G
Giants
Guest
That’s still not what I’m doing. I’m not rationalizing anything. If anything, I’m offering an objective basis for moral decisions. If there’s no suffering or well-being to be experienced in a given act, the act is without a moral component.But maybe many people, in the future, would suffer for this person’s not being born. And I don’t mean suffer in terms of a void in relationships. I mean in terms of some practical effect that developed person would have had. You don’t know that. I don’t know that. The person consenting to the abortion doesn’t know that.
And yes, naturally, the opposite is also a possibility: that misery on future others will be prevented by such an act. But many atheists would still say that it is still affirmatively immoral, not amoral, to rationalize decisions to terminate any life based on suppositions of harm prevented or lack of good performed, or even the stastistical probability of a net neutral consequence by aborting that life.
Incidentally, there’s another side to your argument for human potential. What if, by terminating a week-old zygote, the would-be parents don’t have their lives upended by an unplanned pregnancy? They can both keep working, raising their economic profile. And maybe a few years down the line, have a planned pregnancy when they’re more capable of supporting a child.
Now, I don’t know if that’s what would happen. I don’t know that that’s not what wouldn’t happen. But why is this hypothetical less compelling as an argument than the one you’re giving me?