I found it myself.
I thought that it is clear. Sorry for that.
Here is the argument in syllogism form:
It would have to be considered eternal, immutable, and unchanging. I think it’s a rather radical claim, though, to go so far as to claim that this is the only possible configuration of such a block universe. That it’s exact arrangement could not have been different by one gluon or quantum fluctuation. We still run into difficulties, though, in that the universe would still seem to require an* intrinsic *reason to exist instead of not existing. A block universe could very well be eternal and unchanging, but I do not see how it could be reasoned it exists eternally due to any reason intrinsic to itself, and would therefore still have an ontological dependence on something else. In God, this is because He simply Is Subsistent Being. What He is is that He is, and vice versa. I don’t think that easily clicks for some people. The universe is clearly not simply unconditioned existence. It exists in a certain way, with a certain arrangement of parts. It’s not the concept of what it is “to be” manifest, but a “to be in this way” at best. But that’s a deep discussion to get into.
Something which is not contingent does not need a cause.
Right.
There is only one configuration. An individual in this universe either does X or Y at a given time and that is unique when the decision is made.
The existence of universe in a specific way is necessary even if we accept that there is a God. That is true because Gods knowledge and act are one. God cannot make decision because there is no potentiality in him. Therefore the universe is necessary.
You prove God from contingency of creation. The fact that there exist a subsistent being follows from the fact there are things which are contingent. The former, God existence, does not follow when there is no contingent being.
That is what Spinoza’s idea that the nature is God. I will look for what I read to explain the idea better.
This is already discussed.
That is the definition of block universe, it is unique and unchanging. The question is whether our universe is a block universe? The answer is yes. Why? Because everything has specific trajectory in this universe whether it has capacity to decide or not. Things are subject of change, destruction and creation, in the universe in temporal perspective but the whole is unchanging.
Something which is not subject to destruction and creation (change in general) is not contingent. The only thing which is left is to show that the universe is necessary. That is easy to show too. The universe exist and has a beginning. There is nothing before beginning then nothing cannot exist. Therefore universe is necessary.
Thanks for confirmation.
I think we can discuss that too. Something which is not subjected to destruction or creation , change, is not contingent. Things are subject to change because we look at them from temporal perspective. The whole is unchanging. What is left to show is that the block universe is necessary. That is simple too. The universe exists and has a beginning. There is no before than beginning therefore nothing cannot exist. This means that the universe is necessary.
I think you misunderstand what I’m saying. Let’s assume that X is the existent block universe. Is/was Y an impossibility? Not because of any external conditions. Is Y metaphysically impossible to even consider to be existing instead of X? Is it metaphysically inconsistent to say that Y could hypothetically exist? That X is the only metaphysical possibility? Right down to the placement of each and every quark and gluon at each and every moment in time?
It’s not just a matter of saying “There must be a God because the universe is contingent.” It’s a matter of saying that that a reality of only contingent beings leads to rational absurdities. It’s a matter of then determining what properties are excluded from a non-contingent reality. While, say, Saint Thomas Aquinas does make cataphatic theological assertions, these are based on an apophatic theological study. The negative theology comes first. We then get to something which is what we refer to as God. That’s why he ends all his proofs that way. We don’t just *say *that God is Subsistent Being just because. Subsistent Being is God. Following an apophatic study of finding a thing that exists because of intrinsic necessity does not lead us to a bulk universe. It causes us to rule it out.
We don’t just need to explain THAT it is, we need to also explain why it exists in one way and not in another.
I understand what you are trying to say but that applies to God too since God’s knowledge of His creation is subjected to creation (decisions of individuals). This means that God’s knowledge would be x or y if He created the universe X or Y respectively. So I think what you are trying to say does not apply to contingent thing otherwise we have to accept that God is also contingent too.
Unfortunately I am not familiar with apoptotic study so I buy your words on that unless you could kindly explain that to me.
I meant that the existence of God does not follow in contingency argument if there is nothing contingent. Are we in the same page?
This is already discussed in the first comment.
That is what I am trying to argue against (the bold part). The universe is necessary because of three facts: (1) The universe exists, (2) It has a beginning and (3) There is nothing before its beginning. I can argue that differently: (1) God is the creator, (2) God’s knowledge of the creation if fixed, (3) God cannot decide (there is no potentiality in Him) and (4) therefore the creation is necessary.
The idea of the universe popping or being creating from nothing is wrong because time is a part of creation and there is no point before beginning of the universe.
I assumed when you argued that a block universe would not be contingent that you meant there was no creator, but I see from your post #9 that you are assuming a creator.in you hypothesis to bring the universe into being. But that would mean that the universe is contingent on the creator.
God’s knowledge is complete. He already knows both X and Y. And if he willed X, there’s nothing to wait on to determine if it will go one way or another. He already knows.
It is negative theology. It makes assertion about what God is not. Or in this case, what a necessary being that intrinsically exists is not. This rules out things extended in space or which are ordered one way when it could be ordered another way. Saint Thomas would then make positive statements about what was left, with the caveat that these statements had to be understood in an analogous sense. An example of a word being used in an analogous sense? Good. This food is good. My health is good. That is a good triangle. That man exemplifies good moral behavior. All of these uses apply a different sense of the word good, but there is something similar and common being applied by each use, too. Granted, there are arguments also for things being univocal or equivocal, but Thomas’ use of positive statements for God were always intended to be used in an analogous sense, and only after using a negative analysis to rule qualities/properties/conditions out due to them creating logical contradictions.
We may be using slightly different definitions of contingency, as Saint Thomas’ differs from the contemporary definition. First, contingent only means something that tends towards corruption. It does not mean it is has ontological independence from external causes. To Saint Thomas, angels would be considered necessary beings. His scientific understanding of the celestial bodies (planets, stars) would admit them as necessary beings (something we know is not the case, but that is not an issue). Prime matter might be considered necessary under this definition. Aquinas’ argument from contingency started by leading back to a necessary being of this sort (and was part of a larger set of arguments designed to build a case when all taken together). However, that something is incorruptible and eternal and necessary does not, in Saint Thomas’ view, mean that its necessity isn’t derived. It does not mean that it exists essentially. And to exist essentially, it must be existence. If the what of a thing differs from unconditioned existence, it is a composition of essence and existence, and that composition requires an external cause (ontological dependence), because a thing cannot compose itself before it actually exists.
There being no time before a beginning does not mean its existence is free from ontological dependence on something else or that it is impossible for it not to be. That God never began to will (in that His will is eternal, without start or end) does not mean that God’s will is not voluntary or His own and not coerced. I already explained how Saint Thomas defined necessary and contingent. That God wills something means that will necessarily be, but it does not mean that all creation is therefore incorruptible, nor does it mean that this result was involuntary on His part.
What I am stressing is that the universe has a beginning and there is nothing before beginning so we cannot say that there was nothing then something.
That is not correct. God’s knowledge of creation is unique otherwise God’s foreknowledge would be different in a given instances which is rationally incorrect.
Thank you.
Good.
I think that was people mistake who argued that something cannot comes of nothing. When something has a beginning and there is nothing before beginning then something is necessary. The idea which I have in my mind is simple but I cannot explain it better.
I think the point in this argument is that God cannot decide therefore the creation is necessary because it exists.
I think that block universe has to have a beginning otherwise we deal with a problem, we cannot reach from minus infinity to now.
