what is imaginary and what is non-imaginary.” Right?

I want to take a moment to contrast our writing styles:

When I write my posts, I do so in the clearest possible terms. I present my ideas as claims, and I clearly mark them as such, and I give very specific and concrete examples to clarify what I’m talking about. My goal is communication.

That’s nice, but your examples don’t show much - except the fact that you’re prone to reasoning in non sequiturs. For example, see your example above - that should be clear enough.

When you write posts, you do so in riddles. You make cryptic comments like, “that dichotomy [between imaginary and non-imaginary] isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems,” yet you never bother to explain what you mean. You need to actually say, in straightforward English, what’s “problematic” about it in your opinion. It would also help to give specific, concrete examples to clarify whatever it is that you’re on about.

But that’s what the last, I don’t know, fifty posts have been about: explaining that “the dichotomy [between imaginary and non-imaginary] isn’t always as unproblematic as it first seems.” If you have a problem with this claim, just say so and say what it is. Why do you act as if that’s an unreasonable expectation?

I’ve said that my goal is communication; yours appears to be obfuscation.

That’s not true, and rather silly. If you don’t understand me, it doesn’t follow that my goal is obfuscation. And with groundless red herring accusations like this, it seems that I could be justified in making this same claim about you. (I prefer to stay on topic, however.)

I am forced to assume that the only reason you do not state your own claims as clearly as I do is that you do not have fully-formed opinions of your own on these subjects.

The other possibility here is that your premise is false: in fact I do state my claims as clearly as you do, but you mistakenly attribute your failure to understand my claims as evidence that I am not being clear. In any case, the appropriate response when you fail to understand something is not to resort to an ad hominem, as you have done here; the appropriate response is to ask for clarification, to explain what it is you don’t understand and why.

For example, write a sentence that begins, “I disagree with your claim that evidence-basd inquiry is the only consistently reliable method we have of learning things about the non-imaginary world because…” Finish it with a reason that supports your disagreement. Follow this reason with a specific example of what you’re talking about.

It’s really not that hard.

Apparently it is that hard, because I’ve done what you ask for here, but you apparently didn’t notice.

In any case, I’d appreciate it if you tried to stay on topic.

 

[Betterave]

Oh, I follow it. But generally you express everything what I wanted to say, so there is no need to jump in and say the same thing.

Let’s stress something, however. The trouble is not the criticism, rather its empty, non-constructive manner. It is not enough to say that your definition of “real vs. imaginary” is somehow incorrect or deficient; rather the very minimum would be to offer an alternative definition, so the two sides might be able to work out a compromise, or at least arrive at some mutual understanding. And that’s what is sorely missing. That is why I stepped back from active participation, because it is futile. It is impossible to work out the definition of even a few basic concepts to mutual satisfaction, so that a meaningful dialog could be built on them.

LOL! The trouble here, Spock, is with the criticism, with the fact that it obviously is “empty and non-constructive.” (Not to mention the fact that it is framed in terms of an absurd false dichotomy.) Oops!

 

[Betterave]

If I have a hallucination in which I think I see my toaster floating and singing the latest Lady Gaga song, then it’s a real hallucination. [If it wasn’t a real hallucination, I couldn’t experience it]

In those last two examples, the book is real and the hallucination is real, but what’s not real are the contents of the book and the hallucination.

A story with no real content is not a story. If I claim to have a story with no real content, then that is not a real story. If I say I have a real story, but the content is all imaginary, then I’m actually just imagining that I have a story. Same goes for a hallucination with no real content: that’s not a real hallucination. Same goes for a dragon which picks me up and takes me to school every day, that’s not a real dragon (really it’s a bus ).

But in any case, it’s really not clear what point you are trying to make here relative to the topic of this thread. Could you explain that?

This is the crucial point that no one seems to be understanding. I can learn things about storybooks and about hallucinations, but it doesn’t make the contents of those storybooks and hallucinations real – unless, of course, you choose to define “real” to mean “stuff I can learn things about, including imaginary things like dragons and Spiderman.”

The only reason, so far as I can see, that a person would choose to define “real” in that last sense is to give themselves an excuse for thinking that their fantasies actually exist, instead of being nothing more than the product of a fevered imagination.

But that’s a false dichotomy! Our fantasies really do exist, even if they are nothing more than the product of a fevered imagination! Your problem here is that you are not using terms rigorously and you think you don’t need to because for some reason you are happy to use them in a stupidly obvious way and attribute to others a use of them in an obviously stupid way. (There’s a riddle for you to think about. )

 

[AntiTheist]

But it really is (sometimes)[difficult to distinguish the imaginary from the non-imaginary]

Let’s stay with this. I agree that some individuals in some situations – such as, for example, a person having a hallucination – may have difficulty in the moment determining whether or not what the content of their experiences is non-imaginary.

But I’m saying that when we actively investigate whether or not the content of a particular experience is imaginary or non-imaginary, it is easy – and in most cases trivially easy – to distinguish the difference between imaginary and non-imaginary.

For example, if I woke up tomorrow and saw my toaster flying around the room singing a Lady Gaga song, my understanding of the way that the world works is sufficient that I would probably conclude that my brain was probably playing a trick on me. I would think that I was having a hallucination – the hallucination is non-imaginary (i.e. If I saw a flying, singing toaster, I wouldn’t be imagining that I was having a hallucination – I would actually be having a hallucination!), but the content of that hallucination is imaginary (i.e. the flying, singing toaster depends entirely on my imagination for existence).

It would be easy to confirm this – I could ask other people if they see the toaster flying around and singing Lady Gaga songs. I could have a group of independent investigators set up a machine that picks up sound waves in the kitchen. I could have the group set up a bunch of thin wires over the toaster so that if it really could fly, it would break the wires when lifting off.

After all, if the claim is “The flying, singing toaster is non-imaginary,” we would expect it to cause non-imaginary effects. By making predictions on the basis of this claim and measuring the effects, we can tell whether or not the claim is true.

Now, I suppose that you’re probably thinking, “Gah! There he goes again with another black-and-white example!” So provide me with an example or two where we cannot distinguish between imaginary and non-imaginary through investigation after the fact.

In addition, your dichotomy between imaginary and non-imaginary is not only difficult to know how to apply sometimes, it is also far to simplistic as a universal sorter or differentiator of claims with regard to their epistemic status.

I’m not trying to use it as a universal sorter. I’m specifically interested in the question, “How do we know that something is likely to be real, where real is defined as ‘not imaginary’”?

I grant that we can learn about imaginary things – which is to say, since imaginary things only exist in minds, that we can learn about the stories people invent about these imaginary things – but I’m specifically interested in how you go about determing whether or not a thing is likely to be imaginary or not.

 

[AntiTheist]

Our fantasies really do exist

Well, there’s a slogan for you, eh Betterave?

Again, I’m using “real” and “exist” to mean “non-imaginary.”

By those definitions, a child’s storybook – the physical book, the words, the narrative created by the words – are all real. They’re right there. Anybody can pick up the book and read it and get an idea of a dragon. That idea of a dragon is a real idea – it really exists in my head as an experience and as a physical brain-state.

But what’s not real is the dragon itself.

A picture of a dragon in my head is not the same thing as a dragon running around Tokyo outside of my head. The picture exists – the dragon does not.

I don’t know how to make this point any more clearly, and I guess at this point, I will appeal to the lurkers. Could everyone lurking on this thread please let us know who is making a better, clearer case so that person could try to clarify?

 

[AntiTheist]

But in any case, it’s really not clear what point you are trying to make here relative to the topic of this thread. Could you explain that?

Certainly. We are discussing methods of learning things about the world on this thread.

One specific case of learning things about the world – very relevant to evaluating religious claims – is learning whether or not something is imaginary, learning to distinguish the imaginary from the non-imaginary.

I claim that we do so by means of evidence-based inquiry and that we further use evidence-based inquiry to evaluate claims made about the non-imaginary world. By “evidence-based inquiry,” I mean induction and deduction – both of which rely on data being gathered from the non-imaginary world – and a specific kind of deduction in which we make predictions on the basis of claims and then observe whether or not those predictions are correct (a very formal version of this process – used by relatively few people – is called “science”).

I claim that evidence-based inquiry is the only consistently-reliable method we have of evaluating claims made about the non-imaginary world.

Now, I thought that agreeing on a few basic definitions would be a good way to start talking about this. I didn’t think that “real means non-imaginary” would meet much of an objection, but if it did, I thought that we could reasonably agree to use real to mean “non-imaginary” for the duration of the thread.

You seem to be stubbornly holding out just because you can define the word in a different way. But I submit that any definition that considers Spiderman real is worthless in a conversation where we are trying to reach conclusions about the non-imaginary world.

But that’s a false dichotomy! Our fantasies really do exist, even if they are nothing more than the product of a fevered imagination! Your problem here is that you are not using terms rigorously and you think you don’t need to because for some reason you are happy to use them in a stupidly obvious way and attribute to others a use of them in an obviously stupid way. (There’s a riddle for you to think about. )