Wittgenstein, God, and Herisy

[IvanKaramozov]

Wittgenstein ended his masterpiece of logic with the final line, “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent”.

He dismissed most questions of philosophy as either senseless or such that they cannot be spoken OF but only SHOWN.

I’m starting to really study his philosophy and am very interested in it, however I’m trying to get back into Catholicism. So I had some questions.

1-If questions as to God’s existence falls into the realm of what cannot be coherently spoken of, then is this heresy? Not in matters of personal belief, however I believe Roma says that Catholics must accept that God’s existence CAN be proven, even if no current proof is sound. What exactly is the deal with this in general

2-Solipsism, I’m an Epistemological Solipsist, that is I do not believe that anything beyond one’s own mind(if even that) can be PROVEN to exist, is this heretical?

3-I understand that occasionally Rome will condemn a Philosophy, like Materialism. Is the Philosophy in itself condemned and not believable by the faithful, or is it only relegating theological belief by that philosophy that is not allowed?

for instance, could I be an empiricist in Hume’s fashion so long as I did not extend this empiricism to metaphysical claims, but only as a scope of the limits of knowledge?

thanks: )

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Ivan,

In his later years, Wittgenstein actually retracted the claims in his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, where he had originally defended a logical positivistic view of epistemology.

The main objection modern philosophers have with logical positivism (re: the verification principle) is that the verification principle cannot itself be verified. Speaking of metaphysics as if it is inherently non-sense (not in the condescending way, of course), has led many to conclude that positivism is ironically another metaphysical theory.

Ivan:

1-If questions as to God’s existence falls into the realm of what cannot be coherently spoken of, then is this heresy?

This may require some clarification, since the coherence of theistic language is defended even by some atheists. Are you asking whether it is meaningful to talk of God if God cannot be empirically observed? If so, then it would seem to be question begging in favor of the verification principle.

Ivan:

2-Solipsism, I’m an Epistemological Solipsist, that is I do not believe that anything beyond one’s own mind(if even that) can be PROVEN to exist, is this heretical?

By “proof”, I assume you mean absolute certainty. The Church would unlikely call this view heresy unless it extends to matters of faith or pragmatic reason. Descartes held a similar view, except he believed that God’s existence could be proven.

Ivan:

3-I understand that occasionally Rome will condemn a Philosophy, like Materialism. Is the Philosophy in itself condemned and not believable by the faithful, or is it only relegating theological belief by that philosophy that is not allowed?

I honestly do not see a difference between the two. There is only one reality, so if one’s philosophy is in conflict with God’s created order, then it would seem safe to conclude that the Church’s prohibition against Materialism applies to the philosophical realm, as well.

Ivan:

for instance, could I be an empiricist in Hume’s fashion so long as I did not extend this empiricism to metaphysical claims, but only as a scope of the limits of knowledge?

This is an interesting question. One reason is because even Hume did not follow his philosophical speculations. His conclusion concerning the problem of induction, for example, is impossible to consistently apply, in my estimation. We might rephrase your question like this: could one be an empiricist so long as one does not extend this empiricism to claims about metaphysical knowledge? As before, this view appears to make metaphysical claims anyway, so I think there is some difficulty with its coherence.

Ivan:

thanks: )

Great questions! Keep thinking!

 

[drafdog]

Jump forward a few years from Wittgenstein’s logical positivism and read OLP. Wittgenstein is the only philosopher to have developed two opposing schools of philosophy.

Matthew

 

[IvanKaramozov]

Jump forward a few years from Wittgenstein’s logical positivism and read OLP. Wittgenstein is the only philosopher to have developed two opposing schools of philosophy.

Matthew

OLP?

 

[drafdog]

And here I thought you were reading philosophy. My mistake.

Ordinary Language Philosophy.

Language is rooted in the experience of the physical world and as a result there are limits to what can be communicated meaningfully with a set of symbols. The other problem with language is the tentative tacet agreement on the meaning of symbols which changes over time through contact with new experiences and ideas. This is the basic thrust of OLP. It is useful in cutting through nonsense to get at real communication.

Matthew

 

[Authorcharlieg]

I find Wittgenstein to be one of the great apologists of the Catholic faith, although I do not believe he could ever have understood himself as such. Key arguments in the Tractatus include, "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. "

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Wittgenstein talks about the transcendent. What is transcendent transcends language. When we transcend language we end up with “Can God pick up a rock so big he cannot pick it up?” “Is God one or is he three,” or thirteen in the Jewish faith, or ninety-nine in the Muslim faith?

The great philosophers have argued these things for centuries, and Wittgenstein found the answer. In discussing God we have transcended language and ended up with non-sense, but non-sense in a good sense. We can fall back into language games and continue arguing or pass over in silence.

The inherent contradiction in discussing God is that he transcends language so we cannot do it properly, but we must pass our faith on to our children, so we must do it. I do not see Wittgenstein changing his position so much as trying to phrase it in more meaningful ways. The method is heterodox, but the result is very orthodox.God transcends our understanding but is a very central part of our everyday lives.

 

[Jonesboy]

Wittgenstein ended his masterpiece of logic with the final line, “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent”.

He dismissed most questions of philosophy as either senseless or such that they cannot be spoken OF but only SHOWN.

I’m starting to really study his philosophy and am very interested in it, however I’m trying to get back into Catholicism. So I had some questions.

1-If questions as to God’s existence falls into the realm of what cannot be coherently spoken of, then is this heresy? Not in matters of personal belief, however I believe Roma says that Catholics must accept that God’s existence CAN be proven, even if no current proof is sound. What exactly is the deal with this in general

2-Solipsism, I’m an Epistemological Solipsist, that is I do not believe that anything beyond one’s own mind(if even that) can be PROVEN to exist, is this heretical?

3-I understand that occasionally Rome will condemn a Philosophy, like Materialism. Is the Philosophy in itself condemned and not believable by the faithful, or is it only relegating theological belief by that philosophy that is not allowed?

for instance, could I be an empiricist in Hume’s fashion so long as I did not extend this empiricism to metaphysical claims, but only as a scope of the limits of knowledge?

thanks: )

I’m doing Witt at the mo. Here’s some answers.

1. That which cannot be spoken of refers to the manifesting or identifying conditions of elements. Sometimes called transcendental conditions. See Kant too. So if the elements are language (words or syntax) then the manifesting condition of language cannot be put into elements or syntax, words.
   For example, the elements of a bouquet of flowers are identified by the bouquet. The elements do not identify themselves, and neither do they show a bouquet. WE have to see the bouquet to see that the set of flowers is in fact a bouquet.
   Like the bouquet, if God is the manifesting condition of the elements of sense, logic, and all things experiential, etc, then we cannot show by sense, logic, or experience, what God is. Like the bouquet, we know it when we see it, but the elements themselves cannot describe their own manifesting condition.
2. Solipsism fails for Witt because the “I” cannot see itself (cf. the “eye” cannot see itself).
   I am Witt reincarnated, and I can add to that. We cannot identify an “I” on the basis of a body, as other bodies are found in the same space. There isn’t anything we can attach to an “I” to say that only it exists. It is a manifesting condition, not an element, so we can’t say “I am the only one”. As a manifesting condition it is uncountable, there is no “only”.
3. Witts idea, and still a modern one, of philosophy is that philosophy is clarification. It has no subject matter or stances of its own, so there is nothing to condemn.

 

[Jonesboy]

Hi Ivan,

In his later years, Wittgenstein actually retracted the claims in his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, where he had originally defended a logical positivistic view of epistemology.

The main objection modern philosophers have with logical positivism (re: the verification principle) is that the verification principle cannot itself be verified. Speaking of metaphysics as if it is inherently non-sense (not in the condescending way, of course), has led many to conclude that positivism is ironically another metaphysical theory.

This may require some clarification, since the coherence of theistic language is defended even by some atheists. Are you asking whether it is meaningful to talk of God if God cannot be empirically observed? If so, then it would seem to be question begging in favor of the verification principle.

By “proof”, I assume you mean absolute certainty. The Church would unlikely call this view heresy unless it extends to matters of faith or pragmatic reason. Descartes held a similar view, except he believed that God’s existence could be proven.

I honestly do not see a difference between the two. There is only one reality, so if one’s philosophy is in conflict with God’s created order, then it would seem safe to conclude that the Church’s prohibition against Materialism applies to the philosophical realm, as well.

This is an interesting question. One reason is because even Hume did not follow his philosophical speculations. His conclusion concerning the problem of induction, for example, is impossible to consistently apply, in my estimation. We might rephrase your question like this: could one be an empiricist so long as one does not extend this empiricism to claims about metaphysical knowledge? As before, this view appears to make metaphysical claims anyway, so I think there is some difficulty with its coherence.

Great questions! Keep thinking!

Just a one correction, Wittgenstein never rejected positivism, he never took it up.

 

[Jonesboy]

Jump forward a few years from Wittgenstein’s logical positivism and read OLP. Wittgenstein is the only philosopher to have developed two opposing schools of philosophy.

Matthew

Wittgenstein didn’t have two opposing philosophies. He always kept the key idea of frameworks or manifesting conditions, from the ineffability and picture theory of the Tractatus, to the middle period “criteria” to the later “language games” of the Investigations.