Why Scientism is a Faith

[AntiTheist]

Or take, Ion, for example, the character in the Platonic dialogue of that name: we know that lots of the characters in Platonic dialogues were real people, but we don’t know whether Ion was. Supposing there was no real Ion: does that mean he is ‘imaginary’? Not necessarily. He may be a caricature of a real person, or he may be an archetype of the rhapsode who gives us a reliable picture of what real rhapsodes were like - but in any case, his role is conceptual, not merely a stimulus for our imaginations (our faculty of producing mental images - which is what I think the word ‘imaginary’ implies).

Thank you for the example.

As you note, we don’t have enough evidence to say whether or not Ion was a real person, so, because we don’t have enough evidence, I would not accept the claim “Ion was a real person!” if someone wanted me to accept it as true.

But as you just noted, the character Ion in the story is real as a literary character – he exists as someone described in a story, and the words and actions that the story ascribes to him really do exist. Since he only has an importance for us today as a part of the text, it’s irrelevant whether he was a real person. The fact that there’s a real story about him and that he’s a real character in that real story is the only thing that matters.

So I ask you: where, exactly, is the distinction I’m drawing “problematic”? What exactly is problematic about saying that we don’t have enough information to say that an historical Ion existed, but the only thing that matters for us is that stories about him exist and he exists for us as a character in those stories?

Remember, your claim was that the distinction I’m drawing between imaginary and non-imaginary is not unproblematic, so I’m trying to figure out exactly how my distinction is problematic.

If you could clarify this point – perhaps with another example or two where the distinction really is problematic – I’ll be happy to address the rest of the points you raise.

 

[AntiTheist]

How would you describe, given your definition, a shadow?

My shadow is a real shadow. If it weren’t a real shadow, I wouldn’t be able to see it, and neither would others standing near me.

A shadow is created when light is blocked, but that shadow is a real blocking of light in that spot…not a blocking of light that I’m imagining.

 

[JDaniel]

My shadow is a real shadow. If it weren’t a real shadow, I wouldn’t be able to see it, and neither would others standing near me.

A shadow is created when light is blocked, but that shadow is a real blocking of light in that spot…not a blocking of light that I’m imagining.

It takes up space; it moves. Does it have a real existence of its own? If no one was standing with you, and you had to go and get someone to verify it, by the time you got back, it might be gone. How, then, would you describe it as ‘real’?

By the way, a shadow is not a ‘blocking’ of light, is it? A shadow is not capable of blocking anything. Isn’t it actually an ‘absence’ of light? Isn’t that what is universally admitted about it? But, perhaps that is what you meant?

God bless,
jd

 

[Betterave]

Thank you for the example.

As you note, we don’t have enough evidence to say whether or not Ion was a real person, so, because we don’t have enough evidence, I would not accept the claim “Ion was a real person!” if someone wanted me to accept it as true.

But how do we know whether we have ‘enough evidence’ or not?? You can’t just pretend that the answer to this question is always obvious, surely?

When you’ve answered that question, here’s another example I’d be interested in discussing (I’m also interested to see where you go in JD’s example of a shadow): Is chess real? If so, in what sense, and what specifically is it about chess that makes it true to say that it is real?

 

[gentle_atheist]

Sheesh!!! If philosophers ran the world nothing would ever get done!

 

[The_Exodus]

It takes up space; it moves. Does it have a real existence of its own? If no one was standing with you, and you had to go and get someone to verify it, by the time you got back, it might be gone. How, then, would you describe it as ‘real’?

By the way, a shadow is not a ‘blocking’ of light, is it? A shadow is not capable of blocking anything. Isn’t it actually an ‘absence’ of light? Isn’t that what is universally admitted about it? But, perhaps that is what you meant?

God bless,
jd

Interesting point to show that evil is only accidentally existent, and not essentially so. Hence, a shadow could not exist unless there were an object to cast it.

That may be as good as the classic “cavity” metaphor!

 

[AntiTheist]

But how do we know whether we have ‘enough evidence’ or not??

Well, that’s the question, isn’t it? That’s kind of the entire point of discussing these claims to begin with.

You see, we take the evidence, and we apply reason to that evidence – we perform acts of induction and deduction on the basis of evidence (or, in other words, we use evidence-based inquiry) to determine the likelihood of claims being true.

For example, we do have sufficient evidence to say that George Washington was a real person. We have, for example, documents written in his own hand, his correspondence, drawings of him, records of his deeds as president, items that he owned, accounts of people who knew him – written by those people while he was a alive.

We can examine all of that evidence and conclude that it is likely that George Washington existed.

Now, that’s not to say that every action ascribed to Washington really happened. Take, for example, the chopping down a cherry tree story. Yes, it’s a real story in the sense that’s it really is a story that is told about Washington. But did the events depicted in the story really happen?

It’s an event that seems, on the surface, to be the kind of tall-tale we’d expect to spring up around a figure who was admired and whose life we would expect would be mythologized as some. I personally don’t have access to all of the evidence, but if I were really interested, I could dig around and find the origins of the story – or, rather, the first appearances of it in popular culture. And I’d be willing to bet that there’s no solid evidence that it actually happened.

Now, I’m not claiming that Cherry Tree Gate didn’t happen absolutely – I’m just saying that I don’t think the evidence is sufficient for me to accept it. Now you’re free to disagree, but you wouldn’t be able to convince me without presenting more evidence and showing me how you are reasoning from it that the event happened (or without showing me that the evidence that there is really does support the claim). But either way, you cannot get around using evidence.

When you’ve answered that question, here’s another example I’d be interested in discussing

Well, wait. Before you start throwing examples at me, I want to know what’s “problematic” about the particular example of Ion.

Please explain the problem or problems that my distinction between imaginary and non-imaginary creates in terms of that particular example

Is chess real? If so, in what sense, and what specifically is it about chess that makes it true to say that it is real?

Chess is real as a game that’s really played by people in the real world. It’s also real as a set of rules that exist in books and in people’s minds.

If people stopped playing chess, then it would still exist as a bunch of rules that aren’t put into use, but it would no longer exist as a game that people really played.

Where in the world are you going with these examples? What’s the “problem” exactly and specifically?

I’m just about to leave my computer, so I’ll save explaining why shadows are real for another post (I can’t believe I just wrote that).

 

[Betterave]

Sheesh!!! If philosophers ran the world nothing would ever get done!

Gently now! Why do you say that? Because you don’t understand the point I made?

 

[Betterave]

Well, that’s the question, isn’t it? That’s kind of the entire point of discussing these claims to begin with.

What is the entire point of discussing which claims??

You see, we take the evidence, and we apply reason to that evidence – we perform acts of induction and deduction on the basis of evidence (or, in other words, we use evidence-based inquiry) to determine the likelihood of claims being true.

What do you mean by an ‘act of induction’ and an ‘act of deduction’ and by what general criteria do we determine whether such an act is “performed on the basis of evidence” or not - presumably in such a way that it produces knowledge? Let’s see if your much-vaunted examples answer those questions…

For example, we do have sufficient evidence to say that George Washington was a real person. We have, for example, documents written in his own hand, his correspondence, drawings of him, records of his deeds as president, items that he owned, accounts of people who knew him – written by those people while he was a alive.

Let’s arbitrarily take the first item on your list here, just because it’s the first: if you claim that we have documents written in GW’s own hand, therefore GW was a real person, aren’t you just begging the question? Is that a deduction or an induction? Is it a good one, whichever it is? Isn’t your whole example totally contrived? (Surely we have no reason to doubt in the first place that GW was a real person!) Why do you think your provision of this contrived example is a helpful contribution to this discussion? I don’t get it.

And why point out that there are certain stories about GW that may not be true. What is that supposed to contribute? That’s perfectly obvious, and people who feel the need to go on and on pointing out things that are perfectly obvious… well, we tend to give sideways glances and shuffle away from people like that, if you know what I mean.

Now, I’m not claiming that Cherry Tree Gate didn’t happen absolutely – I’m just saying that I don’t think the evidence is sufficient for me to accept it. Now you’re free to disagree, but you wouldn’t be able to convince me without presenting more evidence and showing me how you are reasoning from it that the event happened (or without showing me that the evidence that there is really does support the claim). But either way, you cannot get around using evidence.

Again, that’s obvious. So what is your point?

Maybe your examples are not all that you crack them up to be? An example isn’t very useful if you don’t explain the principle which the example is supposed to be illustrating. I don’t think you’ve done that, so again I’ll ask:

What do you mean by an ‘act of induction’ and an ‘act of deduction’ and by what general criteria do we determine whether such an act is “performed on the basis of evidence” or not - presumably in such a way that it produces knowledge?

Well, wait. Before you start throwing examples at me, I want to know what’s “problematic” about the particular example of Ion.

Please explain the problem or problems that my distinction between imaginary and non-imaginary creates in terms of that particular example

As I pointed out, we may not know whether Ion was a real person, but, as I explained, we cannot say: if Ion was not a real person, then Ion is merely imaginary. If we take Ion as a point of reference in an investigation into the nature of the ancient Greek rhapsode, then Ion can be imaginary in a sense, not a real person, but entirely real so far as we judge him to be a source of real information about the real world of ancient Greece. A judgment whether there was a real historical figure Ion (i.e., a judgment as to whether Ion is ‘non-imaginary’ or not) is simply not necessarily something which care about, even if, for our purposes, Ion is clearly not merely ‘non-imaginary’ - so you’ve simply chosen a distinction which isn’t very interesting or important for many of our purposes. And even if we are interested in making that judgment, it may come, necessarily, at the very end, as something of an after-thought, from an epistemic perspective. In other words, it may well be the last thing about which we come to form a true justified belief - but this fact need not affect the rest of our inquiry, we can bracket it as long as we like.

Chess is real as a game that’s really played by people in the real world. It’s also real as a set of rules that exist in books and in people’s minds.

If people stopped playing chess, then it would still exist as a bunch of rules that aren’t put into use, but it would no longer exist as a game that people really played.

Where in the world are you going with these examples? What’s the “problem” exactly and specifically?

You’ve offered what you apparently believe to be a clear criterion for determining whether something is real or not. I was hoping you would explain how you apply that criterion to the game of chess (instead of telling me a bunch of obvious facts about the game of chess - remember: the point of examples is to illustrate principles, not to provide you with an opportunity to type out some irrelevant trivia about the subject raised in the example). I assume that is also what JD was looking for regarding the subject of shadows.*

 

[AntiTheist]

Again, that’s obvious. So what is your point?

I’m using obvious examples because I’m trying to establish where we agree. It would seem that we agree on the following points:

1. Ion may or may not have been a real person – we don’t have enough evidence to believe that he was a real person. Ion the character is real as a character – we have enough evidence to believe that he is real as a character.
2. George Washington was a real person – we have enough evidence to believe that he was a real person. Stories about Washington are real, but we don’t have enough evidence to say that we believe every last thing attributed to him – like the cherry tree story – is real.
3. We both understand perfectly well that “real” – as I’m using it in this thread – means “non-imaginary,” and we’re both perfectly capable of using it in this sense, without any problems, when we specify whether we’re talking about a person, a character that may be based on a person, stories that may be based on a person, etc.

A name – like “Ion” – might refer to an actual person, a character in a story, a cultural item, etc. As long as we’re clear about which of those things we mean when we say “Ion,” there is no confusion that arises when we say “Ion is real.”

For example, as long as we specify that “By Ion, I mean the character in the story,” there is no confusion when we say, “Ion is real.”

Similarly, as long as we specify that “By Ion, I mean an actual person that the story might be based on,” there is no confusion when we say, “We don’t have enough evidence to say that Ion is real.”

Your claim, then, that my distinction is “problematic” is wrong.

1. We both agree that we can determine whether or not we believe that a person was real – or whether a character in a story, a cultural item, a story, etc, is real – by applying reason to evidence. We can get into how we apply reason to evidence later.

If you agree with these four points, please indicate that you agree – a simple yes will do – and I will proceed.

But unless we agree on the basics, further discussion is pointless.

And don’t worry, I intend to answer this question:

What do you mean by an ‘act of induction’ and an ‘act of deduction’ and by what general criteria do we determine whether such an act is “performed on the basis of evidence” or not - presumably in such a way that it produces knowledge?

But I’m not going to until you agree to points 1-4 that I have presented above.

 

[Betterave]

I’m using obvious examples because I’m trying to establish where we agree. It would seem that we agree on the following points:

Sounds good. I’ll tweak it where I see the need:

1. Ion may or may not have been a real person – we -]don’t/-] may not have enough evidence to believe that he was a real person - whether we do or not may be problematic, i.e., difficult to assess. Ion the character is real as a character – we have enough evidence to believe that he is real as a character. [We actually have conclusive evidence on this last point, which no sane person could dispute - same applies to GW, below.]
2. George Washington was a real person – we have enough evidence to believe that he was a real person. Stories about Washington are real, but we don’t have enough evidence to say that we believe every last thing attributed to him – like the cherry tree story – is real.

[Yes.]

1. We both understand perfectly well that “real” – as I’m using it in this thread – means “non-imaginary,” and we’re both perfectly capable of using it in this sense, without any problems, when we specify whether we’re talking about a person, a character that may be based on a person, stories that may be based on a person, etc.

[Yes - although your examples here are unfortunately far too limited (they are all about persons). Other kinds of entities, like chess, or shadows, or science, or morality, or propositions, or numbers, or relations, or transcendentals, or spirits, or faculties, or essences, may still be problematic…]

A name – like “Ion” – might refer to an actual person, a character in a story, a cultural item, etc. As long as we’re clear about which of those things we mean when we say “Ion,” there is no confusion that arises when we say “Ion is real.”

[Yes - I certainly hope that is nothing but obvious.]

For example, as long as we specify that “By Ion, I mean the character in the story,” there is no confusion when we say, “Ion is real.”

Similarly, as long as we specify that “By Ion, I mean an actual person that the story might be based on,” there is no confusion when we say, “We don’t have enough evidence to say that Ion is real.”

Your claim, then, that my distinction is “problematic” is wrong.

*[No. For one, it may be that my claim simply doesn’t apply if we artificially restrict our universe of discourse to the kinds of easy examples you’ve given. But other than that, your distinction remains problematic insofar as it’s not clear how it is supposed to apply or be relevant to the problem of establishing and explaining an epistemic criterion.]

1. We both agree that we can **** determine whether or not we believe that a person was real – or whether a character in a story, a cultural item, a story, etc, is real – by applying reason to evidence. We can get into how we apply reason to evidence later.

*[Yes - although it’s rather strange to say that we determine whether we believe something by applying reason to evidence. Is that really what you meant? Or did you just mean we determine whether we should believe something by applying reason to evidence?]

 

[AntiTheist]

Alright. You’ve actually somewhat impressed me by being straightforward and reasonable.

[Yes - although your examples here are unfortunately far too limited (they are all about persons). Other kinds of entities, like chess, or shadows, or science, or morality, or propositions, or numbers, or relations, or transcendentals, or spirits, or faculties, or essences, may still be problematic…]

Let’s stop here. See, this is why I wanted you to bring up clear examples in the beginning. If you had said something like “numbers” in the beginning, you might have saved us some time.

What I’m claiming is that the process we go through to determine whether a person is real or not is the same process we use to determine if other things are real, like chess. It applies to numbers, spirits, shadows, everything else on your list.

I have no problem, for example, accepting that spirits are real in the same way that Spiderman is real – as things that people have thought up and that persist as stories in the popular imagination.

But just as there is not actually a person walking the earth who was bitten by a radioactive spider and gained superpowers, so too are there no spirits.

Similarly, I accept that numbers exist in the same sense as Spiderman and spirits – they’re really thoughts that persist in human cultures, but they’re not real in the sense that they’re floating in the ether independently of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, the idea of spirits would also vanish, as would the idea of the number four.

I presume that there will be an objection to that last sentence, so let’s hear it.

[To be very clear, I’m not saying that numbers are fictitious characters or that they were invented in the same way as fictitious characters. Numbers are models of reality, abstractions from our experience of reality. As such, they exist as thoughts in the mind, as models of reality.

Similarly, I have in my head a model – a mental picture – of my living room. It’s a real model of the room, and I generated it from my experience of the room. I can use that model productively to actually help me do things, but it’s still just a model. If my mind were to vanish tomorrow, the model would vanish as well. And if a similar model of the living room exists in the minds of other people, then if their minds were to vanish, then all models of the living room would vanish as well]

But other than that, your distinction remains problematic insofar as it’s not clear how it is supposed to apply or be relevant to the problem of establishing and explaining an epistemic criterion.]

Well, ok, good. I was just getting to that.

Here’s the question you asked on this subject:

What do you mean by an ‘act of induction’ and an ‘act of deduction’ and by what general criteria do we determine whether such an act is “performed on the basis of evidence” or not - presumably in such a way that it produces knowledge?

There are several different questions in there, and I’m going to tackle them one at a time, making sure that we reach agreements before moving on to other parts of your question.

I’ll start with the last part first – what general criteria do we use to determine whether or not an act is “performed on the basis of evidence”?

Well – hang on to you hat – in general, we determine that an act of reason is performed on the basis of evidence when it cites data obtained from the world as part of its premises.

For example, here are two acts of reason that are evidence-based:

1. I believe that my car will start when I turn the key because it has started every time I have turned the key in the past when the car was working properly.
2. I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because the sky is blue.

Both of these conclusions have data obtained from the world as a premise of the argument, and both are evidence-based arguments. The difference, obviously – and yes, I am using an obvious example here, intentionally so – is that the second evidence-based conclusion is ineptly reasoned out from the evidence.

Are we in agreement so far on the general criteria for determining whether an act of reason is evidence-based?

 

[JDaniel]

What I’m claiming is that the process we go through to determine whether a person is real or not is the same process we use to determine if other things are real, like chess. It applies to numbers, spirits, shadows, everything else on your list.

AT:

If I may jump in here for a moment - I hope Betterave won’t mind. I find it quite interesting that you throw together a list of exigencies, then, as proof for your proposition, you lump it or, them, in with the less controversial of them.

I have no problem, for example, accepting that spirits are real in the same way that Spiderman is real – as things that people have thought up and that persist as stories in the popular imagination.

But just as there is not actually a person walking the earth who was bitten by a radioactive spider and gained superpowers, so too are there are no spirits.

As I just said!

So, what is your fact-based evidence that “spirits are real in the same way Spiderman is real?” Perhaps because you have never seen one? Or, perhaps because scientists can’t figure out a way to test for them?

Here, you make a unjustified (based upon your own criteria!) assertion that “there are no spirits.” Are we to take that as a statement testifying Truth? Or, a statement testifying that you just don’t know for sure and, perhaps, can’t conceive of a way to get at fact based evidence?

Similarly, I accept that numbers exist in the same sense as Spiderman and spirits – they’re really thoughts that persist in human cultures, but they’re not real in the sense that they’re floating in the ether independently of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, the idea of spirits would also vanish, as would the idea of the number four.

Four cows standing in a field are not four cows? Those cows just flatulated. But, their flatulence has dissipated into the air. Do you mean that four cows didn’t flatulate? Why? Because there are not four, or, because there is no flatulence to sense?

[To be very clear, I’m not saying that numbers are fictitious characters or that they were invented in the same way as fictitious characters. Numbers are models of reality, abstractions from our experience of reality. As such, they exist as thoughts in the mind, as models of reality.

This is why we all need the help of the masters! You have not sufficiently thought this through, which is why you are having so much trouble with Betterave’s arguments.

In St. Thomas’ Summa, Vol I, q. 85, a. 1, reply 2, he says,

“In the framework of immateriality, the mathematician in his strictly scientific character is said to leave aside all sensible matter and to retain in the abstracted result universal intelligible matter.”

You are saying that there are no such things as universals? Only “models?”

Model -

noun

1. a standard or example for imitation or comparison.
2. a representation, generally in miniature, to show the construction or appearance of something.
3. an image in clay, wax, or the like, to be reproduced in more durable material.
4. a person or thing that serves as a subject for an artist, sculptor, writer, etc.
5. a person whose profession is posing for artists or photographers.
6. a person employed to wear clothing or pose with a product for purposes of display and advertising.
7. a style or design of a particular product: His car is last year’s model.
8. a pattern or mode of structure or formation.
9. a typical form or style.
10. a simplified representation of a system or phenomenon, as in the sciences or economics, with any hypotheses required to describe the system or explain the phenomenon, often mathematically. - Dictionary.com

Similarly, I have in my head a model – a mental picture – of my living room. It’s a real model of the room, and I generated it from my experience of the room.

How did you “generate” it?

I can use that model productively to actually help me do things,

Such as?

but it’s still just a model.

Is it a “model”, or is it a recalled “picture” brought forward from your memory?

If my mind were to vanish tomorrow, the model would vanish as well.

But, the fact that you recalled the room today would not. That is a Truth that is immortal. Even if your mind vanished, as you say.

And if a similar model of the living room exists in the minds of other people, then if their minds were to vanish, then all models of the living room would vanish as well]

Likewise, the Facts that they held these recalled pictures in their minds, are Truths lasting beyond the deaths of the people or the universe.

continued . . .
[/quote]

 

[JDaniel]

cont . . .

I’ll start with the last part first – what general criteria do we use to determine whether or not an act is “performed on the basis of evidence”?

Well – hang on to you hat – in general, we determine that an act of reason is performed on the basis of evidence when it cites data obtained from the world as part of its premises.

For example, here are two acts of reason that are evidence-based:

1. I believe that my car will start when I turn the key because it has started every time I have turned the key in the past when the car was working properly.

Really? So, all deductive propositions, in order to be true, must rely on conditionals? And, cannot leave those conditionals behind?

1. I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because the sky is blue.

Stated as you did seems to make a causal statement. The sun rises because the sky is blue? What if the sky was black? Goodness: what if the sky was gray?

Both of these conclusions have data obtained from the world as a premise of the argument, and both are evidence-based arguments. The difference, obviously – and yes, I am using an obvious example here, intentionally so – is that the second evidence-based conclusion is ineptly reasoned out from the evidence.

Why?

Are we in agreement so far on the general criteria for determining whether an act of reason is evidence-based?

Betterave can more than adequately speak for himself, but, I, for one, am not in agreement.

God bless,
jd

 

[Betterave]

Alright. You’ve actually somewhat impressed me by being straightforward and reasonable.

Thank you! … I guess. (Am I not always straightforward and reasonable? )

Let’s stop here. See, this is why I wanted you to bring up clear examples in the beginning. If you had said something like “numbers” in the beginning, you might have saved us some time.

Let me stop right here. Quick question, I’m curious: what made you assume that “numbers” is a clear example?

(I guess I’m having a hard time convincing you of this, but my contention is that examples are never clear in themselves - they can only *possibly *be clear insofar as they are *preceded *by clear principles. I think this thread is generating more and more evidence in proof of this point.)

 

[Betterave]

What I’m claiming is that the process we go through to determine whether a person is real or not is the same process we use to determine if other things are real, like chess. It applies to numbers, spirits, shadows, everything else on your list.

I agree, except I will add that the process is not just, and not primarily either, about determining whether things are ‘real.’ It is primarily about determining the nature of things, about *understanding *them as the kind of realities which they really are.

I have no problem, for example, accepting that spirits are real in the same way that Spiderman is real – as things that people have thought up and that persist as stories in the popular imagination.

Of course; how could you? But sameness in that respect - both exist as part of a cultural reality - is not at all indicative of sameness in other respects - i.e., whether they are fictional or not (and how do we determine this? - that’s the question). These are separate questions and I don’t think you’ve done much to explain your methodology for addressing the second question. (The first question - “do these things exist, even as ideas current in our culture?” - is too obvious and not worth asking.)

But just as there is not actually a person walking the earth who was bitten by a radioactive spider and gained superpowers, so too are there no spirits.

…possibly, but possibly not. But how do we determine which it is, without simply begging the question?

Similarly, I accept that numbers exist in the same sense as Spiderman and spirits – they’re really thoughts that persist in human cultures, but they’re not real in the sense that they’re floating in the ether independently of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, the idea of spirits would also vanish, as would the idea of the number four.

I presume that there will be an objection to that last sentence, so let’s hear it.

But this surely isn’t what you meant to say, is it? If all human minds vanished tomorrow, presumably the idea of George Washington would vanish too. That doesn’t mean that when we think of George Washington, we are not thinking of a real person. Presumably the idea of the earth or of water or of energy or of light would vanish too - that doesn’t imply that any of these things are not real (not if you ask the man on the street, anyway!).

[To be very clear, I’m not saying that numbers are fictitious characters or that they were invented in the same way as fictitious characters. Numbers are models of reality, abstractions from our experience of reality. As such, they exist as thoughts in the mind, as models of reality.

This is not a clear example at all: I would say that numbers exist as *objects *of our thoughts, but not as models of reality and not as thoughts in the mind per se. They can be *used *to model reality, but they are not in themselves models of reality. They are *apprehended *by our thoughts, but are not themselves thoughts.

Similarly, I have in my head a model – a mental picture – of my living room. It’s a real model of the room, and I generated it from my experience of the room. I can use that model productively to actually help me do things, but it’s still just a model. If my mind were to vanish tomorrow, the model would vanish as well. And if a similar model of the living room exists in the minds of other people, then if their minds were to vanish, then all models of the living room would vanish as well]

Sure, but what is your point here??

I could point out that minds need not vanish in order for the models to vanish - they could just be affected by amnesia… but still, so what??
[/quote]

 

[Betterave]

I’ll start with the last part first – what general criteria do we use to determine whether or not an act is “performed on the basis of evidence”?

Well – hang on to you hat – in general, we determine that an act of reason is performed on the basis of evidence when it cites data obtained from the world as part of its premises.

Okay, and what does “data obtained from the world” entail, presumably such that a) we can reliably identify “data obtained from the world” and b) such that we have grounds for thinking that our citing it as such - as “data obtained from the world” - will be indicative of the presence of some kind of ‘evidential’ (knowledge-making?) property? - and further, such that we are justified in using this ‘data’ to support whichever particular claim we cite it in support of? (Which will then invite the question, how it is we determine whether our actual citations of such data is appropriate or not… i.e., based on what evidence? More “data obtained from the world,” maybe??)

For example, here are two acts of reason that are evidence-based:

1. I believe that my car will start when I turn the key because it has started every time I have turned the key in the past when the car was working properly.

1. I believe that [fact 1:] the sun will rise tomorrow because fact 2: the sky is blue.

Both of these conclusions have data obtained from the world as a premise of the argument, and both are evidence-based arguments. The difference, obviously – and yes, I am using an obvious example here, intentionally so – is that the second evidence-based conclusion is ineptly reasoned out from the evidence.

No, the second is not “ineptly reasoned out from the evidence,” since it is not “from the evidence” at all. And here ‘evidence’ is just the term applied to one supposed fact, which is cited in support of another supposed fact. And fact 2 is not from fact 1 here, in any real sense. Just because you have constructed a sentence with the word ‘because’ in it does not change this, does it?

And whether or not you agree (I’m interested to know which it is), the question I will have is: how do you know this? (whatever it is you think you know*). What evidence do you appeal to, and what is the nature of the evidence you appeal to, in order to arrive at your conclusion?

*In case this isn’t clear, I am using whatever-it-is-you-think-you-know as an example, relative to which I am asking you to explain your principles.

 

[AntiTheist]

Am I not always straightforward and reasonable?

No. It’s like pulling teeth to get you to be lucid.

Let me stop right here. Quick question, I’m curious: what made you assume that “numbers” is a clear example?

It’s a clear example because it is a concrete example of an area where you think the distinction between imaginary and non-imaginary is problematic.

Without a specific example, the words “your distinction is problematic” are too abstract to express precisely problem you have in mind.

examples are never clear in themselves - they can only *possibly *be clear insofar as they are *preceded *by clear principles.

I agree. My method is to make sure that we agree on specific examples before moving up to the principles that they illustrate.

If we agree on certain examples, then perhaps we can determine that we are using similar methods.

But sameness in that respect - both exist as part of a cultural reality - is not at all indicative of sameness in other respects - i.e., whether they are fictional or not (and how do we determine this? - that’s the question). These are separate questions and I don’t think you’ve done much to explain your methodology for addressing the second question.

Yes, they are separate questions, and I’m getting there.

I’m trying to make it clear that there is no problem with concluding that spirits are “real” in the sense of being cultural items that people tell stories about and “not real” or “imaginary” in the sense of being not actually floating around our heads and haunting us. There is no problem with this distinction.

Again, you claimed that my distinction is problematic, and I fail to see how it is so. Clearing this point up is important before we move on because if we don’t agree on what’s “real” and what’s “imaginary,” then we’re going to have a hard time discussing how we go about determining whether or not something is real – which is one specific example of knowing things in general.

We’re going up the ladder here. And we’re not taking a step up until we have some basic agreement on terminology. If you think that my distinction is “problematic,” let’s hear the problem.

If all human minds vanished tomorrow, presumably the idea of George Washington would vanish too. That doesn’t mean that when we think of George Washington, we are not thinking of a real person. Presumably the idea of the earth or of water or of energy or of light would vanish too - that doesn’t imply that any of these things are not real (not if you ask the man on the street, anyway!).

It’s bits like this that make me doubt if you’re actually following anything that I’m saying.

Nowhere – anywhere – did I say or remotely imply that “Unreal things are things that we make mental models of.”

We make mental models of real things all the time. Those models are themselves real models. But the model isn’t the thing modeled.

There’s a guy, George Washington, and there’s our idea of George Washington. If the idea were to vanish, the guy is still real. Similarly, there’s my living room, and there’s my idea of my living room. The idea could vanish, but the living room itself is still real.

What I’m saying is that numbers are models of reality. We put two rocks and two rocks together, and we can abstract the formula 2+2 = 4. But if human minds disappeared, 2+2=4 would also disappear. The rocks would still exist, but the rocks aren’t numbers.

“4” exists only as an idea in the minds of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, dogs would still have the same physical makeup, but there would be no one to come up with numbers and determine that they have X number of legs.

 

[Betterave]

I’ve appreciated your efforts in this thread to be rational and open-minded, but you’re losing me a bit here:

It’s bits like this that make me doubt if you’re actually following anything that I’m saying.

Nowhere – anywhere – did I say or remotely imply that “Unreal things are things that we make mental models of.”

And I never said you said that, did I? Now here’s what you did say:

Similarly, I accept that numbers exist in the same sense as Spiderman and spirits – they’re really thoughts that persist in human cultures, but they’re not real in the sense that they’re floating in the ether independently of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, the idea of spirits would also vanish, as would the idea of the number four.

It appeared to me that you were presenting an argument for your claim that numbers are not real, where ‘real’ means non-imaginary, like GW, as opposed to imaginary, like Spiderman, but not wholly imaginary, like Potatoman (assuming that no such fictional character actually exists).

That’s why I said:

But this surely isn’t what you meant to say, is it? If all human minds vanished tomorrow, presumably the idea of George Washington would vanish too. That doesn’t mean that when we think of George Washington, we are not thinking of a real person. Presumably the idea of the earth or of water or of energy or of light would vanish too - that doesn’t imply that any of these things are not real (not if you ask the man on the street, anyway!).

Were you in fact just pointing out that ideas can only be thought if a thinker exists to think them? I really don’t know what your point was, sorry.

In any case, you still appear to me to be presenting an argument for your claim that numbers are not real, where ‘real’ means non-imaginary, like GW, as opposed to imaginary, like Spiderman, but not wholly imaginary, like Potatoman (assuming that no such fictional character actually exists). To remind you, here’s what you wrote:

We make mental models of real things all the time. Those models are themselves real models. But the model isn’t the thing modeled.

There’s a guy, George Washington, and there’s our idea of George Washington. If the idea were to vanish, the guy is still real. Similarly, there’s my living room, and there’s my idea of my living room. The idea could vanish, but the living room itself is still real.

What I’m saying is that numbers are models of reality. We put two rocks and two rocks together, and we can abstract the formula 2+2 = 4. But if human minds disappeared, 2+2=4 would also disappear. The rocks would still exist, but the rocks aren’t numbers.

“4” exists only as an idea in the minds of people. If all human minds vanished tomorrow, dogs would still have the same physical makeup, but there would be no one to come up with numbers and determine that they have X number of legs.

And to all this my reply will be the same as last time: you have done nothing to prove that numbers are not real, that numbers would cease to exist if they ceased to be the object of at least one human being’s thought. Can you see that?

 

[Betterave]

It’s a clear example because it is a concrete example of an area where you think the distinction between imaginary and non-imaginary is problematic.

Without a specific example, the words “your distinction is problematic” are too abstract to express precisely problem you have in mind.

I agree. My method is to make sure that we agree on specific examples before moving up to the principles that they illustrate.

If we agree on certain examples, then perhaps we can determine that we are using similar methods.

But surely we have already had plenty of examples like this. What about Spiderman? What about Ion? What about Jesus and God and GW and stories about them? Why act relieved when I bring up numbers, of all things (which was just one item in a list of examples, b.t.w.)?

I’m trying to make it clear that there is no problem with concluding that spirits are “real” in the sense of being cultural items that people tell stories about and “not real” or “imaginary” in the sense of being not actually floating around our heads and haunting us. There is no problem with this distinction.

There is obviously no problem, in principle, in general, with concluding that X’s are “real” in the sense of being cultural items that people tell stories about and “not real” or “imaginary” in the sense of being not actually instantiated in nature. Whether *spirits *are a case that can legitimately be substituted for X is a different matter: you have yet to offer any principles which would clue us in as to whether this is problematic or not.

Again, you claimed that my distinction is problematic, and I fail to see how it is so. Clearing this point up is important before we move on because if we don’t agree on what’s “real” and what’s “imaginary,” then we’re going to have a hard time discussing how we go about determining whether or not something is real – which is one specific example of knowing things in general.

It sounds like you’re trying to decide what we know first (examples), then decide how we know it (principles). But that approach can’t possibly be effective in this context, surely? If we already know what we know, then what is the point of trying to specify a general epistemic criterion? I thought the point was that we wanted to specify a criterion which we think we can apply so as to think critically about what it really is that we know… since we obviously disagree about this point when it comes to examples. Does that make sense?