Why Scientism is a Faith

[JDaniel]

No. You need to read again more carefully. I said that reality is “that which appears to presents itself to us that continues to exist even when we are not consciously thinking it into existence.” Another way of saying this is to say that “Reality is that which is not imaginary.”

I have and did, AT. And, it would appear to me that this definition well befits that which we call the contents of a dream. The images in a dream ‘appear to present themselves to us.’ They often continue to persist even when we awake and are no longer ‘thinking them,’ so to speak, ‘into existence.’ I could be completely wrong, and you could be correct. I offer this for discussion, plus it helps me think it through.

The last part of your definition is problematic to me. It would seem or, appear, that one could think them out of existence as well, if we can think them into existence. I know that many times I awake from a dream. Later, when I fall beck to sleep, the dream recurs, or continues from whence it left off. Other times, by not desiring the continuation of the dream, the contents disappear from memory.

But, while the contents of the dream are not ‘real,’ I know that the dream, per se, was real.

(I am working on a definition as we speak, which I will share as soon as I am happy with it.)

God bless,
jd

 

[AntiTheist]

I have and did, AT. And, it would appear to me that this definition well befits that which we call the contents of a dream.

Ahhh, you give a concrete example to clarify what you’re talking about. This is very good, and it’s exactly what I was requesting from you. If you would have brought this up in your intitial response to me, we could have discussed it right away.

The images in a dream ‘appear to present themselves to us.’ They often continue to persist even when we awake and are no longer ‘thinking them,’ so to speak, ‘into existence.’ I could be completely wrong, and you could be correct. I offer this for discussion, plus it helps me think it through.

Well, I agree that the images of a dream appear to present themselves to us, and indeed, a dream that I have is a real dream (if it wasn’t a real dream, I wouldn’t be having it). During the dream, one might think that the content of the dream is real, but – as you point out – once one awakes, it is easy to distinguish the dream from the waking world.

It’s exactly parallel to a person having a hallucination. During the hallucination, one might think that the content of the hallucination is real, but after soberly evaluating it, it is easy to distinguish between the images of the hallucination and the waking world.

I don’t agree that the images persist when we awake. When I awaken from a dream, I don’t keep “seeing” the dream. I might remember the dream, and its images are still accessible to me as a memory, but that’s very different from my experiencing the dream in the way that I do when I’m asleep.

The last part of your definition is problematic to me. It would seem or, appear, that one could think them out of existence as well, if we can think them into existence. I know that many times I awake from a dream. Later, when I fall beck to sleep, the dream recurs, or continues from whence it left off. Other times, by not desiring the continuation of the dream, the contents disappear from memory.

What you’re talking about here is a kind of lucid dreaming, where you’re aware that you’re dreaming and have some measure of control over the dream world. Or you’re talking about the ability of your conscious mind to affect the dream world (it’s well known that dreams often consist of things you’ve been thinking a lot about).

Again, during a dream, people are usually fooled into thinking that the content of the dream is real, but there are some cases where people realize that the content of the dream is not real during the dream. The realization that the content is not real – and is in fact a product of your own mind – naturally gives you control over it. In the vast majority of cases (unless you train yourself in lucid dreaming), dreams end when you realize that you’re dreaming precisely because you know that the content is not real.

The dream is always real because you’re really experiencing it and it’s really a brain state…the content isn’t real, and as soon as you realize that it’s not real, it tends to vanish.

A lucid dream becomes like a strong form of daydreaming. A daydream is real in the sense that you experience it and that it’s a physical brain state, but the contents of it – the beings that you dream up, create, and make go away whenever you want – are not real.

But, while the contents of the dream are not ‘real,’ I know that the dream, per se, was real.

Yes, I agree. The fact that you had a dream is real – it’s a real, physical brain state, it’s a real experience that you had.

What’s not real is all the stuff that happened in the dream.

And as you note, almost nobody mixes the two up. Almost no one wakes up and is convinced that their dream of Sailor Moon telling them to rescue the world from the Flying Spaghetti Monster means that they need to take action in the waking world against the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

And people who do think that they need to take action…well, we have a special little place with padded rooms where we lock them up.

 

[Betterave]

Let’s stay with this. I agree that some individuals in some situations – such as, for example, a person having a hallucination – may have difficulty in the moment determining whether or not what the content of their experiences is non-imaginary.

…

After all, if the claim is “The flying, singing toaster is non-imaginary,” we would expect it to cause non-imaginary effects. By making predictions on the basis of this claim and measuring the effects, we can tell whether or not the claim is true.

Now, I suppose that you’re probably thinking, “Gah! There he goes again with another black-and-white example!” So provide me with an example or two where we cannot distinguish between imaginary and non-imaginary through investigation after the fact.

It’s not just that your particular silly example is black-and-white and irrelevant. It’s that the whole class to which it belongs is irrelevant. If ‘evidence-based inquiry’ (the extension/meaning of which we are attempting to come to an agreement about) is our means of establishing the truth and falsity of claims, then why should the applicability of this criterion to *the detection of hallucinations *(!) be a salient point of departure for establishing its applicability in general? Why not pick one of the obvious things we disagree about? God, miracles, essences, objective moral norms, etc.

I’m not trying to use it as a universal sorter. I’m specifically interested in the question, “How do we know that something is likely to be real, where real is defined as ‘not imaginary’”?

Right, to which the prior quesiton is: How do we come to know anything at all? And our starting point for this is to understand the meaning of the words we are using. We can’t begin by asking whether something is non-imaginary until we understand what the term ‘non-imaginary’ means, and we can’t do that simply by saying, “I take it to mean X,” where X appears to be arbitrary and question-begging.

I grant that we can learn about imaginary things – which is to say, since imaginary things only exist in minds, that we can learn about the stories people invent about these imaginary things – but I’m specifically interested in how you go about determing whether or not a thing is likely to be imaginary or not.

You presuppose here that stories people invent are only “in minds” - whatever that means (it leaves open the questions “what is a mind” and “how do spatial metaphors apply to minds and the contents of minds”). Ask the man on the street: “Is love real?” What do you think he will say? Ask him, “what’s more real: love or this donut?” What will he say? Or: “what is more real: evolution or love; the meaningfulness of life or the meaninglessness of life; inductive reasoning or the law of non-contradiction?” What will people say?

Dragons or hallucinations may provide convenient examples, but you should understand that they’re not what we’re ultimately interested in. If you are unable to focus on understanding the principles that such simple examples are supposed to illustrate, maybe we should forget about those examples.

 

[Betterave]

Well, there’s a slogan for you, eh Betterave?

What do you mean?

Again, I’m using “real” and “exist” to mean “non-imaginary.”

Really? So ‘non-imaginary’ is a verb now? “The moon non-imaginaries, but God does not non-imaginary”? Please try to be more precise when you try to stipulate these kinds of equivalences.

By those definitions, a child’s storybook – the physical book, the words, the narrative created by the words – are all real. They’re right there. Anybody can pick up the book and read it and get an idea of a dragon. That idea of a dragon is a real idea – it really exists in my head as an experience and as a physical brain-state.

But what’s not real is the dragon itself.

A picture of a dragon in my head is not the same thing as a dragon running around Tokyo outside of my head. The picture exists – the dragon does not.

But what is the point of your saying this? Do you really think that there are people who get confused into thinking that a mental image and a large animal running around Tokyo exist in the same sense? Why are you trying to prove this obvious point? What do you think it shows about the adequacy of your conception of ‘evidence-based inquiry’ as a determinate and normative ‘method’ for knowing reality?

I don’t know how to make this point any more clearly, and I guess at this point, I will appeal to the lurkers. Could everyone lurking on this thread please let us know who is making a better, clearer case so that person could try to clarify?

You are just repeating yourself, but I don’t see what your point is at all.

 

[Betterave]

Certainly. We are discussing methods of learning things about the world on this thread.

One specific case of learning things about the world – very relevant to evaluating religious claims – is learning whether or not something is imaginary, learning to distinguish the imaginary from the non-imaginary.

I claim that we do so by means of evidence-based inquiry and that we further use evidence-based inquiry to evaluate claims made about the non-imaginary world.

I’ve asked about this before and you’ve ignored my question: why this restriction to the ‘non-imaginary world’? Doesn’t this method apply to investigating ‘the imaginary world’ too?

By “evidence-based inquiry,” I mean induction and deduction – both of which rely on data being gathered from the non-imaginary [or imaginary!] world – and a specific kind of deduction in which we make predictions on the basis of claims and then observe whether or not those predictions are correct (a very formal version of this process – used by relatively few people – is called “science”).

But that is all just hand-waving. You’ve done nothing to circumscribe that actual meaning of ‘evidence-based inquiry,’ you haven’t given anything like a criterion for discerning what should and what should not count as ‘evidence-based inquiry,’ and you certainly haven’t provided any kind of a justification for taking your vague notion of ‘evidence-based inquiry’ as normative - it’s so vague that it’s impossible to see how it could be normative, since you haven’t really shown us what it is.

I claim that evidence-based inquiry is the only consistently-reliable method we have of evaluating claims made about the non-imaginary world.

But as it stands it seems to me that you’re completely ignoring the problem: you haven’t given any content to your vague construal of ‘evidence-based inquiry’ and you haven’t justified or characterized the normative epistemic value of the vague content you have provided.

Now, I thought that agreeing on a few basic definitions would be a good way to start talking about this. I didn’t think that “real means non-imaginary” would meet much of an objection, but if it did, I thought that we could reasonably agree to use real to mean “non-imaginary” for the duration of the thread.

You seem to be stubbornly holding out just because you can define the word in a different way. But I submit that any definition that considers Spiderman real is worthless in a conversation where we are trying to reach conclusions about the non-imaginary world.

But that seems clearly wrong: If I say, “Spiderman is real, that’s him standing beside Superman over there,” it seems that you would tell me, “No, no; that’s just a guy dressed up as Spiderman.” I’ll give you a withering look and say, “Obviously! Nonetheless, that Spiderman guy right there is real” You could say, “Oh stop being difficult: I mean that the real Spiderman isn’t real.” I might say, “Sure he is; the real Spiderman is comic book character who has special spidey powers, etc.” He’s a cultural artefact, but still very real. If you want to learn about him you can’t just go consult your imagination; therefore he is ‘non-imaginary’ - that is, for epistemic purposes he cannot be regarded as purely imaginary.

 

[Spock]

LOL! The trouble here, Spock, is with the criticism, with the fact that it obviously is “empty and non-constructive.” (Not to mention the fact that it is framed in terms of an absurd false dichotomy.) Oops!

How cute, and how empty. The fact is that you shy away from giving a coherent definition of “real” vs. “imaginary”, and that is the obfuscation AT was talking about, and that “dancing” went on for many pages now.

Here is a definition you might want to chew upon. Real is something that can be observed via our senses or via the extension of our senses, and which can be observed by others, too, whether they accept the result of the measurements a-priori or not. Imaginary is the opposite, which cannot be observed either directly or indirectly, which cannot be observed by others.

Can’t be simpler than that.

A dream is a brain-state, which can be observed with EEG. The contents of the dream cannot be observed. The contents of the dream are not real. A story about Hamlet is real, Hamlet himself is not. God would be considered real, if he made an observable appearance, if he made a declaration of his existence. Lacking this we must conclude that God is just a figment of the imagination. Demons, angels, dragons, poltergeists, leprechauns, the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus and honest lawyers are simply figments of our imagination.

 

[AntiTheist]

It’s not just that your particular silly example is black-and-white and irrelevant. It’s that the whole class to which it belongs is irrelevant. If ‘evidence-based inquiry’ (the extension/meaning of which we are attempting to come to an agreement about) is our means of establishing the truth and falsity of claims, then why should the applicability of this criterion to *the detection of hallucinations *(!) be a salient point of departure for establishing its applicability in general?

I’m not using it to establish its applicability in general – I’m using it as a specific case on which (I foolishly thought) all people could easily agree. I want to establish where we agree before we move on to where we disagree.

Why not pick one of the obvious things we disagree about? God, miracles, essences, objective moral norms, etc.

If the conversation continues long enough, I’m sure we’ll get there, but I want to be sure we’re in agreement on the terminology we’re using. We’re obviously not.

Right, to which the prior quesiton is: How do we come to know anything at all? And our starting point for this is to understand the meaning of the words we are using. We can’t begin by asking whether something is non-imaginary until we understand what the term ‘non-imaginary’ means, and we can’t do that simply by saying, “I take it to mean X,” where X appears to be arbitrary and question-begging.

Well, actually we can. Even a child can distinguish between real and imaginary without having a rigorous working definition of “non-imaginary.” They are categories of our experience and most people who do not have mental disabilities of some kind find it trivially easy to distinguish something that comes from their imaginations from something that does not.

But alright, let’s play your game. What’s your definition of “non-imaginary”? If I agree with it, we might be able to use it.

You presuppose here that stories people invent are only “in minds” - whatever that means

I don’t presuppose it. If I write a book about a man who saves the world from an alien invasion, that story was something that I imagined and then, using a series of symbols, recorded on a document. Others who know my language can look at that series of symbols and, from them, acquire a picture in their head that is similar to the picture in my head – it won’t be the same exact picture (they’ll probably imagine things a little bit differently than I do), but it will be similar enough that we can talk about it.

This story – and by story, I mean the words that comprise it and the description of events that happen in it – is real, but it’s only real as a story that exists in my head (or “as a brain state for me” if you want to get really technical) and in the head of anyone who hears or reads my story (though actually, it’s not the same story, but a very similar one that they have in their heads).

The story is real. The story could become a real cultural artifact that exists as a piece of culture that people can discuss and quote and make up silly games about.

But the guy who saved the world from aliens never walked on the earth and never saved the earth from an alien invasion. That’s the imaginary part.

The story is real; the events that the story is reporting are not real.

Ask the man on the street: “Is love real?” What do you think he will say?

Of course he’ll say it’s real because it is. No one doubts that emotions are real – we experience them, we can measure the brain states that result in them.

Ask him, “what’s more real: love or this donut?” What will he say?

“More real” is, I think, nonsensical. Something is either real or it’s not.

Dragons or hallucinations may provide convenient examples, but you should understand that they’re not what we’re ultimately interested in. If you are unable to focus on understanding the principles that such simple examples are supposed to illustrate, maybe we should forget about those examples.

So are you going to give me an example of a case where it’s difficult for us to determine whether or not something is real?

But what is the point of your saying this? Do you really think that there are people who get confused into thinking that a mental image and a large animal running around Tokyo exist in the same sense?

No, but I think that there are people who talk themselves into thinking that gods or spirits exist in one sense of the word “exist” and then turn around and sloppily conclude that they “exist” in other senses of the word.

I’m not saying that you’re one of those people, but before we can talk about whether gods are real or not, we have to be clear about how we’re using language.

 

[AntiTheist]

I’m not using it to establish its applicability in general – I’m using it as a specific case on which (I foolishly thought) all people could easily agree. I want to establish where we agree before we move on to where we disagree.

If the conversation continues long enough, I’m sure we’ll get there, but I want to be sure we’re in agreement on the terminology we’re using. We’re obviously not.

Well, actually we can. Even a child can distinguish between real and imaginary without having a rigorous working definition of “non-imaginary.” “Imaginary” and “Non-imaginary” are categories of our experience and most people who do not have mental disabilities of some kind find it trivially easy to distinguish something that comes from their imaginations from something that does not.

But alright, let’s play your game. What’s your definition of “non-imaginary”? If I agree with it, we might be able to use it.

I don’t presuppose it. If I write a book about a man who saves the world from an alien invasion, that story was something that I imagined and then, using a series of symbols, recorded on a document. Others who know my language can look at that series of symbols and, from them, acquire a picture in their head that is similar to the picture in my head – it won’t be the same exact picture (they’ll probably imagine things a little bit differently than I do), but it will be similar enough that we can talk about it.

This story – and by story, I mean the words that comprise it and the events that happen in it – is real, but it’s only real as a story that exists in my head (or “as a brain state for me” if you want to get really technical) and in the head of anyone who hears or reads my story (though actually, it’s not the same story, but a very similar one that they have in their heads).

The story is real. The story could become a real cultural artifact that exists as a piece of culture that people can discuss and quote and make up silly games about.

But the guy who saved the world from aliens never walked on the earth and never saved the earth from an alien invasion. That’s the imaginary part.

The story is real; the events that the story is reporting are not real.

Of course he’ll say it’s real because it is. No one doubts that emotions are real – we experience them, we can measure the brain states that result in them.

“More real” is, I think, nonsensical. Something is either real or it’s not.

So are you going to give me an example of a case where it’s difficult for us to determine whether or not something is real?

No, but I think that there are people who talk themselves into thinking that gods or spirits exist in one sense of the word “exist” and then turn around and sloppily conclude that they “exist” in other senses of the word.

I’m not saying that you’re one of those people, but before we can talk about whether gods are real or not, we have to be clear about how we’re using language.

 

[AntiTheist]

If you want to learn about [Spiderman] you can’t just go consult your imagination; therefore he is ‘non-imaginary’ - that is, for epistemic purposes he cannot be regarded as purely imaginary.

This is actually a great example of our area of disagreement.

Since to you, “real” seems to mean “anything that we can know stuff about – even totally made up things like spiderman and superman,” Spiderman is most certainly real.

Since to me, “real” means “that which is non-imaginary,” I consider the stories about Spiderman to be real – and we can learn things about those stories, like whom those stories report Spiderman has a love affair with – but Spiderman himself isn’t.

Or again, the cultural phenomenon that surrounds an imaginary superhero Spiderman is quite real, but the imaginary superhero himself is not.

I think we’re on the same page in that neither one of us thinks that there ever was a person walking the earth who was bit by a radioactive spider and gained superpowers. Where we disagree is in how we use language. I’m trying to clarify how I use the word “real” because it will become important when we start applying the definition to other things and looking at specific cases where we have to determine whether or not something is real.

 

[AntiTheist]

So are you going to give me an example of a case where it’s difficult for us to determine whether or not something is real?

Sorry. I meant to write, "are you going to give me an example of a case where it’s difficult for us to determine whether or not something is imaginary?

You’ve implied that it’s not an unproblematic distinction between imaginary and non-imaginary. I don’t know what you mean. Please illustrate that claim with some examples.

 

[Betterave]

How cute, and how empty.

But that is an empty reply to my comment, Spock, which was not empty - my comment was obviously true! If you would really like to dispute that claim, then give me some substance, give me a rebuttal. Do not give me this kind of sophomoric hypocritical nonsense. Go ahead: I’m waiting…

 

[Betterave]

This is actually a great example of our area of disagreement.

Since to you, “real” seems to mean “anything that we can know stuff about – even totally made up things like spiderman and superman,” Spiderman is most certainly real.

Since to me, “real” means “that which is non-imaginary,” …

Just a quick note on the meaning of ‘meaning’: the meaning of a word depends on the context in which the word is being used. When we are trying to develop conceptual tools with which to address very general questions about reality, this is a very special context. It is antecedently quite possible that the meaning of an important word, which is unproblematic in lots of everyday contexts, will become problematic when we attempt to use it in this special generalized context, and will thus require a particular technical construal for that context. Does that make sense? That doesn’t mean that my construal is right or necessary, but I just want to motivate the need for you to possibly reconsider your approaching the issue in terms of these kind of dichotomies (i.e., “to you it means X, but to me it means Y”).

 

[Betterave]

Here is a definition you might want to chew upon. Real is something that can be observed via our senses or via the extension of our senses, and which can be observed by others, too, whether they accept the result of the measurements a-priori or not. Imaginary is the opposite, which cannot be observed either directly or indirectly, which cannot be observed by others.

Can’t be simpler than that.

A dream is a brain-state, which can be observed with EEG. The contents of the dream cannot be observed. The contents of the dream are not real. A story about Hamlet is real, Hamlet himself is not. God would be considered real, if he made an observable appearance, if he made a declaration of his existence. Lacking this we must conclude that God is just a figment of the imagination. Demons, angels, dragons, poltergeists, leprechauns, the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus and honest lawyers are simply figments of our imagination.

I’m not sure whether Spock intends to play a constructive role in this discussion or not, he seems to be tergiversating. In any case, just to try another tack to gauge what your view specifically is and where you see or don’t see issues that need to be resolved, I’m curious, AntiTheist: what would you say about Spock’s position here? Can you see anything problematic about it?

 

[AntiTheist]

Just a quick note on the meaning of ‘meaning’: the meaning of a word depends on the context in which the word is being used. When we are trying to develop conceptual tools with which to address very general questions about reality, this is a very special context. It is antecedently quite possible that the meaning of an important word, which is unproblematic in lots of everyday contexts, will become problematic when we attempt to use it in this special generalized context, and will thus require a particular technical construal for that context. Does that make sense?

I’m afraid that I will need a few concrete examples.

I’m especially interested in a few examples where you think the barrier between imaginary and non-imaginary is “problematic.”

 

[AntiTheist]

I’m not sure whether Spock intends to play a constructive role in this discussion or not, he seems to be tergiversating. In any case, just to try another tack to gauge what your view specifically is and where you see or don’t see issues that need to be resolved, I’m curious, AntiTheist: what would you say about Spock’s position here? Can you see anything problematic about it?

Once again we get from you a post that does not consist of “I disagree for X reason. Here is a problem with your definition: Y. Here is a specific example of a case where your definition will not work: Z. Here is my own superior definition: Q. Here is a specific example where my definition works far better than yours: V.”

Instead, you want me to do your job for you. Fine:

While I more or less agree with Spock when we’re talking about entities that exist in the world – we need to be able to detect an entity before we can say that we believe the entity exists – I don’t think his definition works as a definition of “real” in a broader sense. For example – ah, do you see this word? “example” – I have a preference for drinking coffee over tea. It’s a real preference, and it remains real regardless of whether or not anyone apart from me is capable of detecting it.

It’s real, under my definition, because it presents itself to me and it doesn’t go away when I stop thinking about it. It’s not a product of my imagination – it’s a real preference.

Now seriously, Betterave, are you not capable of replying to posts in clear ways with unambiguous examples? I am strongly left with that impression, and you’re not doing anything to convince me otherwise.

 

[Betterave]

Now seriously, Betterave, are you not capable of replying to posts in clear ways with unambiguous examples? I am strongly left with that impression, and you’re not doing anything to convince me otherwise.

LOL! Are you seriously unable to respond to my posts without this kind of pettiness? I find your question rather ironic: have you noticed me pointing out that your examples have been ambiguous (and often irrelevant) and that has been a serious problem with your arguments?? Anyway, examples are only ever examples. I am quite confident that they can’t substitute for an understanding of principles and they are often not a reliable tool for inculcating an understanding of principles. Do you disagree?

for example" in future posts though, just to make you happy - not because the use of such a phrase actually implies a more clearly expressed position. ]

 

[Betterave]

Once again we get from you a post that does not consist of “I disagree for X reason. Here is a problem with your definition: Y. Here is a specific example of a case where your definition will not work: Z. Here is my own superior definition: Q. Here is a specific example where my definition works far better than yours: V.”

Instead, you want me to do your job for you.

It’s my job to clarify your position for me, not yours?

 

[Betterave]

I’m afraid that I will need a few concrete examples.

I’m especially interested in a few examples where you think the barrier between imaginary and non-imaginary is “problematic.”

This is where I get a little nonplussed with you. Isn’t the obvious for example that springs to mind ‘real’?? Or ‘imaginary’? Take ‘imaginary,’ for example: how do we rigorously analyze this word? You seem to think you can just say, “It’s obvious! Spiderman is imaginary and elephant man is not. See what a clear and unambiguous example I’ve given?” (But is it clear and unambiguous as to its point, as to what is proves? Not at all!) Then it seems that you’re going to want to go on to say, “And likewise, God is imaginary and Jesus is not, although lots of the stories about him are - and why are they ‘imaginary’? - because they’re not ‘real’” (presuming you’re not one of these radical doubters who think that it is possible to intelligently doubt whether Jesus was a real person). Isn’t that how it goes? But this whole approach is just question-begging and doesn’t give us any clarity about the justification for your position.

Or take, Ion, for example, the character in the Platonic dialogue of that name: we know that lots of the characters in Platonic dialogues were real people, but we don’t know whether Ion was. Supposing there was no real Ion: does that mean he is ‘imaginary’? Not necessarily. He may be a caricature of a real person, or he may be an archetype of the rhapsode who gives us a reliable picture of what real rhapsodes were like - but in any case, his role is conceptual, not merely a stimulus for our imaginations (our faculty of producing mental images - which is what I think the word ‘imaginary’ implies).

 

[Betterave]

I’m not using it to establish its applicability in general – I’m using it as a specific case on which (I foolishly thought) all people could easily agree. I want to establish where we agree before we move on to where we disagree.

I think you are getting this point now, but to reiterate, the point is that our agreement on the ontological status of Spiderman is obvious and showing that we agree on it is not interesting in itself unless we are already thinking ahead to how our agreement about Spiderman is supposed to be relevant to a question that we’re actually interested in.

Well, actually we can. Even a child can distinguish between real and imaginary without having a rigorous working definition of “non-imaginary.” They are categories of our experience and most people who do not have mental disabilities of some kind find it trivially easy to distinguish something that comes from their imaginations from something that does not.

Again, you’re just referring to easy cases that are irrelevant to addressing the hard cases. Examples like this are just red herrings.

But alright, let’s play your game. What’s your definition of “non-imaginary”? If I agree with it, we might be able to use it.

As I’ve pointed out, meanings depend on context. For example, if I say morality is non-imaginary, then I mean that there are true and false moral claims. If I say that Peter Pan is non-imaginary, then I would probably mean that there is a message in Peter Pan that teaches us real things about human nature… I could keep trying to manufacture examples, but the truth is, I think, ‘non-imaginary’ is a rather contrived expression that just doesn’t come up very often. It doesn’t seem like a central epistemological or metaphysical concept to me.

I don’t presuppose it. If I write a book about a man who saves the world from an alien invasion, that story was something that I imagined and then, using a series of symbols, recorded on a document. Others who know my language can look at that series of symbols and, from them, acquire a picture in their head that is similar to the picture in my head – it won’t be the same exact picture (they’ll probably imagine things a little bit differently than I do), but it will be similar enough that we can talk about it.

This story – and by story, I mean the words that comprise it and the description of events that happen in it – is real, but it’s only real as a story that exists in my head (or “as a brain state for me” if you want to get really technical) and in the head of anyone who hears or reads my story (though actually, it’s not the same story, but a very similar one that they have in their heads).

So how is this different from your preferences?

“More real” is, I think, nonsensical. Something is either real or it’s not.

I don’t think that’s wrong, but only if you grant that there is nothing which is not real. Either something is real or it’s not something. But it seems to me that this is true only for the very broad sense of ‘real’ which you have been protesting against.

No, but I think that there are people who talk themselves into thinking that gods or spirits exist in one sense of the word “exist” and then turn around and sloppily conclude that they “exist” in other senses of the word.

Absolutely. And that would be just as true if you had written:
No, but I think that there are people who talk themselves into thinking that gods or spirits do not exist in one sense of the word “exist” and then turn around and sloppily conclude that they do not “exist” in other senses of the word.

I’m not saying that you’re one of those people, but before we can talk about whether gods are real or not, we have to be clear about how we’re using language.

Agreed. In fact I suspect the ultimate resolution of such questions primarily depends on clearing up linguistic confusions (if that’s not too tendentious a way of putting it).

 

[JDaniel]

I’m afraid that I will need a few concrete examples.

AT:

How would you describe, given your definition, a shadow?

God bless,
jd