Why would a Catholic not be committed the divine command theory?

[Linusthe2nd]

But if the Ten Commandments are good because they contribute to our overall good, then that means they are good not based on God’s commands, which you yourself implied. That means an action P could be the right action because doing P is in my best interests. That amounts to some kind of Hobbesian rational egoism. It can’t be the case that the divine command theory is correct and rational egoism is correct at the same time, can it?

Again, you are falling into the trap of labeling God’s actions. They are not susceptible of categorization, not Hobbesian, nor Divine Command, nor anything else. His commands are good in themselves because they reflect His own goodness and the goodness of His creation and the final end of Creation, which is the right order which leads to Himself. You can’t put God’s actions in a box any more than you can put God in a box. And they are good for us because they lead us to Him.

Linus2nd

 

[Khalid]

So an action P not commanded or condemned by God and not written or implied in any Holy work is still right or wrong based on God’s command when He hasn’t given a command or condemnation regarding the action P?

Perhaps all actions are such that there are general principles outlined by God applicable to any given situation. Is that a good way to put it if I accept divine command?

He has given a command or condemnation of action P in either the natural moral law or the revealed written law, or both. Your second paragraph is a better explanation of the natural law than it is of DCT, I believe. I would say something such as:

"Any action P has moral value solely in relation to God, the creator of all things, including the notions of “right” and “wrong”. God lets us know the moral value he has assigned to action P either in his written revelation (the Bible) or in his unwritten revelation (the natural law). "

God has told us in his written revelation that he will not arbitrarily change the laws, which is an abuse often associated with straw-men of DCT. DCT, additionally, is one of the only ways (possibly the only way) to bridge the naturalistic “is-ought” problem in modern ethics.

What do you think?

 

[Khalid]

Again, you are falling into the trap of labeling God’s actions. They are not susceptible of categorization, not Hobbesian, nor Divine Command, nor anything else. His commands are good in themselves because they reflect His own goodness and the goodness of His creation and the final end of Creation, which is the right order which leads to Himself. You can’t put God’s actions in a box any more than you can put God in a box. And they are good for us because they lead us to Him.

Linus2nd

That is the very definition of divine command theory! “His command are good in and of themselves”, not because of anything other than or in addition to the fact that “they reflect his own goodness [and will].” The goodness of the creation is derived solely from God and his command, and is not innate to creation or its telos.

 

[Khalid]

The Divine Command Theory is the only sound approach to ethics. Essentially, good and evil in themselves are nothing, except as understood in relation to an Absolute Being. Take away God, and nothing in the universe has any consequence or value. Things only have value in their relation to the Real (i.e. God). Without God, it would be infinitely preferable that the human race, and the universe did not exist at all. Without God, there can be no morality, since all things are equally indifferent.

If God tomorrow issued a “Press Release” (and we somehow were sure it was from God) that we should stop using the letter “E”, so be it. If God tomorrow said “Lying is permissible”, so be it. God could reverse each of the Ten Commandments, if He so chose. To God along belongs Wisdom, Truth and Freedom.

Therefore, obedience to God is the only useful guide to living- since God alone is Good, God alone truly exists. All else is dust and shadows, swirling particles of non-meaning in an infinite void. “It is only by obeying the commands that we know God.” 1 John

That’s certainly a more poetic way of putting it.

 

[andyklein]

I’m seeing some different answers here:

1. Good ethical conduct can exist independent of God because the good is independent of God, yet DCT still applies because God knows what’s good for us
2. Whatever God says is good in and of itself and hence right to act in ways God says
3. All good stems from God. Only God is what makes doing P right or wrong.

Maybe this example will hopefully settle it:

I’m going to buy Listerine and gargle it. Would God really care? Does gargling Listerine have any moral worth at all? If God commanded me not to do it, it would be a wrong course of action, but He didn’t. However, it would be good for me because it will aid my oral health, which is in my best interests so I live and grow and make make contributions to world. Why would these effects have any moral worth? Because they make it possible to achieve my natural ends as a human to be united with God in heaven. Hence, God is the source of ethical value. God makes all good because He is God. Hence, my gargling Listerine has ethical value solely based on God.

Is that a good example?

 

[Khalid]

I believe so, except (2) and (3) on your list are actually in identity on further inspection - what God says is good is because God is good - and (1) is poorly phrased - the good is dependent on God at all points, and can not exist independently of him. So invert number (1) and make (3) a footnote to (2) and you’re getting there. I take it you’re studying philosophy and attempting to learn how to make a rigorous argument, distilling your premises down to simple statements so they can be used as major and minor premises in term logic (and, eventually, converted in to predicate calculus). Learning the art of logically-rigorous argumentation - which premises are major, which minor? which premises are presupposed? [to avoid infinite regress] - is harder than arguing well in a rhetorical sense, but you’ll get the hang of it - I know this because the example you give is British-quite good.

Keeping the argument as you have put it has an inconsistency that leaves it open to the assault on the major premise, if good is in any way independent of God, but God knows what is good for us and reveals it, by what law does God reveal it? Couldn’t we learn with our human reason to identify what is good apart from God’s commands given enough time? God forbid! Is the cultural memory of God’s law enough? God forbid!

In ethics, as in all other areas of knowledge and indeed all areas of being, God must be the absolute standard, with no standard existing independently of God, nor any standard dependent on God yet superior to him (as some of the mediaeval via moderna theologians believed in, the potentia ordinata, the ordained power of God, by which God would bind himself to a standard he created. (This is neither here nor there, but reduces to absurdity, and thus the later addition insofar as he deals with men, the concept of pactum.)

(This is a derivative theory that brings in theology proper, i.e. the study of God qua God.) The heart of Divine Command is “the good is the good because God commands it”, without regard for God in himself - why does God command as he does? The why of God commands good is because God is good in himself and acts in accordance with the Divine personality. Two different questions, you see, one asking “Why is a given action moral? Because it is good in itself, or because God commands it?”, and a second question, which is, “Given that the good is good because God commands it, why does God command the good?”

If you wish to be focused, leave out the “why?” (of which my answer is traditional, placing God’s intellect before the will, but there are voluntarist answers that root the “why?” in purely volitional terms, leaving God’s nature out of it), as that’s a paper for another day, or add it as an excursus or put it in footnotes.

 

[Khalid]

Appendix A:

That is, unless you mean to say, “(1) An individual can perform an ethical action without directly relying on God’s revelation of his decree, such as an atheist, whose ethics are irrational, but can be made rational by conscious submission to the revealed decree of God.” However, this is mostly unrelated to the thrust of your argument, and is yet a third question, “Assuming that the good is good because God commands it * as good, how do we know what the good is, according to God’s Command?”

So we have three questions, only one of which is DCT concerned with, and two of which are a result of accepting DCT.

1. Why is the good, good? (Metaphysics if the focus is on why, or ethics if the focus is on the good.)

And, with the answer being proved, “The good is good because it is what God commands”, the additional questions follow, which you muddle inconsistently with the first, being:

1. Why does God command the good? (Revealed and systematic theology, not ethics or metaphysics.)
2. How do we know what God has commanded? (Epistemology, not ethics or metaphysics.)

These are good questions, but they are not directly relevant to DCT (of which I get the impression you’re either trying to understand as DCT, or write a paper on DCT). Any question, no matter how simple, if it is traced out in term logic, eventually leads to the sum total of knowledge and then to God as we attempt to justify each additional premise and define our terms. Question gives rise to question.*

 

[Qoeleth]

I’m seeing some different answers here:

1. Good ethical conduct can exist independent of God because the good is independent of God, yet DCT still applies because God knows what’s good for us
2. Whatever God says is good in and of itself and hence right to act in ways God says
3. All good stems from God. Only God is what makes doing P right or wrong.

Maybe this example will hopefully settle it:

I’m going to buy Listerine and gargle it. Would God really care? Does gargling Listerine have any moral worth at all? If God commanded me not to do it, it would be a wrong course of action, but He didn’t. However, it would be good for me because it will aid my oral health, which is in my best interests so I live and grow and make make contributions to world. Why would these effects have any moral worth? Because they make it possible to achieve my natural ends as a human to be united with God in heaven. Hence, God is the source of ethical value. God makes all good because He is God. Hence, my gargling Listerine has ethical value solely based on God.

Is that a good example?

I don’t think that it possibly the best example. Of course, you could argue that God commanded you to “Love God and love your neighbour” and that involves taking care of your teeth (so you can pray and do acts of charity). But that is somewhat circuitous!

A clearer example might be going to Mass on Sunday. Now, one could say “There is no particular reason why it should be Sunday.” But God (through the Church) has commanded it thus. So, it doesn’t need any other reason to justify it. Similarly with the prohibition on divorce. In some situations, it might seem like a divorce is ‘better’ for everyone involved. But that fact that God has commanded against it is sufficient reason.

It is a deontological approach, in that it is not primarily concerned with what seems to bring about the best result.

A classic example is in the 2nd Book of Maccabees. The seven Jewish brothers and their mother are threatened with death, unless they consume pork. But they refuse, and are burnt to death. Now, there is no reason not to eat pork apart from the fact that God commanded it.

DCT involves accepting commandments, even (and especially) if there is no apparent reason for them.

I suppose the “dark side” of it is that a person could (in principal) say, “There is no prohibition against X (e.g. taking cocaine, owning slaves, etc.) in the Bible, so I am free to do it.” But I have never come accross a person taking such an approach in practical terms.

I like the DC approach, because it is not necessary to ‘argue’ about what is good or bad- but it is sufficient to follow the Divine Law, as the will of God. God made the ‘game’ (the universe and life), so He is also entitled to make the Rules as He pleases!

 

[andyklein]

I believe so, except (2) and (3) on your list are actually in identity on further inspection - what God says is good is because God is good - and (1) is poorly phrased - the good is dependent on God at all points, and can not exist independently of him. So invert number (1) and make (3) a footnote to (2) and you’re getting there. I take it you’re studying philosophy and attempting to learn how to make a rigorous argument, distilling your premises down to simple statements so they can be used as major and minor premises in term logic (and, eventually, converted in to predicate calculus). Learning the art of logically-rigorous argumentation - which premises are major, which minor? which premises are presupposed? [to avoid infinite regress] - is harder than arguing well in a rhetorical sense, but you’ll get the hang of it - I know this because the example you give is British-quite good.

Keeping the argument as you have put it has an inconsistency that leaves it open to the assault on the major premise, if good is in any way independent of God, but God knows what is good for us and reveals it, by what law does God reveal it? Couldn’t we learn with our human reason to identify what is good apart from God’s commands given enough time? God forbid! Is the cultural memory of God’s law enough? God forbid!

In ethics, as in all other areas of knowledge and indeed all areas of being, God must be the absolute standard, with no standard existing independently of God, nor any standard dependent on God yet superior to him (as some of the mediaeval via moderna theologians believed in, the potentia ordinata, the ordained power of God, by which God would bind himself to a standard he created. (This is neither here nor there, but reduces to absurdity, and thus the later addition insofar as he deals with men, the concept of pactum.)

(This is a derivative theory that brings in theology proper, i.e. the study of God qua God.) The heart of Divine Command is “the good is the good because God commands it”, without regard for God in himself - why does God command as he does? The why of God commands good is because God is good in himself and acts in accordance with the Divine personality. Two different questions, you see, one asking “Why is a given action moral? Because it is good in itself, or because God commands it?”, and a second question, which is, “Given that the good is good because God commands it, why does God command the good?”

If you wish to be focused, leave out the “why?” (of which my answer is traditional, placing God’s intellect before the will, but there are voluntarist answers that root the “why?” in purely volitional terms, leaving God’s nature out of it), as that’s a paper for another day, or add it as an excursus or put it in footnotes.

I wasn’t really trying to make any kind if formal argument. I was first just listing the different views of DCT that I was seeing. Then i gave an example with the intention to show what these views would say about it.

I understand the utterly flawless and infinite goodness of God. Anything he commands is good. Therefore, to disobey God is to do wrong. Still, I don’t yet have an answer to second question. Why does God command the good. Either God arbitrarily makes the good or the good is unrelated to God (if this is a false dichotomy, please correct me). If God were to bar from taking Listerine, it would only be right to refrain from taking Listerine. It would be bad for my physical health, so why would God command that? If that command is bad for me, God would never command it. If its bad, either God understands that its bad for me or God Himself has arbitrarily made it the case that it is bad for me.

So in DCT, the right action is independent of the good? If this is the case, why would God command us to do what’s not good?

Another idea: God is the maker of all things. But we as humans are entitled to think, act, do, and overall live freely. Perhaps we must do certain things to promote our good based on the evolution of our environments and their effects. This good exists independently of God. Perhaps God is aware of this evolution and His commands reflect the changing nature of earthly good and bad. Hence, ~DCT while God is still all of His perfect characteristics.

 

[tonyrey]

So is it safe to say that divine command is sufficient to determine what is the right action but not necessary? The way I’m reading most of these replies is that when God doesn’t directly command the action P, we must resort to another method to determine the right course of action. How could we then know of any objective moral truths? For example, Abraham sacrificing Isaac would have been right because God commanded it, but it would be wrong for me to sacrifice my son without a divine command. I still can’t see how I’m not committed to the divine command theory since God has willed that murder is wrong. But then God seems to turn Himself when He commands Abraham to commit murder. Why would it not be the case that my doing P is right if and only if God prescribes that I do P?.

Abraham **believed **God commanded him to commit murder…

 

[ilikepizza1]

Abraham **believed **God commanded him to commit murder…

The bible is quite explicit in stating that it was God, and this is hardly the only place where God commands something that would otherwise be murder.

 

[Khalid]

I wasn’t really trying to make any kind if formal argument. I was first just listing the different views of DCT that I was seeing. Then i gave an example with the intention to show what these views would say about it.

I understand the utterly flawless and infinite goodness of God. Anything he commands is good. Therefore, to disobey God is to do wrong. Still, I don’t yet have an answer to second question. Why does God command the good. Either God arbitrarily makes the good or the good is unrelated to God (if this is a false dichotomy, please correct me). If God were to bar from taking Listerine, it would only be right to refrain from taking Listerine. It would be bad for my physical health, so why would God command that? If that command is bad for me, God would never command it. If its bad, either God understands that its bad for me or God Himself has arbitrarily made it the case that it is bad for me.

So in DCT, the right action is independent of the good? If this is the case, why would God command us to do what’s not good?

Another idea: God is the maker of all things. But we as humans are entitled to think, act, do, and overall live freely. Perhaps we must do certain things to promote our good based on the evolution of our environments and their effects. This good exists independently of God. Perhaps God is aware of this evolution and His commands reflect the changing nature of earthly good and bad. Hence, ~DCT while God is still all of His perfect characteristics.

God commands the good because God’s nature is purely and perfectly good, and God acts in accordance with his nature. “Right action” is an action choosing “the good”; “the good” is chosen by “right action”. Both “the good” and “right action” are commanded by God apart from all else, that is, completely separate from any other consideration than the nature of God. (Some would say the will of God is primary, answering “because it is the command of God”, some would say the intellect, “because it is what God chose to command”; but both will and intellect are of his nature.)

The answer to (2) you already gave yourself in (3). There is no changing nature of good and bad, because God’s nature is eternal. The question of why God commands certain things, beyond “He commands them because he is God”, is a question that can not be answered, as God has not revealed the answer; the fullness of God’s will is hidden from us. We can be certain that his commands are bound by nothing but his own will, but we can not be certain what exactly his will is. (If we could, we could predict his commands and nullify revelation.)

From our point of view, we can say that God commands the good arbitrarily, because we can not fully understand God’s nature. As I said in my earlier post, question (2), “Why does God command the good?”, is not part of DCT; it is theology or the metaphysics of God qua God. DCT is why good is good and bad is bad for us, the answer being “God commanded us”; you are asking, “How does God determine what he will command?” - we can not answer that in this lifetime, beyond the answer “He acts in accordance with his nature”, which leads to the question, “What is his nature?”; “It is good.” “How do we know his nature is good?” “Because he has revealed it to us in the Bible”, leading to the tautology:

God commands the good because it’s what he commands; the good is what God commands because he is God (or “because it is the will of God”).

A parallel question would be, “Why does God save some and let others be reprobate?”, the answer being, “Because it is the will of God”. We can no more answer, “Why does God command P?” than we can answer, “Why does God save P but not N”?

 

[tonyrey]

The bible is quite explicit in stating that it was God, and this is hardly the only place where God commands something that would otherwise be murder.

Only Fundamentalists believe every statement in the Old Testament is** literally **true.

 

[tonyrey]

God commands the good because God’s nature is purely and perfectly good, and God acts in accordance with his nature. “Right action” is an action choosing “the good”; “the good” is chosen by “right action”. Both “the good” and “right action” are commanded by God apart from all else, that is, completely separate from any other consideration than the nature of God. (Some would say the will of God is primary, answering “because it is the command of God”, some would say the intellect, “because it is what God chose to command”; but both will and intellect are of his nature.)

The answer to (2) you already gave yourself in (3). There is no changing nature of good and bad, because God’s nature is eternal. The question of why God commands certain things, beyond “He commands them because he is God”, is a question that can not be answered, as God has not revealed the answer; the fullness of God’s will is hidden from us. We can be certain that his commands are bound by nothing but his own will, but we can not be certain what exactly his will is. (If we could, we could predict his commands and nullify revelation.)

From our point of view, we can say that God commands the good arbitrarily, because we can not fully understand God’s nature. As I said in my earlier post, question (2), “Why does God command the good?”, is not part of DCT; it is theology or the metaphysics of God qua God. DCT is why good is good and bad is bad for us, the answer being “God commanded us”; you are asking, “How does God determine what he will command?” - we can not answer that in this lifetime, beyond the answer “He acts in accordance with his nature”, which leads to the question, “What is his nature?”; “It is good.” “How do we know his nature is good?” “Because he has revealed it to us in the Bible”, leading to the tautology:

God commands the good because it’s what he commands; the good is what God commands because he is God (or “because it is the will of God”).

A parallel question would be, “Why does God save some and let others be reprobate?”, the answer being, “Because it is the will of God”. We can no more answer, “Why does God command P?” than we can answer, “Why does God save P but not N”?

God’s infinite goodness and love are beyond our comprehension but they have to be interpreted in the light of His infinite freedom and creativity. That is the flaw in Spinoza’s concept of Deus sive Natura:

The infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. … All believe that they speak by a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak

. - Ethics

It is more reasonable to believe the Creator is transcendent because we don’t even regard ourselves as biological machines. If we were we wouldn’t be responsible for any of our actions or decisions…

 

[Khalid]

Only Fundamentalists believe every statement in the Old Testament is** literally **true.

I’m a proud fundamentalist.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m a proud fundamentalist.

Then we’re bound to disagree!

 

[andyklein]

God commands the good because it’s what he commands; the good is what God commands because he is God (or “because it is the will of God”).

That is Euthyphro’s dilemma! Is that a tautology or is it circular reasoning? So it appears that if we accept God as all of what He is by definition, then it appears that God cannot be reduced beyond God. So I’m beginning to see that since God is irreducible and beyond our complete understanding, then it would be ok to deny Euthyphro’s dilemma as a kind of fallacy? That further shows that God is beyond our understanding, if we accept our rules of logic as a means to discover truth. God Himself becomes the philosopher king who created the rules of logic as a fundamental aspect of the laws of nature. God is then not subject to our philosophical investigation.

Right?

 

[Khalid]

It is a tautology, not a circular argument (nor insofar as any possible argument is always circular, or infinitely regressive, if nothing is accepted as an axiom beyond the three classical laws themselves). I suppose the broad strokes of your argument are correct. We can understand God and his designs partially, not fully, and most especially only that he has revealed about himself and his will. Certain questions lead us to realize that God, “reconciliation of all contradictions”, the Infinite One, is far beyond our knowledge as finite creatures, as his is eternal decree is beyond our short days under the sun in understanding gained. I suppose this is why I eventually adopted a strong form of presuppositionalism and give quite a bit more warmth to apophaticism now than I have in the past.

These questions can be answered partially, but not completely, for, in line with modern mathematical-philosophical discoveries, no (finite) system of logic can be both consistent and complete. (I trust that God’s logic is both consistent and complete.) Think of Flatland, if you’ve read it, but don’t take the analogy too far. (That would be that we are the inhabitants of Flatland as compared to God.)

Still I believe you have misunderstood a bit, as I have answered the Euthyphro dilemma (something is good if and only if it is commanded by God, whose command is necessary and sufficient for moral predication), and I have answered my answer of the Euthyphro dilemma (God commands the good because he is good by nature) - see the regress starting? - but I have not answered my answer of my answer, which is “Why is God’s nature good?”, which can be answered, as you point out, by stating that “God is God”, because whatever God’s nature is, is good, since God is the definition and definer both of the good (remember that God is “an eternal act of self-knowledge”, here). Now we have come from ethics, through economy and epistemology, to theology itself: “Why is God the way he is?”

Moses asked this question when he asked for the name of God; he asked God who God was. God answered, “Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh” - “I AM THAT I AM”.

So what Plato asks is a false dilemma after a sense, for he assumes the gods of which he poses the question are part of the cosmos; they are humanity writ large. He discounts anything other than the Third Realm* as having any independence from matter, views the universe as eternal and the gods as contained within it, and thus overlooks the existence of an ontologically-prior Creator ex nihilo. For the gods the Plato believed in, the question was not answerable, as they were bound up in the cosmos as much as us: for Jehovah God, who is completely transcendent and prior, who created all things out of nothing by the power of his word, it is.

*Whereas Plato viewed the Good as non-cosmic, extant in the Third Realm; his concept of the gods was materialistic; Plato’s conception of “the Good” (capital “G”: “the form of the Good”) correlates more closely with our true conception of “God” than Plato’s concept of the gods correlates with our conception of God, so, to believers in an omnipotent creator ex nihilo, the question is almost inverted!