Why unmoved mover?

[Gorgias]

There are things that we don’t know. There are things that we know we don’t know. And there are things that we don’t know that we don’t know.

Did you know that?

Ahh, but these are things that we know by virtue of logic. We don’t need empirical observation to reason to these conclusions. It’s not something that “appears to everyone to be true”, it’s something that philosophers have reasoned out and reached a conclusion. Did you know that?

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

There are things that we don’t know. There are things that we know we don’t know. And there are things that we don’t know that we don’t know.

Did you know that?

…it’s something that philosophers have reasoned out and reached a conclusion.

Based on premises with which I don’t agree. Based on assumptions.

 

[Gorgias]

Based on premises with which I don’t agree.

OK – so, it’s not a case of “we don’t know”; it’s merely a case of “Wozza thinks he’s a better philosopher/logician than Aquinas et al.” Ok… got it.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

Based on premises with which I don’t agree.

OK – so, it’s not a case of “we don’t know”; it’s merely a case of “Wozza thinks he’s a better philosopher/logician than Aquinas et al.” Ok… got it.

One starts with agreed facts and then develops the philosophy. If the facts are wrong then the philosophising doesn’t even start.

To state that an infinite regress is not possible is an assumption. It is not a fact. So you can’t build a philosophical position on that. Unless you want to qualify the position right from the start.

 

[SalamKhan]

Perhaps we should drop this discussion of infinite regress and instead focus on whether there is a necessary existent, whose existence is always in actuality. Starting with the modes of existence:

[Necessary] intrinsically necessary- exists by itself

[Possible] extrinsically necessary- acquires its existence from something else

[Possible] contingent- is neutral to existence & non existence

[Possible] extrinsically impossible- lacks a cause to acquire its existence

[Impossible] intrinsically impossible- something that cannot occur per se

Part I [on the possible existent]:

1. That which is extrinsically & intrinsically impossible do not exist in reality.
2. That which is contingent has neither existence nor non-existence.
3. That which is extrinsically necessary exists in reality, therefore there are possible existents.
4. Possible existents require a cause to bring their existence from potentiality to actuality.
5. That which does not actually exist cannot cause anything, therefore an internal cause is impossible and an external cause is necessary.

Part II [on the necessary existent]:

1. An internal cause for the totality of possible existents is impossible, and an external cause is required.
2. Another possible existent would be included in the totality and therefore not an external cause for the totality.
3. The external cause for the totality must be intrinsically necessary, therefore there is a necessary existent.

 

[snarflemike]

I’ve got no problem with that.

I want to read about this. Links?

 

[STT]

Are you saying that the first cause doesn’t really have to be a being at all; it might also be an inanimate first cause, or, if alive, not aware of its own existence?

Yes.

Theism goes several steps further, of course. Not only is there a being aware of itself, but also a supremely and absolutely omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and benevolent Being, Who generates His love by His creation of the whole universe (and beyond, perhaps) and, particularly, mankind, the main focus of G-d’s love. If you then add to that the belief that all the manifestation of G-d, His love, and His law occurred on this one tiny planet in the universe, and finally, factor in the belief that your own religion is mainly the one that got all of G-d’s creation, His plan, His nature, His theological truth correct, while the others, good-intentioned as they might be, got some or most of this wrong, that’s quite a lot to process and accept, isn’t it?

True. Theism claims a lot without providing any supports.

 

[MarysLurker]

On hierarchical sort of series of changer why this series must have first changer ?

And infinite regress is disproven by the Big Bang.

 

[MarysLurker]

Theism claims a lot without providing any supports.

Are you saying that the first cause doesn’t really have to be a being at all; it might also be an inanimate first cause, or, if alive, not aware of its own existence?

But the physically observable Universe allows us to attribute some properties to the First Cause without depending on revelation.

The matter-energy equivalence ratio (E=mc^2) along with thermodynamics show that the First Cause would have to have more energy than the Universe itself. In fact, it would require infinite energy to create something from nothing.

The general relativity relationship between space-time and mass (you can’t have time without mass, basically) prove that the First Cause is extratemporal (outside of time/eternal).

The Universe has physical laws that are immutable and also extratemporal as well. Things like E=mc^2 have to be in place at the time of the Big Bang for the Universe to actually exist, which it obviously does. Yet time began at the Bang, so again, you have extratemporality. Therefore, it’s logical to attribute the physical laws to the First Cause as well. Nothing that actually exists in time mean be the cause of time itself… duh.

Some of the physical laws are also transcendent (such as the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter) and therefore not completely comprehensible to those within the Universe. This again suggests that the First Cause is an intelligent designer.

 

[Wesrock]

What’s frequently missed in Aquinas’ arguments is that he made a distinction between two types of infinite regress.

The first is the infinite regress of a linear series (also called an accidental series or a series ordered per accidens). This is the type of series that proceeds father to son to grandson. The grandson’s ability to have children is not dependent upon his father or grandfather continuing to exist to enable him to do so. Once he is set in motion from the father he is no longer dependent on the father. Other examples that come to mind are a series of falling dominos or a series of events from the present going back in time.

Aquinas, following Aristotle, did not object to such a series proceeding to infinity without a first term.

The other type of series is an hierarchical series (also called an essentially ordered series or a series ordered per se"). A book is on a shelf, the shelf is on the wall, the wall is on the foundation, the foundation is on the ground… The book’s continued position is at all times continuously dependent upon each of the other terms. Remove any of the terms and everything after falls. And all these terms do not have their power intrinsically, but only derivatively from a prior term. If there is no member who has the power in an underived way, then this power can’t be in the system at all. Aquinas’ own example was a rock being moved by a stick, which is being moved by a hand, and so forth. If we’re thinking about physical motion, it’d be like something without the intrinsic power to change its own inertial reference frame having it’s own inertial reference frame being changed (accelerated). This cannot be happening without being acted upon by something external to it.

It’s an hierarchical series that Aquinas rejected could have an infinite regress. The continued actuality of a thing in our experience, according to Aristotle and Saint Thomas is something that must be brought to actuality continuously, either by an intrinsic principle or extrinsic. And, upon reflection and logic, it can be shown that there is only one possible thing that is actual by intrinsic principle.

Pointing to the big bang is only thinking in terms of a linear series. It has nothing to do with Aquinas’ objections to an hierarchical series proceeding to an infinite regress. Such arguments aren’t tracing their way back in time but are concerned with the immediate here-and now essential causes of a substance (not even an event; like Aristotle, Aquinas looked at causation in terms of explaining substances). What is the being of a thing dependent on as a full explanation?

If you’re interested in whether a linear series can proceed to infinity, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is up your alley. Saint Thomas Aquinas rejected the central arguments of the KCA, but not all Thomists agree with him.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

Reaching a first mover that lacks potential is critical, for if the first mover had potentials, it would be less than God. We need to arrive at something that is purely actual to get divine attributes. I think some people forget this critical step in argument for God.

And if so, how do we know this first changer must lack any potential?

Could the first changer/ultimate reality be potential in other ways? Could it be that the reality’s existence is actual but has some potential attributes? If so, then this would mean the reality’s existence would be different from the alleged potential attributes. So the reality would have an actual part and at least one potential part. But now now we have a problem: Any combination is less fundamental than its parts, for we have to have a reason that combines the parts in such a way. There would have to be some prior actualization of the combination of parts. The existence of this supposed actual reality would in fact be potential, after all. So the pure actual reality must be purely actual in itself, with no parts.

Another way to see why there must be a reality that is Pure Actuality through-and-through, with no other potentials, is because when we say there must be a reality whose existence is already actual, that’s really short-hand for saying the reality itself is fully actual. Because to say something is actualized is to just say that this kind of thing is actualized. For example, to say water is actualized is (among other things) to say that the potential for hydrogen and oxygen to be combined in such a way is actualized. Now for something’s existence to just be actual is to say that this kind of thing is actual. And for something of itself to be actual is different from something whose potentials are being actualized. To be actual, of itself, is to not have potentials that need actualizing, in the first place.

Still another way to show that this ultimate reality is purely actual – with no potential – is to realize the ultimate reality must be necessary. It is not something that can fail to exist. But if this supposed reality had potentials to be actualized, then it would not be necessary being after all. It would be being with possibilities, with contingencies. Therefore, the ultimate reality must be the fullness of reality, the fullness of being: Purely Actual with no potential. A reality with potentials just is not a necessary being.

 

[Wozza]

Gorgias:

On hierarchical sort of series of changer why this series must have first changer ?

And infinite regress is disproven by the Big Bang.

This universe appeared to have a beginning. That does not disprove an infinite regress.

Imagine you wake up on a desert island all alone. You have no concept of where you came from yet you know you must have been created at some point. Because you are getting older. So you must have been younger. So there must be some point at which you didn’t exist. You cannot have existed forever.

Therefore, the seemingly entirely reasonable argument goes, there was nothing before you.

 

[MarysLurker]

This universe appeared to have a beginning. That does not disprove an infinite regress.

Standing alone, sure, but the evidence for infinite expansion is pretty strong (lambda-CDM, CMBR observations etc.)

 

[lelinator]

So I have a question.

What is it that the unmoved mover supposedly moved?

 

[MarysLurker]

What is it that the unmoved mover supposedly moved?

The physical laws, time itself and at least the starting conditions of the material universe (the energy singularity of the Big Bang).

 

[lelinator]

The physical laws, time itself and at least the starting conditions of the material universe (the energy singularity of the Big Bang).

But where did those things come from?

 

[RealisticCatholic]

There can only be two times of beings that currently exist: necessary and contingent.
@lelinator

Alternatively, either that is the case, or everything is necessary. But not everything can be contingent (or else nothing wouldn’t even exist, in the first place).

We look around us and it’s very obvious certain things and states of affairs are not necessary. Even Big Bang cosmology suggests the Universe itself, at is is, was not necessary.

But there has to be some necessary reality. The difference is that one does not exist of its own accord whereby the necessary reality does. Therefore, the contingent realities — say the Universe for example — must come from nothing except the necessary reality, God.

But the Universe is not God, because it is contingent, while God is not.

 

[MarysLurker]

But where did those things come from?

From outside of/before time, logically. Ditto for constants like c (the speed of light), pi (See here), and so on.

Since causation requires time, once you have gotten to “the land before time,” as it were, there is no more before, only after. That’s why the Unmoved Mover is unmoved, such that a question like “what caused/moved the Unmoved Mover?” is properly answered nothing.

 

[lelinator]

Alternatively, either that is the case, or everything is necessary. But not everything can be contingent (or else nothing wouldn’t even exist, in the first place).

We look around us and it’s very obvious certain things and states of affairs are not necessary. Even Big Bang cosmology suggests the Universe itself, at is is, was not necessary.

But there has to be some necessary reality. The difference is that one does not exist of its own accord whereby the necessary reality does. Therefore, the contingent realities — say the Universe for example — must come from nothing except the necessary reality, God.

But the Universe is not God, because it is contingent, while God is not.

But isn’t it true that every contingent thing is the result of the actualization of potential. So the universe must have potentially existed before it actually existed. So wherein did this potential reside? It couldn’t have resided within the universe, because it didn’t exist yet.

So if there ever was a point where only a necessary, completely actual being existed, how could anything else have ever come into existence? Because it would seem that it could never have had the potential to exist.

 

[lelinator]

From outside of/before time, logically. Ditto for constants like c (the speed of light), pi and so on.

Since causation requires time, once you have gotten to “the land before time,” as it were, there is no more before, only after. That’s why the Unmoved Mover is unmoved, such that a question like “what caused/moved the Unmoved Mover?” is properly answered nothing.

But if a contingent thing’s existence is preceded by its potential to exist, then there could never have been a time, even before the beginning of time, when potential didn’t exist. On the other hand, if the universe’s existence wasn’t preceded by its potential to exist, then its existence must be necessary.