A
Anthony_V
Guest
Recall that the original meaning of “matter” in western thought came from Aristotle, under the concept of hylemorphism. Matter is simply the principle by which substances are individuated. It was a term relative to the substantial form or the accidental form. The matter of a marble statue is the marble (and the form is the statue). The matter of the marble is a certain mixture of rock (and the form is the marble). The matter of the mixture of rock is some sort of chemical compound (and the form is the rock). The matter of the chemical compound is some arrangement of atoms and sub-atomic particles (and the form is the chemical compound). The matter of the atoms and sub-atomic particles… etc. If you collectively extracted all the forms from matter, you would have prime matter. While not nothing, it has no characteristics except that it can receive form. It’s form that has the characteristics.
If we wanted to ask if something was immaterial, we would be meaning to ask if it is a form that subsists without matter. So the real question is: Are magnetic fields subsistent forms (i.e. do not enform any matter [of their own])? Since there would be no matter to differentiate one magnetic field from another, and you would probably say that there is more than one magnetic field, you would have to say that each magnetic field has its own essence (i.e. that each subsistent form of “magnetic field” is unique, such that the difference between one magnetic field and another is a parallel difference between the form of a dog and the form of a a tree). They would be radically different kinds of things. Otherwise, every magnetic field would be the self-same subsistent form of magnetic field, since there would be nothing to distinguish the self-same subsistent form of “magnetic field” from another self-same subsistent form of “magnetic field.” Since there are different varieties of magnetic fields, that seems implausible.
I think that would be a hard claim to maintain: every subsistent form of magnetic field is essentially different from every other subsistent form of magnetic form. How are they all magnetic fields? It seems they need to be essentially the same, such that they all have the same form. But since you want to say there is more than one, you would want to say that there are many different instances of the same form in different matter.
To provide a more concrete example, imagine you have two pottery jars. They both have the same form of “pottery jar.” But their similarity is not what makes them different. The very concept of having more than one pottery jar entails that they must be actually the same in some respect (what we call the same form) but potentially different in another (what we call different matter). So, for example, one pottery jar is made from this lump of clay, and the other is made from this other lump of clay. If we wanted to say the pottery jars were immaterial, but that we still want two of them, we would run into a problem. What makes them different is their matter. But if we take the matter away, we take away their difference, and they would be only one, self-same, subsistent form of pottery jar. Since we don’t want that, we need to put in another difference; but the only thing they have is the form, since ex hypothesi that’s all they are. The only way out is to say that there are two forms rather than one, i.e. there are two essences rather than one. But now we don’t have two pottery jars. We have (maybe) an immaterial pottery jar, and something else that’s at best similar to an immaterial pottery jar.
When you take away matter, you have to account for the principle of individuation elsewhere – if you want more than one individual, that is.
If we wanted to ask if something was immaterial, we would be meaning to ask if it is a form that subsists without matter. So the real question is: Are magnetic fields subsistent forms (i.e. do not enform any matter [of their own])? Since there would be no matter to differentiate one magnetic field from another, and you would probably say that there is more than one magnetic field, you would have to say that each magnetic field has its own essence (i.e. that each subsistent form of “magnetic field” is unique, such that the difference between one magnetic field and another is a parallel difference between the form of a dog and the form of a a tree). They would be radically different kinds of things. Otherwise, every magnetic field would be the self-same subsistent form of magnetic field, since there would be nothing to distinguish the self-same subsistent form of “magnetic field” from another self-same subsistent form of “magnetic field.” Since there are different varieties of magnetic fields, that seems implausible.
I think that would be a hard claim to maintain: every subsistent form of magnetic field is essentially different from every other subsistent form of magnetic form. How are they all magnetic fields? It seems they need to be essentially the same, such that they all have the same form. But since you want to say there is more than one, you would want to say that there are many different instances of the same form in different matter.
To provide a more concrete example, imagine you have two pottery jars. They both have the same form of “pottery jar.” But their similarity is not what makes them different. The very concept of having more than one pottery jar entails that they must be actually the same in some respect (what we call the same form) but potentially different in another (what we call different matter). So, for example, one pottery jar is made from this lump of clay, and the other is made from this other lump of clay. If we wanted to say the pottery jars were immaterial, but that we still want two of them, we would run into a problem. What makes them different is their matter. But if we take the matter away, we take away their difference, and they would be only one, self-same, subsistent form of pottery jar. Since we don’t want that, we need to put in another difference; but the only thing they have is the form, since ex hypothesi that’s all they are. The only way out is to say that there are two forms rather than one, i.e. there are two essences rather than one. But now we don’t have two pottery jars. We have (maybe) an immaterial pottery jar, and something else that’s at best similar to an immaterial pottery jar.
When you take away matter, you have to account for the principle of individuation elsewhere – if you want more than one individual, that is.