You cannot speak for the thoughts of these individuals.
Whether or not they willed their deaths as a means is not a matter of intent here.
Whether or not they willed their deaths as an end, is. I admit that, though we have no good reason whatsoever even for being open to the possibility that they did. I nonetheless admit, however, that whether those poor people’s action fit the second criteria of double effect is something that I cannot deductively prove.
Whether they willed their deaths as a means is a different matter, though. That condition isn’t one of the two subjective ones, but rather one of the objective ones. It’s not determined by what they ultimately intended - that’s the previous condition -
rather, it’s determined by whether or not the bad effect of their action is, objectively and causally speaking, a means to the good end.
In this case it objectively is not. Death was not a means to the end of escaping the flames - if it were so, then they would have
had to die in order to escape pain, but if they had somehow miraculously survived, they still would have escaped pain. So it
is logically demonstrably true that they didn’t will their deaths as a means.
The subjective part that I can’t prove is whether or not they willed it as an end. But they’re literally no more likely to have done this on that day than any random passerby you’ve encountered on the street has on
this day, vz.
You can see the flaw in that logic right there “assume it”
We should not be assuming anything.
Yes, we should be. We should assume that for those people to die went against what they would have preferred if they could have controlled their situation. That’s not an unreasonable assumption to make.
Cartesian skepticism is just unnecessary here - and what’s worse, it really is, I think, insulting to those who perished on that day.
Actually, I have admitted that some may not have intended the end. Not that they all did not want to die. There is an important distinction there.
In one statement, I account for what I do not know. In the other there is an unreasonable assumption being made.
But you don’t understand which side of the distinction your argument falls on.
What you’ve suggested is that it’s possible for some of those people to have “taken into their own hands what is God’s” - i.e. the manner of their death. That is
not equivalent to “willing their own death as an end,” because to die wasn’t their ultimate goal, obviously.
Rather, your suggestion that it is possible that some of them may have “taken into their own hands what is God’s” - the manner of their death - is the suggestion that they may have “willed their own death as a means” - i.e. a means of escaping a more painful manner of death - burning and suffocating.
But here’s the key
I cannot know anyone’s intention. But I can gauge the
objective part of an action. And whether or not they willed their death as a means is one of the
objective criteria of double effect. It’s
not subject to what an individual thinks he or she is doing, but rather by the
objective structure of their moral act’s effects:
Either the foreseen evil effect and the foreseen good effect are both the results of their act.
Or the foreseen evil effect is the result of the foreseen good effect of the act.
Or the foreseen good effect is the result of the foreseen evil effect of the act.
In this case, the foreseen evil effect is death. The foreseen good effect is an escape from unbearable agony. The act is jumping out a window.
This
objectively meets the third criteria, regardless of intention, since
causally speaking, “death” - the foreseen evil effect - was
not a means to the good effect - “escape from pain.” In other words, “less pain” didn’t cause their deaths - jumping out the window did.
Thus,
no evil act or effect was willed as a means.
And since your suggestion that they could have taken the manner of their own death into their hands is a matter of means and not ends, you’re wrong to suggest that they could have sinned in this way.
And what of the third option? The one you seem unable to take?
The option that says some chose death for all of the wrong reasons??
As I explained above, your “third option” is simply equivalent to “willing their deaths as a means,” which
is one of the objective and not the subjective criteria of double effect.
That’s easy. I thought that my reference to Jack Kavorkian would have made that clear.
But you see, that’s just it! The Kevorkian attitude that you’re referencing is euthanasia to prevent suffering - in other words, willing one’s death as a means.
That
is objectively
not the case here. As I explain above, that criterion is one of the objective ones, since it’s based on the cause-and-effect structure of an act’s consequences.
If someone were to leap from a burning building with the intent of choosing their own end and removing the decision from God, that would be a sin.
Yes, but if their motive is to escape pain then it’s not suicide they’re intending, but rather simply to escape pain.
The only way such an act could still be suicide would be if they will their death not as an end, but as a means. That objectively is not the case with
these individuals, for the reasons explained above - that lack of pain is not the effect of death, but rather that both death and the lack of pain are results of jumping.
It’s a classic double effect scenario: the moral agent allows a potentially foreseen but
unwilled evil effect to occur for justifiable reasons.