hasantas said** : “Likewise reject presence of God is impossible to prove. Because that claim cannot be demonstrated by physical and material proofs …
To prove presence of God is too easy.”**
I think you these things backwards.
Nobody has been able to prove the existence of God.
…
And, even if they did, maybe God no longer exists (but, in the past, did exist).
…
This makes to “reject presence of God” very easy to do.
I would say, there is NO proof that God exists, so I can reject the idea of the presence of God.
You can no more reject the presence of God than you can reject your own existence, even less, in fact, once a proper understanding of ‘God’ is established.
What God is not is some ‘thing’ like other ‘things’ in existence. God is that which grounds the existence of all things. In other words the essence of existence itself.
This is what Aquinas was getting at in his Five Ways. Every thing that exists does not account for its own existence nor the existence of anything else, that ‘accounting’ has to come from that which has existence necessarily as an aspect of its essence.
For all ‘things,’ THAT some ‘thing’ exists (its ‘thatness’) is quite a different matter from WHAT it is (its ‘whatness.’) If this were true for every existent there could be no explaining the existence of anything, since nothing could explain itself or anything else. The only logical possibility, according to Aquinas is that the ‘thatness’ of everything is ultimately derived from Existence Itself (Ipsum Esse Subsistens.) Whatness and Thatness have to be essentially conjoined and inseparable in Being Itself, in God. There must exist ‘God’ whose essence is existence itself.
If the Five Ways are read with this idea in mind, they become a set of very powerful principles that are undeniable.
The first way, **the argument from motion **holds since motion (properly understood as ‘change’) exists, tracing the source of that change is only successful if it arrives at change being an aspect of the ‘whatness’ of things. Things that exist do so in the way they do (their whatness) because they exist in a manner that is susceptible to being changed. No changed entity nor changer sufficiently explains change itself. Only if Existence itself does contain within it a sufficient explanation for all change can change itself be properly explained.
The second way,
from efficient causation, holds that since contingently existing things do not, ultimately explain or account for their own existence and can only cause other things to exist if the cause of their own existence can be sufficiently explained, tracing the account of causation cannot end with something itself caused. Rather, there must be an Uncaused Cause that sufficiently explains why causes occur at all.
The third way,
from potentiality, observes all things that exist conditionally are contingent for their existence on something else. Which is to say all things have not always existed and might not always exist. Trees, rocks, planets, galaxies, universes, etc. come and go. Yet, if this were the case absolutely, then at some point, given infinite past time, nothing would have existed and thus nothing could come to be. From nothing, nothing comes. Yet this is impossible since things do now exist. There must be ‘something,’ speaking loosely, that is not contingent on anything else and that has ‘within’ it the "accounting’ for the existence of all contingent things.
The fourth way,
from degrees of being, begins with the ‘gradation’ found in all things. Some things are better than others. There could be no speaking of ‘best’ without a standard to which things can be compared. That standard cannot exist in the things themselves, because it is those things that are being compared in virtue of something they each possess. That standard, to be meaningful, must EXIST apart from all things and that can only be in Existence Itself, in God.
The fifth and last way observes there is
design in creation. Things tend naturally towards discernible ends. That essential ordering could only be possible if it derived from the nature (the ‘whatness’) of those things themselves. The ‘whatness,’ since it is determined by the existence of each entity, could not be imposed from without, but is, rather, essential to the manner of existence of each entity, which is essentially ordered in coordination with other entities towards clearly identifiable ends. This ‘design’ is not imagined, is undeniable and integral in nature. Therefore, the design could only have been ordered by Existence Itself, which we call God.